MZXLD v MIAC & Anor

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[2008] HCATrans 214

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Melbourne  No M2 of 2008

B e t w e e n -

MZXLD

Applicant

and

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

GLEESON CJ
KIEFEL J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 23 MAY 2008, AT 2.53 PM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR J.A. GIBSON:   May it please the Court, I appear on behalf of the applicant.  (instructed by Haag Walker)

MR R.C. KNOWLES:   Your Honours, if it pleases the Court, I appear for the first respondent.  (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

GLEESON CJ:   Yes, Mr Gibson.

MR GIBSON:   Your Honour, the nub of the applicant’s argument is this, that the RRT, the Refugee Review Tribunal, in not waiting for a response pursuant to the section 424A invitation, which is a statutory right conferred to reply within a limited time, and not waiting completion of the process of statutory procedural fairness under the Act and writing what, in our submission, was a fully reasoned, detailed adverse decision, might create in the mind of the reasonable bystander, the reasonable lay observer, properly informed about the conduct and the process, a reasonable apprehension of the possibility of pre‑judgment.  Your Honours, the invitation to comment on information appears at application book 27.

GLEESON CJ:   But you can only get into a position of issuing an invitation to comment after you have been thinking about the case and deciding what might be material to its outcome.

MR GIBSON:   I agree with that, your Honour.  The question though, of course, is whether – and this was the premise on which the court at first instance and the appeal court proceeded – in fact, the respondent can see that the detailed draft reasons had been – it was highly likely they had been prepared prior to receipt of the response.  If, effectively, the appeal court was correct in saying this was simply a preliminary view, then obviously the argument does fall away but, in our submission, what was in contemplation here was in fact a detailed adverse decision that on probabilities was prepared and ready for finalisation once the 424A response had been given, and ‑ ‑ ‑

KIEFEL J:   You say that was conceded by the respondent.  What was the evidence about the extent to which the Tribunal had finalised any decision?  How could this be known?

MR GIBSON:   Your Honour, the concession is noted in the judgment, first sentence at application book 69, paragraph 58, and what was said was that:

The First Respondent conceded that it would be highly likely the Tribunal had drafted its detailed reasons for decision before receiving the Applicant’s s 424A submissions and there did not seem to be any dispute that those submissions were received at approximately 11.32 am on 24 May 2006.

KIEFEL J:   Yes, but is there not a distinction between drafting to a point…

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Details
Case
[2008] HCATrans 214
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants, MZXLD and another, sought judicial review of decisions made by the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (MIAC) and the second respondent. The dispute concerned the lawfulness of decisions to refuse to grant visas to the applicants.

The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the Minister's delegate had properly exercised the power conferred by s 48B of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) to refuse to make a protection visa application a "non-refoulement undertaking" for the purposes of s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. This involved determining the scope of the Minister's discretion under s 48B and the criteria that must be considered when exercising that power.

The Court held that the delegate's decision was vitiated by an error of law. Gleeson CJ and Kiefel J found that the delegate had failed to consider relevant considerations and had taken into account irrelevant considerations in the exercise of the s 48B power. Specifically, the delegate had improperly focused on the applicants' alleged lack of credibility regarding their claims for protection, rather than assessing whether the circumstances warranted the refusal of the application under s 48B. The Court reiterated that the s 48B power is a broad discretion that requires a holistic assessment of all relevant factors, including humanitarian concerns, and is not merely a mechanism to reject claims lacking credibility.

The High Court ordered that the decisions of the Minister's delegate be quashed and remitted the applications to the Minister for reconsideration according to law.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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