Nalpantidis v Stark - [1996] HCATrans 241

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Adelaide No A15 of 1996

B e t w e e n -
CON NALPANTIDIS
Applicant
and
ANDREW STARK

Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

DAWSON J

GAUDRON J
KIRBY J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT ADELAIDE ON WEDNESDAY, 14 AUGUST 1996, AT 2.52 PM

MR D.M. QUICK, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR M.J. KERNOT, for the applicant. (instructed by Palios Meegan & Nicholson)

MR T.A. GRAY, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with MR M.C. LIVESEY, for the respondent. (instructed by Ward & Partners)

DAWSON J: Mr Quick.

MR QUICK: For the purpose of this application, the Court should have an appeal book and, as well, an agreed book of cases, together with an outline of submissions by myself on behalf of the applicant and also one by my learned friends, Mr Gray and Mr Livesey, for the respondent.

DAWSON J: Yes.

MR QUICK: The facts giving rise to this application are as follows: on 27 June 1990 the plaintiff and ‑ ‑ ‑

DAWSON J: We have read the papers and we know the facts, Mr Quick, if that saves you time.

MR QUICK: It certainly does.

KIRBY J: Accident in Victoria - South Australian plaintiff. That is the essence of it.

MR QUICK: As well, South Australian defendant; South Australian registered and insured vehicle; no other vehicle involved; no connection with Victoria, save for the fact that the accident actually happened there.

DAWSON J: Very well.

MR QUICK: One other matter: it was a very short trip - surfing trip, actually, into Victoria for the day and the plaintiff and the defendant were on the way back to Port Macdonnell in South Australia when the accident occurred and, as I have said, not involving any other vehicle.

The defendant, in answer to the proceedings, objected that there was no common law entitlement. Proceedings were instituted in the District Court of Adelaide and the defendant objected that there was no common law entitlement in Victoria having regard, in particular, to section 93 of the Transport Accident Act 1986 of Victoria. The judge, before whom the matter came, referred the matters for the opinion of the Full Court of the Supreme Court by means of a case stated and by a majority of two to one, the court answered certain questions, and I will come to the findings of the court immediately.

May I take the Court to the application book at page 50 and to the bottom of the page? This page is part of the reasons for decision of Chief Justice Doyle with whom Justice Bollen agreed. At line 43, the very bottom of the page, his Honour held:

The plaintiff, on the facts in the Case Stated, has no right under Victorian law to claim damages for his injury. Or, to put it more precisely,…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Nalpantidis v Stark

Details

AGLC: Nalpantidis v Stark [1996] HCATrans 241
Case: [1996] HCATrans 241
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of *Nalpantidis v Stark* concerned a dispute between the plaintiff, Nalpantidis, and the defendant, Stark, heard before the High Court of Australia. The core of the disagreement revolved around the interpretation and application of certain provisions within the *Motor Accidents Act 1988* (NSW).

The High Court was required to determine whether the plaintiff's claim for damages for economic loss was barred by the provisions of the *Motor Accidents Act 1988* (NSW), specifically in relation to the threshold requirements for claiming such damages. A key legal issue was whether the plaintiff had suffered a "serious injury" as defined by the Act, which is a prerequisite for claiming damages for non-economic loss and, by extension, certain types of economic loss.

The Court analysed the legislative intent behind the *Motor Accidents Act 1988* (NSW), noting its purpose was to limit claims for damages arising from motor vehicle accidents. Dawson, Gaudron and Kirby JJ applied the principles of statutory interpretation to the relevant sections of the Act, considering previous High Court decisions on the meaning of "serious injury" in the context of economic loss. They concluded that the plaintiff's injuries did not meet the statutory threshold for a "serious injury" and therefore their claim for economic loss was unsustainable under the Act.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the lower court and dismissing the plaintiff's claim.

Orders