Nandita RAGINI Naroth v Innovative Hair Loss Solutions Pty Ltd

[2014] HCASL 142

NANDITA RAGINI NAROTH

v

INNOVATIVE HAIR LOSS SOLUTIONS PTY LTD & ORS

[2014] HCASL 142
P14/2014

1. The applicant provided accounting and bookkeeping services to the first respondent under a service contract, which she claimed was repudiated by the first respondent in a series of emails containing false, malicious and harassing statements.  The applicant purported to accept that repudiation and to terminate the contract.  The first respondent rejected the applicant's entitlement to terminate the contract and claimed that the applicant was in breach of the contract.    

2. The applicant commenced proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia (now the Federal Circuit Court of Australia) claiming damages for breach of contract and for breaches of ss 51AC and 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ("TPA"). With minor exception, Lucev FM (as he then was) dismissed the applicant's claim and made certain adverse findings as to the applicant's credibility.

3. The applicant appealed to the Federal Court of Australia (Barker J), which dismissed her claim. The Court found that the applicant had failed to identify any error in Lucev FM's findings as to breach and repudiation of the contract, that there was a reasonable basis for the first respondent making the representation which the applicant alleged amounted to a breach of s 52 of the TPA and that there was no evidence to support a finding of unconscionability under s 51AC of the TPA. The Court also found that while it was unfortunate that findings of credit had been made under a separate heading, those findings were directed to why the applicant's interpretation of events should not be accepted in light of the totality of the evidence and were not strictly to the applicant's credit.

4. The applicant does not have legal representation. The application therefore falls to be dealt with under r 41.10 of the High Court Rules 2004.

5. The applicant seeks special leave to appeal from the decision of the Federal Court and leave to amend her application for special leave to appeal.  We would grant the applicant leave to amend her application under r 3.01, but dismiss the application for special leave. There is no basis for doubting the correctness of the decision of Barker J.  An appeal to this Court would enjoy insufficient prospects of success.  The application is dismissed.

6. Pursuant to r 41.10.5 we direct the Registrar to draw up, sign and seal an order dismissing the application.

V.M. Bell
15 August 2014 S.J. Gageler