DECISION
| Fair Work Act 2009 |
| s.604 - Appeal of decisions |
| Mustafa Hodzic |
| v |
| Bing Lee Electronic Pty Ltd T/A Bing Lee |
| (C2015/1830) |
| VICE PRESIDENT CATANZARITI |
| SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT HARRISON |
SYDNEY, 6 MAY 2015
COMMISSIONER BULL
Appeal against refusal to extend time for lodging an unfair dismissal application [2015] FWC
1278 - s.394(3) - no public interest in appeal identified - permission to appeal refused -
appeal dismissed.
[1] On 24 October 2014, Mustafa Hodzic (the appellant) was dismissed from his
employment with Bing Lee Electronic Pty Ltd T/A Bing Lee (the respondent). Mr Hodzic
subsequently lodged an application for an unfair dismissal remedy pursuant to s.394 of the
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the Act) on 21 January 2015.
[2] An application for an unfair dismissal remedy must be made within 21 days after the
dismissal takes effect or within such further time as the Fair Work Commission (the
Commission) allows under s.394(3) of the Act.
[3] The application was filed outside the statutory time limit. In making the application
the appellant acknowledged the late filing and stated at question 1.4 of the Form F2 - Unfair
Dismissal Application:
“I did not know about 21 days requirement until 17 January 2015 when my daughter
told me to google unfairly sacked at work in NSW. I never (sic) been sacked before
this incident and I was trying to talk to my ex employer to see whether they are willing
to let me go back to my job.”
[4] Section 396 of the Act provides that before the Commission determines the merits of
an unfair dismissal application, it must first decide a number of jurisdictional matters, one of
which relates to the 21-day period in which to file the application:
“396 The FWC must decide the following matters relating to an application for an
order under Division 4 before considering the merits of the application:
(a) whether the application was made within the period required in subsection
394(2) ..."
[5] If an unfair dismissal application is filed out of time, the Commission is able to extend
the time for filing where satisfied that “exceptional circumstances” exist, having taken into
account a number of factors listed in s.394(3) of the Act.
[6] On 23 January 2015, Deputy President Sams requested in writing that the appellant
provide a written statement within 14 days explaining why the time period for filing should be
extended based on there being “exceptional circumstances”. The matters that the Commission
must take into account were listed in the correspondence to the appellant. The respondent was
not required to make any submission.
[7] On 28 January 2015, the appellant responded via email stating that he was unaware of
the 21-day time limit until 18 January 2015 and that as soon as he became aware of the time
limit, he lodged the application.
[8] There were no relevant facts in dispute that would have required the Deputy President
to conduct a conference or hold a hearing…
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- Case
- [2015] FWCFB 3014
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue in this appeal is whether the Commission erred in refusing to extend the time for Hodzic to file his unfair dismissal application. Under section 394(3) of the Fair Work Act 2009, the Commission may extend the time for filing if it is satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist, taking into account various specified factors. The Deputy President found that Hodzic had not demonstrated exceptional circumstances warranting an extension. Hodzic argues that the Deputy President did not properly consider the factors and that the decision manifests an injustice.
The Fair Work Commission Full Bench, in dismissing the appeal, held that there were no public interest considerations sufficient to warrant an appeal. The grounds of appeal did not identify any alleged error by the Deputy President. While Hodzic's unfamiliarity with the process and late filing were noted, they did not constitute exceptional circumstances as required by the statute. The Full Bench found that the Deputy President had not erred in his consideration of the factors under section 394(3), and that the decision was not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed, and permission to appeal was refused.
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