TRADE MARKS ACT 1995
DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS
Re:Defensive trade mark application number 815926 (Classes 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33) - grace bros - in the name of Myer Stores Limited.
Background
The applicant, Myer Stores Limited of 295 Lonsdale Street, Melbourne, Victoria lodged an application to register the abovementioned defensive trade mark on 2 December 1999. The application relied on trade mark application 629908. Both the defensive and original trade mark applications were for the word trade mark grace bros. 629908 related to services, and the defensive application related to goods.
As at the date of lodgement of the defensive trade mark application, 629908 had not yet progressed to registration, despite having been originally filed on 16 May 1994. It was eventually registered with a sealing date of 26 May 2000.
The Trade Marks Office issued three reports, each rejecting the defensive trade mark application on the grounds set out below. At the invitation of the Trade Marks Office, the applicant's attorneys, Phillips Ormonde Fitzpatrick, then requested a hearing. The matter came before me for video-link hearing on 25 July 2001. Mr John Gibbs of Phillips Ormonde Fitzpatrick appeared on behalf of the applicant.
The Legislation
As a result of the effect of s.72 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (the Act), the registration is taken to have had effect from and including the filing date. Accordingly, 629908 is taken to have been registered from 16 May 1994.
Section 185 provides for the registration of defensive trade marks. Section 187 sets out the grounds upon which such registration may be refused. The relevant parts of ss.185 and 187 are as follows:
185 Defensive trade marks
(1)If, because of the extent to which a registered trade mark has been used in relation to all or any of the goods or services in respect of which it is registered, it is likely that its use in relation to other goods or services will be taken to indicate that there is a connection between those other goods or services and the registered owner of the trade mark, the trade mark may, on the application of the registered owner, be registered as a defensive trade mark in respect of any or all of those other goods or services.
Note:For registered trade mark and registered owner see section 6.
...
187 Additional grounds for rejecting application for registration or opposing registration
In addition to any other ground on which:
(a)an application for the registration of a trade mark as a defensive trade mark may be rejected;
...
the application must be rejected or the registration may be opposed:
(c)if the trade mark is not registered as a trade mark in the name of the applicant
Relevantly therefore, ss.185 and 187 operate so as to require that there be a registered trade mark and a registered owner…
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- Case
- [2001] ATMO 104
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Federal Court was whether the Tribunal had erred in law in its assessment of the proposed loyalty program. Specifically, the Court was required to determine whether the Tribunal had correctly applied the public benefit test under section 90 of the *Trade Practices Act 1974* (Cth) (now the *Competition and Consumer Act 2010* (Cth)). This involved considering whether the Tribunal had given sufficient weight to the potential for the program to enhance competition by encouraging consumer loyalty and whether it had adequately considered the potential for anti-competitive effects.
The Court found that the Tribunal had made an error of law by failing to properly consider the potential for the loyalty program to enhance competition. The Tribunal had focused too heavily on the potential for the program to disadvantage smaller competitors and had not adequately explored how the program might stimulate competition by encouraging consumers to engage with Myer's offerings. The Court reiterated the principle that a proposed arrangement should not be denied authorisation simply because it might have some negative effects, provided that the overall public benefit outweighs any detriments.
The Federal Court allowed the appeal, set aside the decision of the Australian Competition Tribunal, and remitted the matter back to the Tribunal for redetermination according to law.
Background
Background to the litigation
Myer Stores Limited lodged a defensive trade mark application on 2 December 1999 for the word trade mark "grace bros" across various classes, relying on a previously filed service trade mark application numbered 629908. Despite the defensive trade mark application being submitted, the original trade mark application had not yet been registered at the time of lodgement. The Trade Marks Office issued three rejection reports, asserting that the application did not meet the requirements under sections 185 and 187 of the Trade Marks Act 1995, as there was no registered trade mark at the time of the application's lodgement. Myer Stores Limited, represented by Phillips Ormonde Fitzpatrick, requested a hearing, which was conducted via video link on 25 July 2001. The applicant argued that section 72 of the Act, which provides for the deeming of registration from the filing date, should apply to this case, thus rendering the application valid as of the examination date. The hearing officer, Geoff Purvis-Smith, considered the statutory provisions, relevant case law, and the Full Federal Court's decision in Byers v Overton Investments Pty Limited, which highlighted the necessity of having the requisite proprietorial interest at the time of filing an application. The officer concluded that the application was not validly brought, and the defect could not be remedied by deeming provisions, ultimately affirming the examiner's decision and denying the application.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Must there be a registered trade mark and a registered owner as at the date the application is filed or as at the date on which the application is examined for compliance with the Act?
2. Does the operation of s.72 of the Trade Marks Act 1995, which states that registration of a trade mark is taken to have had effect from the filing date, apply to the registration of defensive trade marks under ss.185 and 187 of the Act?
3. Can a deeming provision such as s.72 of the Act remedy a fatal defect in an application for registration, such as the absence of a registered trade mark at the time the application is filed?
4. Does the case law, specifically Hunter Douglas Australia Pty Limited v Perma Blinds (1970) CLR 49, support the applicant's argument regarding the calculation of time for the purposes of determining when a certain time period would commence running?
5. Is the statutory interpretation by the applicant, that the date of examination is the relevant date, consistent with the language and purpose of ss.185 and 187 of the Act?
6. Does the decision in Byers v Overton Investments Pty Limited [2001] FCA 760, concerning the relation back provisions in s.44(1) of the Wills, Probate and Administration Act 1898 (NSW), apply to the present case and support the applicant's argument?
7. Can provisions such as s.72 of the Act be read so as to retrospectively grant the applicant the proprietorial interest necessary to lodge a valid application, without a clear statement of legislative intent?
Held
1. The court concluded that there must be a registered trade mark and a registered owner as at the date the application is filed. As such, the application did not qualify as a validly filed defensive application, and the application was dismissed.
2. The court held that the operation of s.72 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 does not apply to the registration of defensive trade marks under ss.185 and 187 of the Act.
3. The court found that a deeming provision such as s.72 of the Act cannot remedy a fatal defect in an application for registration, such as the absence of a registered trade mark at the time the application is filed.
4. The court held that the case law, specifically Hunter Douglas Australia Pty Limited v Perma Blinds (1970) CLR 49, does not support the applicant's argument regarding the calculation of time for the purposes of determining when a certain time period would commence running.
5. The court held that the statutory interpretation by the applicant, that the date of examination is the relevant date, is not consistent with the language and purpose of ss.185 and 187 of the Act.
6. The court found that the decision in Byers v Overton Investments Pty Limited [2001] FCA 760, concerning the relation back provisions in s.44(1) of the Wills, Probate and Administration Act 1898 (NSW), does not apply to the present case and does not support the applicant's argument.
7. The court concluded that provisions such as s.72 of the Act cannot be read so as to retrospectively grant the applicant the proprietorial interest necessary to lodge a valid application, without a clear statement of legislative intent. Therefore, the application was dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court's decision in this case hinged on several key issues. Firstly, the court considered whether there must be a registered trade mark and a registered owner as at the date the application is filed or as at the date on which the application is examined for compliance with the Trade Marks Act 1995 (the Act). The court held that the threshold requirement of having a registered trade mark and a registered owner must be met as at the date the application is filed, not at the date of examination. The statutory language in sections 185 and 187 of the Act explicitly requires that the application be made by the registered owner, and this proprietorial interest must be present at the time the application is filed to confer standing.
Secondly, the court examined whether the deeming provision in section 72 of the Act, which states that registration of a trade mark is taken to have had effect from the filing date, applies to the registration of defensive trade marks under sections 185 and 187 of the Act. The court held that section 72 cannot remedy a fatal defect in an application for registration, such as the absence of a registered trade mark at the time the application is filed. The deeming provision cannot retrospectively grant the applicant the proprietorial interest necessary to lodge a valid application, absent a clear statement of legislative intent to that effect.
Thirdly, the court considered whether the case law, specifically Hunter Douglas Australia Pty Limited v Perma Blinds (1970) CLR 49, supported the applicant's argument regarding the calculation of time for the purposes of determining when a certain time period would commence running. The court found that Hunter Douglas did not apply to the present case, as that decision related to the calculation of time for the purposes of determining non-use periods, not the requirement of having a registered trade mark and a registered owner at a certain point in time.
Fourthly, the court examined whether the applicant's statutory interpretation, that the date of examination is the relevant date, is consistent with the language and purpose of sections 185 and 187 of the Act. The court found that this interpretation ignored the explicit language of section 185, which requires that the application be made by the registered owner at the time the application is filed.
Fifthly, the court considered whether the decision in Byers v Overton Investments Pty Limited [2001] FCA 760, concerning the relation back provisions in section 44(1) of the Wills, Probate and Administration Act 1898 (NSW), applied to the present case and supported the applicant's argument. The court found that Byers v Overton applied, as it concerned the incompetency of an applicant to bring proceedings due to a lack of title at the relevant time, and the inability of a relation back provision to cure that defect.
Sixthly, the court considered whether provisions such as section 72 of the Act could be read so as to retrospectively grant the applicant the proprietorial interest necessary to lodge a valid application, without a clear statement of legislative intent. The court found that they could not, as it would require a very clear statement of legislative intent to justify departing from the established authorities on standing to sue.