Nagrint v Ship Regis - [1939] HCA 6

THE SHIP REGIS, FORMERLY THE SHIP High Court-Admirally jurisdiction-Action in rem against ship-Personal injury

to passenger-Improper navigation-Injury caused by ship-Admirally Court Act 1861 (24 &25 Vict. c. 10), sec. 7-Colonial Courts of Admirally Act 1890 (53 &54 Vict. c. 27), sec. 2 (2)-Maritime Conventions Act 1911 (1 &2 Geo. V. 1938,

c. 57), sec. 5-Navigation Act 1912-1935 (No. 4 of 1913-No. 30 of 1935), sec. 1939,

The High Court of Australia in its admiralty jurisdiction has jurisdiction to adjudicate on a claim by a passenger against the vessel carrying him for negligent navigation resulting in personal injury to him caused by the capsizing of the vessel, and this is so notwithstanding that the casualty was not an incident of inter-State trade. SUIT.

In an action brought in the admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court the plaintiff, Lorna Ellen Irene Nagrint, claimed to recover the sum of £400 against the ship Regis, formerly known as the ship Rodney, "for damage done by the said ship which by reason of the negligence of the master and owner thereof in Port Jackson on 13th February 1938 occasioned personal injuries to and otherwise damni- fied the plaintiff."

An appearance to the action was entered by Charles Henry Rosman, who, in an affidavit, swore that he was the owner of the defendant ship.

61 CLR 689

OF AUSTRALIA, The statement of claim filed on behalf of the plaintiff was substan- tially as follows :-

1. The plaintiff is an infant within the age of 21 years and sues herein by her duly appointed next friend Cordy Nagrint of Rockdale, near Sydney, New South Wales.

2. On 13th February 1938, the ship Regis, then known as the ship Rodney, was a ship owned and controlled and in the care and management of one Charles Henry Rosman.

3. Rosman then was and still remained a British subject. 4. The said ship was at the date of the commencement of the action known as the ship Regis and was still owned by Rosman.

5. On 13th February 1938 the plaintiff promised to pay to Rosman a certain sum in consideration that he would carry her on the said ship on the waters of Port Jackson in order that she might view the United States of America cruiser Louisville proceed outward from the port of Sydney to sea.

6. In pursuance of that agreement the plaintiff embarked on the Rodney on 13th February 1938.

7. Rosman then and at all material times was the master of the Rodney.

8. The ship thereupon proceeded to follow the cruiser referred to above and at all material times both vessels were being navigated in waters of Port Jackson ordinarily used by ships engaged in trade and commerce with other countries.

9. At a certain time the Rodney negligently and improperly approached SO close to the cruiser that it became necessary in order to avoid a collision between the Rodney and the cruiser for the Rodney to alter her…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Nagrint v Ship Regis

Details

AGLC: Nagrint v Ship Regis [1939] HCA 6
Case: [1939] HCA 6
Decision Date: 28 March 1939

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Nagrint v Ship Regis*, the plaintiff, an infant suing by her next friend, brought an action in rem against the ship Regis (formerly Rodney) in the admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court of Australia. The plaintiff alleged that on 13 February 1938, while a passenger on the ship in Port Jackson, she suffered personal injuries and damage to her apparel when the vessel, due to the negligent navigation of its master and owner, capsized while attempting to avoid a collision with another ship. The defendant owner denied the allegations and contended that the statement of claim did not disclose a cause of action within the admiralty jurisdiction, particularly for a proceeding in rem.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the plaintiff's claim for personal injuries, caused by the negligent navigation and subsequent capsizing of the vessel in which she was a passenger, fell within the admiralty jurisdiction of the court, thereby permitting an action in rem against the ship. This question required the court to consider the scope of the admiralty jurisdiction as conferred by Imperial statutes, specifically section 7 of the Admiralty Court Act 1861, and its application to claims for personal injury not arising from collision or damage to property.

Dixon J. held that the High Court, as a Colonial Court of Admiralty, possessed jurisdiction to entertain the claim. His Honour reasoned that section 7 of the Admiralty Court Act 1861, which grants jurisdiction over "any claim for damage done by any ship," has been authoritatively interpreted to include claims for personal injuries. The court applied the principle that the damage must be "done by the ship" as an active agent or "noxious instrument," distinguishing this from damage merely occurring on or in connection with the ship. In this case, the negligent navigation causing the ship to capsize and injure the plaintiff was considered damage inflicted by the ship as an active agent. Therefore, the court concluded that proceedings in rem lay against the ship Regis. The court ordered that upon the facts alleged in the statement of claim, proceedings in rem lay against the ship Regis, and awarded the plaintiff her costs in the cause.

Orders