NACB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NACB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 236

APPLICANT NACB OF 2001 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

No N 142 of 2002

SPENDER, MOORE, KIEFEL JJ
SYDNEY
14 AUGUST 2002


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 142 OF 2002

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

APPLICANT NACB of 2001
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

SPENDER, MOORE, KIEFEL JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

14 AUGUST 2002

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 142 OF 2002

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

APPLICANT NACB of 2001
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

SPENDER, MOORE, KIEFEL JJ

DATE:

14 AUGUST 2002

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of a judge of the Court, Stone J, given on 6 February 2002 dismissing an application for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”). On 25 October 2001, the Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the respondent, which decision was made nearly four years before on 27 November 1997, refusing the appellant a protection visa.

  2. When the appeal was called on this morning there was no appearance by or on behalf of the appellant.  The Court notes that the appellant was informed by letter dated 27 May 2002 that the appeal would be listed for hearing here on Wednesday, 14 August 2002 at 10.15 am, yet the appellant has not sought to prosecute his appeal.  For that reason the appeal should be dismissed.  Notwithstanding that, the Court has carefully looked at the material the subject of the present appeal.

  3. The appellant is a national of Bangladesh.  He arrived in Australia on 2 September 1997 after informing the Australian High Commissioner in Dhaka that he wanted to come to Australia to take part in martial arts shows.  He claimed to fear persecution in Bangladesh from the Awami League because of his membership of a political party called the Freedom Party which he joined in 1989.  At the Tribunal hearing, the appellant further claimed that he feared harm because “he had been an opponent of drug users and suppliers”. 

    The Tribunal’s Decision

  4. In making its decision on the application for the protection visa, the Tribunal considered the application, a departmental interview, oral evidence given to the Tribunal on 7 December 1999 and the appellant’s written submissions responding to updated independent country information concerning the political situation in Bangladesh that the Tribunal had sent to the appellant.  The Tribunal noted that…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCAFC 236
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of NACB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs involves a Bangladeshi national who sought a protection visa in Australia. The appellant, a martial arts enthusiast, claimed to fear persecution in Bangladesh due to his membership in the Freedom Party and opposition to drug use. The Refugee Review Tribunal rejected his application, finding his claims implausible and unsupported by credible evidence. The appellant challenged the Tribunal's decision in the Federal Court, raising the issue of actual bias in the Tribunal's findings.

The legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal's decision was subject to judicial review, given the privative clause in the relevant legislation. The court recognised the challenge as a privative clause decision, which limits the scope of judicial review. The court had to determine whether the appellant's claim of actual bias was substantiated, a question that would only be considered if the bias claim was valid. The court concluded that the claim of actual bias could not be substantiated, and therefore, there was no need to address the issue of judicial review under the privative clause.

Justice Stone dismissed the appeal, finding no actual bias in the Tribunal's decision. The court held that the appellant's allegations of wrongful findings regarding his credibility and the lack of forensic examination of his documents did not substantiate a claim of actual bias. As the claim of bias failed, the court did not need to explore the extent of judicial review under the privative clause. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs.

In summary, the Federal Court upheld the Tribunal's rejection of the appellant's protection visa application. The court found no actual bias in the Tribunal's decision and dismissed the appeal. The appellant's claims of persecution were deemed implausible, and the court did not need to address the issue of judicial review under the privative clause. The appellant was also ordered to pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

SPENDER, MOORE, KIEFEL JJ
The appellant is a national of Bangladesh. He arrived in Australia on 2 September 1997 after informing the Australian High Commissioner in Dhaka that he wanted to come to Australia to take part in martial arts shows. He claimed to fear persecution in Bangladesh from the Awami League because of his membership of a political party called the Freedom Party which he joined in 1989. At the Tribunal hearing, the appellant further claimed that he feared harm because “he had been an opponent of drug users and suppliers”. The Tribunal’s Decision In making its decision on the application for the protection visa, the Tribunal considered the application, a departmental interview, oral evidence given to the Tribunal on 7 December 1999 and the appellant’s written submissions responding to updated independent country information concerning the political situation in Bangladesh that the Tribunal had sent to the appellant. The Tribunal noted that the appellant had lived in Narayangonj in Bangladesh for 20 years before leaving for Australia. The Tribunal also noted that the appellant had a university degree and had owned a trading business for some years. Having considered the material before it, the Tribunal found that the appellant had fabricated claims to substantiate his application for a protection visa. It stated: “I am not satisfied that there is credibility in the applicant’s claims regarding his political situation, and the general political situation in Bangladesh.” The Tribunal regarded as implausible the claim that the appellant became leader of the Freedom Party in his village at the age of fifteen so soon after having joined the Freedom Party but stated that:“Even if I were to accept this fanciful claim, I find it implausible that he faced, or would face persecution from either of the major parties or that he lacks the protection of relevant authorities in Bangladesh for holding a political opinion sympathetic to the [Freedom Party].” The Tribunal was also not convinced that the appellant’s supporting documentation was genuine. The Tribunal summarised its conclusions:“In light of all of the above, I am not satisfied that the applicant faces persecution over his political opinion in Bangladesh: it is implausible that a person with his claimed low-profile role would be a source of concern to rival parties and be thus targeted by them, and even in the unlikely instance that he had been targeted, I find that the authorities of Bangladesh are willing and able to offer him protection from harm.” The Application for Review As Justice Stone recognised, the decision under challenge is a privative clause decision within the meaning of s 474 of the Act. The appellant was represented by counsel at the hearing before the primary judge, and the only ground of review raised on the appellant’s behalf at that hearing was actual bias constituting jurisdictional error. The particulars in support of this ground allege wrongful findings by the Tribunal as to the credibility of the appellant and the absence of independent forensic expert examination of the appellant’s documents to determine their authenticity. Her Honour said at [15]:“The Court’s jurisdiction to review such decisions is severely limited by the provisions in s 474 and s 476 of the Act. While the principle enunciated by Dixon J in R v Hickman; ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598 suggests that there remains some scope for review, the extent of this jurisdiction has yet to be determined. As I have formed the view that the claim of actual bias cannot be substantiated it is not necessary for me to comment on this issue.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SPENDER, MOORE, KIEFEL JJ