Myers v Alfred Hospital

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Myers v Alfred Hospital [2023] FCA 833  

File number(s): VID 475 of 2022
Judgment of: WHEELAHAN J
Date of judgment: 24 July 2023
Catchwords:

HUMAN RIGHTS – alleged unlawful direct discrimination under ss 5, 23, and 24 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) – requirement by law and by policy of a hospital to wear a face mask when visiting a public hospital unless exempt – applicant in possession of a medical letter to effect that she could not wear a face mask because of a skin rash on her face – hospital staff allegedly placed a face shield on applicant without her consent – hospital staff allegedly made applicant sit by herself in a cubicle away from the general waiting area – doctor allegedly threatened not to provide medical services to the applicant – doctor allegedly rendered sub-standard medical services to the applicant – allegations of direct discrimination

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for extension of time - applicant lodged a complaint to the Australian Human Rights Commission alleging unlawful direct discrimination – a delegate of the President of the Commission terminated the complaint – the applicant filed a proceeding in the Court under s 46PO(1) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) – order sought under s 46PO(2) to bring proceeding outside 60 day time limit – insufficient prospects of success to justify grant of leave – application refused

Legislation:

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), s 11,

Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth), s 46PO(1), (2), (3A), and (4)(d)

Disability Discrimination Act1992 (Cth), s 4, s 5(1), (2), and (3), s 23(b), (e), s 24(b), (c), 47, and s 122

Disability Discrimination and Other Human Rights Legislation Amendment Act 2009 (Cth)

Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), s 31

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 166(f)

Human Rights Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 1999 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 477A(2)

Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic), s 21 and s 23

Public Health and Wellbeing Act 2008 (Vic), s 203

Stay Safe Directions (Metropolitan Melbourne) (No 3), dated 17 June 2021

Productivity Commission, Report No. 30: Review of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992, published 30 April 2004

Cases cited:

Bahonko v Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology [2006] FCA 1325

Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor [1996] HCA 25; 186 CLR 541

Chircop v Technical and Further Education Commission [2022] FCA 1015

Culpin v Scandinavian Tobacco Group Australia [2013] FCCA 1666

Ferrus v Qantas Airways Ltd [2006] FCA 812

Hamilton v New South Wales [2013] NSWSC 1437

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 186; 3 FCR 344

Ingram-Nader v Brinks Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 624; 151 FCR 524

Matthews v Markos [2019] FCA 1827

Purvis v State of New South Wales [2003] HCA 62; 217 CLR 92

Stepien v Department of Human Services [2018] FCA 1062

Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services…

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Details
Case
[2023] FCA 833
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Myers, sought an extension of time to bring a proceeding against Alfred Hospital for alleged unlawful discrimination based on disability under the Disability Discrimination Act 1992. Myers attended the hospital for a medical appointment and procedure at its Bariatric Clinic on 24 June 2021, during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. She had a medical certificate stating she could not wear a mask due to a skin rash. Myers alleges that hospital staff placed a face shield on her, made her sit in an isolated cubicle, threatened to refuse her medical services, and provided her with sub-standard care. The hospital denies these allegations. Myers filed a complaint with the Australian Human Rights Commission, which was terminated on 8 December 2021. Myers filed a proceeding in the Court on 23 August 2022, beyond the 60-day time limit.

The Court had to decide whether to exercise its discretion under s 46PO(2) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 to allow Myers an extension of time to bring her proceeding. The Court found there was insufficient merit in the application to justify an extension of time. The Court was not satisfied there was a reasonable case that the injuries Myers claimed were due to unlawful discrimination. The Court found that the significant delay by Myers of six-and-a-half months for which no responsibility could be attributed to the respondent weighed against granting an extension of time.

The Court refused Myers' application for an extension of time. The Court found there was insufficient merit in the application to justify an extension of time, given the significant delay by Myers. The Court will hear the parties on costs. Myers was initially self-represented but was assisted pro bono by Mr Rolf Sorensen of the Victorian Bar.

The Court found that the 60-day limit serves to provide prospective respondents with legal certainty and finality. The respondent argued that prejudice may occur if the time limit expires and the respondent is later exposed to litigation. The Court found prejudice to be a neutral consideration, given the respondent only faintly argued the question. The Court found there was insufficient merit in Myers' claims to justify an extension of time.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant’s originating application in the proceeding is dismissed.

2. There be no order as to costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant seeks an extension of time within which to bring a proceeding against the respondent alleging direct discrimination on the basis of disability. The applicant could have commenced a proceeding by 7 February 2022, being within 60 days of the date of issue of a notice of termination of a complaint made by the applicant to the Australian Human Rights Commission: see, Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth), s 46PO(2). Instead, a further period of six-and-a-half months elapsed before, on 23 August 2022, the applicant sought to engage the jurisdiction of the Court. The question on this application is whether, in the exercise of the Court’s discretion under s 46PO(2) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act, the Court should allow the applicant further time within which to make an application alleging unlawful discrimination.Background The applicant claims that the respondent discriminated against her when she attended the Alfred Hospital for a medical appointment and procedure at its Bariatric Clinic on 24 June 2021. At the time, the applicant was suffering from a skin rash on her face. The timing of her attendance coincided with the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, and public and private policies were in place to mitigate the risk of the spread of the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) that was causing COVID-19, including the requirement to wear masks in public places and elsewhere. The Alfred adopted policies whereby, subject to some exceptions, all persons within the hospital’s premises were required to wear masks or face shields and which promoted social distancing. The applicant had a medical certificate from a medical practitioner dated 21 June 2021 stating that she had a rash that was likely to have been caused by mask-wearing, and that she was advised not to wear a mask until her condition resolved. The applicant alleges that the respondent engaged in conduct said to amount to unlawful discrimination, including making her wear a face shield, making her sit in an isolated cubicle away from the general waiting area, threatening to refuse to provide medical services to her, and providing her with sub-standard medical care. The respondent denies these allegations. The applicant claims that she made a complaint to the Australian Human Rights Commission on the day of the alleged conduct, namely 24 June 2021. Documents before the Court suggest that the applicant made an online complaint to the Commission in late July 2021. The precise date of the complaint is immaterial. A delegate of the President of the Commission issued a notice of termination dated 8 December 2021 pursuant to s 46PH(2) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act, stating that the delegate was satisfied that there was no reasonable prospect of the matter being settled by conciliation. A letter containing the delegate’s reasons for the termination advised the applicant of her ability to apply to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia or this Court to have the allegations decided by a court. The letter specifically stated that an application to a court must be made within 60 days of the date on the notice of termination.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

As to the loss and damage that the applicant claims that she has suffered, I am not satisfied that there is a reasonable case that the damage alleged was because of any conduct of the respondent amounting to unlawful discrimination. While this application was not the trial of the proceeding, and the parties were not required to bring forward their entire evidentiary cases, the opinions of Associate Professor Gin which I summarised at [16] were unchallenged. Given those opinions, there was at least some onus on the applicant to advance a contradictory medical case so as to raise a reasonable triable issue in relation to those opinions. Further, even on the assumption that the applicant sustained injury as a result of the requirement to wear a face shield, or to wait in a cubicle at the hospital, I am not satisfied that there is a reasonable case that this was because of any unlawful discrimination, as distinct from injury that might have been incidental to the application and wearing of the face shield, or the state of the air-conditioning in the cubicle, or as a result of what appears to have been the applicant’s general state of agitation while on the hospital premises.Conclusions There is insufficient merit in the application to justify an extension of time. That evaluation is against the background of the significant delay by the applicant of six-and-a-half months for which no responsibility may be attributed to the respondent. For these reasons, I refuse the applicant’s application. I will hear the parties on costs.Pro bono counsel The applicant was initially self-represented in this application. Mr Rolf Sorensen of the Victorian Bar accepted a referral from the Court to give pro bono assistance to the applicant. Mr Sorensen undertook a considerable amount of work, including drawing the proposed amended originating application, two affidavits, written submissions, and his appearance before the Court at the hearing of the application. This had the result that the applicant’s case was presented in a very organised and coherent way that was of great assistance. Mr Sorensen is to be commended for the service that he provided.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The respondent submitted that one might infer that one of the purposes of the 60-day limit is to ensure that prospective respondents, once the 60-day limit has expired, are entitled to rely upon the presumptive legal certainty and finality indicated by the existence of that limit. As counsel for the respondent submitted at the hearing, a respondent before the Commission, after the termination of the relevant applicant’s complaint and the effluxion of 60 days, might be entitled to assume “well, that’s over, we can close the file”. There is some overlap between this submission and the question of prejudice – that is, that prejudice may occur to a respondent, who has relied upon the expiration of the time limit as indicating the end of the risk of litigation being brought against it, where that respondent is once again exposed to litigation and all of what comes with defending a legal proceeding as a result of a grant of an extension of time. At the hearing, counsel for the respondent made submissions of the sort just discussed in the context of prejudice as a relevant consideration. ConsiderationThe nature of, and reasons for, the delay in bringing the proceeding The applicant’s evidence that her claim is made in good faith was unchallenged. So too was her evidence that she did not see the reference to the 60-day time limit in the letter from the Commission until it was specifically drawn to her attention on 25 October 2022. The applicant’s persistent efforts to seek redress for her grievances through all the channels to which I referred at [29] above provide circumstantial support for the applicant’s evidence that she did not take notice of the 60-day time limit that was referred to in the letter of 8 December 2021 that accompanied the termination of her complaint. I therefore accept the applicant’s evidence of her reasons for the delay in commencing a proceeding. However, the acceptance of the applicant’s evidence does not carry with it a conclusion that her explanation is acceptable, when viewed objectively. Weight must be given to the fact that there is a prima facie 60-day limit, which the applicant exceeded by a considerable margin, and where she must bear some responsibility for her oversight. This is not a circumstance where the applicant is “without fault”: see, Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor [1996] HCA 25; 186 CLR 541 (Taylor) at 555 (McHugh J). The practical consequence of this interim conclusion is to direct greater attention to questions of prejudice and merits.Prejudice to the respondent Prejudice to a respondent may exist generally. For instance, in Taylor, the High Court considered whether the discretion under s 31 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) should have been exercised to grant an extension of a limitation period. In addressing the question of prejudice, McHugh J at 556 stated that long delay may give rise to a presumption of prejudice. The nature and extent of any prejudice is fact-dependant, and specific prejudice may carry greater weight than general prejudice. Further, general or presumed prejudice may carry more weight where the delay is lengthy as opposed to a short delay. Here, the respondent argued the question of prejudice only faintly, and accepted that prejudice was arguably a neutral consideration. I agree.The merits of the applicant’s claims