NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL
CITATION: Murdoch v Davis [2005] NSWCA 466
FILE NUMBER(S):
40232/05
HEARING DATE(S): 07/12/05
JUDGMENT DATE: 19/12/2005
PARTIES:
Gerald Murdoch - Appellant
Bradley Robert Davis - Respondent
JUDGMENT OF: Santow JA McColl JA Brownie AJA
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: District Court
LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): DC3698/03
LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER: Bishop DCJ
COUNSEL:
Ms S Norton SC with Ms M M Fraser - Appellant
S G Campbell SC with I D Cullen - Respondent
SOLICITORS:
Bryden's Law Office, Liverpool - Appellant
Vandervords - Respondent
CATCHWORDS:
Evidence - a certificate under s 61 of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 is conclusive evidence as to the matters mentioned in subs (2)(a), (b) and (c), unless subs (6) is successfully invoked.
LEGISLATION CITED:
Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999
Motor Accidents Act 1988
Motor Accident Compensation Amendment (Medical Assessments) Act 2000
Suitors' Fund Act 1951
DECISION:
1.Grant leave to appeal; 2. Allow appeal, and set aside the judgment and orders of the District Court; 3. Remit matter to the District Court for retrial; 4. Order the opponent to pay the costs of the claimant of the appeal, but grant to the opponent a certificate under the Suitors’ Fund Act 1951, if otherwise qualified; 5. The costs of the first trial should be in the discretion of the judge conducting the retrial.
JUDGMENT:
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL
CA 40232/05
DC 3698/03SANTOW JA
McCOLL JA
BROWNIE AJAMonday 19 December 2005
MURDOCH v DAVIS
Judgment
SANTOW JA: I agree with Brownie AJA.
McCOLL JA: I agree with Brownie AJA.
BROWNIE AJA: The claimant was injured in a motor accident that occurred on 14 June 2000. Having taken the necessary preliminary steps, he sued the appellant, claiming damages for negligence. At trial the claimant tendered a certificate dated 25 July 2003, given under s 61 of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (the Act). That certificate was to the effect that the various impairments suffered by the claimant as a result of the injury sustained in the motor accident was greater than ten percent of what is apparently often described as a “whole person assessment” or “whole person impairment”. Without such a certificate the claimant would not have been able to recover damages for non-economic loss: s 131 of the Act.
When the certificate was tendered, at the commencement of the trial, it was said that the opponent had not seen the certificate previously. Counsel for the opponent took no objection to the tender, but foreshadowed an application under s 132(2) of the Act for an adjournment of the trial later on, to enable the opponent to apply for a further assessment, under s 62 of the Act. The trial proceeded, and after the close of evidence, the opponent made that application, but without calling upon the claimant, the learned trial Judge, Bishop DCJ, rejected the application.
During the course of the trial, it emerged that the opponent had arranged to keep the claimant…
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- Murdoch v Davis [2005] NSWCA 466
- Case
- [2005] NSWCA 466
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the District Court had erred in its interpretation and application of section 61 of the *Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999* (NSW). Specifically, the court had to determine the evidentiary weight and conclusiveness of a certificate issued under that section, and whether the circumstances of the case allowed for its challenge under subsection (6).
The Court of Appeal reasoned that a certificate issued under section 61 of the *Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999* (NSW) is generally conclusive evidence of the matters specified in subsections (2)(a), (b), and (c), unless subsection (6) is successfully invoked to challenge its validity. The court found that the District Court had misapplied this principle, leading to an incorrect judgment. Consequently, the Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal, and set aside the District Court's judgment and orders. The matter was remitted to the District Court for a retrial, with the costs of the appeal to be paid by the opponent, Murdoch, and the costs of the first trial to be determined by the judge presiding over the retrial.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.Grant leave to appeal; 2. Allow appeal, and set aside the judgment and orders of the District Court; 3. Remit matter to the District Court for retrial; 4. Order the opponent to pay the costs of the claimant of the appeal, but grant to the opponent a certificate under the Suitors’ Fund Act 1951, if otherwise qualified; 5. The costs of the first trial should be in the discretion of the judge conducting the retrial.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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