Murfet v Clerk of Petty Sessions

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[2003] TASSC 88

CITATION:            Murfet v Clerk of Petty Sessions [2003] TASSC 88

PARTIES:  MURFET, Ivan Dwayne
  v
  CLERK OF PETTY SESSIONS

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
JURISDICTION:  APPELLATE
FILE NO/S:  LCA 53/2003
DELIVERED ON:  19 September 2003
DELIVERED AT:  Hobart
HEARING DATES:  17 September 2003
JUDGMENT OF:  Slicer J

CATCHWORDS:

Magistrates - Procedure - Orders and convictions - Sentencing - Imposition of fines - Duty of court to ascertain defendant's financial circumstances - Failure to give proper consideration to directing that civil proceedings be taken against offender.

Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas), ss47, 53.

Magistrates Court (Civil Division) Act 1992 (Tas), s31A.

Campbell v Turner [2001] TASSC 91; Briant v Bessell (1994) 74 A Crim R 204, followed.

Aust Dig Magistrates [147]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
           Applicant:  K Cuthbertson
           Respondent:  F C Neasey
Solicitors:
           Applicant:  Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania
           Respondent:  Director of Public Prosecutions

Judgment Number:  [2003] TASSC 88
Number of Paragraphs:  16

Serial No 88/2003
File No LCA 53/2003

IVAN DWAYNE MURFET v CLERK OF PETTY SESSIONS

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  SLICER J

19 September 2003

  1. The applicant was charged by complaint dated 11 February 1997 with offences contrary to the Fisheries Rules 1986, rr29 and 32.  He appeared in the court of petty sessions on 16 September 1997 and was remanded on bail for plea.  On 6 October 1997, he entered a plea of not guilty and the matter was adjourned for hearing.  The offences were the unlawful possession of 631 abalone and the possession of a further 339 abalone which were less than the prescribed weight. The experience of the courts is that such cases are subject to lengthy delay, often at the behest of a defendant.  Between the date first fixed for hearing, 23 December 1997, and the date of conviction and penalty, 1 September 1998, there were nine further remand dates, some of which involved legal argument and at least two on which the applicant did not appear.

  1. On 1 September 1998, the applicant changed his plea to one of guilty.  He was convicted, fined the sum of $7,500 and, in accordance with the combined effect of the Living Marine Resources Management Act 1995 and the Fisheries Rules, ordered to pay a special penalty in the assessed sum of $80,730.  The court of petty sessions ordered that the fine and penalty be paid by instalments of $100 per month.  The applicant appealed the penalty by way of motion to review (LCA 33/1998) dated 7 September 1998, claiming error in the calculation of the special penalty.  He did little to advance his appeal which was not proceeded with and dismissed on 28 September 1998.  His explanation that he believed the appeal to be "on foot" is not credible.

  1. The applicant made no attempt to pay the fine or special penalty by way of the instalments ordered by the court.  He claimed in his affidavit in support of an application for an extension of time to bring this appeal that he did not pay…

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Details
Case
[2003] TASSC 88
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, Ivan Dwayne Murfet was charged with offences under the Fisheries Rules 1986. He pleaded not guilty but later changed his plea to guilty and was convicted. The court imposed a fine of $7,500 and a special penalty of $80,730, which was to be paid in monthly instalments. Murfet failed to make any payments and was arrested for non-payment. The court of petty sessions sentenced him to 884 days' imprisonment, suspended for six months on condition that he paid the outstanding amount within that time. Murfet appealed against the penalty, claiming error in the calculation, but his appeal was dismissed. He then applied for a review of the sentence, claiming the magistrate erred in issuing a warrant of commitment against him when he did not have the means to pay the fine and special penalty. The court had to decide whether the magistrate erred in fact and/or in law by issuing the warrant of commitment and suspending its execution.

The court considered the operation of the legislative scheme in the initial imposition of penalty and the subsequent enforcement proceedings. The court noted that Parliament intended that in some cases an offender would be required to pay a fine beyond their capacity to pay. However, the court also noted that it would be wrong for justices to commit a defaulter forthwith unless the defaulter has, or since the imposition of the fine has had, the means to pay it, or to order that the defaulter be committed but suspend the execution of the warrant unless the justices are satisfied that it is reasonable to expect that the offender will be able to pay the outstanding amount during the period of the suspension. The court concluded that the magistrate was required to take into account the incapacity of the applicant to pay the required amount within the time permitted by legislation.

The court quashed the determination of the court of petty sessions and directed that civil proceedings be taken against the offender under the Magistrates Court (Civil Division) Act 1992. The court suggested, but did not require, as suitable terms of payment of the civil debt, payment at the rate of $100 per month.

Background

Background to the litigation

Ivan Dwayne Murfet was charged with offences related to the unlawful possession of abalone, contrary to the Fisheries Rules 1986, on 11 February 1997. He appeared in the court of petty sessions on 16 September 1997 and was remanded on bail for plea. On 6 October 1997, Murfet entered a plea of not guilty and the matter was adjourned for hearing. The offences involved the unlawful possession of 631 abalone and the possession of a further 339 abalone which were less than the prescribed weight. Between the date first fixed for hearing, 23 December 1997, and the date of conviction and penalty, 1 September 1998, there were nine further remand dates, some of which involved legal argument and at least two on which Murfet did not appear.

On 1 September 1998, Murfet changed his plea to one of guilty. He was convicted, fined the sum of $7,500 and, in accordance with the combined effect of the Living Marine Resources Management Act 1995 and the Fisheries Rules, ordered to pay a special penalty in the assessed sum of $80,730. The court of petty sessions ordered that the fine and penalty be paid by instalments of $100 per month. Murfet appealed the penalty by way of motion to review (LCA 33/1998) dated 7 September 1998, claiming error in the calculation of the special penalty. However, he did little to advance his appeal which was dismissed on 28 September 1998. Murfet made no attempt to pay the fine or special penalty by way of the instalments ordered by the court. He claimed that his brother, a co-defendant, had advised him that it was not necessary to pay until the appeal was determined.

On 25 March 1999, Murfet was arrested on warrant for non-payment. At that time the outstanding amount was $88,254. On 5 May and 9 June 1999, Murfet was granted further adjournments, but he failed to appear on 24 June. He appeared on 1 September 1999 and admitted the amount owing. On 8 September, he was directed to appear on 29 September when the order, subject to this motion to review, was made. On that day, the court of petty sessions sentenced Murfet to 884 days' imprisonment, suspended for six months on condition that he pay the outstanding amount within six months. The calculation of the term of imprisonment was made in accordance with the mandatory requirements of, and method employed by, the Sentencing Act 1997, s50. Between 29 September 1999 and 25 May 2001, Murfet paid a total of $1,050 towards the outstanding amount.

The matter before the Supreme Court of Tasmania was an appeal by Ivan Dwayne Murfet against the decision of the Clerk of Petty Sessions. The applicant was originally charged with offences under the Fisheries Rules 1986 on 11 February 1997 and was initially remanded on bail for plea. After several adjournments and changes of plea, the applicant was convicted on 1 September 1998 and fined $7,500, with a special penalty of $80,730. The fine and penalty were to be paid in instalments of $100 per month. The applicant subsequently failed to pay the fine and penalty, leading to the issuance of a warrant for his arrest on 25 March 1999. After multiple adjournments and the applicant's continued failure to pay, the court of petty sessions sentenced him to 884 days' imprisonment, suspended for six months on the condition that he pay the outstanding amount within that period. The applicant appealed this decision by way of a motion to review, claiming that the magistrate had erred in issuing the warrant of commitment and suspending its execution without considering his inability to pay the amount. The Supreme Court of Tasmania considered this appeal and found that the motion to review was upheld, with the original decision quashed and replaced with a direction for civil proceedings to be taken against the offender under the Magistrates Court (Civil Division) Act 1992.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Did the learned magistrate err in issuing a warrant of commitment against the applicant when it was not reasonable to expect the applicant to have the means to pay the outstanding amount?
2. Did the learned magistrate err in suspending the execution of the warrant of commitment for six months upon the condition that the applicant pay the outstanding amount during the period of suspension, when it was not reasonable to expect the applicant to be able to pay that amount within that time?
3. In what circumstances, if any, is it appropriate for a court to direct civil proceedings under the Magistrates Court (Civil Division) Act 1992 when an offender has defaulted on a fine imposed by a court of summary jurisdiction?
4. Should the court consider the financial capacity of an offender when deciding on the appropriate penalty for default of payment of a fine?

Held
1. Did the learned magistrate err in issuing a warrant of commitment against the applicant when it was not reasonable to expect the applicant to have the means to pay the outstanding amount?
The court concluded that the learned magistrate erred in issuing the warrant of commitment as it was not reasonable to expect the applicant to have the means to pay the outstanding amount. Result: the motion to review is upheld.

2. Did the learned magistrate err in suspending the execution of the warrant of commitment for six months upon the condition that the applicant pay the outstanding amount during the period of suspension, when it was not reasonable to expect the applicant to be able to pay that amount within that time?
The court concluded that the learned magistrate erred in suspending the execution of the warrant of commitment under the given circumstances. Result: the motion to review is upheld.

3. In what circumstances, if any, is it appropriate for a court to direct civil proceedings under the Magistrates Court (Civil Division) Act 1992 when an offender has defaulted on a fine imposed by a court of summary jurisdiction?
The court concluded that it is appropriate for a court to direct civil proceedings under the Magistrates Court (Civil Division) Act 1992 when an offender has defaulted on a fine imposed by a court of summary jurisdiction, provided that the court takes into account the incapacity of the offender to pay the required amount within the time permitted by legislation. Result: the court directs that civil proceedings be taken against the offender under the Magistrates Court (Civil Division) Act 1992.

4. Should the court consider the financial capacity of an offender when deciding on the appropriate penalty for default of payment of a fine?
The court concluded that the court should consider the financial capacity of an offender when deciding on the appropriate penalty for default of payment of a fine, as it was not reasonable to expect the applicant to have the means to pay the outstanding amount. Result: the motion to review is upheld.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Supreme Court of Tasmania, in this case, addressed several critical issues related to sentencing and the enforcement of fines imposed by the courts of summary jurisdiction. The first issue concerned whether the learned magistrate erred in issuing a warrant of commitment against the applicant when it was not reasonable to expect the applicant to have the means to pay the outstanding amount. The court found that the learned magistrate was required to consider the applicant's financial incapacity to pay the fine within the time permitted by legislation. According to the principles elucidated in Briant v Bessell, the magistrate should not have issued the warrant unless the applicant had the means to pay or it was reasonable to expect the applicant to pay the fine during the period of suspension. The court underscored that the capacity to pay should be regarded as an important factor in sentencing, particularly in cases where the offender has made no attempt to pay.

The second issue was whether the learned magistrate erred in suspending the execution of the warrant of commitment for six months on the condition that the applicant pay the outstanding amount during the period of suspension, when it was not reasonable to expect the applicant to be able to pay that amount within that time. The court held that the magistrate should not have suspended the execution of the warrant unless it was reasonable to expect the applicant to pay the fine within the given period. The court emphasized that the magistrate's discretion must be exercised with regard to the applicant's financial capacity, and the principles of sentencing should guide such decisions. The failure to consider the applicant's financial circumstances rendered the magistrate's decision erroneous.

The third issue involved the appropriate circumstances under which a court should direct civil proceedings under the Magistrates Court (Civil Division) Act 1992 when an offender has defaulted on a fine imposed by a court of summary jurisdiction. The court clarified that while directing civil proceedings does not necessarily render the defaulter immune from a potential custodial sentence, it does afford the court the same enforcement powers as the Supreme Court. The court suggested that the terms of payment, such as instalments, could be negotiated, and failure to agree or unreasonable refusal to negotiate could constitute a basis for reconsideration of the available sentencing options.

Lastly, the court considered whether it should take into account the financial capacity of an offender when deciding on the appropriate penalty for default of payment of a fine. The court concluded that the financial capacity of the offender should indeed be considered, as it is integral to ensuring that the penalty imposed is fair and reasonable. The court held that the learned magistrate's failure to consider the applicant's financial circumstances in issuing the warrant and suspending its execution constituted an error.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that when sentencing an offender or enforcing a fine, the court must consider the offender's financial capacity. This principle ensures that penalties are imposed in a manner that is fair and reasonable, and it prevents the enforcement of fines that are beyond the offender's capacity to pay. The court departed from prior authority by emphasizing the necessity of considering financial capacity, which had not been sufficiently highlighted in previous cases. The decision underscores the importance of judicial discretion in balancing legislative mandates with individual circumstances, thereby ensuring that the administration of justice remains fair and just.