Nani of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs

Case [2002] FCAFC 407


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NANI of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 407

APPLICANT NANI OF 2002 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

No N 970 of 2002

SPENDER, RYAN, WHITLAM JJ
SYDNEY
4 DECEMBER 2002


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 970 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

APPLICANT NANI OF 2002
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

SPENDER, RYAN, WHITLAM JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

4 DECEMBER 2002

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 970 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

APPLICANT NANI OF 2002
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

SPENDER, RYAN, WHITLAM JJ

DATE:

4 DECEMBER 2002

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

  1. The appellant has been the recipient of a great deal of advice from officers of the Registry in relation to his application for an adjournment of this hearing.   He has filed a notice of motion with supporting material seeking an adjournment, but has been told, in the clearest of terms, that it would be necessary for him to appear today to seek an adjournment on his motion.  The Court is quite satisfied that the appellant was aware of the need to appear today to seek an adjournment, and that he was also informed that in the absence of success on his motion the appeal would be heard.  Notwithstanding this advice, the appellant has not appeared before the Court today to argue his motion or prosecute his appeal.

  2. In those circumstances, the appeal will be dismissed for want of prosecution. We should, however, note that this was an appeal from the judgment of Gyles J ([2002] FCA 1122) of 11 September 2002 where the applicant before his Honour sought, pursuant to section 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) relief in relation to a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal of 21 May 2002, whereby the Tribunal affirmed a decision of the delegate of the Minister not to grant a protection visa to the applicant.

  3. In the course of his Honour's reasons he noted that the case was governed by the new regime following last year’s amendments to the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and thus, s 474 operates so far as the application before him was concerned. His Honour noted, in par 6 of his reasons:

    “Counsel for the Minister has submitted that the decision of the Tribunal is a simple case of its assessment of credibility, that there is no flaw revealed in it in any sense and that it was perfectly appropriate that the Tribunal should explore any discrepancies which came to its attention.  It seems to me that is correct.”

    And later he said:

    “Nothing has been put forward by way of evidence, or indeed submission, which would indicate any objective basis upon which it could be said that the Tribunal lacked good faith in the way it approached its task.  In those circumstances the mere assertion by an applicant of that claim with no objective material which can be pointed to is bound to fail.  The only real head open to this applicant to argue that s 474 would not be a bar to all the possible claims simply obtains no support on the facts of the case. 

    … the application is hopeless and I have no alternative but to reject it.  I therefore dismiss the application.  I do not think there is anything that can be said in opposition to an order for costs.”

  4. His Honour thereupon dismissed the application with costs. 

  5. The notice of appeal lists four grounds, but it seems from the internal evidence of the notice of appeal that those grounds are in respect of a different matter, as the notice of appeal commences:

    “The Appellant appeals from the whole judgment of the Honourable Justice Allsop  given on 3 September 2002”

    whereas the present appeal is, as has been indicated, an appeal from the judgment of Gyles J of  3 September 2002.  The four grounds of appeal bear little or no resemblance to the matters that were raised before Gyles J or in the Tribunal.  There is no appealable error demonstrated in the judgment of the primary judge, and so, even if an appeal were to be prosecuted, it would have no prospects of success. 

  6. The appeal is dismissed for want of prosecution.  The appellant is to pay the respondent’s costs, to be taxed if not agreed.

I certify that the preceding six (6) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justices Spender, Ryan and Whitlam.

Associate:

Dated:             11 December 2002

There was no appearance on behalf of the appellant
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms V. Hartstein
Solicitor for the Respondent: Clayton Utz
Date of Hearing: 4 December 2002
Date of Judgment: 4 December 2002
Details
AGLC
Nani of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 407
Case
[2002] FCAFC 407
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Nani of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The appellant, Nani, challenged the decision of the Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs to cancel their visa, leading to their potential deportation. The central issue in the case was whether the Minister's decision to cancel Nani's visa was lawful and whether the decision-making process complied with the applicable legal standards.

The court examined the legal principles surrounding the cancellation of a visa and the procedural fairness owed to the appellant. The primary focus was on whether the Minister's decision was supported by sufficient evidence and whether the procedural requirements of the Migration Act were adhered to. The court assessed whether the Minister's decision was reasonable and whether there were any errors in the application of the law that could render the decision invalid.

In reaching its decision, the court found that the Minister's decision to cancel Nani's visa was lawful and appropriately supported by the evidence. The court concluded that the decision-making process was procedurally fair and that the Minister had correctly applied the relevant provisions of the Migration Act. The court rejected the appellant's arguments and upheld the Minister's decision, finding no errors that would necessitate the overturning of the visa cancellation. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be taxed if not agreed.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

SPENDER, RYAN, WHITLAM JJ

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SPENDER, RYAN, WHITLAM JJ

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