Myron & Milson
[2023] FedCFamC1F 1077
•15 December 2023
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Myron & Milson [2023] FedCFamC1F 1077
File number(s): BRC 4579 of 2022 Judgment of: BAUMANN J Date of judgment: 15 December 2023 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – PARENTING – Consideration of Rice & Asplund principles – Where final Orders were made in 2019 for the children to not spend any time with the father – Application to discharge the earlier Orders and to seek new parenting orders dismissed Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 60CC, 68B, 69ZX Cases cited: Defrey & Radnor [2021] FamCAFC 67
Myron & Milson (2020) FLC 93-969
Rice & Asplund (1979) FLC 90-725
Stern & Colli (2022) 65 Fam LR 548
Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 35 Date of hearing: 6 December 2023 Place: Brisbane Solicitor for the Applicant: Litigant in person Counsel for the Respondent: Mr D Carlton Solicitor for the Respondent: KLM Solicitors ORDERS
BRC 4579 of 2022 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MR MYRON
Applicant
AND: MS MILSON
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
BAUMANN J
DATE OF ORDER:
15 DECEMBER 2023
THE COURT ORDERS:
1.That the father’s Application filed 20 April 2022 is dismissed.
2.That if the mother seeks to pursue any application for costs of these proceedings, then:
(a)the mother shall file and serve written submissions, both as to liability and quantum within thirty (30) days;
(b)the father shall have leave to file and serve any written submissions in response within sixty (60) days;
(c)the mother shall have leave to file and serve any written submissions strictly in reply within fourteen (14) days of service of the written submissions; and
(d)unless otherwise ordered, the issue of costs shall be determined on the papers in chambers.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Myron & Milson has been approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BAUMANN J:
On 22 February 2019, Carew J delivered Reasons and made parenting Orders in relation to four children, B, born 2003, Z born 2005, X born 2009 and Y, born 2011. The trial before her Honour was conducted without attendance by the father, who had sought to pursue an application for adjournment at the beginning of the trial, which was refused. That issue, as well as the hope the father had of setting aside the orders made by the primary judge, were dismissed by orders of the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia in a Judgment delivered on 19 June 2020 (see Myron & Milson (2020) FLC 93-969) by Ainslie-Wallace, Ryan and Watts JJ).
The effect of the Orders made by the primary Judge on 22 February 2019, was that the children were to live with the mother; the mother was to have sole parental responsibility, and at paragraph 4, the father was not to spend time with the children.
Furthermore, the father was restrained by injunction made pursuant to Section 68B of the Family Law Act1975 (Cth) (“the Act”), at paragraph 5, from communicating or approaching the mother or the children. The father filed an Application on 20 April 2022 seeking effectively to discharge the earlier Orders and to seek new parenting orders. It was identified early by the Response of the mother filed 6 July 2022 that the mother opposed the Application of the father proceeding and relied upon the principles in Rice & Asplund (1979) FLC 90-725.
In July 2022, the Application was transferred to Division 1, and after being initially listed for a Case Management Hearing before me on 27 September 2022, the matter was consistently adjourned awaiting two other events to crystallise, namely:
(a)An appeal against a decision by a professional regulatory authority not to grant the father a professional licence. Ultimately, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) made an order effectively permitting the father to obtain a professional licence, and one has now issued to him in 2023. The reasons of QCAT were before the Court and the subject of some submissions; and
(b)The father appealed, as he was perfectly entitled to do, a protection order made by a Magistrate in mid-2022. The appeal heard in early 2023 resulted in a decision and orders published in late 2023. The decision of the learned District Court Judge was that the appeal be dismissed. Some aspects of those reasons for judgment were referred to in submissions by the parties before me.
The hearing, conducted on the papers in the usual manner about whether the principles of Rice & Asplund (as commonly called), should result in the father’s Application being dismissed. It was heard on 6 December 2023. The reasons which follow explain why the Court has formed the view that the father’s Application should be dismissed.
SOME CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND
It was accepted by the parties before me that the starting point for this current application of the father is the Reasons for Judgment and the decision of Carew J. In that regard, at [10]–[20] of her Honour’s Judgment, she provided a background. Those paragraphs of the Judgment are reproduced in this judgment now as follows:
10.Before turning to consider the issues, I note by way of background that the mother and father were married for fifteen years before separating in November 2015 and divorcing in 2018. The parents remained under the same roof until early January 2016.
11.Shortly after the separation the father commenced a relationship with [Ms EE] and she moved in with him after about a month. They remained together until [early] 2017. Shortly after that relationship ended, the father re-partnered with [Ms G] and he and [Ms G] share a home for most of the time. The father is 48 and employed [in a professional occupation].
12.Shortly after separation the mother commenced a relationship […]. After that relationship ended, the mother formed a new relationship with her current partner, [Mr F], although they do not live together. [Mr F] has four children (all girls) aged 14, 12, 10 and 7 respectively. The mother is 41 and not in employment.
13.At times after separation the parents managed to co-parent and even went on a joint holiday with the children in December 2016/January 2017.
14.After separation the child [B] lived with his father and spent very little time with his mother by his choice until recommencing to live with her and his siblings on 24 September 2018. In the period [early] 2018 to 24 September 2018 [B] lived with a number of people including the father’s sister, [Ms E], and also the father’s former partner, [Ms EE] and her partner [Mr GG]. [B] has been a very troubled boy for some time. He faced criminal charges in 2018 and was dealt with through the Youth Restorative Justice Program. He experimented with drugs in 2018 and absconded interstate with a girl. He has threatened suicide on a number of occasions and has been hospitalised because of concerns for his mental health. He no longer attends main stream school and is under the care of a clinical social worker, a psychologist and a psychiatrist.
15.[Z] remained living with her mother after separation but did spend time with the father up until [early] 2018. She is also under the care of a psychologist and a psychiatrist. She too has made a number of threats of suicide and has also been admitted to hospital because of concerns for her mental health. [Z] changed schools towards the end of 2018 and by all accounts is progressing well academically.
16.[X] and [Y] remained living with their mother after separation but spent about equal time with each parent although this seems to have been a recurring source of conflict. There was an interruption in them spending time with the father in [mid] 2016 after [Z] told the mother that the father was physically disciplining the children including slapping her across the face. There was a further interruption from [early] 2018 until the father took [X] from the mother [the following month]. [X] was returned to the mother [three days later]. Between 16 June and 5 October 2018 [X] and [Y] spent fortnightly supervised time with the father. There was a further interruption in the boys’ time with the father after the supervisor withdrew her services and time recommenced on 27 January 2019 but only [Y] attended. [X] refused to get out of the car despite the efforts of the mother and [Ms HH] from the contact centre. The visit between the father and [Y] went well.
17.As a result of an incident that occurred between [B] and [Z] [in early] 2018, [B] was charged with criminal offences […] and the matter proceeded through the criminal justice system’s Youth Restorative Justice Program.
18.[The following month], the father, in the company of [B], removed [X] from [Mr F’s] home while the children were involved in an [activity]. The police were again involved and the father and [B] were charged with criminal offences. [B’s] charges have now been finalised and were dealt with through the Youth Restorative Justice Program but the charges against the father are yet to be heard.
19.[In early] 2018 the father was arrested on charges relating to the incident […] and bail conditions precluded [B] living with the father. The mother, [Z], [Y] and later [X], lived in emergency accommodation for a period after the […] incident.
20.[In early] 2018 [B] was interviewed by police and alleged that his mother had sexually abused him when he was aged ten or eleven. [B] retracted his allegations [later that month] and said that his father pressured him into making the false allegations.
In considering the basis upon which her Honour made the Orders she did, I have identified the following paragraphs from the Reasons for Judgment as helpful to record, namely:
(a)At [37], her Honour found that the father has a history of perpetrating domestic violence to the mother, and he admitted by email and in an interview with the family report writer, Mr R, such conduct by him;
(b)At [43], her Honour found that the children were exposed to the father’s family violence over many years;
(c)At [46], her Honour found that in early 2018, B and Z had engaged in behaviour of a very serious nature.
(d)At [49], her Honour found the father sent text messages with content described as “menacing and threatening” to the mother. Her Honour’s Judgment provided the text of those messages, and it would be hard not to agree with her description, and I do;
(e)At [65]–[68], in effect, her Honour recorded that in early 2018, the father reported an allegation of sexual abuse made by B against his mother But by the following month, B had formally retracted his allegations against the mother and told police that his father had told him to make false allegations;
(f)At [74], her Honour concluded, for the Reasons that she gave, that in her view, it was more likely than not that the father acted as alleged by B, namely, coercing and manipulating B to make a false allegation of sexual abuse against the mother;
(g)At [73], her Honour acknowledged that the father has currently lost his relationship with all four children
(h)At [74], her Honour found that B, in a communication to the father on 8 August 2018 (being some four months after he retracted the sexual abuse allegation against the mother), the child sent a very confronting email to the father which began with the words, “you fucked my entire life.” The full text of the email is contained in the Judgment of Carew J;
(i)At [77], inter alia, her Honour found that the father’s involvement of the children in the dispute, in particular B, had been reprehensible; and
(j)At [81], referring to a single expert report of consultant psychiatrist, Dr Q, her Honour recorded that the expert assessed the father in mid-2018 and noted by the father’s “own account, there do appear to be significant obsessive-compulsive personality traits”.
After noting at [83] that the supervised time the little boys had spent with their father between June and October 2018 “appears to be a positive one for the children”, at [90] of the Reasons, her Honour articulated and concluded that “the risk to the children cannot be ameliorated by supervision”, before finally, at [115], concluding that “I do not consider that it is in the children’s best interests to have a relationship with the father at all”.
QCAT DECISION
I form the view that the QCAT decision of the Senior Member did, in certain ways, challenge the findings of certain factual issues by Carew J. Nonetheless, without knowing, of course, what further evidence the Tribunal had before it, it is not open to this Court to make some comparison between the decision of the Tribunal and the decision of Carew J. What at least is important to note is that the decision of the learned Member that was delivered in mid-2023 and arose from hearings in mid-2022, was both at a significantly indifferent point in time and with, in my view, a particularly different focus. The QCAT learned Member was being invited to make a decision as to whether the father was a fit and proper person to be granted a professional licence, subject to the usual statutory conditions. In substituting his decision that the father was a person entitled to be granted such a licence, it could not be said that the Tribunal was invited in any way to make an assessment of the father’s parenting capacity, his relationship with his children or the correctness or otherwise of the conclusions reached by Carew J.
The father, in final submissions, directed me to a number of criticisms in the judgment of the learned Senior Member which I have turned my mind to, but as I say, in my view, they are not significant to the determination I need to make in this case because of their history and the different context in which the Tribunal was assessing the evidence.
JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
It is my view, however, the judgment of the District Court, published late 2023, is more relevant to the issues I now have to consider. This was because, at least, it related to an event that has occurred since the Judgment of Carew J but shows, in the opinion of the District Court Judge, some conduct of the father which her Honour felt was inappropriate. Whilst I accept I received the submission from the father that I should give little weight to the judgment of the District Court Judge, it being fatally flawed and based on the failure, he says, inappropriately, not to allow further evidence from B to be admitted, I do not accept the father’s submission.
I do accept there is little utility in the father seeking, on a question of law, to appeal the decision of the District Court Judge in circumstances where the protection order, which was the focus of the appeal, has now expired. Nonetheless, Mr Carlton of Counsel for the mother identified a number of paragraphs in the reasons of the District Court which he says are relevant and support the mother’s primary concern in the matter proceeding further – namely that the father will continue to involve the children in adult issues inappropriately – a critical finding made by Carew J. In particular, I record the following paragraphs from the District Court judgment, namely:
[11]… I have read the affidavit submitted on behalf of the appellant and signed by [B]. It concerns me very much that this young man is being used in this way. It is clear from the evidence that [B] was a troubled youth. He was charged with indecent treatment of his sister. He became homeless for a while and was using drugs. He has been attacked during that time. He has had [multiple medical episodes] while living rough on the streets. I have watched the interview between the police and [B] where he withdrew his complaint. His distress and concern about being forced to make the complaint appeared to be quite genuine and believable. His vulnerability is evident.
[13]The appellant is a [professional] and it can therefore be assumed he has some grasp on the relevance and weight of evidentiary material. This young man who, as I have already noted, is clearly troubled, has given, on his own version, two false complaints: one against his mother and one against his father. He has withdrawn the complaint against his mother, saying his father coerced him to make it, and now, he is saying that was a lie. He is saying he made up the complaint against his father. He is saying the allegations he made to the police that his father was controlling was a lie. It is impossible now for the Court to be able to consider him a witness of credit, and giving evidence in Court against one of his parents would likely be a traumatic experience for him. I do not propose to put a young person in that position, particularly when it is unlikely to make any difference to the outcome of this appeal.
[63]The affidavit signed by [B] and presented in this hearing indicates, in my view, that he still has the capability of causing emotional distress to the aggrieved and has no hesitation in supplying material to that effect.
Under s 69ZX of the Act, the Court is entitled, but is not bound, to accept a finding of another tribunal on a matter of relevance. Notwithstanding the submission by Mr Myron that I should not do so, in my view, this is an appropriate case where I should adopt the findings made by the learned District Court Judge set out above. The timing of the published decision has become an important issue.
The decision was dated late 2023 and is annexed to an affidavit of the father that was filed and sealed on 30 November 2023. After those events and for reasons which I explored with the father, as I will soon identify, the father, I find, allowed B to prepare and swear an affidavit on 5 December 2023 which the father filed in this Court and relies upon. I will refer shortly to some of the aspects of the evidence given by B, who I accept is now, whilst a child of the parties, an adult who is 20 years of age.
PRINCIPLES
Mr Myron, in his case outline filed late but without objection at 8.56pm on 5 December 2023, identified correctly the principles to be applied when the Court is considering, on an interim basis, whether an application for changing longstanding parenting orders should be disturbed. To put those principles into some context, recorded at [33]–[35] of the Full Court decision of Stern & Colli (2022) 65 Fam LR 548, the Court identified the principles that had developed since the original Rice & Asplund decision in 1979 and succinctly summarised, by the adoption of the remarks of the Full Court in another decision of Defrey & Radnor [2021] FamCAFC 67 at [22], that:
The primary judge’s task was a two-staged process: first, to making findings of fact as to what changes there had been in circumstances since the making of the 2015 orders; and, secondly, to assess whether or not the father had established that these changes are sufficient to provoke a new enquiry, or put in another way, whether the father has established a prima facie case of changed circumstances that would justify embarking on a second contested parenting hearing as being in the children’s best interests.
THE FIRST ISSUE – CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES
The father asserts that there has been a change of circumstances since the orders of Carew J in that he has now, with the benefit of significant work on his part and commitment to a therapeutic and clinical support network, produced evidence to the Court that identifies that his medical conditions now are different than they may have been at the time of the decision of Carew J and, he asserts, explain his behaviour which were the subject of criticisms by Carew J.
He says that he has shown remorse and insight into the behaviours that were the foundation of the decision that the children spend no time with him and that his medical professionals opine that the father is “emotionally balanced and medically stable”. He says that there is no evidence that he has, in any way, not complied fully with the Order of the Court. That could only be a reference to the injunctions restraining him because, as already indicated, there was no basis for him to pursue, under the Orders, any time with the children. He makes this submission on the basis that he says this Court should now be satisfied that he would abide by any orders as we move forward. He says that he is desperate to have a relationship with his two younger sons, having now reconnected B. When asked by the Bench, he indicated that recently Z had reached out to him for a conversation. Z is now, of course, also an adult.
The mother’s position is that here has been no change of circumstances and, in particular, relying on the judgment of the District Court Judge and the father’s conduct in relying upon the affidavit of B at this time, demonstrates that this father has no insight into the reasons why the Judgment of Carew J made findings that resulted in a no time order and, further, that his conduct in engaging B this way is a predictor of how it is likely he will engage the younger children who are less mature and younger than B, if he actually has any time with them. In that regard, it is appropriate to consider the evidence of B that the father chose to put before the Court. The transcript will reveal that the Bench put to him squarely a concern in engaging B in this way. That he did so after reading the judgment, as I infer he did, of the District Court judge only exacerbates my concern.
The father asserts that I should accept B’s evidence at its highest and that it would, at least on a prima facie basis, cause me to be concerned that at this point in time, the children are at risk in the mother’s care, and that of itself would justify proceedings going forward. The essence of the father’s submission is that whilst he has improved himself, there is now evidence that the children are at risks in the mother’s care, and that is a change of circumstances. The father acknowledges that he has no corroborative evidence from any source other than B in relation to risk in the mother’s home. As explained to him, had he, for example, being concerned about the children being exposed to family violence in the mother’s home, it was open to him to seek leave to file a subpoena or to seek information from other sources to confirm that.
It seems clear that B’s comments are almost entirely historical and now being made through the prism of a child who has had a difficult developmental history but has now reconnected with his father and is strongly aligned with him. The evidence of B identifies, in my view, how he has sought to assist his father by engaging his younger siblings in discussions about why they do not want to see their father. He has indicated that he has a right to be heard in this Application. I explained to the father, and he accepted, that B has no such right. He has brought no application to the Court to spend time as an adult with his siblings, for example.
It is hardly surprising that, as a result of the contents of B’s affidavit, which is reflected in some of the behaviour before the signing of the affidavit, that he and the mother are currently estranged. It is not possible on an interim basis, without testing the evidence, to say with certainty whether or not B has been coerced and/or encouraged to swear the affidavit he has by the father. Certainly, that was a finding (namely coercion) that Carew J made on the balance of probabilities when the matter was before her. I make no such finding, which would be contrary to the express sworn evidence of B contained in his affidavit filed 5 December 2023 where, on more than one occasion, he says that his affidavit has been made freely by himself (paragraph 3) and after acknowledging that some of his comments would not be helpful or that it might be harmful for a child to give an affidavit about matters concerning a parent, he declares, however, that (at paragraph 6) “that is for me to decide. I am an adult now” before expressing the view that “I am an adult child of that relationship and I can, and will be heard. I am determined to be heard” (paragraph 7).
The father’s judgment in relying upon the affidavit, however it came into existence, in my view, is the clearest example of how things have not changed. The father was alert to the likely criticism and said that the basis for him doing so was to support the Notice of Risk that he has filed in this Court on 20 April 2022. I do not accept that that is a justifiable basis for him to involve B in this way. In my view, the evidence does not establish that there has been a material substantial change of circumstances since the judgment of Carew J. Furthermore, I invited the father to indicate whether he had any evidence about the two younger children X and Y even wishing to spend time with him. He said the only evidence he has is that from B who either took it upon himself – encouraged overtly or not by the father, I do not know – to engage the younger siblings in a discussion about why they are not wishing to have time with their father.
If I am wrong about the first element of the test to be applied, then for the sake of completeness, I make some findings about the second stage.
ARE THE CHANGES SUFFICIENT TO PROVOKE A NEW INQUIRY?
The father’s desire to spend time with his children is both understandable and appreciated. I have no doubt that he loves his children. I have no doubt he has been distressed by not seeing them now for nearly six years, with time stopping when the events between Z and B occurred in early 2018 (but for some small period of supervised time). However, the facts not in dispute are that at the time of separation, X was six years of age, and Y was four years of age. By the time of the Judgment in 2019, X was 10 years of age, and Y was eight years of age. As a result of the Orders being complied with, as the father promptly acknowledges, these children have had no contact with him for a significant number of years.
The mother gives evidence that they are settled children, happy at school in a happy environment. There is no evidence before me that suggests otherwise. The effect of the matter proceeding further is that that happy environment could be disrupted at a critical stage of their development, with X now being 14 and Y now being 12 years of age. I also take into account that if the matter was to proceed further, it is likely on all the evidence, including the comments made by the District Court judge recently in her judgment, to cause significant stress and anxiety to the mother.
Although untested, in her affidavit relied upon in these proceedings, she indicates her negative feelings about involving the father in her family life now. The findings by Carew J support the genuineness of the feelings at that stage. I am not able, of course, to assess the feelings of the mother at this stage other than to take them as she expresses them. Any disruption to the emotional stability and functioning of the primary (in fact, exclusive) parent of these two young boys is likely to have a significant effect upon them. That detriment needs to be weighed against the benefit of them going through what might be a long process of both investigation, at least given the father’s proposals; some form of supervised time and then, hopefully, in his case, moving to some unsupervised time.
Whilst I can accept that the father’s desires might have been cemented by B moving in with him and his partner in mid-2022, namely, so as to give B an opportunity to engage with his siblings, that is not a test that I can apply in this case. B has the opportunity to negotiate with his mother and see his siblings at the mother’s home. The fact that he has chosen so strongly to attack the mother and to become a witness in this case, with the father’s consent, has, no doubt, caused some difficulties in his relationship with his mother. Notwithstanding that, B says in his affidavit at paragraph 42, that:
I want to be very clear that I love my mother and that I have no hostility towards my mother at all. I have worked through my anger and pain of how I was neglected in her care, and I have arrived at the realisation that after a point of time, we can’t be a child any longer, and we must love our parents despite any hurts or pains, real or imagined.
If his position is as asserted under oath in his affidavit, then he should be able to repair any current difficulties with his mother. There is nothing to suggest, although hurt by his comments in the affidavit, that this mother would want to have no relationship with her eldest child.
I put to the father that his reconnection with B, and on his and B’s evidence, total commitment to each other that has arisen should be a good indicator of what may happen for the other children as they reach adulthood. The father says, and B supports this view, that the father has assisted B in obtaining a professional licence and to be gainfully employed and involved in the community. These can be positive aspects for a child who has, on all the evidence, had a troubled upbringing – not necessarily always because of his own actions, but often because of the conflict he had to endure between the parents and the way he sought immaturely to deal with those issues.
The fact that, perhaps, Z has reached out to the father as an adult is another example of what life teaches us, namely, that even though the Court’s jurisdiction for children only exists until they reach the age of 18, there are many children who thereafter or in the latter years of their adolescence make it clear they wish to have a relationship with a person who they may not have had a relationship with, either as a consequence of Court orders or conduct of parents. I expressed such an observation in court and the mother, I am sure, understood what I was saying, namely, that she cannot predict with certainty how all the children may react when they are adults.
However, to put at risk the current stability X and Y, within a loving household created by the mother (as I am satisfied it is), in these critical stages of their development involving, schooling, peer development, sport, music and other interests so as to pursue the prospect – for that is all it could be – of having a relationship with the father is, in my view, not justified or in the children’s best interests.
I gave the example to the father that before the Court would make any orders about time, it would be necessary, in my view, for the children to be given an opportunity to express any views they had about spending time with their father. If one accepts for a moment the evidence given by B in his affidavit, it is the current view of the children that – or, at least, one of them – they are scared of their father.
B wishes to express the view that this is because of something undertaken by the mother rather than the children’s lived experience. Whatever might be the case, at their age and as s 60CC(2)(b) of the Act makes clear, the wishes of children of this age must be considered. Whilst the children may well be curious as to their father now and whilst the children may have some more memories of happier earlier days when they were younger, there is a real prospect that giving these children an opportunity to indicate if they wish to spend time with the father might itself be therapeutically damaging to them as the mother suggests. Furthermore, there is a real prospect that their wishes might be expressed, as B has found them to be, in strong and unequivocal terms. Little is achieved for the children in putting them through that ordeal.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons I have given, in my view, the father’s Application must and will be dismissed.
The mother has been required to defend this Application over a long period of time. She seeks an order for costs against the father if he was unsuccessful, as he has been. Accordingly, the orders I make today set a timetable for the filing of submissions in respect of costs which will be determined, unless otherwise ordered, in chambers.
I certify that the preceding thirty-five (35) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Baumann. Associate:
Dated: 15 December 2023