Murat Aldagul and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
[2014] AATA 13
[2014] AATA 13
Division GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION File Number(s)
2012/5039
Re
Murat Aldagul
APPLICANT
And
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal Mr S Penglis, Senior Member
Date 7 January 2014 Place Perth Pursuant to section 43 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth):
1.The reviewable decision dated 26 October 2012 is set aside.
2.In substitution therefor there be a decision that the Applicant’s Application for Conferral of Australian Citizenship lodged with the Department of Immigration and Citizenship on 4 May 2012 is approved.
..(Sgd) S Penglis............
Mr S Penglis, Senior Member
Catchwords
CITIZENSHIP – evidence establishes that notwithstanding past convictions for breaching violence restraining orders and bail conditions, the Applicant is of “good character” – decision under review set aside – turns on its own facts
Legislation
Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth), s21 and 24
Cases
Drake and Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634
Irving and Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (1996) 68 FCR 442
Mlinar and Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1997) 48 ALD 771
Radmanovic and Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2010] AATA 569
Walsh v Baron [2012] WADC 165
Zheng and Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2011] AATA 304Secondary Materials
Australian Citizenship Instructions, 1 July 2013
REASONS FOR DECISION
Mr S Penglis, Senior Member
7 January 2014
OVERVIEW
With his family, the Applicant arrived in Australia in May 2007 as the holder of a permanent resident visa.
On 4 June 2010, the Applicant was convicted in the Magistrates Court of Western Australia of 3 breaches of a Violence Restraining Order in respect of which the Applicant’s then estranged wife was the “protected person”.
On 9 September 2011, the Applicant was convicted in the Magistrates Court of Western Australia of 20 additional breaches of a Violence Restraining Order in respect of which his then estranged wife was the “protected person”, as well as 20 breaches of a bail condition.
In May 2012, the Applicant applied for conferral of Australian citizenship.
By a decision dated 26 October 2013, a delegate of the Minister refused the application (reviewable decision). The delegate concluded that the Applicant satisfied all of the requisite criteria prescribed by section 21(2) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) (Act), save for sub-section (h) which requires the Minister to be satisfied that an applicant “is of good character at the time of the Minister’s decision on the application”.
In reasons which were provided in relation to the reviewable decision, the Minister’s delegate stated as follows:
“…The Violence Restraining Order Transcript dated 15/01/2010 and other departmental records indicate that Mr Aldagul has consistently displayed behaviour which is contrary to normal community standards. I am aware that Mr Aldagul has been convicted of repeated serious breaches of the Violence Restraining Order issued on 15/01/2010 relating to his estranged wife. I further note from Mr Aldagul’s undated personal statement that he offers no remorse or mitigation for his actions related to the various breaches of the Violence Restraining Order. Considering the fact that Mr Aldagul is the subject of an active Violence Restraining Order and his previous criminal history, I do not accept Mr Aldagul meets the “good character” requirements for citizenship at this time”.
The Tribunal finds that the Minister’s delegate overstated the position by describing the Applicant’s breaches of the Violence Restraining Order as “serious”. Indeed, such a description of the breaches is inconsistent with the presiding Magistrates’ comments and the orders made against the Applicant with respect to the breaches.
Having regard to the whole of the evidence before the Tribunal, whilst certainly not condoning nor minimising the nature of the matters relied upon by the Minister, the Tribunal is satisfied that, notwithstanding those matters, the Applicant satisfies the requirement of “good character” in section 21(2)(h) of the Act.
THE ISSUE
As noted above, section 21(2)(h) of the Act provides that a person is eligible to become an Australian citizen if, inter alia, the Minister is satisfied that the person is of “good character” at the time of the Minister’s decision on the application.
It was not in dispute that in determining whether the Applicant is of “good character” at the time of the Tribunal’s decision, the Tribunal may have regard to and apply the relevant Ministerial policy, namely the Australian Citizenship Instructions (ACIs) that were published on 1 July 2013: see, for example, Drake and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural & Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634 at 643 and 645.
In this regard (as submitted on behalf of the Minister and accepted on behalf of the Applicant):
(a)factors to be taken into account in considering why an applicant’s behaviour might demonstrate that they are not of “good character” are set out at p 116-117 of the ACIs. These include:
·whether the person has committed any offences;
·if the person has committed an offence, whether it was serious or minor;
·whether there were victims of the offence, and particularly whether they were vulnerable victims;
·whether the offence was premeditated;
·the length of any sentence, if one is imposed;
·whether there are any ongoing obligations;
·how many offences have been committed, and whether it was one-off or demonstrates a pattern of behaviour;
·whether the offence was committed overseas and, if so, whether there is an equivalent Australian offence.
(b)the ACIs (at p 118-119) also list a number of mitigating factors that decision makers should consider in determining whether the person may be of “good character” notwithstanding their conduct. These include:
·the length of time between the date of offence or conviction and application for citizenship;
·whether the person has accepted responsibility and shown remorse for their conduct;
·how the person has behaved since being released from prison or upon completion of any obligations to a court such as a good behaviour bond. The ACIs state that “it is important to see how the client behaves when they are free from the obligations of such a sentence or bond. A reasonable amount of time will need to have passed in order for the person to have established a pattern of good behaviour and thus justify a conclusion that the person is now of good character and is upholding Australian laws”;
·whether the person has rehabilitated themselves;
·the person’s age at the time of offending;
·whether there were any extenuating circumstances;
·whether there is evidence of length of employment, stable family life and/or community involvement.
(c)the ACIs state that, in weighing up the various factors in reaching a decision on whether a person is of good character, the decision maker must apply community standards and, having regard to the words of the preamble to the Act and the pledge to be made if citizenship is approved, should ask (ACIs, p 120):
·would a person of good character have behaved the way the applicant did;
·what is there to demonstrate that the applicant has upheld and obeyed the law;
·has the applicant behaved in accordance with Australia’s community standards;
·does the applicant share Australia’s democratic beliefs and respect its rights and liberties.
As for the words “good character”, it was not in dispute that those words should “be taken to be used in their ordinary sense, namely, a reference to the enduring moral qualities of a person, and not the good standing, fame or reputation of that person in the community”: see, for example, Irving and Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (1996) 68 FCR 442 at 431/2.
It was also not in dispute that the obligations listed in the preamble to the Act (which are taken to be imposed on Australian citizens) are relevant yardsticks against which it can be assessed whether a person is of good character: see Zheng and Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2011] AATA 304 where, at [120], Forgie DP commented:
“In the context of the Act, loyalty to Australia, a belief in a democratic form of government, a respect for the rights and liberties of all Australians and obedience to and observance of the law are values that are regarded as significant. An assessment of a person’s character will need to have regard to them. They are not values that can be assessed in the abstract. Instead, they are measured in part by what a person says, in part by what a person does and in part by what a person is heard to say and seen to do.”
It was submitted on behalf of the Minister, and I accept, that “ in assessing whether the Applicant’s character has changed sufficiently for him to be regarded as being of good character for the purpose of paragraph 21(2)(h) of the Act, the Minister contends that the Tribunal should take into account that citizenship is to be regarded as ‘both a privilege and a responsibility” (Zheng … at [51]) and that in that context a standard of good character required to be proved to be eligible to become a citizen is a high standard (Mliner and Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1997) 48 ALD 771 at 776)”.
It is open to a person who is not of “good character” to rehabilitate themselves and thereafter apply again for citizenship: Radmanovic and Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2010] AATA 569 at [17].
THE FACTS
The facts of this matter were not materially in dispute.
The Applicant is currently 38 years of age. He married his former wife in Izmir, Turkey, on 7 January 1999. He has 3 children to that marriage, namely Melissa (14 years old), Adem (8 years old) and Elise (7 years old), all of whom now reside with their mother.
The Applicant is self-employed and has been operating his own business since at least 2009.
The Applicant and his former wife were divorced by order of the Family Court of Western Australia made on 2 May 2013, which order became effective on 3 June 2013.
The Applicant had applied to the Family Court to have contact with his children (who he has not seen for some years). He did not pursue that application as he considered it best to wait until his children wanted to make contact with him.
The Applicant was separated twice from his wife when they lived in the United Kingdom, where he lived with his wife before arriving in Australia with his family on 29 April 2007. He was made a British citizen on 14 May 2004.
For reasons which are not presently relevant, the relationship between the Applicant and his former wife broke down and proceedings were commenced in the Family Court of Western Australia in early 2009.
Around the same time (namely on 16 April 2009), the Applicant’s former wife took out an interim Violence Restraining Order against him.
On 15 January 2010, after a contested hearing, a magistrate of the Magistrates Court of Western Australia ordered that the interim order made on 16 April 2009 be made a final order for the period of 2 years to expire on 13 January 2012. The Court did so after being satisfied, for the purposes of section 11A of the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA), that, in early April 2009, the Applicant had committed an “act of abuse”, namely that the Applicant spat in his wife’s face, pushed her into a walk-in wardrobe and there restrained her for some 10 minutes against her will. This was immediately following the Applicant being informed by his former wife that she was going to leave the marriage.
On 4 June 2010, the Applicant was convicted of 3 breaches of the Violence Restraining Order. Those convictions related to 3 occasions in April 2010 when the Applicant contravened the Violence Restraining Order by entering the premises where his then estranged wife lived and communicated with her (on 2 occasions) and “by going within 100 metres of the protected person’s home address” (on a third occasion).
Magistrate Gluestein placed the Applicant on a 6 month conditional release order, with a recognisance sum of $500. The Applicant was also ordered to pay costs of $119.20. The Applicant was granted a spent conviction, with the learned Magistrate “noting that the prosecutor is not opposing that and it is appropriate given the low level of behaviour in this manner(sic)”.
On 9 September 2011, the Applicant entered pleas of guilty to 20 breaches of the Violence Restraining Order and 20 breaches of a protective bail condition. All of those convictions related to the Applicant communicating and attempting to communicate with his then estranged wife on 20 occasions between 12 and 26 January 2011.
I pause here to note that the protective bail condition to which I refer was imposed in regard to a matter for which the Applicant was subsequently tried, and which resulted in all charges being dismissed. Nothing relating to those charges was relied upon by the Minister to support his contentions in this matter (in my view, properly so).
On 9 September 2011, Magistrate Malone of the Magistrates Court of Western Australia imposed a 3 month conditional release order on the Applicant along with a protective bail condition not to contact or attempt to contact or communicate in any way with or approach within 100 metres of where she lives or 100 metres personally of his then estranged wife. During the course of the hearing, Magistrate Malone said as follows:
“… It seems to me that essentially we are talking about a matter of failed attempts to contact somebody which is bad but it is not particularly bad. We are talking about four messages that might have a more hidden meaning but on the face of them are relatively innocuous … As far as the other ones, did you miss me and happy Australia Day and are you available or something, miss me, call me, they are all on the face of them the wrong thing to do but relatively innocuous.”
The Applicant’s former wife subsequently made an application for an extension of the Violence Restraining Order, which application was heard by Magistrate Scadden of the Magistrates Court of Western Australia on 25 July 2012. Magistrate Scadden dismissed the wife’s application for an extension of the Violence Restraining Order, and published Reasons for Decision on 30 August 2012. Magistrate Scadden was “not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the (Applicant) is likely to again commit an “act of abuse” against (his former wife)” and was “not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the (Applicant’s wife’s) fears that the (Applicant) will commit an “act of abuse” are reasonably based”.
The learned Magistrate went on to find that even if the Applicant’s wife had established a jurisdictional basis to make a restraining order, “I do not consider that extending the (Violence Restraining Order) is appropriate in the circumstances for the following reasons:
·outside of Family Court proceedings, some 18 months have passed since the Applicant and Respondent have had any form of contact. I note that of that 18 months, the Respondent was in custody for nine months;
·while in custody the Respondent did not contact or attempt to contact the Applicant;
·the Family Court proceedings are resolved and the Respondent has supervised access to the two younger children;
·no evidence demonstrates an incident occurring during the course of supervised access with the children or that the Respondent uses this access to find out about the Applicant or where she lives;
·no evidence demonstrates the Respondent attempting to locate the Applicant, notwithstanding that he has bought a business in Safety Bay;
·the Applicant has not seen the Respondent in the Safety Bay or Rockingham area;
·the Respondent has no contact with the eldest daughter and is subject to a VRO in respect of her. No evidence demonstrates the Respondent breaching this VRO;
·while the Respondent has been convicted for past breaches of the FVRO, this involved sending SMS text messages and making telephone calls over a two week period approximately 18 months ago and previous breaches occurred some ten months or more before that;
·even if I was to accept that certain incidents occurred in April 2010, these incidents occurred over two years ago;
·no evidence was led about the Respondent’s conduct from May 2010 to January 2011, save for an incident in August 2010 at the Family Court involving the Respondent ripping up a proposal and swearing in Turkish. Further, I am ultimately left to speculate why the Applicant moved to a refuge in 2010 and why she changed the children’s school in the same year, and, presumably, infer that it was a consequence of a the Respondent’s conduct. In the absence of any evidence on what occurred during this time, I do not intend speculating on this;
·the Respondent explained that he did not object to the VRO application in favour of his eldest daughter, as he did not want to further upset the children and realised that he needed to let them come around in their own time;
·the marital breakdown and Family Court dispute over access to the children was acrimonious, but the Respondent states he has now moved on and is in a new relationship; and
·the Respondent has two businesses, one in Fremantle and one in Safety Bay. The objective evidence does not support the Applicant’s belief that the Respondent purchased the business in Safety Bay so that he can find where she lives. The Applicant is aware of the Respondent’s business in Safety Bay (although no evidence was led on how she is aware) and she has no intention of going to the business.”
On 1 December 2011, the Applicant’s then estranged wife applied for a Violence Restraining Order on behalf of her eldest daughter. It was founded on matters which related to the criminal charges which the Applicant was then facing. The application was heard without notice to the Applicant and an order made on an interim basis. In the circumstances, the Applicant chose not to contest the order, so it became final. It ended on 28 December 2013. There was no evidence of the Applicant breaching that Order;
In 2012, the Applicant became the subject of a Violence Restraining Order in respect of which the “protected person” was Kylie Jean Noakes. The Applicant met Ms Noakes in October 2011. In that month, they commenced a period of cohabitation and the Applicant employed her in February 2012. That relationship also broke down and involved a dispute about monies allegedly owed by Ms Noakes to the Applicant. The Violence Restraining Order was issued on an interim basis (without hearing from or on behalf of the Applicant). On 1 July 2013, Ms Noakes’ application to make the order final, which application the Applicant intended to oppose, was dismissed because Ms Noakes failed to appear on that day. The Violence Restraining Order therefore lapsed.
The evidence before the Tribunal is to the effect, and I find, that since January 2011 the Applicant has not done anything untoward with respect to his former wife.
Indeed, the evidence before the Tribunal establishes that the only thing that the Applicant has done since then which it is submitted to be reflective of an absence of “good character” is that he broke a window of a car which he had purchased for Ms Noakes. The evidence is to the effect, and I find, that:
(a)he did this in anger after being assaulted by Ms Noakes’ then boyfriend;
(b)the Applicant realised his wrongdoing and made good by facilitating and paying for the replacement of the broken window.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION
In short, the Minister contends that a reasonable period of time must elapse after the expiration of all Violence Restraining Orders against the Applicant during which the Applicant must “keep his nose clear” before the Tribunal can be satisfied “that the Applicant’s character has changed such that he can now be regarded as being of good character”.
Counsel for the Minister quite properly indicated that, if the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review, it would be open to the Applicant to make a fresh application for citizenship in due course once a sufficient period had elapsed (whatever that period might be) so as to satisfy the Minister that, notwithstanding the matters now complained of, the Applicant is at that future time of “good character”.
APPLICANT’S CONTENTION
In short, the Applicant contends that the matters relied upon by the Minister, considered in their proper context, are not indicative of an absence of “good character” on the part of the Applicant. The Applicant’s case is that, having regard to the relative gravity of the matters relied upon by the Minister, the otherwise undisputed evidence of the Applicant’s good character, the circumstances surrounding the matters upon which the Minister relies and the Applicant’s behaviour since the matters relied upon by the Minister, the Tribunal should be satisfied on the evidence it has received that the Applicant is of “good character”.
CHARACTER EVIDENCE
The Tribunal received into evidence numerous letters from people who have known the Applicant for varying periods and in varying respects. At least 4 of them were aware of the Applicant’s convictions. They all attested to the fact that, in their respective opinions, the Applicant was a man of good character.
The Tribunal also heard evidence from the older sister of the Applicant’s former wife. She was fully supportive of the Applicant’s application for citizenship and was critical of the Applicant’s former wife.
I accept the submissions made on behalf of the Minister that none of this evidence is of any real assistance to the Tribunal. I do so because the issue is whether the Tribunal is satisfied, on all the evidence, that, notwithstanding the matters relied upon by the Minister, the Applicant is of “good character”. That is a matter to be determined by the Tribunal having regard to the nature and circumstances of those matters. All of the character evidence adduced on behalf of the Applicant thus goes no further than to establish a proposition that was not disputed by the Minister.
ANALYSIS
If I were to conclude that the matters relied upon by the Minister were reflective of a previous absence of “good character” on the part of the Applicant, I would then need to consider the Minister’s submission that insufficient time has passed in order to “be satisfied the Applicant’s character has changed such that he can now be regarded as being of good character” (to use the words of the Minister’s Counsel).
I am of the view, however, that the Applicant is now and has always been of “good character”. I am of that view because whilst in no way condoning or minimising the nature of the matters relied upon by the Minister, properly analysed those matters are not reflective of any lack of “good character” on the part of the Applicant.
In this regard, I refer to the following:
(a)but for the matters relied upon by the Minister, it is not in issue that the Applicant is otherwise of “good character”. In particular, he is 38 years old, a self-employed father of 3 children with no criminal record other than in respect of the matters set out above;
(b)save for the incident which occurred in early April 2009 when the Applicant spat on his then estranged wife and forced her into a wardrobe for some 10 minutes, all other matters upon which the Minister relies concerning the Applicant’s dealings with his former wife did not entail any form of physical or verbal abuse;
(c)whilst they were acts in contravention of his bail conditions and a Violence Restraining Order then in place, the acts of the Applicant for which he was convicted in 2011 cannot properly be described as anything other than at the “lower end of the scale “. To respectfully adopt the words of Magistrate Malone, the Applicant’s conduct was “bad, but it’s not particularly bad”. This is also reflected in the orders made by the Magistrates Court on both occasions;
(d)the Applicant’s former sister-in-law gave evidence of the Applicant having thrown a phone and keys at her and her mother when the Applicant was living in the United Kingdom. Such matters are not necessarily inconsistent with the Applicant generally having a “good character” (as opposed, for example, to having a bad temper). As the Applicant’s former sister-in-law said, “Like a lot of people, hit the wrong button and the (Applicant) can lose his temper”;
(e)even if I were to accept that those matters were capable of indicating (either their own or with more) a lack of “good character” by the Applicant, they occurred over 10 years ago. In short, those acts are simply too remote in time to be of any assistance in determining whether or not the Applicant is presently of “good character”. (I should say in this regard, in fairness to Counsel for the Minister, that these matters were not relied upon as indicative of the Applicant not presently being of “good character” now, but rather being matters against which I ought assess the evidence of the Applicant’s former sister-in-law);
(f)the conduct relied upon by the Minister primarily relates to a time when the Applicant was going through a separation from his wife and children. Whilst that certainly does not justify his conduct, it does put it into context. In this regard, I respectfully refer to and adopt what Staude DCJ of the District Court of Western Australia said in Walsh v Baron [2012] WADC 165 where at [156] and [157] His Honour described the sending of offensive texts by one party of a relationship to another party at a time that their relationship is breaking down as being “undoubtedly disproportionate, offensive and vindictive”, but not the province of Violence Restraining Orders which His Honour said “is not to protect people from the emotional fallout of a failed relationship, which may be bitter, spiteful and unpleasant, but to protect them from violence in the form of acts of abuse which, in such a case as this, include behaviour that is progressively and continuously, not occasionally, intimidating, offensive or emotionally abusive”;
(g)the other conduct relied upon by the Minister is even less serious and is not inconsistent with the Applicant being of “good character”. In particular:
· the fact that a Violence Restraining Order was obtained by Ms Noakes is of no moment as it was obtained without notice to the Applicant, the Applicant intended to oppose it being made final and the Order was not made final: the fact that the Order was not made final because Ms Noakes did not appear does not detract from the proposition that the basis upon which the interim order was granted has never been tested, let alone upheld by a court;
· the breaking of a window of Ms Noakes’ car occurred after the Applicant had been assaulted by Ms Noakes’ then boyfriend, and again is really reflective of the Applicant’s temper as opposed to his character (a conclusion which is fortified by the fact that the Applicant facilitated and paid for the window being replaced).
CONCLUSION
Orders made by a court, both in the form of Violence Restraining Orders and protective bail conditions, are made with the intention that they be observed. A failure to comply with such orders is not a matter to be taken lightly.
However, the requirement to be of “good character”, albeit a high standard, is not one that requires perfection. Indeed, it would be quite unrealistic to approach a consideration of whether someone is of “good character” to ignore the fact that occasionally people of “good character” do things which are unacceptable from the viewpoint of general community standards.
In my opinion, whilst there is clearly scope for the Applicant to improve the manner in which he appears to deal with stressful situations, and having regard to various matters contained in the ACIs, I find those incidents to be sufficiently isolated such as to cause me to be satisfied that they are not reflective of a lack of “good character” on the part of the Applicant at any time.
Clearly the most serious matter relied upon by the Minister is the fact that the Applicant spat on his former wife and restrained her in a wardrobe for 10 minutes. That is palpably conduct inconsistent with “good character”. However, it was an isolated incident which took place some 4½ years ago.
Moreover, although certainly not justifying the conduct, it is proper for me to note that this incident occurred when the Applicant was told by his former wife that the marriage was at an end. I therefore do not consider this incident, either in isolation or along with the other matters relied upon by the Minister, as evidence a lack of “good character” on the part of the Applicant.
Nor do the Applicant’s convictions for breaching the terms of the Violence Restraining Order and his protective bail conditions. As I have stated, although contraventions of the orders and bail conditions, they were otherwise innocuous: so much so that, notwithstanding such conduct, the Violence Restraining Order which was breached was not subsequently extended.
I find that the conduct complained of, save for the fact that it constituted a breach of court orders, was not conduct in any way capable of evidencing a lack of “good character”. In the circumstances, the fact that such conduct constituted breaches of a Violence Restraining Order and protective bail conditions is not sufficient to elevate the matter to a level of seriousness so as to sufficiently impeach the Applicant’s character and justify a finding that he is not of “good character”.
For the sake of completeness, I note that even if the Violence Restraining Order taken out on behalf of his eldest daughter was still on foot, it would not cause me to conclude that the Applicant was not of “good character”. I say this because the existence of a Violence Restraining Order that was made final without a contested hearing is not of itself inconsistent with a finding that a person is of “good character”. One must go behind such an order to understand the basis upon which it was made and why it was not opposed. In this case, having regard to the basis upon which it was made and why it was not opposed, the Violence Restraining Order taken out on behalf of the Applicant’s eldest daughter would not have caused me to conclude that the Applicant was not of “good character”.
In any event, as it happens, the Violence Restraining Order terminated a few days prior to the making of this decision. Accordingly, even if it were relevant (which I find it is not), as at the date of this decision the Applicant is not the subject of any relevant order of a court.
Even if I had concluded that what happened in April 2009 meant that the Applicant was not then of “good character”, given that over 4½ years has passed since then during which the Applicant has not done anything inconsistent with being of “good character”, I would be satisfied that the Applicant has rehabilitated himself and is now of “good character”.
Accordingly, either way, I find that, for the purpose and within the meaning of section 21(2)(h) of the Act, the Applicant is of “good character”.
As the Minister’s delegate found that the Applicant had satisfied all other requirements under the Act for approval of his application for citizenship, it follows that there is no reason to remit this matter to the Minister for further consideration. Rather, it is appropriate for the Tribunal to set aside the reviewable decision and to substitute therefor a decision that the Applicant’s application for citizenship be allowed.
I certify that the preceding fifty-six 56 paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Mr S Penglis, Senior Member
…(Sgd)..T.Freeman…….
AssociateDated: 7 January 2014
Date of hearing:
18 December 2013
Written submissions after hearing
Applicant: 20 December 2013
Respondent: 23 December 2013Counsel for the Applicant:
Mr B Stokes
Solicitors for the Applicant:
Brians – Solicitors
Counsel for the Respondent:
Mr D McLaren
Solicitors for the Respondent:
Sparke Helmore
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