MZABA v Minister for Immigration
[2014] FCCA 1928
•29 August 2014
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| MZABA v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2014] FCCA 1928 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal – application for adjournment refused – alleged failure by the Tribunal to consider each integer of the Applicant’s claim – claimed failure by the Tribunal to enquire into the authenticity of documents produced by the Applicant – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36(2)(aa), 901R, 424A |
| Du v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and Anor [2011] FMCA 753 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 83 ALJR 1123 |
| Applicant: | MZABA |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | MLG 352 of 2014 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Whelan |
| Hearing date: | 24 July 2014 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 24 July 2014 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Delivered on: | 29 August 2014 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Applicant in person |
| Counsel for the First Respondent: | Mr T Goodwin |
| Solicitors for the First Respondent: | Australian Government Solicitor |
ORDERS
The application filed by the Applicant on 27 February 2014 be dismissed.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
MLG 352 of 2014
| MZABA |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
This is an application for review of a decision (“the application”) of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) of 31 January 2014. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the Applicant a Protection (Class XA) visa.
The Applicant seeks the following orders:
1. A writ of certiorari quashing the decision or alternatively an order setting aside the decision.
2. A declaration that the decision is invalid
3. An order remitting the matter to the Second Respondent for determination according to law.
4. Costs.
5. Such further or other orders as to [sic] the Court deems fit.[1]
[1] Application filed 27 February 2014 at p.2.
Background
The Applicant is a citizen of Pakistan. He is from the Punjab.
On 23 February 2012 he was granted a subclause 456 Business Visitor visa and arrived in Australia on 1 May 2012. On 24 May 2012, he applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa. On 21 September 2012, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the visa.
On 18 October 2012, the Applicant applied to the Tribunal for a review of the delegate’s decision. On 13 and 19 August 2013 the Applicant appeared before the Tribunal with the assistance of his migration agent and an interpreter. On 21 January 2014 the Tribunal wrote to the Applicant inviting him to respond to certain matters. He responded on 30 January 2014.
On 31 January 2014, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision and on 27 February 2014 the Applicant applied to this Court for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision.
The Tribunal’s Decision
The Applicant claimed to fear persecution and/or harm in Pakistan on three grounds:
As a member of the Ahmadi religion;
An Ahmadi lawyer or minority lawyer who has acted for minority groups such as Ahmadis, Shias and Christians and against religious extremists; and
An educated and professional Ahmadi who believes in freedom of religion and freedom of speech and other liberal values.[2]
[2] Court Book filed 30 May 2014 at p.489.
Before the Tribunal, the Applicant gave evidence about various events and produced documents that he submitted supported the veracity of his claims. These included claims concerning:
·Discrimination he suffered as an Ahmadi;
·A claim that his uncle had been kidnapped and tortured because of his religion; and
·Evidence that the Applicant and his family were identified as Ahmadi and suffered discrimination and prejudice because of this.
The Applicant also maintained that he had been involved as a lawyer in several prominent cases and that he had been threatened and attacked because of his work as a lawyer. He also claimed that his brother and brother-in-law had been wrongly accused of a crime and detained by police because of police enmity against him and other lawyers seeking revenge on him because of his involvement in minority cases.
The Tribunal based its decision primarily on adverse credibility findings against the Applicant. In particular, the Tribunal found that the Applicant:
10.1did not actively practice, if at all, as an Ahmadi, either before or after 1999; and
10.2 did not actively practice, if at all, as a lawyer after 2000.[3]
These two findings underpinned the Tribunal’s rejection of the key evidence advanced by the Applicant and led to its decision to affirm the delegate’s decision.
[3] First Respondent’s Contentions of Fact & Law filed 1 July 2014, p.3 at para.10.
Grounds for Review
The Application states that the decision of the Tribunal was made without jurisdiction or was effected by an error of jurisdiction for the following reasons:
(a)The tribunal has failed to consider each integer of the applicant’s claim and/or failed to take into account the whole of the evidence in determining whether the feared persecution claimed amounted to persecution and serious harm as per section 91R of the Migration Act.
(b)The applicant has made a number of claims regarding his practice as an Ahmadi or minority lawyer and has produced a number of documents to support this. The tribunal has rejected these documents on mere speculation that it had doubts about the authenticity of the certificates … the tribunal should have verified these documents, rather than speculating and making generalized statements that fraudulent documents are rife in Pakistan.
(c)It would have been very easy for the tribunal to verify whether the applicant was a practising lawyer until his departure to Australia and the tribunal has failed to do this.
(d)The tribunal has failed to refer to country information/reports which contain information about the treatment of lawyers who act for minorities and the general situation in Pakistan, re political violence and the influence of terrorism as the tribunal had nevertheless made a finding that the applicant was a practising lawyer until 2000.
(e) The tribunal has erred when considering s.36(2)(aa)[4]
[4] Application filed 27 February 2014 at p.3.
The Applicant provided written submissions in support of his case.[5] For the most part, these submissions challenge the findings of fact made by the Tribunal. The submission also contends that the Tribunal should have verified certain matters and contended that the Tribunal was unable to “perceive the complication of laws and the judicial system of pakistan [sic] while sitting in australia [sic]”.[6] The submissions also accuse the Tribunal of bias, claiming the Tribunal “twisted the things in such a way and got the finding according to its desire”.[7] The Applicant’s oral submissions were in a similar vein.
[5] Written submissions of the Applicant filed 17 June 2014.
[6] Ibid, p.2 at para.8.
[7] Ibid, p.4 at para.16.
The adjournment application
At the commencement of the proceedings, the Applicant made an oral application for adjournment. He had previously made a written request which was opposed by the First Respondent. In support of the application, the Applicant produced a letter from Victoria Legal Aid (“VLA”) dated 10 July 2014, which stated that VLA did not have the capacity to conduct a complete merits assessment of his case “in the next fortnight”[8] but that, if he was able to adjourn the matter to a later date, they might be able to represent him. It was apparent that the Applicant had only sought the assistance of VLA some two weeks prior to the hearing date. The original application was lodged on
27 February 2014. The application had been the subject of a directions hearing before a Registrar on 21 May 2014. At that time, directions were given for the filing of material by both parties and for the matter to be set down for hearing before the Court on 10 July 2014.[9] This date was later changed at the Court’s initiative to 24 July 2014.
[8] Correspondence dated 10 July 2014, from Victoria Legal Aid addressed to the Applicant.
[9] Order of Registrar Caporale dated 21 May 2014.
The First Respondent opposed the granting of an adjournment and referred the Court to the principles with respect to such an application as set out in the judgment of Lucev FM (as he then was) in the matter of Du v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FMCA 753 (“Du”). In that matter, his Honour stated as follows:
24.Any application for adjournment must be considered in the relevant statutory, factual and case management context. The role and mode of operation of this Court as set out in the Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth) and the FMC Rules, as prescribed by the objects of the FM Act and the objects of the FMC Rules, provide for the Court to operate in a manner:
a) as informal as possible in the exercise of judicial power;
b) which is not protracted in its proceedings;
c) which resolves proceedings justly, efficiently and economically;
d) which uses streamlined procedures; and
e) that avoids undue delay, expense and technicality.
25.The Court must also take into account the following principles when determining whether or not to grant leave to allow an adjournment:
a) the paramount consideration remains the doing of justice between the parties, but a just resolution must have regard to any relevant legislative purpose or object;
b) modern principles of case management;
c) the avoidance of undue delay; and
d) the wastage of public resources.[10]
[10] [2011] FMCA 753 at pp.8-9.
The First Respondent submitted that, in this case, the Court should take into account the following matters:
·First, the history of the matter and the delay by the Applicant in taking steps to obtain legal assistance;
·Second, prejudice to the First Respondent and the use of Commonwealth resources already on the matter;
·Third, the general case management principles referred to in Du; and
·Fourth, the First Respondent’s submissions with respect to the grounds, and in particular the submission that the application is without merit.
The First Respondent submitted that the Applicant had been given adequate time to prepare his case, and to seek legal assistance at an earlier point in the proceedings.
Having considered the principles as set out in the case of Du and the facts as they were before the Court, I determined that the adjournment application should not be granted, and that the Court should proceed to consider the application on its merits.
The First Respondent’s submissions
The First Respondent addressed how the Tribunal had handled each of the claims made by the Applicant:
·With respect to the claim that the Applicant was an Ahmadi, the First Respondent referred the Court to the Tribunal’s findings that “the Applicant and his family engaged in little, if any, practice of the Ahmadi faith prior to 1999 (CB 491 at [19]) or after that date (CB 494-5 at [32]-[34])”.[11];
·That “the Applicant’s grandfather was Ahmadi and served in the Punjab Assembly as a non-Muslim member, the Tribunal found that the Applicant had not suffered any harm as a result (CB 490 at [16]-[17])”.[12];
·That the Applicant had not suffered any harm following the death of his teacher who was killed because of his own profile and political involvement;
·That “[t]he Applicant’s passport, marriage certificate and his children’s birth certificates identified him and his family as Muslim (CB 492 at [23]-[25]”.[13] Evidence from the electoral rolls from 1986/87, showing the Applicant as Ahmadi, were rejected by the Tribunal;
·The Tribunal also rejected the Applicant’s claim that his family were “conducting a court case that publicly identified his family as of the Ahmadi faith (CB 493 at [26]-[29]). The Tribunal found that there was no mention of the family being Ahmadi in the relevant judgment”.[14];
·The Tribunal further rejected the Applicant’s claim that he would “suffer harm arising from his uncle’s property dispute as the uncle would not have been identified as Ahmadi (CB 494 at [30]-[31])”.[15]; and
·The Tribunal found “that the Applicant had not suffered discrimination or prejudice or any other harm as an Ahmadi primarily on the basis that the Applicant would not have been identified as Ahmadi and had not actively practiced as one”.[16]
[11] First Respondent’s Contentions of Fact & Law filed 1 July 2014, p.3 at para.12.
[12] First Respondent’s Contentions of Fact & Law filed 1 July 2014, p.3 at para.13.
[13] Ibid at para.15.
[14] Ibid at para.16.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid at para.17.
With respect to the Applicant’s claim to have suffered harm as an Ahmadi or minority lawyer, the First Respondent submitted that:
19.The Tribunal found that the Applicant had effectively ceased his legal practice in 2000 when he commenced his business venture (CB 496-7 at [36]-[41]). This formed the primary basis of the Tribunal’s rejection of the Applicant’s particular claim.
20.Further, the Tribunal noted a number of inconsistencies in the documents produced by the Applicant in support of his various contentions about his practice after 2000 ….
21.The Applicant’s specific claims to have acted as a lawyer for various minorities in Pakistan were found to be variously inconsistent, implausible or uncorroborated (CB 497-500 at [42] to [52]).[17]
[17] First Respondent’s Contentions of Fact & Law filed 1 July 2014 at pp.3-4.
The Tribunal also rejected the Applicant’s claims to have suffered as a minority lawyer. It rejected the Applicant’s claim to have been stabbed while acting for a Shia client in 2009 on the basis that his evidence about this event was inconsistent and implausible.
With respect to the Applicant’s claim to have suffered harm as an educated and professional Ahmadi with liberal views, the
First Respondent submitted that the Tribunal had repeated its findings that it did not accept that the Applicant was of the Ahmadi faith, or that he had would be perceived to be an Ahmadi:
The Tribunal accepted that the Applicant was both educated and professional and may hold liberal views, but found that there were many thousands of people with the same profile living in the Applicant’s home area of Pakistan (CB 503 at [70]). The Tribunal concluded that there was neither a real chance of the Applicant suffering serious harm, nor a real risk of him suffering significant harm on account of being an educated, liberal professional.[18]
[18] Ibid, p.4 at para.2 4.
The First Respondent accepted that, if the Tribunal failed to deal with a claim or integer of a claim raised by the evidence and submissions made to it, which could be dispositive of the review, this could constitute a denial of procedural fairness. The First Respondent submitted, however, that it was clear that the Tribunal had considered all of the Applicant’s claims. The Tribunal set out the claims at paragraph [9] of its decision[19] and detailed each of the Applicant’s claims. It proceeded to consider the extensive evidence relied upon by the Applicant. Ultimately, it was the rejection of a majority of this evidence that led the Tribunal to its conclusion. The First Respondent submitted that the Tribunal’s findings of credibility were rationally made and based upon facts having logical and probative weight. The First Respondent submitted that “the real complaint of the Applicant is that the Tribunal rejected the evidence”.[20]
[19] Court Book filed 30 May 2014 at pp.488-489.
[20] First Respondent’s Contentions of Fact & Law filed 1 July 2014, p.6 at para.31.
The First Respondent submitted that both grounds two and three should be rejected by the Court. The First Respondent accepted that:
A failure by the Tribunal to make an “obvious inquiry about a relevant fact, the existence of which is easily ascertained, could, in some circumstances, supply a sufficient link to the outcome to constitute a failure to review” and thereby, jurisdictional error. However, this is the extent of the Tribunal’s obligation. The Tribunal is under no general duty to inquire.
… the Tribunal considered the documents provided by the Applicant and rejected a majority of them either due to authenticity concerns or because they did not go to proving that the Applicant faced serious or significant harm. These findings were open to the Tribunal.[21]
[21] Ibid at paras.33-34.
The First Respondent submitted that there is no evidence that further inquiries by the Tribunal into the documents would have assisted the Tribunal:
Inconsistencies in the documents were highlighted by the Tribunal to the Applicant, both during the hearing (e.g. CB 491 at [20]; CB 497 at [39], [41]) and … in the s 424A letter (CB 469). The Tribunal ultimately rejected the Applicant’s explanations for any inconsistencies.[22]
[22] Ibid at para.34.
For similar reasons, “[t]he Tribunal was under no obligation to verify the Applicant’s claim that he practiced as a lawyer until his arrival in Australia. In any event, the Tribunal expressly rejected the evidence that the Applicant acted as a lawyer due to his business activities
(CB 496 at [36])”.[23] The First Respondent submits that this conclusion was open on the evidence provided by the Applicant himself.[23] Ibid at para.38.
Ground four raises concern that the Tribunal failed to have regard to country information regarding :
39.1. the treatment of lawyers who act for minorities; and
39.2.the general deterioration of conditions in Pakistan regarding political violence and terrorism.[24]
[24] First Respondent’s Contentions of Fact and Law filed 1 July 2014, p.7 at para.39
The First Respondent submits that as:
The Tribunal rejected the central premise that the Applicant was a lawyer who acted for minorities, at least from 2000 (CB 496 at [36]) … the Tribunal was not under an obligation to consider such general country information”.[25]
[25] Ibid at para.40.
The First Respondent further submits that the second contention is irrelevant as:
The Applicant did not base his claim on a fear of generalised violence … The Tribunal was under no obligation to consider country information regarding generalised violence when this issue was not articulated and did not clearly arise on the material before the Tribunal.[26]
[26] Ibid at para.41.
With respect to Ground 5, the First Respondent submits that:
It was legitimate for the Tribunal to rely on its general findings in considering the complementary protection criterion under
s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. It is clear from paragraph [75] of its decision that the Tribunal turned its mind to the independent criterion and rejected it on the basis of its factual findings.[27]
[27] Ibid at para.43
Conclusions
The Applicant’s first claim is that the Tribunal failed to consider each integer of his claim and/or failed to take into account the whole of the evidence in determining whether he feared the persecution claimed. Neither in the application nor in the written submissions produced has the Applicant identified which integer of his claim the Tribunal failed to consider. The written submission put forward material upon which the Applicant says the Tribunal should have reached different conclusions, but does not identify where the Tribunal failed to consider those matters. Over some 23 paragraphs of its decision,[28] the Tribunal considered the Applicant’s claims with respect to being harmed as a follower of the Ahmadi faith. The Tribunal gave detailed reasons for rejecting the contentions made by the Applicant with respect to his practice as an Ahmadi and also his identification as such.
[28] Court Book filed 30 May 2014, pp.489-495 at paras.13-35.
With respect to the Applicant’s claim that he was threatened and harmed in Pakistan as an Ahmadi lawyer or minority lawyer who acted for minority groups, the Tribunal set out the specific claims that the Applicant made with respect to his activity as a minority lawyer who acted for minority groups. Over the course of 34 paragraphs,[29] the Tribunal systematically addressed each of the Applicant’s claims with respect to his practice as a lawyer and rejected those on the grounds that it found his claims to lack credibility. The Tribunal found that the Applicant was unable to provide details with respect to the cases in which he said he was involved, which in the view of the Tribunal, given the high profile of those cases, he should have been able to recall. The Tribunal also considered that, given the Applicant’s extensive involvement in an import/export business after 2000, which included a significant amount of travel, he would have been unable to conduct the type of legal practice which he claimed to have done.
[29] Court Book filed 30 May 2014, pp.495-503, paras.35-68.
With respect to the claim that the Applicant suffered harm as an educated and professional Ahmadi who believed in liberal values, the Tribunal found that, as the Tribunal did not accept that the Applicant:
·Was of the Ahmadi faith; or
·Practiced as an Ahmadi; or
·Was perceived to be an Ahmadi,
it therefore did not accept that he was an educated and professional Ahmadi with liberal views. Having rejected that aspect of the Applicant’s claim the Tribunal went on to consider that, even as an educated professional who might hold liberal views, the area in which he lived was the third largest city in Pakistan and it was likely that there were many other educated and liberal professionals living in that area.
I am unable to see where the Tribunal has failed to consider each integer of the Applicant’s claim and/or failed to take into account the whole of the evidence in determining whether the feared persecution he claimed amounted to persecution and serious harm for the purposes of s.901R of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”).
The second and third grounds of the Applicant’s claim for judicial review relate to a failure of the Tribunal to verify documents produced by the Applicant and whether he was a practising lawyer until his departure for Australia. The Applicant claimed that the documents produced by him regarding his practice as a lawyer were rejected by the Tribunal on mere speculation and doubts about the authenticity of certificates he produced.
The Tribunal dealt with the issue of the authenticity of certain documents produced to the Tribunal at paragraphs [37] to [41] of its decision.[30] It also wrote to the Applicant on 21 January 2014, requesting his response to certain information in accordance with the provisions of s.424A of the Act.[31] That letter specifically raised the issue of a letter produced by the Applicant and purportedly from the local Bar Association dated 26 March 2012, and also a claim by the Applicant that he acted for the defendant, who was charged with murdering a high profile Minister in 2007.
[30] Court Book filed 30 May 2014 at pp.496-497.
[31] Ibid at pp.469-470.
The Tribunal noted, with respect to various documents that were provided by the Applicant, that they listed officeholders who were not the officeholders at the relevant time, and that the letterhead used was not consistent. The Tribunal found that it had some doubts about the authenticity of certificates provided by the Applicant. The Tribunal did accept that the Applicant had been admitted to practice as a lawyer and was a practising lawyer and may have maintained his membership of the Bar Association, even after he stopped practising.
The Tribunal made a specific finding[32] with respect to a letter purporting to be from the Bar Association and dated 30 July 2013. It did so because of the content of the letter and also the difference between the letterhead on this piece of correspondence and other material produced by the Applicant. The Tribunal also raised with the Applicant various Powers of Attorney which he stated were required for each case. The Tribunal did not accept that the Powers of Attorney produced were genuine documents. The Tribunal’s reasons included the fact that the same handwriting appears on different forms over a
10-year period and the forms contained the same spelling mistake. Further, the date the documents were signed had been incorrectly filled out in the same way on every form. In addition, the Applicant appeared to have signed one Power of Attorney when, according to his travel history, he was not in the country.[33]
[32] Ibid, p.497 at para.39.
[33] Court Book filed 30 May 2014, p.497 at para.41.
In Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 83 ALJR 1123, (“SZIAI”) the issue before the High Court was whether the Tribunal had committed jurisdictional error by unreasonably failing to undertake its own enquiries into certain matters. Those matters related to the authenticity of documents, provided by the applicant, in that case, which had been impugned by third party information of which the applicant had been given notice, and to which he had replied in writing. In a single judgment of six members of the High Court, headed by French CJ, the Court found as follows:
The duty imposed upon the Tribunal by the Migration Act is a duty to review. It may be that a failure to make an obvious inquiry about a critical fact, the existence of which is easily ascertained, could, in some circumstances, supply a sufficient link to the outcome to constitute a failure to review. If so, such a failure could give rise to jurisdictional error by constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction. It may be that failure to make such an inquiry results in a decision being affected in some other way that manifests itself as jurisdictional error. It is not necessary to explore these questions of principle in this case. There are two reasons for that.
The first reason is that there was nothing on the record to indicate that any further inquiry by the Tribunal, directed to the authenticity of the certificates, could have yielded a useful result. There was nothing before the Federal Magistrates Court or the Federal Court to indicate what information might be elicited if the Tribunal were to undertake the inquiry which was said to be critical to the validity of its decision. The inquiry suggested was telephone contact with the persons whose mobile telephone numbers were shown on the certificates. But the question whether the certificates contained false statements as to authorship or otherwise would not be able to be determined by calls placed to those telephone numbers. If the respondents to the calls admitted to the Tribunal or its officers that the certificates contained false statements, then the grounds for a decision adverse to SZIAI would have been strengthened. If the respondents said that the contents were true, it would have added nothing to the statements effectively conveyed by the certificates themselves. The second reason is that the response made by SZIAI’s solicitors to the Tribunal’s letter of 14 January 2008 itself indicated the futility of further inquiry. There was nothing that SZIAI or his solicitors were able to add, beyond a bare denial of what appeared in the National Ameer’s letter. For these reasons there is no factual basis for the conclusion that the failure to inquire constituted a failure to undertake the statutory duty of review or that it was otherwise so unreasonable as to support a finding that the Tribunal’s decision was infected by jurisdictional error.[34]
[34] (2009) 83 ALJR 1123, pp.1129 at para.25-26
In a separate judgment, Heydon J stated as follows:
The question of whether the Tribunal should have made further inquiries must be assessed bearing in mind that it was for the respondent to demonstrate that his claims were genuine; it was not for the Tribunal to try to achieve a demonstration that he had failed to achieve.[35]
[35] Ibid, p.1133 at para.52.
In this matter, the authenticity of the documents was not the only matter relied upon by the Tribunal in reaching conclusions adverse to the Applicant. The Tribunal accepted that the Applicant may have remained as a member of the Bar Association while not actively practising as a lawyer. There was, however, other evidence before the Tribunal including:
·The extensive nature of the Applicant’s business;
·The lengthy periods the Applicant spent out of the country; and
·The unsatisfactory nature of the Applicant’s answers in response to questioning about the cases in which he claimed to have been involved.
In those circumstances, I am not satisfied that it was incumbent on the Tribunal to telephone various officeholders of the Bar Association named on the certificates or search the court records from the Applicant’s city of residence for evidence of his involvement in legal practice.
The fourth ground relied upon by the Applicant is misconceived. The Tribunal, having concluded that the Applicant was not a lawyer who acted for minorities, was not obliged to consider country information on the treatment of such lawyers. Further, the Applicant made no claim that he feared harm for a Convention reason based on the general situation in Pakistan with respect to political violence and the influence of terrorism.
The Applicant does not specify how the Tribunal erred when considering s.36(2)(aa) of the Act. The Tribunal dealt with this in paragraph [75] of its decision.[36] While the consideration is brief, it is clear that the Tribunal based its finding that it did not accept that there were substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the Applicant being removed from Australia, he would face a real risk of suffering significant harm on his return to Pakistan on the same finding of facts that underpinned its conclusion that he did not face a real chance of serious harm for a Convention reason.
[36] Court Book filed 30 May 2014 at p.504.
While not specified as a ground for review, the Applicant makes allegations in his submission that the Tribunal’s decision was affected by bias on the part of the Tribunal member. These are mere allegations and are not supported by any evidence of a failure on the part of the Tribunal to do other than consider the evidence put before it in a fair manner. The Applicant has not sought to put before the Court the transcript or recording of the proceedings before the Tribunal. There is, therefore, no basis for any conclusion that the Tribunal acted in such a way as to lead a fair-minded observer to conclude that the Tribunal had pre-determined the outcome.
I am satisfied that the Tribunal considered the evidence and gave cogent and rational reasons for the findings and conclusions made. The Applicant is not satisfied with the outcome and seeks essentially to challenge the Tribunal’s findings. That is not a proper basis for the Court to determine an application for judicial review.
For these reasons, the application is dismissed.
I certify that the preceding forty-five (45) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Whelan
Associate:
Date: 29 August 2014
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