FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NABC v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2003] FCA 38
MIGRATION – documents provided by applicants to respondent not sent by respondent to Refugee Review Tribunal – whether Refugee Review Tribunal had access to documents – whether facts distinguishable from Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal - documents available on Internet - privative clause decision
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 474
Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001 (Cth)
Migration Legislation Amendment (Procedural Fairness) Act 2002 (Cth)NAAV v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 228 applied
Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal [2002] HCA 30; 76 ALJR 966 distinguished
Rippon v Chilcotin Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 198 distinguished
Lie v Refugee Review Tribunal [2002] HCA 30; 76 ALJR 966
NABM of 2001 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 294 referred to
VAAR of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 252 referred to
NADD of 2001 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 275 cited
NADR v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 293 citedNABC v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
N 1494 of 2001
BRANSON J
3 FEBRUARY 2003
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 1494 of 2001
BETWEEN:
NABC
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
BRANSON J
DATE OF ORDER:
3 FEBRUARY 2003
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT the application be dismissed.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 1494 of 2001
BETWEEN:
NABC
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
BRANSON J
DATE:
3 FEBRUARY 2003
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
The applicants, who are father and son, seek judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) made on 21 September 2001 whereby the Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the respondent not to grant them protection visas.
A Further Amended Application filed on 19 November 2002 identified three grounds upon which the application to this Court is made. The first two grounds were only formally relied upon as they are drawn on the assumption that NAAV v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 228 (‘NAAV v MIMIA’) is wrongly decided. The applicants, by their counsel, recognised that the Court is bound to dismiss the application to the extent that it is supported by these grounds. The applicants formally submitted that NAAV v MIMIA is wrongly decided, including on constitutional grounds. However, they recognise that sitting as a single judge, I am bound by the construction of s 474 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘the Act’) adopted by the majority of the Full Court in NAAV v MIMA.
The third ground of the application is as follows:
‘3. The Tribunal’s decision is void, and respondent is estopped from contending otherwise,…
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- Case
- [2003] FCA 38
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the applicants' argument that the delay in the Tribunal's decision-making process, coupled with the principles established in Muin and MIMA v Bhardwaj, should render the decision void. The court further considered whether section 474, despite its focus on the status of decisions, impacted the applicants' claims of estoppel and abuse of process. The applicants relied on Rippon v Chilcotin Pty Ltd to support their argument that the Minister's conduct constituted an abuse of process and an estoppel. The court had to determine if the cited Full Court decisions aligned with the applicants' arguments, given that none of those cases involved evidence placing the applicants within the scope of the Muin decision or addressed the specific arguments presented.
In its reasoning, the court held that the enactment of section 474 did not affect the applicants' claims. The court noted that section 474 addressed the status of decisions rather than the conduct of parties in litigation. Consequently, the court concluded that section 474 did not remedy the procedural flaws that would otherwise render the decision void or subject to an estoppel. The Full Court decisions cited by the applicants did not support their claims as they did not involve the same evidentiary basis or arguments presented in this case. The court found that the applicants' submissions were not consistent with the established legal principles.
The final orders of the court were that the applicants' claims were not supported by the legal framework, and the decision in question remained valid. The court dismissed the application on the grounds that the amendments, including section 474, did not alter the legal position that would have rendered the decision void under the previous law.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: BRANSON J
The submissions of the applicants were summarised in the applicants’ outline of their written submissions in the following way:‘8.But for the fact that the Tribunal, which having taken 17 months to determine the review, and despite having “made” its decision on 21 September 2001, delayed handing down its decision under 16 October 2001, this application would be on all fours with Muin.9.Pursuant to Muin and MIMA v Bhardwaj (2002) 76 ALJR 598, the decision would have been void.10.Moreover, by reason of his being bound by those decisions, the Minister would have been estopped and it would have been an abuse of process for the Minister to content that this decision was other than void: cf Rippon v Chilcotin Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 198.11.The central question then is in what manner if at all has the enactment of the amendments accompanying the insertion of s474 into the Act changed the position that would formerly have applied?12.The repeal of former s476(2) precluding review by reason of a breach of natural justice confirms that the defect identified in Muin is one from which the Federal Court is not precluded.13.Does s474 itself make any difference to this result? There is a short reason why it does not.14.Section 474 is directed to the status of decisions, not to the conduct of parties to litigation. There is nothing in s474 to cure conduct by the Minister in defending litigation that would otherwise be an abuse of process or subject to an estoppel.15.It may be suggested that this conclusion is inconsistent with several Full Court decisions namely VAAR of 2002 v MIMIA [2002] FCAFC 252, NADD of 2001 v MIMIA [2002] FCAFC 275 and NADR v MIMA [2002] FCAFC 293, to which the answer is:(a)first, none of those decisions are decisions where the applicant adduced evidence bringing him or her within what was held by Muin;(b)secondly, in none of those decisions does it appear that the foregoing argument was put.’CONSIDERATION Rippon v Chilcotin Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 198, upon which the applicants place reliance, concerned a proceeding instituted in the District Court of New South Wales with respect to a transaction that had been the subject of an earlier proceeding in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. Handley JA, with whom Mason P and Heydon JA agreed, at 203-205 observed:‘The present proceedings are an attempt to litigate or re-litigate issues which were either decided in or are barred by the earlier proceedings. In substance … the purchasers are attempting to re-litigate the issue of reliance on the 1991 figures which they lost.…The substance of the matter therefore is clear. The purchasers, disappointed with their bargain, sued their vendor in contract and in misrepresentation. They lost their case in misrepresentation and were disappointed with their modest recovery in contract. A few weeks before the expiration of the limitation period they sued the accountants for what is in substance the same misrepresentations. In the first proceedings they had to prove that they relied upon those misrepresentations. This turned on the evidence of Mr Hoefl, the contemporary documents, and the surrounding circumstances. The purchasers lost that issue and seek to re-litigate it against the accountants on substantially the same evidence in the hope that this time Mr Hoefl will be believed.…There is no question here of oppression and unfairness because the accountants were not parties to the earlier action, but these proceedings do threaten the integrity of the administration of justice and raise the prospect of conflicting judgments.In my opinion therefore these proceedings are an abuse of process … .’