Murphy and Murphy (Child support)
[2016] AATA 2001
•13 May 2016
Murphy and Murphy (Child support) [2016] AATA 2001 (13 May 2016)
DIVISION: Social Services & Child Support Division
APPLICANT: Mr Murphy
OTHER PARTIES: Mrs Murphy
Child Support Registrar
DECISION DATE: 13 May 2016
DECISION
The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and, in substitution, decides that:
Mr Murphy’s objection is allowed;
For the period from 2 April 2015 until there is a child support terminating event in respect of [Child 1]:
(a) Mrs Murphy’s child support income is varied to $56,000; and
(b) Mr Murphy’s child support income is varied to $230,000; and
For the period from 2 April 2015 until there is a child support terminating event in respect of [Child 1], the annual rate of child support payable by Mrs Murphy is varied, by adding the following amounts:
(a) For the period from 2 April 2015 to 31 December 2015, $23,830;
(b) For the period from 1 January 2016 to 31 December 2016, $12,570; and
(c) From 1 January 2017 until the occurrence of a child support terminating event, $13,200.
CATCHWORDS
Child Support - Departure determination - School fees - Income and financial resources of parent - Liquid assets - Decision under review set aside and substituted.
Names used in all published decisions are pseudonyms. Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been removed from this decision and replaced with generic information so as not to identify involved individuals as required by subsections 16(2AB)-16(2AC) of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988.
REASONS FOR DECISION
BACKGROUND
Mr Murphy and Mrs Murphy are the parents of [Child 2], aged 17 and [Child 1], aged 16. As at 2 April 2015, the children were recorded as being in the care of Mr Murphy for 90% of the time, and in the care of Mrs Murphy for 10% of the time.
With regard to those percentages of care and the parents’ recorded adjusted taxable incomes of $0, Mrs Murphy was liable to pay Mr Murphy child support at a rate of $2,644 per year. That rate is called the fixed annual rate, which is a special rate prescribed by the child support law in cases in which the basic formula would otherwise produce a lower rate payable by a person who did not receive any Commonwealth income support in the relevant tax year.
On 2 April 2015, Mr Murphy lodged an application of a type commonly referred to as an application for a change of assessment. I shall refer to it as an application for a departure determination. Mr Murphy completed the application form such that he asserted that there were extra costs because the children were being educated in the manner expected by the parents (specifically, private school fees) and that Mrs Murphy’s income, property, financial resources and/or earning capacity were not correctly reflected in the assessment. In the form, he stated that he suggested that a correct assessment would have Mrs Murphy paying $50,000 per year child support.
Initially, the Registrar modified the assessment by varying Mrs Murphy’s adjusted taxable income from $0 to $60,000 and Mr Murphy’s adjusted taxable income from $0 to $120,000. The result was that Mrs Murphy was liable to pay Mr Murphy child support at the rate of $9,426 per year.
Mrs Murphy objected and was partly successful. The objections officer, as the delegate of the Registrar, changed the decision such that Mrs Murphy’s adjusted taxable income was varied to $64,000 and Mr Murphy’s to $308,000. These changes meant that the Mrs Murphy was liable to pay Mr Murphy child support of $5,100 per year.
Mr Murphy has applied to the Tribunal for a review of the Registrar’s decision on the objection.
HEARING
As per normal practice for applications for review of decisions concerning applications for departure, I conducted a telephone directions hearing on 20 October 2015, intending to identify the issues, make directions of the parties concerning documents to be provided or other matters and to provide information to the parties about the process, to enable them to present their respective cases at a final hearing.
During that directions hearing, Mrs Murphy was continually disruptive, frequently interrupting either me or Mr Murphy when one of us was attempting to speak and, a number of times, attempting to change the subject of discussion to other matters of questionable relevance. The conduct persisted despite my requests to her to desist. I persevered for a time but ultimately concluded that I was unable to make any progress toward the desired outcomes.
I indicated my concern as to how I could conduct a proper hearing if Mrs Murphy were to again conduct herself in that manner. Mr Murphy indicated that this type of conduct had occurred frequently during their seven years of Family Court litigation and said that he would be willing to have the matter decided without any further hearing.
I issued written directions to the parties. Among other things, I directed each to provide me with submissions as to the costs each incurred in maintaining the children. I asked Mrs Murphy if she consented to the review being conducted without a further hearing (subject to my final decision as to whether the issues could be properly dealt with in that way). I also sought the Registrar’s consent. I noted that I took Mr Murphy’s statement at the directions hearing to be his giving of the relevant consent.
I received submissions and evidence from each parent. Both Mrs Murphy and the Registrar gave written consent for the matter to be dealt with without a hearing. On consideration of the evidence and submissions, I was satisfied that the issues could be adequately determined in the absence of the parties, and as I had received consent from all parties, decided to proceed without a hearing, as per section 34J of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975
ISSUES
Departure determinations are made under Part 6A of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (“the Act”). In that Part, section 98C provides that, for a departure determination to be made, the Registrar must be satisfied that at least one of the grounds set out in the law exists and if so, must also be satisfied that the departure determination made is just and equitable and is otherwise proper.
The grounds to be considered relate to the payment of private school fees for the children and to the income, property or financial resources of each parent.
IS THERE A GROUND FOR DEPARTURE?
School fees
The relevant ground in the Act is in subparagraph 117(b)(i). The ground exists if:
in the special circumstances of the case, the costs of maintaining the child are significantly affected … because the child is being cared for, educated or trained in the manner that was expected by his or her parents…
In 2015, both children were undertaking secondary education at private schools in [State 1]: [Child 2] at [one] College and [Child 1] at [another] College. Mr Murphy provided invoices showing that the fees for 2015 for [Child 2] were $23,720 and for [Child 1], $23,940. The total of just under $48,000 is clearly a cost which significantly affects the cost of maintaining [Child 2] and [Child 1]. The question is whether this was the manner of education expected by both parents.
It is significant that the specific word in the relevant statute is “expected”. That word does not have the same meaning as “agreed” or “intended”, both of which appear in the evidence relating to the issue. Furthermore, the test goes to the question of a past expectation: Mee v Ferguson.[1]
[1] (1986) 84 FLR 179
In this case, Mr Murphy and Mrs Murphy separated when the children were in grades 1 and 2 respectively, each at a private school. Evidently, the children have continued to be schooled privately since then.
Early in the decision process, a Child Support Agency officer recorded a file note of a conversation with Mrs Murphy’s representative, her father, [Mr A].[2] The note relevantly reads:
Discussed income and schooling briefly.
Both children have always been in private education and there is mutual intent.
[2] File note of 28 April 2015, page 41 of the papers.
Mrs Murphy herself attached a typewritten page[3] to the standard form in which she provided the Registrar with a response to Mr Murphy’s application. That page included the following:
He insisted that the children go to private schools.
[3] Page 57 of the papers.
Mr Murphy conceded during the original decision process that he had not discussed with Mrs Murphy the choice of secondary schooling for the children. The senior case officer, considering those circumstances, declined to find that Mr Murphy and Mrs Murphy had expected private secondary education for the children and held that the related ground for departure did not exist.
I take a different view. In my view, children who attend a private primary school are, in general, much more likely than not to go on to attend a private secondary school. At the time at which enrolment at secondary schools was taking place, the children were effectively in the sole care of Mr Murphy. Aware that Mr Murphy “insisted” that the children be privately educated, in the absence of any discussion with him on the topic, Mrs Murphy could only reasonably have expected that [Child 2] and [Child 1] would be going to a private secondary school.
I find that the ground for departure set out in subparagraph 117(b)(i) exists.
Income, property or financial resources
The relevant ground in the Act is in paragraph 117(c). The ground exists if:
in the special circumstances of the case, application in relation to the child of the provisions of this Act relating to administrative assessment of child support would result in an unjust and inequitable determination of the level of financial support to be provided by the liable parent for the child…
(ia) because of the income, property and financial resources of either parent; or
(ib) because of the earning capacity of either parent.
Mr Murphy’s income, property or financial resources
Mr Murphy describes himself as [an occupation]. An internet search indicates that he is a [number]-generation [occupation] and [an office bearer of an association].[4]
[4] [Information deleted.]
Mr Murphy’s Statement of Financial Circumstances indicates that he has property with a total value of just over $8.8 million, a self-managed superannuation fund that he values at $500,000 and liabilities of $600,000. The major items of property are [a named property] (net value given as roughly $4.6 million) and a 4.6% share in “[Business 1]” which he values at $2.4 million. He states that his income is $1,009 per week, made up of “[Business 1] director fees” of $400, income from [production] (“[property name]/[Business 1]”) of $389 (said to be the average over the last 10 years) and $220 per week family tax benefit.
I take the references to “[Business 1]” to refer to the entity named [Business 1] Pty Ltd; Mr [Murphy’s] [property] website states that he is [an office bearer] of that company. [Business 1], on its website, describes itself as set out below (errors in original):
The family owned company currently consists of eight properties around [State 1]; and produces [product in region 1].[5]
[5] [Information deleted.]
Mr Murphy’s taxable incomes since the 2009/2010 year appear in the papers on page X. They are:
2009/2010 $0
2010/2011 $264,914
2011/2012 $115,715
2012/2013 $0
2013/2014 $0.
Mrs Murphy’s income, property or financial resources
In her Statement of Financial Circumstances, Mrs Murphy declares that she has property worth just over $3 million, no superannuation and no liabilities. Her major items of property are her home, valued at $1.125 million and her Commonwealth Bank investments, valued at just under $1.85 million. She stated her income to be $1,044 per week from interest.
Mrs Murphy stated that she is not required to pay tax because of carried forward tax losses. The Registrar’s information indicates that her taxable income has been zero in each year from 2010/2011 to 2013/2014.
The parties’ respective positions
Mr Murphy was the original applicant for a departure determination and is the applicant to this Tribunal. In his original application, as noted above, he expressly suggested that the correct assessment would have Mrs Murphy paying child support at a rate of $50,000. At the directions hearing, he indicated that the figure was born of his frustration at what he perceived to be a long-standing failure on the part of Mrs Murphy to contribute sufficiently to the children’s costs and then a statement by her that she would not pay any child support. I gathered that the figure of $50,000 was not the result of any particular calculation on his part.
I understood that his main grievance concerning the decision of the objections officer concerned the adjusted taxable income figure to which that officer varied his adjusted taxable income ($308,000), as he considers his income to be far less than that.
At the directions hearing, he submitted that primarily he wanted there to be some reasonable contribution by Mrs Murphy to the costs of the children, particularly in light of the amount received by her in the property settlement process (said by Mrs Murphy to be $3.185 million in cash and property; Mr Murphy refers to a figure of $5.5 million but appears to include some payments that were not strictly part of the settlement).
Mrs Murphy’s position, as set out in her objection, is that her expenses exceed her income and, while she acknowledges that she is “in a relatively healthy financial position compared to many people”, her “medical illness and poor health” will prevent her from working, so her assets must support her for the rest of her life. She submits that Mr Murphy is in a much “healthier” financial position than he has disclosed.
In her final written submissions in the matter, Mrs Murphy described the level of child support liable to be paid by her as the result of the objections officer’s decision ($5,100 per year) as just and equitable and expressed a preference for a lower rate “given (Mr Murphy’s capacity to pay”.
WHAT IS A JUST AND EQUITABLE LEVEL OF CHILD SUPPORT?
In deciding whether any particular rate is just and equitable as between the parents and the children, the Act provides guidance in the form of its objects, as stated in sections 3 and 4 (attached) and in the way in which the rate of child support is calculated in the ordinary case. The latter is governed by Part 5 of the Act, pertaining to administrative assessments.
An object of the Act (in paragraph 4(2)(a)) is that parents provide support according to their capacity to provide it and that parents with like capacity should provide like levels of support.
The Part 5 formula requires an assessment of how the costs of supporting the children are distributed, based on the level of care of the child that each parent has; for example, a parent with between 14% and 35% of the care is taken to be providing 24% of the costs of maintaining the child. The workings of the formula then fix a level of child support to be paid so that the total costs of the child are borne by parents in the same proportions that their incomes are of the combined total of their respective incomes. Strictly, the “income” quantity for that purpose is child support income, which is the person’s adjusted taxable income less the statutory self-support amount (the italicised expressions are all defined in the Act).
As at the time of Mr Murphy’s application for departure, the relevant self-support amount was $23,523. It could be said, at least broadly, that that amount of a person’s income is simply unavailable for child support as it represents the person’s own costs for necessary self-support.
Considering the formula provisions in conjunction with the objects of the Act, I consider that Parliament has decided that, in the ordinary case, the appropriate measure of a parent’s capacity to pay is that parent’s child support income.
Any case in which a departure determination is validly made is not an ordinary case. At law, each ground exists only “in the special circumstances of the case”; the word “special” signifies “out of the ordinary”. In this matter, essentially, each party submits that the capacity of the other to contribute to the costs of the children is not properly assessed using only the formula. As the adjusted taxable income of each is zero, it follows that the child support income of each is zero. Even on the very broad analysis of the income, property or financial resources of each above, it is clear that each parent has a substantial capacity to provide support for [Child 2] and [Child 1].
The question is whether the formula level of child support is unjust or inequitable because of the income, property or financial resources. This requires some sort of comparative assessment of their respective capacities to pay. I consider that a just and equitable level of child support would be one that adjusts their respective contributions to the costs of the children such that those contributions are in the same proportions as their capacities to provide support.
In this case, I consider that the differences in the parties’ respective situations make it preferable to adopt a different approach for each in determining that parent’s relevant capacity.
Mrs Murphy’s capacity to provide support
It is relatively easy to assess Mrs Murphy’s actual capacity to provide for the children’s costs. She receives interest at a rate of roughly $54,000 per year. Her necessary costs for self-support do not include payments for income tax, rent or mortgage. The “grossed-up” equivalent of $54,000 nett income is $70,000. That is, Mrs Murphy’s interest income, combined with her carried-forward tax losses that reduce her taxable income of zero, immediately place her in a position equivalent to an ordinary PAYG earner of $70,000 gross per year. That hypothetical person would have a child support income of ($70,000 less the $23,523 self support amount – see paragraph 34) roughly $46,000.
However, that hypothetical ordinary person would be liable for payment for accommodation, generally by way of home loan repayment or rent. Necessarily, a proportion of the statutory self-support amount (the $23,523 above) would represent this expense. As noted, Mrs Murphy’s costs for necessary self-support do not include any such expense. On average, housing costs make up 18% of a person’s expenditure on goods and services.[6] I imagine that some proportion of that total expenditure is on things other than necessities, but will presume that 18% of Mrs Murphy’s nett income (roughly $10,000 per year) would otherwise be directed to housing expenses but, in her case, is available to be expended for other purposes.
[6] >
In combination, I consider that, Mrs Murphy has a capacity to provide child support equivalent to child support income of $56,000 per year. I bear in mind that this equivalence is in relation to income and expense circumstances only. The substantial liquid assets which generate Mrs Murphy’s income are significant, but are best taken into account when considering the actual determination to be made.
Mr Murphy’s capacity to provide support
Mr Murphy’s stated incomes on his Statement of Financial Circumstances appear somewhat flawed, as he appears to have treated a negative amount as if it were positive. In any case, I prefer to approach the question of his capacity from a different angle.
As noted, Mr Murphy is [an occupation] and is involved in [production] on a large scale. It is common knowledge that profits from [this type of] production can vary markedly from year to year, depending on various factors, many of which are not within the [person’s control], notably climatic conditions and market forces. Some years will be good, others bad. [These types of businesses] typically operate on high levels of debt, but in good years profits can be very large. [These] production entities have special provision made for them in taxation law for that and other reasons. From my general understanding of how [these] businesses operate, I consider that I cannot reliably assess the financial status of [an occupation], such as Mr Murphy, on the basis of any particular year in isolation.
In Mr Murphy’s Statement of Financial Circumstances, he discloses expenses that equate to nearly $230,000 per year, far in excess of his and his wife’s stated incomes.[7] I approach that figure conservatively; in my experience, persons estimating their expenses tend to over-estimate rather than underestimate, and the potential for inaccuracy is high when one is asked to estimate a large number of separate expenses of differing periodicity. Even allowing for such error and applying some rounding, I am satisfied that it is likely that the expenses are of the order of $200,000 per year.
[7] Page A1: total personal expenditure of $731 per week plus total household expenditure of $3,660 per week.
However, aside from his home loan, the only stated liability is $300 owed on his two credit cards. He states that he has consistently paid all of [Child 2’s] and [Child 1’s] private school fees. There is no suggestion that he is presently in straitened financial circumstances. His [production] interests are currently in an extended [downturn]because of [climatic condition], but I infer that the stated level of expenditure is indicative of his ordinary (at least in the long term) pattern of expenditure and therefore provides a more reliable indicator of his capacity to support the children than his present income, however assessed.
The stated expenses are household expenses and therefore some are likely to be met from the income of Mr Murphy’s wife. He states her income to be $800 per week from full-time work for [Employer 1]. On the basis that expenses are met from that income, I infer that Mr Murphy’s ordinary expenditure is of the order of $170,000 per year. For a PAYG earner to have that amount after tax would require a taxable income of over $250,000 and therefore a child support income of about $230,000 (rounding down).
Earning capacity
In his application for departure, Mr Murphy asserted a ground for departure relating to Mrs Murphy’s earning capacity. During the process and at hearing, he did not press this issue.
Mrs Murphy’s earning capacity can only have some bearing on the matter if a finding were made that her earning capacity “is greater than is reflected in … her income for the purposes of” the Act. Subsection 117(7B) prohibits such a finding unless three express conditions are satisfied.
The first relates to a decision by the person, either not to work despite ample opportunity to do so, or to change their income-generating activity (such as employment) in a way that reduces their income. There is no suggestion of Mrs Murphy doing the latter and no evidence has been put before me concerning whether there has been ample opportunity for her to work.
The second condition is that the decision or choice referred to above is not justified on the basis of caring responsibilities or health. There is evidence that Mrs Murphy is being treated for a medical condition.
The evidence that is available is not sufficient for me to be satisfied that I can make a finding that Mrs Murphy’s earning capacity is greater than her income and the evidence and manner in which the case has proceeded is such that I do not consider it necessary or desirable to pursue any further evidence. I do not further consider this aspect.
Just and equitable level of child support based on income, property or financial resources of parents
In an ordinary case in which one parent with $230,000 child support income has the sole care of two children over 13 and the other parent has $56,000 child support income, the formula level of child support would be roughly $8,000 per year. As noted above, for Mr Murphy and Mrs Murphy, the formula produced the rate of $2,644 per year.
I find the rate produced by the administrative assessment to be an unjust and inequitable one, given the absolute and relative capacities of the parents to provide support. This ground for departure also exists.
JUST AND EQUITABLE
As at least one ground for departure exists, it is open to me to make a determination departing from the provisions of the law relating to administrative assessment, or in other words, I can lawfully change the way the child support payable is worked out. In considering what determination I make, I must ensure that it is just and equitable as regards Mr Murphy, Mrs Murphy, [Child 2] and [Child 1]: sub-subparagraph 98C(1)(b)(ii)(A).
Period of departure
It is appropriate to first consider the period for which a departure would be put into effect. In my view, presumptively, a departure should not have effect prior to the date of the initiating application; after all, the law leaves it very much up to the parents to initiate such things. I see no good reason in this case to choose any other date from which to give effect to a departure.
In relative terms, the child support case does not have long left to run. [Child 2] turned 18 [in] April 2016, and child support ceased to be payable for her as of that date and [Child 1] turns 18 in 2017. Child support for [Child 1] will end no later than the end of the secondary school year in 2017, during which it is anticipated that he will be in year 12. I consider it appropriate to give effect to any departure until the end of the case; in the context of departure determinations in general, this is a relatively short period.
Proposed determination/s
Consideration of whether a determination is just and equitable requires a particular determination as a starting point. In my view, it is reasonable to start from a determination that reflects the particular grounds for the departure.
My broad views as to the equivalence of each parent’s financial circumstances to an ordinary person with a particular child support income would be reflected in determinations under paragraph 98S(1)(c): varying:
·Mr Murphy’s child support income to $230,000; and
·Mrs Murphy’s child support income to $56,000.
In the absence of any other departure, those determinations would produce an assessment under which Mrs Murphy would be liable to pay just under $8,000 per year from 2 April 2015.
The particular determination to reflect the other ground is perhaps not so clear. A guiding principle is the Family Court’s statement in Mee v Ferguson[8]:
Where the non-custodian has agreed to the child attending a private school, that person is liable to contribute to the fees involved so long as and to the extent that he or she has a reasonable financial capacity to do so.
[8] Note 1
In my experience, the most common approaches are to start from a presumption of equal contribution from each parent (50/50 split) or to apportion the contribution to school fees according to the respective proportion that each parent’s child support income bears to the combined child support incomes. (I note that the latter would be automatically achieved by a determination under paragraph 98S(1)(j) varying the costs of each child by adding the relevant school fees.)
To put this in terms of dollars and cents, and adopting the rate produced by the determinations varying child support income above, the 50/50 approach would make Mrs Murphy liable to pay a little under $32,000 per year, whereas the proportional approach would mean a rate of about $17,500 per year. Of course, those rates would necessarily markedly reduce from the date on which [Child 2] ceased to be a child of the assessment.
In this case, I consider that to adopt the latter approach would ignore the magnitude of Mrs Murphy’s liquid assets, of the order of $1.8 million. The reality is that Mrs Murphy can readily afford to pay whatever rate is fixed with only a minimal effect on her financial circumstances.
I shall therefore also consider a determination varying the rate of child support by an amount of one-half of the school fees for, initially [Child 2] and [Child 1], and later, for [Child 1] alone. I shall assume for this purpose that [Child 1’s] fees will increase by 5% each year.
Specifically, those proposed determinations, under paragraph 98S(1)(a) are to vary the annual rate of child support payable by Mrs Murphy by:
i.For the period from 2 April 2015 to 31 December 2015, adding $23,830;
ii.For the period from 1 January 2016 to 31 December 2016, adding $12,570; and
iii.From 1 January 2017 until the occurrence of a child support terminating event, adding $13,200.
[Child 2’s] tertiary study
I acknowledge Mr Murphy’s evidence that [Child 2] is to attend university in 2016, at a cost that he estimated to be $25,000. I do not consider that the reasoning above concerning an expectation as to private secondary schooling can extend to a university course or courses, and do not consider that the Mee v Ferguson principles apply. I do not consider it just and equitable to add any amount to Mrs Murphy’s child support in respect of the costs of that study.
Factors to be considered under subsection 117(4)
Subsection 117(4) sets out a non-exclusive list of things to which I must have regard in deciding whether a particular determination is just and equitable. I address those below.
· I consider that the said determinations appropriately reflect the duty borne by each parent to support [Child 2] and [Child 1].
· There is no evidence or suggestion that [Child 2’s] and [Child 1’s] proper needs are unusual for children of their respective ages and I am satisfied that the determinations adequately address their needs.
· There is no suggestion that either child has income, property or financial resources of any significance to the review.
· The income, property, financial resources and/or earning capacity of each parent has been adequately considered in coming to the proposed determinations, as have the relevant commitments of the parents.
· I am satisfied that I have properly considered the direct and indirect costs borne by Mr Murphy in maintaining the children.
· The particular determinations are more favourable to Mr Murphy than those of the Registrar, and based on Mr Murphy’s evidence, I am satisfied that no hardship will flow to him or the children if the proposed determinations were to be made. For the reasons set out above, I am also satisfied that no hardship would be caused for Mrs Murphy.
I see no other factors that are relevant to the question. I am satisfied that the proposed determinations are just and equitable.
OTHERWISE PROPER
The requirement that the determinations be otherwise proper relates to the effect of the outcome on any family tax benefit entitlement. I note that Mr Murphy receives family tax benefit. The determinations will increase the rate at which he is entitled to receive child support and will therefore tend to reduce the rate at which he is entitled to receive family tax benefit.
Section 3 of the Act sets out, among other things, that the duty of support for the children is the primary duty of the parents. The result set out is that Mr Murphy will receive less from the Commonwealth for the children because Mrs Murphy will be required to contribute more for their support. I consider it proper that there should be such a redistribution of the burden of maintaining the children.
DECISION
The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and, in substitution, decides that:
i.Mr Murphy’s objection is allowed;
ii.For the period from 2 April 2015 until there is a child support terminating event in respect of [Child 1]:
(a) Mrs Murphy’s child support income is varied to $56,000; and
(b) Mr Murphy’s child support income is varied to $230,000; and
iii.For the period from 2 April 2015 until there is a child support terminating event in respect of [Child 1], the annual rate of child support payable by Mrs Murphy is varied, by adding the following amounts:
(a) For the period from 2 April 2015 to 31 December 2015, $23,830;
(b) For the period from 1 January 2016 to 31 December 2016, $12,570; and
(c) From 1 January 2017 until the occurrence of a child support terminating event, $13,200.
From the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989
3Duty of parents to maintain their children
(1)The parents of a child have the primary duty to maintain the child.
(2)Without limiting subsection (1), the duty of a parent to maintain a child:
(a)is not of lower priority than the duty of the parent to maintain any other child or another person; and
(b)has priority over all commitments of the parent other than commitments necessary to enable the parent to support:
(i)himself or herself; and
(ii)any other child or another person that the parent has a duty to maintain; and
(c)is not affected by:
(i)the duty of any other person to maintain the child; or
(ii)any entitlement of the child or another person to an income tested pension, allowance or benefit.
4Objects of Act
(1)The principal object of this Act is to ensure that children receive a proper level of financial support from their parents.
(2)Particular objects of this Act include ensuring:
(a)that the level of financial support to be provided by parents for their children is determined according to their capacity to provide financial support and, in particular, that parents with a like capacity to provide financial support for their children should provide like amounts of financial support; and
(b)that the level of financial support to be provided by parents for their children should be determined in accordance with the costs of the children; and
(c)that persons who provide ongoing daily care for children should be able to have the level of financial support to be provided for the children readily determined without the need to resort to court proceedings; and
(d)that children share in changes in the standard of living of both their parents, whether or not they are living with both or either of them; and
(e)that Australia is in a position to give effect to its obligations under international agreements or arrangements relating to maintenance obligations arising from family relationship, parentage or marriage.
(3)It is the intention of the Parliament that this Act should be construed, to the greatest extent consistent with the attainment of its objects:
(a)to permit parents to make private arrangements for the financial support of their children; and
(b)to limit interferences with the privacy of persons.
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
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Family Law
Legal Concepts
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Appeal
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Jurisdiction
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Statutory Construction
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Remedies
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