MURNIK v Shire of Dandaragan

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   MURNIK & ANOR -v- SHIRE OF DANDARAGAN [2004] WASC 243

CORAM:   MASTER SANDERSON

HEARD:   28 SEPTEMBER 2004

DELIVERED          :   23 NOVEMBER 2004

FILE NO/S:   CIV 1657 of 2004

BETWEEN:   ANDRES MURNIK

First Plaintiff

RONALD BARRY MAINWARING
Second Plaintiff

AND

SHIRE OF DANDARAGAN
Defendant

Catchwords:

Practice and procedure - Application for leave to bring action against Local Authority - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Limitation Act 1935, s 47A

Local Government Act 1995, s 3.2

Mining Act 1978, s 6(2)(a)(i), s 112(1)

Result:

Leave granted

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

First Plaintiff                :     Mr N P Dobree

Second Plaintiff            :     Mr N P Dobree

Defendant:     Mr I R Freeman

Solicitors:

First Plaintiff                :     Hoffmans

Second Plaintiff            :     Hoffmans

Defendant:     Phillips Fox

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Matheson v Commissioner of Main Roads & Anor (2001) 25 WAR 269

Victorian Railways Commissioner v Cassaccio (1961) VR 157

Case(s) also cited:

Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541

City of Gosnells v Roberts (1991) 74 LGRA 1

Homebase Management Pty Ltd v The City of Subiaco [2000] WASC 212

Howe v City of Nedlands & Anor, unreported; SCt of WA; Library No 980128; 23 March 1998

  1. MASTER SANDERSON:  By originating summons dated 11 May 2004, the plaintiffs sought an order that:

    "Leave be granted to the Plaintiffs to bring an action against the Defendant for damages ('the prospective proceedings') for the unauthorised removal of shell grit from the Plaintiffs' Mining Lease 70/632 on or about 28 August 2001, at any time before the expiration of six years from the date of the said removal."

  2. The prospective defendant is a local authority pursuant to the provisions of the Local Government Act 1995. Before proceedings can be issued against a local authority such as the prospective defendant, two preconditions need to be met. First, the prospective plaintiff must give notice of the action in writing to the prospective defendant, and secondly, the action must be commenced before the expiration of one year from the date on which the cause of action accrued: see s 47A(1)(a) and (b) of the Limitation Act 1935. The plaintiffs have failed to comply with these preconditions and they now require leave of the Court to commence proceedings. The requirements that the plaintiffs need to satisfy in order to obtain leave under s 47A(3) of the Limitation Act was set out by Murray J in Matheson v Commissioner of Main Roads & Anor (2001) 25 WAR 269 at 274. The requirements are:

    (1)The delay must be occasioned by mistake or other reasonable cause;

    (2)Alternatively, there must be an absence of material prejudice to the prospective defendant in its defence by reason of the delay; and

    (3)If one of the above preconditions is satisfied, then the Court has a discretion to grant leave if it is just in the circumstances to do so. 

  3. In this case it was conceded by the prospective defendant…

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Details
Case
[2004] WASC 243
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Murnik v Shire of Dandaragan, the plaintiff brought an action against the Shire of Dandaragan, a local government authority, alleging that it had unlawfully removed material from his mining lease. The dispute was heard in the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The legal issues that arose for determination included whether the Shire of Dandaragan's removal of material from the plaintiff's mining lease was lawful under the Local Government Act 1993 (WA) and the Mining Act 1978 (WA). Specifically, the court had to consider whether the material removed was within the definition of "timber, earth, stone, sand, or gravel" as required by the Local Government Act and if the Shire's actions were authorised by the Mining Act.

The court examined the statutory provisions and the facts of the case to determine the legality of the Shire's actions. The plaintiff argued that the removal of shell grit from his mining lease did not fall within the permitted materials as defined by the Local Government Act. However, the court found that the shell grit, as described in an affidavit by Stuart Turner Brodie, could be classified as "gravelly sand," which falls within the definition of permissible materials. Additionally, the court noted that the Shire's actions were authorised by the Mining Act, which permits the removal of such materials for use in the construction of local government facilities without a mining licence. The court concluded that the Shire's decision to remove the shell grit was reasonable, as it was necessary for the repair of a thoroughfare.

The Supreme Court of Western Australia held that the Shire of Dandaragan's removal of the shell grit from the plaintiff's mining lease was lawful under both the Local Government Act and the Mining Act. The court found that the shell grit was indeed "gravelly sand," thus falling within the definition of permissible materials for removal under the Local Government Act. Furthermore, the court determined that the Shire's actions were authorised by the Mining Act, which allows for the removal of such materials for local government purposes. Consequently, the court dismissed the plaintiff's action, finding that the Shire had not acted unlawfully.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Further, s 6(2)(a)(ii) of the Mining Act allows a local government to remove "rock, stone, clay, sand or gravel for use in the construction of local government facilities from local government property (as defined in the Mining Act) without a mining licence." Section 112(1) of the Mining Act provides that:"112. Reservation in favour of Crown on prospecting licence or exploration licence to take rock, etc.(1)Subject to subsection (2), every prospecting licence and exploration licence is subject to a reservation in favour of the Crown and any person authorised thereby of the right to enter thereon and remove therefrom rock, stone, clay, sand or gravel for use for any public purpose or for use in any prescribed work or undertaking." That being so, it was submitted that the defendant's removal of material from the plaintiffs' mining lease is authorised by the Local Government Act if:(1)The material is removed from land;(2)The material removed is timber, earth, stone, sand or gravel;(3)The material removed is used to make or repair a thoroughfare, bridge, culvert, fence or gate; and(4)In its opinion, the local government requires the material to make or repair a thoroughfare, bridge, culvert, fence, or gate. Three of these requirements do not cause any difficulty. First, the material was clearly removed from land. The term "land" is not defined by the Local Government Act. There is a definition in the Mining Act but it is, for present purposes, unhelpful. What is clear is that upon the grant of a mining lease the area covered by the lease does not cease to be "land". Such a conclusion would be inconsistent with the reservation contained in s 112(1) of the Mining Act. There is also no difficulty with concluding that the shell grit was removed "to make or repair a thoroughfare". "Thoroughfare" is defined in the Local Government Act as:"a road or other thoroughfare and includes structures or other things appurtenant to the thoroughfare that are within its limits, and nothing is prevented from being a thoroughfare only because it is not open at each end." It is true that the access road in this case was unnamed, and it was not a gazetted road. However, it was open to the public and it provided public access to the rubbish tip. It was clearly a thoroughfare within the meaning of the Local Government Act. There can also be no doubt that the local government required the material to repair the thoroughfare. The access road was in poor condition and it was being used in the course of the demolition of the shacks at Settlers Ridge. Even if it were to be assumed that the decision of the defendant had to be, in all the circumstances, reasonable, it is clear that requirement was satisfied. In my view, the defendant's position on this point, as with the previous two points I have mentioned, is unanswerable. That then leaves the question of whether or not the material taken falls within the terms "earth", "stone", "sand" or "gravel". None of these terms is defined in the Local Government Act. It is the defendant's position that properly considered, the shell grit is "gravelly sand". In support of this proposition the defendant relied upon an affidavit of Stuart Turner Brodie ("Mr Brodie"), sworn 1 July 2004. Mr Brodie is the laboratory manager of Materials Consultants Pty Ltd. Materials Consultants Pty Ltd carry on business as an independent testing laboratory. They conduct tests on a variety of materials including sand. In his affidavit, Mr Brodie refers to Australian Standard 1726-1981, which is the Australian Standard for site investigations. In that standard, sand is defined as "unconsolidated, non‑cohesive accumulation of detrital material composed usually of grains of quartz. In particle size analysis material of sand grade is taken as that between 2.0 mm and 0.06 mm." Mr Brodie deals in some detail with what amounts to fine, medium and course sand and what might properly be regarded as gravel. He goes on to say that in May 2003 he was provided with a sample from an area which he refers to as the "Greenhead Pit". He found that the sample contained 32 per cent shell material and 68 per cent sand material. He therefore concluded that the material taken from the plaintiffs' leases was properly described as gravelly sand.