NAHN v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NAHN v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 513

NAHN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
N 7 of 2003

JACOBSON J
26 MAY 2003
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N7 of 2003

BETWEEN:

NAHN
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

JACOBSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

26 MAY 2003

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1The application be dismissed.

2The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the proceedings. 

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N7 of 2003

BETWEEN:

NAHN
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

JACOBSON J

DATE:

26 MAY 2003

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the RRT”) handed down on 10 December 2002 affirming a decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the applicant a protection visa.  The decision of the delegate was given on 29 September 2000.

  2. The applicant is a citizen of Bangladesh.  He claimed to have a well-founded fear of persecution on the ground of imputed political opinions.

    The Applicant’s Claims

  3. The applicant’s claimed fear of persecution arose from what he said was his close association with Taslima Nasreen (“Ms Nasreen”), a feminist author whose writings and statements provoked death threats from some Islamic groups in the early 1990s and who left Bangladesh for Europe in 1994. 

  4. The applicant claimed that Ms Nasreen appointed him as her local book distributor in 1992 and that he feared attacks from fanatical religious groups as a result of his association with Ms Nasreen.  He pointed to examples of this including the burning of his bookstall as well as a violent attack on him and his employees in November 1999.

  5. The applicant also said that he had organised a demonstration on 3 December 1999 at which the procession was attacked by fanatical Muslim students and that the procession turned into a riot at which some of the protesters were injured.

  6. The applicant said that he had left Bangladesh in December 1999 but that he had returned in April 2000 only to find that the situation had not improved.  He said that the police and other fanatical groups were looking for him in order to kill him.

    The decision of the RRT

  7. The RRT was of the view that significant aspects of the applicant’s evidence were confused, internally inconsistent and inconsistent with independent evidence.  The RRT did not consider that the applicant was a credible or reliable witness.  It was of the view that the applicant fabricated his claims in order to create the profile of a refugee to support his application for a protection visa.

  8. The RRT rejected the applicant’s claim that he was…

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Details
Case
[2003] FCA 513
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case before the court involved an applicant challenging the decisions of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) in relation to his refugee status. The applicant appeared in person and made no substantive additions to his written submissions, focusing instead on the RRT's factual findings and the lack of evidence obtained from Ms Nasreen. The applicant sought to challenge the factual findings of the RRT, which the court noted is not within the function of the Court on an application for judicial review. Consequently, this part of the applicant's challenge failed.

The applicant also attempted to rely on the High Court decision in Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal to argue that there was a denial of procedural fairness. However, the court found that the applicant had not provided evidence to prove that the documents in question were not before the RRT or that he had been misled. The court cited the Full Court's observation in NADR v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs that an applicant must provide evidence to support the facts claimed to bring themselves within the Muin principle. As the applicant failed to do so, his attempt to invoke Muin was dismissed.

The court further clarified that Muin does not establish that sending certain letters would amount to a denial of procedural fairness if the RRT did not refer to the documents in its decision. The later decision in Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Lam confirmed that an applicant must show reliance to their disadvantage on RRT communications before a question of procedural fairness arises.

The court dismissed the application and ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs of the proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1 The application be dismissed.

2 The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the proceedings.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

JACOBSON J
The applicant appeared in person and he did not add to the written submissions in any substantive way. He did refer to the RRT’s factual findings and he relied upon the failure of the RRT to obtain evidence from Ms Nasreen.Decision The first part of the applicant’s written submissions sought to challenge the factual findings of the RRT. It is well established that this is not the function of the Court on an application for judicial review. Accordingly, the first ground of review must fail. In the second part of his written submissions, the applicant contended that the circumstances in this case were similar to those which the High Court found in Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal (2002) 190 ALR 601 to amount to a denial of procedural fairness. However, as a Full Court observed in NADR v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 293, the decision in Muin turned on agreed facts and it is necessary for an applicant to provide evidence in support of those facts in order to bring himself or herself within the Muin principle. Here, the applicant did not seek to prove that the Part B documents were not before the RRT. Nor did he seek to prove that he had been misled. The applicant’s attempt to invoke the decision in Muin must therefore be dismissed for the reasons stated by Kiefel J in NADR at [25] as follows:-“At a factual level the present case differs substantially from Muin. It is not agreed that the documents were not physically provided to the Tribunal. It is not agreed that the appellant was misled by the letter, or that he would have taken any particular steps had he been told, if it was the case, that the Tribunal had not been provided with them. It was submitted that the Part B documents can be seen to relate to the appellant’s case. So much can be expected. Beyond that the appellant sought to utilise the findings of fact in Muin to make out his case. Needless to say, that is not a course which is open. Each case must be considered on its own facts.” See also to the same effect the following remarks of Hely J in NADZ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 118 at [14]:-“As the Full Court made plain in NADR v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 293 at par [24] Muin does not establish that the sending of letters in terms of the letter of 12 August 2002 would amount to a denial of procedural fairness in circumstances where the RRT has not referred to the Part B documents in its later decision. Rather, Muin holds that there is a want of procedural fairness where an applicant before the RRT is misled into thinking that the RRT has considered particular relevant information favourable to the applicant, and as a result, the applicant does not ensure that such information is placed before the RRT, or drawn to its attention. The later decision of the High Court in Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Lam (2003) HCA 6, confirms that an applicant in a case such as the present must show that he relied to his disadvantage upon communications from the RRT before there is any question of a want of procedural fairness.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: JACOBSON J