MZZPE v Minister for Immigration
[2014] FCCA 1990
•1 September 2014
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| MZZPE v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2014] FCCA 1990 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Refugee Review Tribunal – whether various interpreting errors could have affected the quality of the hearing or the Tribunal’s findings and reasons. |
| Cases cited: SZRMQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2013) 219 FCR 212; (2013) 139 ALD 436; [2013] FCAFC 142 SZSEI v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 465 |
| Applicant: | MZZPE |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File number: | MLG 1138 of 2013 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Riley |
| Hearing date: | 7 July 2014 |
| Date of last submission: | 7 July 2014 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Delivered on: | 1 September 2014 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | The applicant appeared in person |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | The applicant was not represented |
| Counsel for the First Respondent: | Graeme Hill |
| Solicitors for the First Respondent: | Sparke Helmore |
| Counsel for the Second Respondent: | No appearance |
| Solicitors for the Second Respondent: | Sparke Helmore |
ORDERS
The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal handed down on 1 July 2013 in matter number 1303923 be set aside.
The matter be remitted to the Refugee Review Tribunal for determination according to law.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
MLG1138 of 2013
| MZZPE |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
This is an application for review of a decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal. The Tribunal affirmed a decision made by the second respondent’s delegate refusing the applicant a protection visa.
The applicant’s claims
The applicant claimed that:
a)he is a Hazara Shia from Afghanistan;
b)he took his daughter to a psychiatrist in Herat who prescribed certain medication;
c)it made the child drowsy, caused her to fall over, made her unable to speak and caused her teeth to blacken and fall out;
d)a doctor in India said that the medication was too strong for the girl;
e)the applicant told the psychiatrist he intended to lodge a complaint about him;
f)the psychiatrist laughed at the applicant;
g)the applicant attempted to lodge a complaint at the Herat Security Centre but one of the officers told the applicant not to waste his time as the psychiatrist was a well known Pashtun;
h)the applicant obtained a court order against the psychiatrist and he was taken to the headquarters;
i)the police officers there greeted the psychiatrist with respect while he swore at the applicant and abused him;
j)the officers said that the psychiatrist was a renowned and well-respected professional who the applicant had dishonoured with his complaint;
k)the applicant said that he would complain to the Ministry of Health;
l)the psychiatrist said to the applicant, in front of the officers:
i)“I will get you in Jaghori or wherever you are.”
ii)the applicant had to withdraw his complaint if he wanted to protect himself; and
iii)the psychiatrist was a man of influence in the government as well as with the Taliban and if the applicant went to Jaghori or Qala-e-khoskh (Pashtun operated areas) he would contact his people (the Taliban) and they would sort the applicant out;
m)the applicant returned to his shop in Jaghori;
n)two months later, a taxi driver told the applicant that, when he was on his way to Jaghori, the Taliban had stopped him to ask about passengers with silver plated teeth;
o)the applicant immediately went to a dentist and had his silver plated teeth replaced with natural looking teeth;
p)the applicant began to receive telephone calls, asking for his details;
q)one caller said that he knew where the applicant lived, where his house was and that he would get him; and
r)the applicant sold his shop and hurriedly left Afghanistan.
The Tribunal’s reasons
The Tribunal accepted that the applicant had had a dispute with a Pashtun doctor about the treatment of his daughter and that the authorities did little to assist, partly for reasons of the ethnic divide between the applicant on the one hand and the doctor and the authorities on the other.
However, the Tribunal did not accept that the doctor was so affected by the applicant’s limited claims that he threatened to get the applicant or used his influence with the Taliban to make them seek out and harm the applicant. The Tribunal found that the applicant did not face a real risk of serious or significant harm in the reasonably foreseeable future arising from his dispute with the doctor.
The Tribunal also considered and rejected various other claims made by the applicant that are not relevant to the arguments advanced.
Procedural history
The applicant has not been represented at any time in this court.
At the first directions hearing, on 2 October 2013, the Registrar set this matter down for a show cause hearing before Judge Burchardt on
4 December 2013. On that day, the applicant raised issues concerning the interpretation of certain statements made at the hearing before the Tribunal. On 4 December 2013, Judge Burchardt adjourned the show cause hearing and ordered the first respondent to obtain a transcript of the Tribunal hearing verified by an independent, accredited interpreter. That transcript was produced and annexed to the affidavit sworn by Ahmad Farhan on 20 March 2014. On 4 April 2014, by consent, orders were made dispensing with the show cause hearing and listing the matter for final hearing.
Ground of review: interpreting errors
The only ground of review in the application filed on 24 July 2013 is:
1.The decision of the Tribunal:
(a)is affected by an error of law; and
(b)denied the applicant procedural fairness.
The applicant indicated to the court that what he meant in relation to that ground was that there were two significant interpreting errors at the hearing before the Tribunal. The Full Court of the Federal Court has recently considered the issue of interpreting errors in the context of an independent merits reviewer’s recommendation. In SZRMQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2013) 219 FCR 212; (2013) 139 ALD 436; [2013] FCAFC 142, Allsop CJ said:
9. The question whether standards of interpretation have affected a hearing as an opportunity to be heard is a question of evaluation as to whether the hearing was fair. That in turn involves the recognition of the purpose of the hearing: to give the person concerned or affected by the exercise of power a real opportunity to place before the repository of the power such information as is relevant. This will require a substantially effective mechanism of communicating oral and written information, both from, and to, the person. To the extent that interpretation or translation is necessary, it must be adequate to convey the substance of what is said, to a degree that the hearing can be described both as real and fair. It will be a matter of evaluation in all the circumstances, by reference to the issues, the nature of the evidence, the character and frequency of any proven errors in interpretation, and any other factor apparently relevant to the quality of the communication, as to whether the hearing was fair. Relevant to the task will be how the decision-maker approached the resolution of the task before her or him.
10.How the decision-maker approached the matter may be critical. If an error of interpretation or translation can be seen to lead to a material and adverse finding relevant to a decision against the person, the unfairness of the hearing is self-evident. It may not be possible, however, to show how one or more inaccuracies affected the decision, since it will often be impossible to show what the decision-maker would have done with different information. This is especially so if the decision is based in part, or in whole, on credit. It is at this point that the focus upon the process becomes important. The enquiry is not to investigate, and the applicant’s burden is not to establish, a precise causal link between any irregularity and an adverse result, but to assess whether the decision-making process (including the hearing and the making of the decision) was fair. Even if one cannot show an operative causal influence of any irregularity upon the decision, it may still be that the irregularity might reasonably have had such an effect through its materiality or repetition or context. Any such conclusion may affect the legitimacy of the process in that it may not be able to be concluded that it was fair. Such may be expressed as requiring the appearance of a fair hearing… . It can, in this context of adequacy of communication through interpretation, be perhaps better expressed as requiring that the hearing be fair. How, it might be asked rhetorically, can a hearing be described as fair, when it can be shown that real and potentially material errors of substance occurred in interpreting or translating a person’s version of events to a decision-maker, being errors that may well have affected the decision in a real way, though such causal effect cannot be demonstrated one way or another?
11.That rhetorical question should not be taken as intended to encapsulate any complete evaluative principle. Fairness of the process will fall to be judged by reference to the particular circumstances. In some circumstances, the interpretation may be so inadequate as to deny the fact of any hearing. In such circumstances, it may not even be necessary to show that the errors may well have affected the decision in a real way, because there has been no hearing, to which the person was entitled.
His Honour reviewed the authorities and then considered the particular passages that the appellant in SZRMQ said had been misinterpreted. His Honour said, at [27]:
For the reasons given by Robertson J, I do not consider that, taken individually or together, such misinterpretation as has been proven to occur so impeded the consideration as to render the hearing unfair. I agree that the first asserted mistranslation was minor and immaterial. The second asserted misinterpretation was cleared up and nothing of substance turned on it. The third asserted misinterpretation involved long passages about the passport and the circumstances of its obtaining. While there was undoubtedly a degree of confusion in the passages, I agree with the judge of the Federal Circuit Court that the substance of what was sought to be conveyed was communicated to the reviewer. What was said to be the fourth misinterpretation involved evidence that was adequately conveyed. The fifth asserted misrepresentation did involve a failure to translate for the applicant the reviewer’s view that he (the applicant) was evading discussion on the topic of travel abroad. It was clear, however, from the discussion that the reviewer was not satisfied with answers being given and that he persisted in asking questions. Looked at in the totality of the exchanges, there was no unfairness in any lack of appreciation as to the information required by or attitude of the reviewer. The sixth asserted misinterpretation did involve errors in the translation of questions. Accepting that it is not determinative that the error did not find its way into the reasoning of the reviewer, the matters of misinterpretation are not of a character, in light of the other evidence, to be material to either the process or the outcome. Such confusion as there was in the seventh asserted misrepresentation was cleared up in the course of the hearing. The eighth asserted misinterpretation involved the failure to interpret the UNHCR guidelines as they were put to the applicant by the reviewer. That error, real though it was, did not prevent the applicant from putting any part of his case or claims to the reviewer. No unfairness, in substance, arose.
In SZSEI v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 465, Griffiths J applied the decision in SZRMQ in the context of a Tribunal decision, where the requirements of procedural fairness are affected by the terms of the Migration Act 1958. His Honour said:
72.In my view, subject to some important observations which I will make shortly, the approach to be taken in a case such as this which raises the application of s 425 of the Act is essentially that which was applied in cases such as Perera, SZOYU, Appellant P119 and WALN. In WALN, Ryan J (with whom Tamberlin and Middleton JJ agreed) set out the relevant approach relating to alleged errors in translation in a s 425 context in the following terms at [29]:
To succeed on this ground the appellant must establish that he was effectively prevented from giving his evidence; see Perera (supra) at [38]-[41]. Alternatively, he must establish that errors had occurred in translation which were so material as to cause the decision-making process to miscarry ...
73.In SZRMQ at [22] and [23], the Chief Justice highlighted the need for passages such as the one set out immediately above from WALN to be read with care. That is for two reasons. First, it is clear that there is no requirement to demonstrate that there was a complete incapacity to interpret such that the applicant is prevented from giving any evidence. As the Chief Justice stated in [22], Kenny J in Perera at [45]-[46], “was referring to matters of significance involving important issues, not to a complete incapacity to interpret”. The Chief Justice also highlighted the undesirability of overly defining the relevant tests in circumstances where what is involved “is a more easily expressed and broader requirement: a fair hearing”. In my view, there is considerable force and attraction in expressing the matter that way, while giving effect in a relevant case such as here to the statutory text not only of s 425 of the Act but also other relevant provisions, such as ss 414 and 422B (noting the exhortatory command in s 422B(3) that, in applying Div 4, the Tribunal must act a way that is fair and just and see also the observations of the Full Court on that provision in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMOK [2009] FCAFC 83 at [15] and [18]).
74.Secondly, I respectfully agree with the Chief Justice’s observations in SZRMQ concerning the need to focus on the process which is afforded to an applicant to enable him or her to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review, as required by s 425(1) of the Act. This means that there need not necessarily be a proved causal connection between a mistranslation and the Tribunal’s reasons for decision because “the misinterpretation may be of such a character or frequency as to deny any conclusion that the hearing was fair or was a proper opportunity to be heard” (see SZRMQ at [25] per Allsop CJ). To similar effect, in SZRMQ at [68] Robertson J emphasised that “the process is central”. His Honour reinforced the point at [85] when he posed the relevant question as whether a mistranslation “affected or could have affected the quality of the hearing or the findings and reasons”. The Minister did not contest the correctness of those observations, nor their application to a s 425 case.
75.Nor did the Minister contest the following observations of Allsop CJ in SZRMQ at [17]-[18]:
In Soltanyzand v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1168, the Full Court (Spender, Lee and Tamberlin JJ) at [18] referred to the need to place evidence before the Court “that material errors occurred in the interpreting of the appellant's statements and, therefore, that miscarriage in the decision-making process had occurred”. That expression of principle, correctly, with respect, places emphasis on the importance of the process. The decision-making process is not limited to the articulation of reasons by the Tribunal. It extends to the process granted to the person to place such material before the Tribunal as she or he desires.
In W284 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1788, French J referred to Perera and found various errors going to matters of significance. His Honour then said at [35] in relation to the reasons for decision:
It is plain that there was a variety of factors operating upon the Tribunal's determination that the second applicant was not to be believed. It may be that without the interpreter errors the Tribunal would have come to the same conclusion. However, I cannot exclude the possibility that had the accepted defects in translation to which [the applicant] deposes not existed, the Tribunal might have come to a different decision. That goes to the utility of the grant of relief.
76.In SZRMQ, Robertson J agreed with the Chief Justice’s view that there is no requirement, at least for the purposes of procedural unfairness, to establish a causal connection between a mistranslation and the decision-maker’s ultimate conclusion. At [67]-[69], Robertson J said:
Attention must be given to the course the hearing took as well as to the ultimate reasoning of the decision-maker. A causative impact on the decision-maker’s ultimate conclusion would usually be sufficient to establish a lack of procedural fairness, but may not be necessary. Even where a causative impact is being examined, the court on judicial review should consider whether the mistranslation or non-translation had or could have had significance if the applicant’s words had not been mistranslated or, in the case of a non-translation, had been translated.
The significance of the error or errors is not to be assessed by reference only to the reasoning in fact used by the decision-maker because the decision-maker was, by definition, unaware of the mistranslation or non-translation, singular or plural and because the process is central.
If a mistranslation or non-translation could have affected the outcome then, depending on the circumstances, that may be sufficient to establish denial of procedural fairness. (Emphasis added).
77.I respectfully agree with those observations, which were not challenged by the Minister here. I consider that they apply equally to a complaint that there has been non-compliance with the requirements of s 425.
78.In my opinion, Robertson J provided further useful guidance in SZRMQ. For example, his Honour emphasised the importance of distinguishing between a case where the mistranslation or non-translation is frequent or continuous, as opposed to a case where the errors are intermittent (see SZRMQ at [70]). His Honour also drew attention, correctly in my view, to:
(a) the importance of keeping separate questions of mistranslation and non-translation, as opposed to mere errors of fact (see SZRMQ at [73]); and
(b)the distinction to be drawn between a mistranslation and a lack of detail in the relevant question the subject of translation (SZRMQ at [114]).
79.A further relevant principle is that in assessing whether or not one or more mistranslations or non-translations give rise to jurisdictional error, it is necessary to bear firmly in mind that interpretation or translation is not a perfect science and, having regard to the difficulties which are inherent in the process, perfection cannot reasonably be expected (see generally the observations of Kenny J in Perera at [29]-[31]). It may well be enough that the translation is sufficiently accurate so as to convey the idea or concept being communicated (WACO at [66]).
80.Furthermore, it is necessary to consider not only alleged mistranslations or non-translations individually with a view to assessing their relevance to the fairness of the overall process, but also to have regard to their cumulative effect. As Robertson J said in SZRMQ at [116]:
I turn finally to consider whether, in the aggregate, the mistranslations constituted a denial of procedural fairness. In my view, in the circumstances of this case, they did not. While care must be taken to examine whether errors in translation may have contributed to adverse findings or otherwise have been of significance to the process and thereby to a lack of procedural fairness, in the present appeal the sum of the mistranslations did not rise to that level. The errors of translation were intermittent rather than continuous and did not have a cumulative effect.
81.Finally, as noted above I did not understand the Minister to contest the proposition as stated by Jagot J in SZHEW v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 783 at [52] that the question whether inadequate interpretation has deprived an applicant of the opportunity given by s 425 of the Act “involves a qualitative assessment of the conduct of the hearing before the Tribunal as a whole”.
Based on those authorities, the first respondent conceded in his written submissions that:
21.2.It is necessary to focus on the process that is afforded to an applicant to enable him or her to give evidence.
21.2.1.That means that there need not necessarily be proved a causal connection between a mistranslation and the Tribunal’s reasons for decision. The issue is whether the mistranslation affected or could have affected the quality of the hearing or the findings and reasons: SZSEI at [74].
21.2.2.In other words, there is no requirement that an applicant identify a mistranslation or non-translation that is material to an adverse conclusion reached by the Tribunal: SZSEI at [111]. A breach of s 425 may also occur if a mistranslation “prevented material and substantive information being communicated to the decision-maker in a way that leads to the conclusion that the hearing was not fair”: SZSEI at [113]-[114].
…
21.4.Any alleged mistranslations or non-translations must be considered both individually and cumulatively: SZSEI at [80]. This requires a qualitative assessment of the conduct of the hearing before the Tribunal as a whole: SZSEI at [81].
First alleged error
The first error that the applicant identified was that the interpreter said, at page 22 of the transcript:
this commandant [meaning the police commander] has [a] party
when he should have said:
this doctor run his party … .
The first respondent conceded that mistake was made. However, the first respondent said that the correct information was given to the Tribunal elsewhere. Specifically:
a)the interpreter said at page 19 of the transcript:
And he [the doctor] has a party or groups which supporting (sic) him … ;
b)the interpreter said at page 23 of the transcript:
some friends … told me this person [the doctor] is very well known person he has party and so on … ; and
c)the applicant said in his statutory declaration at CB77 that:
the doctor said that he was a man of influence in the government as well as with the Taliban … .
The first respondent submitted that the Tribunal understood that the applicant claimed that the doctor had a high profile (paragraph 27 of the Tribunal’s reasons for decision) and that he was influential in Herat and in the Pashtun community (paragraph 38 of the Tribunal’s reasons for decision).
The essence of the applicant’s claim in relation to this point was that the doctor had political power. Being a high profile doctor is not synonymous with having political power. The Tribunal’s reference to the doctor being high profile is irrelevant to this point.
Also, there is a qualitative difference between “having” a political party and “running” a political party. The former suggests a degree of influence in a political party. The latter suggests total control of a political party. Consequently, I do not accept the first respondent’s submission that the entirely correct information was given to the Tribunal elsewhere.
The second alleged error
The second alleged error that the applicant identified was that the interpreter failed to say, at page 20 of the transcript, that the police commander swore at the applicant. The first respondent conceded that this instance of non-translation occurred but said:
a)the interpreter said elsewhere, at page 21 of the transcript, that the police commander abused the applicant;
b)the police swearing at the applicant was a matter of detail; and
c)the Tribunal was well aware of the applicant’s general claim that the police treated the doctor with respect and gave the applicant’s complaints little credence.
In the context of this case, there is an insignificant difference between the police swearing at the applicant and the police abusing him.
I accept the first respondent’s submission that this instance of non-interpretation was overcome by a substantially similar statement being correctly interpreted elsewhere.
Other interpreting errors
The first respondent, as model litigant, very properly drew to the court’s attention some other interpreting errors discussed below.
a. the doctor’s knowledge of the applicant’s address
The Tribunal said, at paragraph 43 of its reasons for decision:
… The Tribunal considers that if the doctor wanted to harm the applicant he had the opportunity to directly lead the Taliban to the address of the applicant to do him harm, given the level of information the doctor had about the applicant. …
The Tribunal discussed “[t]he level of information the doctor had about the applicant” at paragraph 39 of its reasons for decision.
The Tribunal said there:
… The Tribunal questioned the applicant about the initial lack of knowledge of the Taliban as to the applicant’s whereabouts in Jaghori. The Tribunal considered this odd, due to the ongoing relationship the applicant had had with the doctor for a reasonable period of time, and the information the applicant would reasonably have been required to provide to the doctor during the consultation period. This would have included the applicant’s name and address. The applicant stated that the system in Afghanistan was different, he gave his address as Jaghori, that he went to Herat to get prescriptions for the medications, and the doctor contacted him by phone. The applicant stated that you would use your Taskera as evidence of identity and address. The Tribunal noted that the Taskera has the applicant’s village noted on it. …
During the hearing before the Tribunal, at page 34 of the transcript, the member put it to the applicant that the doctor would have taken down the applicant’s details including his name and address when he visited the doctor. The applicant responded:
No the doctor won’t write it down … .
The first respondent conceded that this statement was not interpreted for the Tribunal.
At page 35 of the transcript, the Tribunal asked the applicant if he gave the doctor information about his village or house. The applicant said:
Well Afghanistan is not like Australia. In Australia if you visit a doctor or medical centre, first they take your details and all your information appears on the system, where that person live [sic]. In Afghanistan is [sic] not like that … . … I told him that I am not from Herat, I live in Jaghori, I verbally disclosed my particulars to him.
At page 36 of the transcript, the interpreter correctly said that in Afghanistan the system is different, but incorrectly added that in Afghanistan they write the area name.
Also at page 36 of the transcript, the Tribunal asked for the applicant’s Taskera, which he provided. It showed that the applicant came from the province of Ghazni, the district of Jaghori, and village of Dawood. The Tribunal said that it expected that the applicant would show that document to the doctor or staff at the clinic. The applicant replied:
No, no we never show our Taskera [at the doctor’s] … .
The interpreter did not interpret that answer. The Tribunal then said that it was a common practice to show identification. The applicant again said:
No, no they don’t show the Taskera.
The interpreter did not interpret that answer.
The applicant said, and the interpreter correctly interpreted, that the applicant told the doctor that he was from Jaghori and the village of Dawood. The applicant also told the Tribunal, although it was not interpreted, that he told the doctor a number of times that he was from the village of Dawood and that the doctor was aware of that.
The first respondent submitted that, in these circumstances, the interpreter’s error in saying that the doctor writes down the area name was immaterial because the doctor was well aware of the applicant’s village. The first respondent submitted that, on the applicant’s own account, the doctor would have been able to directly lead the Taliban to the address of the applicant, given that the doctor knew which village the applicant came from.
I accept that the interpreter’s failure to state that the applicant did not show the doctor his Taskera is very unlikely to have made a difference to the decision. That is because the Taskera only gave the applicant’s village rather than an actual address, and, on the applicant’s own evidence, he told the doctor a number of times which village he came from.
However, the interpreter’s failure to interpret the applicant’s statement that the doctor did not write down the applicant’s name and address and the interpreter’s statement, which was not made by the applicant, that in Afghanistan they write the area name, could have affected the Tribunal’s findings and reasons. Just because the applicant verbally told the doctor the village he was from does not necessarily mean that the doctor would remember the village.
The first respondent submitted that the applicant had given evidence, at page 39 of the transcript, that the people threatening him had his address and knew his house and area. However, that was not the applicant’s evidence. His evidence was that a person threatening him told him that he knew the applicant’s house and area. That is a significant difference. Obviously, a person trying to intimidate another might falsely claim to know where the person lives.
b. objection to interpreter
At page 6 of the transcript, the applicant initially appeared to object to the use of the available interpreter, although that objection was not relayed to the Tribunal. However, when the question was asked again, the applicant made it clear that he did not have an objection.
The interpreting error on this point was of no significance.
c. Ministry of Health
At page 21 of the transcript, there was some confusion about whether the applicant took a piece of paper to the Ministry of Health. However, the Tribunal said that it did not understand the evidence that had been given and asked specifically whether the applicant took the paper to the Ministry of Health. He said he did not. There appears to have been no significance in any interpreting error relating to this issue.
Conclusion
It may be readily accepted that interpretation is not an exact science and that perfection cannot be expected. However, if the standard of interpretation is so poor that significant statements are not interpreted at all or are interpreted inaccurately, the fairness of the hearing, and the integrity of the system, can be adversely affected.
For the reasons discussed above, it seems to me that the interpreting errors relating to the doctor’s knowledge of the applicant’s address could have affected the Tribunal’s findings and reasons. Combined with that interpreting error, the interpreting error relating to whether the doctor “had” a political party or “ran” a political party could also have affected the overall quality of the hearing or the findings and reasons of the Tribunal.
The other errors mentioned above, individually or cumulatively, while unfortunate, could not, in my view, have affected the quality of the hearing or the findings and reasons of the Tribunal.
The decision of the Tribunal must be set aside. I will hear the parties on the question of costs.
I certify that the preceding thirty-nine (39) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Riley
Associate:
Date: 1 September 2014
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
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Administrative Law
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Immigration
Legal Concepts
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Judicial Review
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Procedural Fairness
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Natural Justice
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Jurisdiction
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