MZZFQ v Minister for Immigration
[2013] FCCA 1995
•10 December 2013
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| MZZFQ v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2013] FCCA 1995 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Review of Refugee Review Tribunal – no matter of principle – application dismissed. |
| Applicant: | MZZFQ |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | MLG 97 of 2013 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Riethmuller |
| Hearing date: | 21 May 2013 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 6 June 2013 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Delivered on: | 10 December 2013 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Ms Karapanagiotidis |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Victoria Legal Aid |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Mr Reilly |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Sparke Helmore |
ORDERS
The name of the First Respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Border Protection”.
The Application filed 25 January 2013 and the Amended Application filed 2 May 2013 be dismissed.
There be no Order as to costs.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
MLG 97 of 2013
| MZZFQ |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The Applicant applies for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT), made on 21 December 2012.
Background
The Applicant is a citizen of Afghanistan. He is approximately 16 years of age and was born in Quetta, Pakistan.
In his contentions of fact and law, the Applicant sets out that he is of Hazara ethnicity and Shia religion.
Application for protection visa
The Applicant applied for a protection visa on 25 July 2013, after arriving on Christmas Island on 20 May 2012 as an unaccompanied minor. His application for a protection visa was based upon his claim to be a refugee on the basis of his being of Hazara ethnicity and Shia religion; that he was a student; and that he is both a young male and a young Hazara male in Afghanistan without family support or male protector; and that he will be imputed to have a pro-Western political opinion because he has resided in a Western country (see Courtbook 116).
Alternatively, the Applicant claims a visa under the complementary protection provisions on the basis that he is at a real risk of significant harm even if it is not on the basis of a ground under the Convention for the Protection of Refugees.
The Delegate of the Minister refused to grant the visa, finding that he was ‘not satisfied that [the Applicant] is a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under section 36 of the Migration Act and clause 866.221 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations.’
Appeal to the Tribunal
The RRT made many findings. As to his home region the Tribunal said:
[158] …the applicant’s home region for the purposes of considering his refugee and complementary protection claims is Kabul, Afghanistan.
As to the Applicant being persecuted due to religion, ethnicity or for imputed political opinion, the Tribunal said:
[170] … the applicant will not face a real chance of persecution for reasons of being a Hazara, a Shia, or for any imputed political opinion arising out of being a Hazara or a Shia, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. The Tribunal finds that the applicant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution for these reasons.
As to the Applicant’s study, the Tribunal said:
[177] The Tribunal considers that the essential and significant reason the applicant stopped studying was due to the change in financial circumstances and that this decision was made easier because of the opportunity to come and work with his grandfather in the shop. Having made this decision, the Tribunal does not consider that the applicant remained a school child… Having determined that the applicant is not a school student, it follows that the Tribunal does not consider the applicant has a real chance of persecution because he is a school student in Afghanistan, and that he does not have a well-founded fear of persecution for this reason.
Relevantly, the Tribunal considered the Applicant’s claim to be a young male without family support or a male protector, saying:
[173] … The Tribunal does not accept that the applicant would be sought to be recruited by the Taliban in their conflict with the government and western forces.
[174] …As found, the applicant is not displaced, he has a home and a secure environment that will shield him from the threat as elucidated by the applicant in the submissions.
[175] The Tribunal does not accept that the applicant has a real chance of persecution because he is a Hazara child or a young male in Afghanistan, and that he does not have a well-founded fear of persecution for this reason, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. The Tribunal finds that the applicant does not have a well-founded fear for these reasons.
…
[180] It has also been claimed that the applicant will be persecuted because he is a young person without a male protector in Afghanistan or without family support. This is not true. The applicant has been residing with a principle male protector for over ten years, his grandfather, who has made significant decisions for the applicant. There is no evidence that the applicant’s grandfather has passed away, he is old, but still is a male protector. His grandmother also resides in the home where the applicant lived for the last ten years, providing family support. Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that the applicant is not a member of this particular social group.
As to the Applicant being a returnee from the West, the Tribunal said:
[190]…The applicant has an established social network in Kabul, and the Tribunal does not accept that the applicant would be singled out for harm because he is returning from overseas. The Tribunal does not accept the assertion that the Taliban would find out that he had returned from a Western country and seek to harm him for this reason.
The Tribunal also considered the Applicant having to travel on the roads in Afghanistan, saying:
[195] The Tribunal does not consider the applicant or his family to have any profile that would place the applicant or his family at greater risk of harm while travelling by the insurgent groups. While the Tribunal does accept that there are risks of harm on the road in Afghanistan, the Tribunal considers that the risk that this will occur to the applicant or his family on the road is remote, and does not constitute a real chance of serious harm for the applicant.
Tribunal’s Conclusion
The RRT (at para.208 of their decision) found that:
…individually and cumulatively, the Tribunal is not satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Afghanistan, that the applicant will face a real risk of suffering significant harm.
The Tribunal concluded by rejecting the Applicant’s application for a protection visa.
Application before the Court
The Applicant applied for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision on 25 January 2013. The Amended Application, filed 2 May 2013, lists the four grounds on which the Applicant relies.
Ground 1
The Applicant’s first ground claims:
1. The Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) erred in its consideration of whether the applicant was at risk of persecution for reason of his membership of a particular social group of “young people without male protectors in Afghanistan”.
Particulars
(a) The Tribunal decided that the applicant was not a member of the postulated group because of the existence of the applicant’s grandfather.
(b) The applicant gave uncontested evidence concerning his grandfather[‘s] old age, ill health and his consequent inability to offer effective protection [to] him.
(c) The Tribunal failed to consider whether the applicant did have a “male protector” that could offer actual and/or effective protection to the applicant.
The Applicant argues that the Tribunal failed to properly consider the capacity of his grandfather to act as a male protector. The Applicant referred to his evidence in a statutory declaration before the Tribunal that:
My grandfather is elderly and sick, and I fear he will pass away. He is weak and can no longer work much. He has stomach and leg problems and cannot walk properly. He will not be able to protect me. I have no one else in Kabul. (CB 39 [11])
He is sick and too old to protect me. I was helping him to run his grocery shop because he was getting too old and it was difficult for him even to go to his own shop. He has arthritis and spinal problems and sometimes goes to hospital. (CB 180 [12])
This issue was raised in submissions before the Tribunal, referring to the grandfather’s ‘limitations’ (CB 220).
The argument is well summarised in the Applicant’s outline:
25. The Tribunal concluded that the applicant’s grandfather was “still a male protector” without giving any consideration to the nature, level or quality of the “protection” that he could actually offer the applicant in light of the applicant’s uncontested evidence concerning his grandfather’s ill health, old age and limitations.
26. In failing to ask the right questions or properly consider all of the elements of the posited particular social group, namely the element of “male protector,” the Tribunal erred in its consideration of this claim and whether the applicant was in fact a member of the posited group: Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26; (2003) 197 ALR 389; MZYPW v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 99 (11 July 2012).
In response, the First Respondent stated in its written submissions:
5. … The error complained of appears to be that the Tribunal at CB 300 [180] regarded the Applicant’s grandfather as a male protector, whereas the Applicant had claimed that his grandfather was old and in poor health (CB 255 [29], 296 [158]). However the Tribunal was not obliged to accept that this rendered the Applicant’s grandfather incapable of being a “male protector”, especially as the Applicant had been residing with him for ten years in Kabul in what the Tribunal regarded as a “stable” and “secure” environment (CB 296 [158], 299 [174]). … Plainly the claim was addressed and rejected at CB 300 [180]. This ground is no more than a disagreement with the merits of the Tribunal’s decision. It does not demonstrate any jurisdictional error by the Tribunal, and so fails.
The finding of the Tribunal at [180] of their reasons is set out above. The Tribunal also touched on this issue at para.158, saying:
[158] … The applicant has a stable environment in Kabul to return to, his grandparents, who are willing to make significant life choices on behalf of the applicant, such as to send him out of Afghanistan, without consulting the applicant’s guardian, his mother. The applicant has stated that his grandfather is elderly and unwell, but that his grandmother is in good health. The Tribunal considers that the applicant has a stable family home to return to in Kabul, even with an elderly grandparent, he has his grandmother present as well.
The substantive question is whether the Tribunal considered and dealt with the Applicant’s claim of fear on the basis he did not have a male protector. The findings at para.180 are to the effect that the Applicant has a male protector. The Applicant’s claim must therefore be on the basis of the meaning of male protector and the question of whether the Applicant’s grandfather was capable of fulfilling this role.
It is clear that the Tribunal were mindful of the evidence as to the grandfather’s health. I am persuaded that the issue of the potential impact of the grandfather’s age or health upon his capacity to be a male protector was considered by the Tribunal and this ground is effectively seeking merits review.
Ground 2
The second ground of the Applicant’s amended application claims:
2. The Tribunal erred in its consideration of whether the applicant was at risk of persecution for reason of his membership of a particular social group of “school children in Afghanistan”.
Particulars
(a) The Tribunal found that the applicant would not pursue his interest in returning to study in the future.
(b) The Tribunal’s finding was influenced by its’ earlier finding that the applicant had ceased studies because of the “opportunity to come and work with his grandfather in the shop”.
(c) The applicant had claimed that he was required to stop attending school because he needed to work since his father had gone missing and it had become too dangerous for him to attend school.
(d) There was substantial country information before the Tribunal concerning the Taliban attacks on schools and supporting the applicant’s fears.
(e) In its consideration of this claim the Tribunal erred by (i) failing to consider whether there were multiple reasons, that is both Convention and non-Convention related, that caused the applicant to stop studying; and (ii) failing to assess the nature of the “decision” and whether it was a voluntary decision made by the applicant.
In its Contentions of Fact and Law the Applicant addressed Ground Two as follows at paragraphs 28 - 43:
28. The applicant claimed that his intention and wish was to resume his schooling but that he would not be able to do so safely. In his statutory declaration the applicant claimed (CB 179[11]):-
If I were forced to return to Afghanistan, I would not be able to study safely. Although I stopped studying since my father went missing, I always wanted to go back to study … I like studying and I was sad when I had to stop studying and start working to support my family. However, I always intended to go back to study once the situation gets better. I want to go to university and study to be a pharmacist.
29. At the hearing with the Tribunal, the applicant stated that “his grandfather had told him to come and work, because the money had run out from his father, there was no alternative. The applicant stated that he wanted to keep studying” (CB 256 [36]). The Tribunal decision also records the following exchange at hearing (CB 255 [31]):-
The applicant was asked why he stopped studying and left his school. The applicant stated that his father was no longer sending money so he could not afford to remain at the school. He also stated that the school was no longer safe, that the Taliban were kidnapping school kids. When asked for more information, the applicant stated that the Taliban were targeting teachers and schoolchildren in higher class levels who were doing well. Due to this the applicant did not feel he could continue at the school”.
30. The applicant’s advisers also submitted that when the applicant’s father went missing the applicant “was forced to stop studying and began assisting his ailing grandfather run his business, however, he intended to resume his education in future” (CB 206.7).
31. The Tribunal found that the applicant was not a member of the postulated social group of “school children in Afghanistan” and further found that he would not return to study now or in the reasonably foreseeable future (CB 300[178]).
32. The Tribunal reasoned as follows:- (i) the applicant was not a student; (ii) the applicant ceased studies for financial reasons; and (iii) the applicant would not return to his studies as he had “opportunities to work to support himself and his family”.
33. At the core of the Tribunal’s decision on this issue was that the applicant had decided to leave school for financial reasons. The Tribunal stated as follows at paragraph [177]:-
The Tribunal considers that the essential and significant reason the applicant stopped studying was due to the change in financial circumstances and that this decision was made easier because of the opportunity to come and work with his grandfather in the shop. Having made this decision, the Tribunal does not consider that the applicant remained a school child, despite his interest in education.
34. Flowing on from this finding, the Tribunal considered that the applicant’s “interest” in education was not one that he would pursue in the future.
35. The Tribunal erred in its consideration of this claim by reason of the following:-
(i) It failed to assess whether there were multiple reasons why the applicant’s education was stopped; and/or
(ii) It failed to consider the nature of the “decision” to stop the applicant’s education; in other words, whether in fact it was the applicant who made the decision or whether the decision was a voluntary one.
36. The applicant’s evidence in his written statements and at the hearing was that [he] the decision to leave school was made for him. He was told to stop studying and come to work by his grandfather because his father had gone missing and had stopped sending money and because it was too dangerous to continue to attend school, in light of the attacks on schools and kidnapping.
37. There was a considerable amount of country information before the Tribunal concerning the attacks on schools. In their submission of 7 November 2012 the applicant’s advisers referred to considerable information to support the submission that “Hazara children” or “Hazara school children” faced a real chance of serious harm on return to Afghanistan (see CB 206-210). The Tribunal itself referred to information documenting the Taliban attacks on students and the education system in Afghanistan (see paragraphs [111] to [133]).
38. In making its finding as to why the applicant left school, the Tribunal failed to refer to, or deal with, his additional claim which was consistent with the country information that is, leaving school also because it was dangerous at the time. The Tribunal referred to it in the preceding paragraph (paragraph [176]) and did not appear to criticise or reject the claim. However, in paragraph [177] it failed to address it and also failed to refer to the substantial country information concerning the dangers of attending school in Afghanistan.
39. On a fair reading of the decision, it can be inferred that the Tribunal considered the two explanations as competing and exclusive and considered itself obliged to choose one over the other, notwithstanding they were both capable of co-existing.
40. The Tribunal was required to apply common sense to the applicant’s claims and not invoke a “false dichotomy: that is, that within the meaning of Art 1A(2) of the Refugees Convention the applicant either faces harm for reason of his [Convention reason] or he faces harm by reason of what he has done as an individual”: see Okere v Minister for Immigration & Anor [1998] 87 FCR 117 at [177].
41. In addition, the Tribunal erred in failing to consider or assess the nature of the “decision” as to the applicant ceasing school. This was relevant because it necessarily had a bearing on the Tribunal’s ultimate conclusion concerning the applicant’s future “interest” in education and whether he would return to school.
42. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant was a minor; either 16 or 17 years of age and that his grandfather acted as a guardian for him. The Tribunal’s reasoning in paragraph [177] and [178] proceeds on the basis that the applicant himself chose to leave school and that he would not return because he was “living in Kabul with opportunities to work to support himself and his family.”
43. To properly assess and engage with the applicant’s claims of being at risk of persecution for reasons of being a Hazara school child in the future or upon return to Afghanistan, the Tribunal was required to consider what decisions the applicant had actually made in the past.
The First Respondent’s reply is contained in para.6 of their Written Submissions:
6. The second ground claims that the Tribunal erred in its consideration of whether the Applicant faced harm as a member of a social group of “school children in Afghanistan”. As with the first ground, it is not apparent what jurisdictional error the Tribunal is said to have committed in rejecting this claim at CB 299-300 [176-179]. The ground suggests that the Tribunal “failed to consider” whether there were multiple reasons, including Convention reasons, that caused the Applicant to stop studying, but this is simply a disagreement with the Tribunal’s factual findings at CB 299-300 [177-178] that the Applicant had left school for financial reasons and was not a school student in Afghanistan and would not return to study in future. The ground also suggests that the Tribunal failed to “assess the nature of” the Applicant’s decision to leave school and whether it was voluntary, but again this is just an attempt to argue with the Tribunal’s findings as to the reason the Applicant left school. In any case, the relevant finding by the Tribunal is simply that the Applicant is no longer a school child and will not again be one in future, which suffices to dispose of the social group claim that the Applicant was a school child. The reason why he ceased to be a school child is not of relevance as to whether he could be a member of this suggested social group. For all of these reasons no jurisdictional error is demonstrated so this ground fails.
This ground is interesting as it relates to a social ‘group’ of which the Applicant is no longer a member, and where the findings are that he has no intention of returning to the ‘group’. If he is not at real risk of persecution as a former member of the group and would not be a member in the future, even absent the circumstances of the past which create a risk, it is difficult to see that he satisfies the criteria for a protection visa.
Ground 3
The Applicant’s third ground is that:
3. The Tribunal failed to consider an integer of the applicant’s claim, namely that children and/or women without a male protector were at risk or greater risk of serious harm when travelling on the roads in Afghanistan.
Particulars
(a) The applicant claimed to have suffered serious harm in the past while travelling the roads from Kabul to Ghazni.
(b) The applicant claimed that his mother and younger siblings had never travelled the roads to visit him because of their fear of persecution.
(c) It was submitted on behalf of the applicant that children and unaccompanied women were at greater risk of harm while traveling the roads.
(d) The Tribunal failed to consider this claim and thereby committed jurisdictional error.
At paragraphs 45-50 of their Contentions of Fact and Law the Applicant submits:
45. The Tribunal referred to this evidence and appeared to accept it though it did note that the applicant had not travelled to see his family since 2009 (CB 302 [193]).
46. The applicant also stated (CB 181 [21]):-
My mother and my siblings cannot come to Kabul because it would be even more dangerous for them to travel, especially without any adult male protecting them.
47. The applicant’s advisers also made the following submission (CB 221.6):-
We submit that women and children travelling without the accompaniment of a male adult are not only more vulnerable because of lack of protection on the roads, but that their ability to travel safely is also prevented by cultural considerations relating to the restrictions placed on a woman’s freedom of movement. The UNHCR Guidelines note that women have been detained and punished for morality crimes including improper accompaniment.
48. The advisers also referred to relevant country information concerning the particular vulnerability of woman and children (CB 221-222).
49. The Tribunal made the following finding on this issue (CB 303 [185]):-
While the Tribunal does accept that there are risks of harm on the road in Afghanistan, the Tribunal considers that the risk that this will occur to the applicant or his family on the road is remote, and does not constitute a real chance of serious harm for the applicant.
50. The Tribunal failed to consider the claim that the applicant was more vulnerable and at greater risk while travelling on the roads because of his status as a child and/or that his mother and siblings were at risk on the roads and more vulnerable because they were without a “male protector”: Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184 at [47]; SAAD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 65 at [40]; MZYPW v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 99 (11 July 2012).
The Minister deals with the third ground claimed by the Applicant at paragraph 7 of their Written Submissions:
7. The third ground claims that the Tribunal erred in finding that the Applicant did not have a well founded fear of harm in travelling to visit his family in Ghazni: CB 302-303 [195-196]. The complaint appears to be that the Tribunal did not address a “claim” of the Applicant at CB 221.8 that women and children travelling without an adult male are “more vulnerable”, but this statement was not made about the Applicant but his family members. The Tribunal was not obliged to consider whether persons other than the Applicant were refugees. And even if the passage at CB 221.8 can be said to also apply to the Applicant, there is no suggestion that it was overlooked by the Tribunal as seems to be suggested by this ground. The passage was in a submission expressly referred to by the Tribunal at CB 253-254 [23-24], so the preferable (indeed, overwhelming) inference is that the Tribunal had read it, but was nevertheless not persuaded that the Applicant’s (or for that matter his family members’) fear of persecution while travelling was well founded eg Applicant WAEE v MIMA (2003) 75 ALD 660 (FCA/FC) at [47]; MIAC v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594 at [33], [73]. This ground accordingly fails.
Clearly the concerns about family travelling are not a relevant risk to the Applicant. Not only is there not a risk directly to the Applicant, but nor would it alter even if a protection visa were granted. The relevance of this point is simply evidence of persecution of others if they do not have a male protector.
That the Applicant may not be able to travel on their roads without his grandfather (or another older male) is difficult to categorise as serious harm, at least in isolation. In any event, it does not appear to be so central to the claim to warrant more specific reasons than the Tribunal’s findings generally as a male protector at para.180.
I find that the Applicant has not succeeded on this ground.
Ground 4
The fourth ground of the Applicant’s amended application is that:
4. The Tribunal failed to consider whether the applicant’s inability to freely complete his education was capable of amounting to “significant harm” under the complementary protection regime.
Particulars
(a) As an alternative, it was submitted on behalf of the applicant that he was owed complementary protection because his “inability to freely complete his education breach[ed] his right to development under the Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CROC”).
(b) The Tribunal found that the applicant had gone to work with his uncle for financial reasons and therefore the ground was not “made out”.
(c) The Tribunal’s finding that the applicant’s education had ceased for non-Convention related reasons did not dispose of the claim or preclude the finding that the applicant had been “unable to freely complete his education” and was therefore at risk of suffering significant harm.
(d) The Tribunal failed to consider whether the applicant had been forced out of education or compelled to work so as to subsist and thereby unable to “freely complete his education”.
In regards to his fourth and final ground the Applicant submits at paragraphs 52-58 of their Contentions of Fact and Law:
52. The adviser’s made the following specific submission (CB 225.4) –
We further submit that the applicant is entitled to protection from refoulement under Article 6 (right to life and development) or Article 37 (freedom from torture, or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. In this regard we submit that the applicant’s inability to freely complete his education in Afghanistan compromises his right to development under Article 6 of the CROC.
53. Article 6 of the CROC contains the following:-
1. States Parties recognize that every child has the inherent right to life.
2. States Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and development of the child.
54. The Tribunal addressed this claim at paragraph [207] of its decision and made the following finding:-
The submission also discusses the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CROC) and that the applicant’s inability to freely complete his education breaches his right to development under the CROC. As stated above, the Tribunal does not consider the applicant to be a student in Afghanistan, and for financial reasons has gone to work for his grandfather. The Tribunal does not consider this ground to be made out.
55. The Tribunal altogether failed to consider whether the applicant would be freely able to complete his education upon return to Afghanistan. Even if the Tribunal was correct in finding that the applicant had ceased his education because of financial reasons, this did not dispose of the claim.
56. There was no consideration of whether the applicant was unable to “freely complete his education”. Such consideration would have involved assessing some of the following issues:- whether the applicant decided for himself that he would leave school; whether the decision for the applicant to leave was a “voluntary” one; or whether the child applicant left school because he had no choice and needed to subsist.
57. The Tribunal failed to consider any of these issues and instead reasoned that because the applicant ceased schooling for financial reasons and not Convention related ones that the claim was automatically not “made out”.
58. To consider the claim the Tribunal was required to assess: (i) whether the applicant was unable “to freely complete his education,” whether or not for Convention related reasons; and if so, (ii) whether this constituted “significant harm” under the complementary protection regime.
The Minister replied at paragraph 8 of their Written Submissions:
8. The fourth ground claims that the Tribunal erred at CB 304 [207] in rejecting a claim that there was a real risk that the Applicant would suffer “significant harm” by being unable to complete his education. It is difficult to see how being unable to complete education could fall within the definition of “significant harm” in ss 5(1) and 36(2A) of the Act, but in any case the Tribunal had made findings that the Applicant left school for financial reasons and did not intend to resume his studies: CB 299-300 [177-178] so there was no factual basis for the claim. The ground fails for the same reasons as ground two: it is simply arguing with the Tribunal’s factual finding that the Applicant did not intend to resume his studies, and does not demonstrate any jurisdictional error by the Tribunal.
This ground suffers the same difficulty as Ground 2 (see above). As there is not a finding that the Applicant intends to return to his education (or desires to do so but is prevent for a convention reason), he is not a member of a relevant group, nor effectively at risk at present.
Conclusion
As I am not persuaded that the Applicant has succeeded on any of the grounds set out, I must therefore dismiss the application.
In respect to costs, it was agreed by the parties that if the Application is dismissed, there be no order as to costs.
I certify that the preceding thirty-nine (39) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Riethmuller
Associate:
Date: 10 December 2013
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
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Administrative Law
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Immigration
Legal Concepts
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Judicial Review
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Natural Justice
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Procedural Fairness
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Jurisdiction
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