FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Myers v Alfred Hospital [2023] FCA 833
File number(s): VID 475 of 2022 Judgment of: WHEELAHAN J Date of judgment: 24 July 2023 Catchwords: HUMAN RIGHTS – alleged unlawful direct discrimination under ss 5, 23, and 24 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) – requirement by law and by policy of a hospital to wear a face mask when visiting a public hospital unless exempt – applicant in possession of a medical letter to effect that she could not wear a face mask because of a skin rash on her face – hospital staff allegedly placed a face shield on applicant without her consent – hospital staff allegedly made applicant sit by herself in a cubicle away from the general waiting area – doctor allegedly threatened not to provide medical services to the applicant – doctor allegedly rendered sub-standard medical services to the applicant – allegations of direct discrimination
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for extension of time - applicant lodged a complaint to the Australian Human Rights Commission alleging unlawful direct discrimination – a delegate of the President of the Commission terminated the complaint – the applicant filed a proceeding in the Court under s 46PO(1) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) – order sought under s 46PO(2) to bring proceeding outside 60 day time limit – insufficient prospects of success to justify grant of leave – application refused
Legislation: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), s 11,
Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth), s 46PO(1), (2), (3A), and (4)(d)
Disability Discrimination Act1992 (Cth), s 4, s 5(1), (2), and (3), s 23(b), (e), s 24(b), (c), 47, and s 122
Disability Discrimination and Other Human Rights Legislation Amendment Act 2009 (Cth)
Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), s 31
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 166(f)
Human Rights Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 1999 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 477A(2)
Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic), s 21 and s 23
Public Health and Wellbeing Act 2008 (Vic), s 203
Stay Safe Directions (Metropolitan Melbourne) (No 3), dated 17 June 2021
Productivity Commission, Report No. 30: Review of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992, published 30 April 2004
Cases cited: Bahonko v Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology [2006] FCA 1325
Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor [1996] HCA 25; 186 CLR 541
Chircop v Technical and Further Education Commission [2022] FCA 1015
Culpin v Scandinavian Tobacco Group Australia [2013] FCCA 1666
Ferrus v Qantas Airways Ltd [2006] FCA 812
Hamilton v New South Wales [2013] NSWSC 1437
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 186; 3 FCR 344
Ingram-Nader v Brinks Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 624; 151 FCR 524
Matthews v Markos [2019] FCA 1827
Purvis v State of New South Wales [2003] HCA 62; 217 CLR 92
Stepien v Department of Human Services [2018] FCA 1062
Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services…
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- Case
- [2023] FCA 833
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court had to decide whether to exercise its discretion under s 46PO(2) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 to allow Myers an extension of time to bring her proceeding. The Court found there was insufficient merit in the application to justify an extension of time. The Court was not satisfied there was a reasonable case that the injuries Myers claimed were due to unlawful discrimination. The Court found that the significant delay by Myers of six-and-a-half months for which no responsibility could be attributed to the respondent weighed against granting an extension of time.
The Court refused Myers' application for an extension of time. The Court found there was insufficient merit in the application to justify an extension of time, given the significant delay by Myers. The Court will hear the parties on costs. Myers was initially self-represented but was assisted pro bono by Mr Rolf Sorensen of the Victorian Bar.
The Court found that the 60-day limit serves to provide prospective respondents with legal certainty and finality. The respondent argued that prejudice may occur if the time limit expires and the respondent is later exposed to litigation. The Court found prejudice to be a neutral consideration, given the respondent only faintly argued the question. The Court found there was insufficient merit in Myers' claims to justify an extension of time.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicant’s originating application in the proceeding is dismissed.
2. There be no order as to costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The respondent submitted that one might infer that one of the purposes of the 60-day limit is to ensure that prospective respondents, once the 60-day limit has expired, are entitled to rely upon the presumptive legal certainty and finality indicated by the existence of that limit. As counsel for the respondent submitted at the hearing, a respondent before the Commission, after the termination of the relevant applicant’s complaint and the effluxion of 60 days, might be entitled to assume “well, that’s over, we can close the file”. There is some overlap between this submission and the question of prejudice – that is, that prejudice may occur to a respondent, who has relied upon the expiration of the time limit as indicating the end of the risk of litigation being brought against it, where that respondent is once again exposed to litigation and all of what comes with defending a legal proceeding as a result of a grant of an extension of time. At the hearing, counsel for the respondent made submissions of the sort just discussed in the context of prejudice as a relevant consideration. ConsiderationThe nature of, and reasons for, the delay in bringing the proceeding The applicant’s evidence that her claim is made in good faith was unchallenged. So too was her evidence that she did not see the reference to the 60-day time limit in the letter from the Commission until it was specifically drawn to her attention on 25 October 2022. The applicant’s persistent efforts to seek redress for her grievances through all the channels to which I referred at [29] above provide circumstantial support for the applicant’s evidence that she did not take notice of the 60-day time limit that was referred to in the letter of 8 December 2021 that accompanied the termination of her complaint. I therefore accept the applicant’s evidence of her reasons for the delay in commencing a proceeding. However, the acceptance of the applicant’s evidence does not carry with it a conclusion that her explanation is acceptable, when viewed objectively. Weight must be given to the fact that there is a prima facie 60-day limit, which the applicant exceeded by a considerable margin, and where she must bear some responsibility for her oversight. This is not a circumstance where the applicant is “without fault”: see, Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor [1996] HCA 25; 186 CLR 541 (Taylor) at 555 (McHugh J). The practical consequence of this interim conclusion is to direct greater attention to questions of prejudice and merits.Prejudice to the respondent Prejudice to a respondent may exist generally. For instance, in Taylor, the High Court considered whether the discretion under s 31 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) should have been exercised to grant an extension of a limitation period. In addressing the question of prejudice, McHugh J at 556 stated that long delay may give rise to a presumption of prejudice. The nature and extent of any prejudice is fact-dependant, and specific prejudice may carry greater weight than general prejudice. Further, general or presumed prejudice may carry more weight where the delay is lengthy as opposed to a short delay. Here, the respondent argued the question of prejudice only faintly, and accepted that prejudice was arguably a neutral consideration. I agree.The merits of the applicant’s claims