IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M26 of 1996
B e t w e e n -
DANIEL FRANCIS MURPHY
Applicant
and
HOWARD OBST, ANTHONY HOOPER and DAVID WELLS as members of the APPEAL COSTS BOARD
Respondents
Application for special leave to appeal
DAWSON J
McHUGH J
KIRBY J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT MELBOURNE ON MONDAY, 5 AUGUST 1996, AT 12.07 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR W.F. LALLY, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR J.B.R. BEACH, for the applicant. (instructed by Coadys)
MR R.H. GILLIES, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR D. MASEL, for the respondents. (instructed by R.C. Beazley, Victorian Government Solicitor)
DAWSON J: Yes, Mr Lally.
MR LALLY: May we go directly to the special leave questions that have been addressed by the respondents in their summary of argument which meet head on the question as to whether or not this was a case that involved one issue or whether the court had before it a number of issues. There was the statutory interpretation of section 18 which we have submitted was a case that was limited to determination by the primary judge and by the Court of Appeal solely to the question of whether or not an applicant who had been successful in the Criminal Court of Appeal and had a new trial ordered had to prove that he had incurred additional costs which triggered off the entitlement then to, as it were, start again in respect of his second trial or whether the legislation was to be interpreted such that that second trial had to in fact commence.
There were of course subsidiary arguments then as to whether, if we failed on that ground, in the circumstances of this particular case where the trial judge who had been selected heard preliminary argument, was that in fact a trial for the purposes of this legislation.
DAWSON J: So the question was, what was the contingency which triggered the right to an order under the Act under the section?
MR LALLY: Yes.
DAWSON J: Could you separate that out in the circumstances from the matter of quantum?
MR LALLY: Yes, with respect.
DAWSON J: You could not on the judgments which were delivered in the Court of Appeal, could you, the majority anyway.
MR LALLY: In this respect, the judgment in respect of the majority, when they come to the second part of section 18, go back and link the words “incurring additional costs” to ‑ ‑ ‑
DAWSON J: But what they say is you have to incur additional costs subsequent to the first trial and that then entitles you to recover those costs as costs thrown away in the first trial.
MR LALLY: Yes.
DAWSON J: So that the contingency is, as it were, linked with the quantum inevitably.
MR LALLY: The contingency, however, as to the way in…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Murphy v Obst and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [1996] HCATrans 213
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was whether section 117 of the *Constitution*, which prohibits discrimination against residents of other states, had been contravened by the impugned state legislation. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the tax imposed a burden on interstate businesses that was not imposed on intrastate businesses, thereby constituting unlawful discrimination.
The Court's reasoning focused on the purpose and scope of section 117. It was held that the section is designed to ensure that residents of one state are not subject to discriminatory disabilities when they are in another state, or when they are carrying on business there. The Court analysed the specific provisions of the state tax and compared its operation on interstate businesses with its operation on intrastate businesses. The majority found that the tax did not discriminate in a manner prohibited by section 117, as any differential treatment was justified by legitimate state interests and did not create a burden solely by reason of interstate status.
The High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the validity of the state legislation.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.