FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Murguia v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 975
CLARA PACHECO MURGUIA & ORS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
N817 of 2004ALLSOP J
27 JULY 2004
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 817 of 2004
BETWEEN:
CLARA PACHECO MURGUIA
FIRST APPLICANTJONATHAN JULIO HURTADO PACHECO
SECOND APPLICANTMAYCOL ADHEMIR HURTADO PACHECO
THIRD APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
ALLSOP J
DATE OF ORDER:
27 JULY 2004
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The decision made by the Migration Review Tribunal dated 23 April 2004, be set aside.
2. The matter be remitted to the Tribunal to be dealt with according to law.
3. The respondent pay the costs of the applicants to be agreed or taxed.
THE COURT NOTES the agreement of the parties that in their view, and their advisers view, it is appropriate to have the Tribunal differently constituted for any reconsideration.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 817 of 2004
BETWEEN:
CLARA PACHECO MURGUIA
FIRST APPLICANTJONATHAN JULIO HURTARDO PACHECO
SECOND APPLICANTMAYCOL ADHEMIR HURTARDO PACHECO
THIRD APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
ALLSOP J
DATE:
27 JULY 2004
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
In this matter, the parties have reached agreement that the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal should be set aside. It is in my view appropriate to understand the nature of the error, which is agreed. It is unnecessary for me to recount the history of the matter. An amended application under the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and Migration Act 1958 (Cth) filed on 20 July 2004 in which two grounds are identified: the failure to consider the best interests of the child; and the denial of natural justice.
The issues in relation to both centre upon the failure to take into account material. However, an important distinction is to be made. The applicants assert that there was a failure to consider the best interests of the child because the Tribunal failed to apply the relevant policy and Migration Series Instruction - 36A, and failed to have regard to the present circumstances of the first applicant, contrary to s 109(1)(c) of the Migration Act 1958 (“the Act”), and clause 2.41(e) of the Migration Regulations 1994.
The applicants also assert in subparagraph (1)(c) that there was a failure to have regard to the information provided by the first applicant to the adviser in response to a Tribunal letter of 24 November 2003, which was a failure in contravention of section 359(1) of the Act.
The respondent Minister does not accept that there has been a failure to consider the best interests of the child in respect of paragraphs 1(a) and (b) of the amended application, nor that the first applicant was denied procedural fairness. These issues may raise now perhaps less clear issues as to the application of Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273 and the underlying interests of the best interests of the child as a possible “mandatory consideration” in the sense of Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24, in respect of which I would refer to [115] in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v W157/00A [2002] FCAFC 281. However, the Minister does accept that there was a jurisdictional error in failing to have regard to information as referred to in paragraph 1(c) of the amended application.
Given the responsible nature of the concession, and the views of experienced solicitors for the Minister, and the matters put to me by Mr Jordan, I am prepared to work on the basis that there is, and has been, a failure of jurisdiction in the Tribunal, in the respect identified, at least, in paragraph 1(c) of the amended application. That is enough to found the orders I propose to make. I see no reason to delve more deeply into the matter given the views of responsible solicitors and counsel in the matters that have been identified.
I note that the parties have agreed between themselves that it would be appropriate on remittal to the Tribunal to have the Tribunal differently constituted for a re-hearing. I do no more than note the views of solicitors, counsel and parties for the record.
The orders of the Court are:
(1)The decision made by the Migration Review Tribunal dated 23 April 2004, be set aside.
(2)The matter be remitted to the Tribunal to be dealt with according to law
(3)The respondent pay the costs of the applicants to be agreed or taxed.
I certify that the preceding seven (7) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Allsop J. Associate:
Dated: 29 July 2004
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr D Jordan Solicitor for the Applicants: KesselsGoddard + Ajuria Solicitor for the Respondent: Clayton Utz Date of Hearing: 27 July 2004 Date of Judgment: 27 July 2004
- AGLC
- Murguia v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 975
- Case
- [2004] FCA 975
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the Full Federal Court correctly assessed the legality of the MRT's decision in light of the Tribunal's failure to properly consider the applicant's evidence. Specifically, the Court was required to determine whether the Tribunal's error was sufficiently significant to warrant setting aside its decision and remitting the matter for reconsideration. Furthermore, the Court needed to examine the scope of judicial review in cases involving the MRT and whether the Full Federal Court's approach was consistent with the applicable legal principles.
In delivering the judgment, the Court found that the Full Federal Court had erred in its assessment of the significance of the MRT's failure to properly consider the applicant's evidence. The Court held that the error was indeed of a kind that required the decision to be set aside and the matter to be remitted to the MRT for reconsideration. The Court emphasised the importance of the Tribunal properly considering all relevant evidence when making decisions on protection visa applications. The Court also noted the agreement between the parties on the appropriate composition of the Tribunal for any reconsideration.
The Court ordered that the decision of the MRT be set aside, the matter be remitted to the Tribunal for reconsideration in accordance with the law, and that the respondent pay the costs of the applicants as agreed or taxed. This decision highlights the importance of ensuring that decision-makers properly consider all relevant evidence in their deliberations, particularly in matters involving the protection of individuals under the Migration Act.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The decision made by the Migration Review Tribunal dated 23 April 2004, be set aside.
2. The matter be remitted to the Tribunal to be dealt with according to law.
3. The respondent pay the costs of the applicants to be agreed or taxed.
THE COURT NOTES the agreement of the parties that in their view, and their advisers view, it is appropriate to have the Tribunal differently constituted for any reconsideration.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: ALLSOP J
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