Nand v Fuji Xerox Australia Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Nand v Fuji Xerox Australia Pty Ltd

[2015] FCAFC 51

Citation: Nand v Fuji Xerox Australia Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 51
Appeal from: Fuji Xerox Australia Pty Ltd v Nand [2014] FCCA 2793
Parties: SHARDA NAND v FUJI XEROX AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED
File number: NSD 8 of 2015
Judges: RARES, JAGOT AND GLEESON JJ
Date of judgment: 16 March 2015
Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – failure to specify or misstatement of statutory provision under which post‑judgment interest claimed in bankruptcy notice – whether Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) and prescribed form of bankruptcy notice made essential that there be no misdescription of such provision in bankruptcy notice – whether bankruptcy notice failed to meet essential requirement in Bankruptcy Act – whether misstatement or omission of correct statutory provision under which post-judgment claimed in bankruptcy notice was formal defect or irregularity within s 306(1) of the Bankruptcy Act – whether misstatement or omission capable of misleading debtor – meaning of “formal defect or irregularity” in s 306(1) of the Bankruptcy Act – whether misstatement or omission led to “substantial injustice”  
Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)
Bankruptcy Regulations 1996 (Cth)
Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW)
District Court Act 1973 (NSW)
Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW)
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW)
Cases cited: Adams v Lambert (2006) 228 CLR 409
Fuji Xerox Australia Pty Limited v Nand [2014] FCCA 2793
Jones v Verity [2007] FMCA 1108
Kleinwort Benson Australia Limited v Crowl (1988) 165 CLR 71
McKean Park (a firm) v Lawrence (2011) 199 FCR 514
Date of hearing: 16 March 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 22
Counsel  for the Appellant: Mr B Skinner
Solicitor for the Appellant: Bowles Lawyers Pty Ltd
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr EC Muston with Ms SF Cirillo
Solicitor for the Respondent: Polczynski Lawyers

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 8 of 2015

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SHARDA NAND
Appellant

AND:

FUJI XEROX AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED
Respondent

JUDGES:

RARES, JAGOT AND GLEESON JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

16 MARCH 2015

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 8 of 2015

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SHARDA NAND
Appellant

AND:

FUJI XEROX AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED
Respondent

JUDGES:

RARES, JAGOT AND GLEESON JJ

DATE:

16 MARCH 2015

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)

THE COURT:

  1. The sole question in this appeal is whether a failure to specify, or a misstatement of, the statutory provision under which post-judgment interest was claimed in a bankruptcy notice resulted in the invalidity of the notice.

  2. A judge of the Federal Circuit Court held that the failure to specify, or misstatement of…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCAFC 51
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Nand v Fuji Xerox Australia Pty Ltd was a case before the Federal Court of Australia that dealt with the validity of a bankruptcy notice due to an alleged misstatement of statutory provisions regarding post-judgment interest. The debtor, Nand, argued that the omission of the correct statutory reference in the bankruptcy notice rendered it invalid. Specifically, Nand contended that the notice incorrectly referred to a statutory rule instead of the relevant section of the Civil Procedure Act, which she argued was essential due to the prescribed form of the bankruptcy notice. Furthermore, Nand claimed that the misstatement could mislead her about the statutory basis for the post-judgment interest claim.

The legal issues before the court involved determining whether the failure to specify or the misstatement of the statutory provision under which post-judgment interest was claimed constituted a formal defect or irregularity within section 306(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). Additionally, the court had to decide whether such a defect or irregularity led to substantial injustice that could not be remedied by an order of the court. The court considered whether the misstatement or omission was capable of misleading the debtor about what was necessary to comply with the notice.

The court reasoned that a misdescription of the statutory provision under which post-judgment interest is claimed could be a formal defect or irregularity, but such an error does not necessarily invalidate a bankruptcy notice if it does not mislead the debtor about what is necessary to comply with the notice. The court held that misleading a debtor about what is necessary to comply with the notice takes the error outside the concept of a formal defect or irregularity. However, in this case, the misstatement of the statutory provision did not mislead the debtor about the necessary compliance requirements, and thus did not constitute substantial injustice. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 101(1) and (2) of the Civil Procedure Act relevantly provided:101 Interest after judgment(1)Unless the court orders otherwise, interest is payable on so much of the amount of a judgment (exclusive of any order for costs) as is from time to time unpaid.(2)Interest under subsection (1) is to be calculated, at the prescribed rate or at such other rate as the court may order, as from:(a) the date on which the judgment takes effect, or(b) such later date as the court may order.…Note. See section 136 in relation to the order in which payments on account of a judgment debt are to be appropriated. Rule 36.7 of the UCPR relevantly provided:36.7 Payment of interest(1)The prescribed rate at which interest is payable under section 101 of the Civil Procedure Act2005 is:(a)in respect of the period from 1 January to 30 June in any year – the rate that is 6% above the cash rate last published by the Reserve Bank of Australia before that period commenced, and(b)in respect of the period from 1 July to 31 December in any year – the rate that is 6% above the cash rate last published by the Reserve Bank of Australia before that period commenced. The Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) provided in s 3 that, in that Act, an “instrument” included a statutory rule made under an Act and s 21 defined a “statutory rule” as meaning a rule of court, as well as a regulation by-law, rule or ordinance that was made by the Governor of the State. The UCPR fall within that latter definition.The debtor’s submission The debtor argued that the omission of any reference to s 101 of the Civil Procedure Act rendered the notice a nullity on two bases. First, she contended, the prescription of Form 1 by the Regulations made it essential that the statutory source of a claim for post-judgment interest be correctly referred to in the bankruptcy notice itself and that in this matter the notice did not refer to any statute but only, and incorrectly, to a statutory rule under which post-judgment interest was payable. Secondly, she contended, the failure to refer to s 101 in the notice was reasonably capable of misleading her because that section provided the sole legislative basis upon which post-judgment interest was payable.Consideration The question for decision is whether the notice either failed to meet a requirement made essential by the Bankruptcy Act or could reasonably have misled the debtor as to what was necessary to comply with the notice: Adams v Lambert (2006) 228 CLR 409 at 419 [25] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ. A bankruptcy notice is a proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act for the purposes of 306: Adams 228 CLR at 415 [17]. There are two issues that must be addressed under s 306(1), first, whether a failure to comply is a formal defect or an irregularity and, secondly, if it is, whether substantial injustice has been caused by the defect or irregularity and whether that injustice cannot be remedied by an order of the Court. Only the first issue arises on this appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The debtor argued that the omission of any reference to s 101 of the Civil Procedure Act rendered the notice a nullity on two bases. First, she contended, the prescription of Form 1 by the Regulations made it essential that the statutory source of a claim for post-judgment interest be correctly referred to in the bankruptcy notice itself and that in this matter the notice did not refer to any statute but only, and incorrectly, to a statutory rule under which post-judgment interest was payable. Secondly, she contended, the failure to refer to s 101 in the notice was reasonably capable of misleading her because that section provided the sole legislative basis upon which post-judgment interest was payable.Consideration The question for decision is whether the notice either failed to meet a requirement made essential by the Bankruptcy Act or could reasonably have misled the debtor as to what was necessary to comply with the notice: Adams v Lambert (2006) 228 CLR 409 at 419 [25] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ. A bankruptcy notice is a proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act for the purposes of 306: Adams 228 CLR at 415 [17]. There are two issues that must be addressed under s 306(1), first, whether a failure to comply is a formal defect or an irregularity and, secondly, if it is, whether substantial injustice has been caused by the defect or irregularity and whether that injustice cannot be remedied by an order of the Court. Only the first issue arises on this appeal. A misdescription of the section number of the Act under which post-judgment interest is claimed is a formal defect or irregularity under s 306(1) that does not invalidate a bankruptcy notice, as is an erroneous statement of the amount of interest owing on a judgment debt: Adams 228 CLR 418 [24]. The Court said in Adams 228 CLR 419 at [27]:If, as in the present case, what is in question is an error in the form of a misdescription of a statutory provision, then a consideration of the general purpose of the Act, and the particular purpose of the legislative scheme relating to bankruptcy notices, leads readily to a conclusion that if the error could reasonably mislead a debtor as to what is necessary to comply with the notice it is not merely a formal defect or irregularity. Any error is capable of misleading somebody about something. When the respondent saw the bankruptcy notice in this case he may well have concluded that s 83A was the section of the District Court Act dealing with post-judgment interest. In that respect, he would have been misled. When Mr Crowl read the bankruptcy notice in his case, he might have been given the temporary satisfaction of believing that his debt was $23,000 less than was in fact owing. In that respect, he would have been misled. (A debtor who receives a notice involving an overstatement of a kind expressly relieved against by s 41(5) of the Act might receive a very unpleasant surprise.) What this Court regarded as relevant to s 306, however, was misleading a debtor about what is necessary to comply with the notice. That kind of misleading, the Court said, takes an error outside the concept of a formal defect or irregularity. However, that is not the full extent of the exclusion. (emphasis added)