Mundraby v Commonwealth of Australia

Case [2001] FCA 834


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Mundraby v Commonwealth of Australia [2001] FCA 834

ELLIS MUNDRABY v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
NG 808 OF 1998

AND

DAVID MARK LEWIS v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
NG 809 OF 1998

TAMBERLIN J
SYDNEY
28 JUNE 2001


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NG 808 OF 1998

BETWEEN:

ELLIS MUNDRABY
APPLICANT

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
RESPONDENT

NG 809 of 1998

BETWEEN:

DAVID MARK LEWIS
APPLICANT

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

TAMBERLIN J

DATE:

28 JUNE 2001

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. In this matter, I am satisfied that Mr McKenzie has sufficient expertise and experience to testify relevantly in relation to the issues in the case which are the subject of his report.  Although he cannot testify specifically in relation to the incident at sea in October 1985, I think his evidence is capable of bearing on the question that will ultimately fall for determination.  I think it is artificial to confine the evidence which may be adduced to experience of what actually happens at sea in relation to the effect of bilge water and oily water and the generation of gas, to the exclusion of more general experience of gas generators.

  2. I think it is important to know, as background to his qualifications, what research Mr McKenzie had done and what he may have communicated.  I can see, of course, that there is a wide area of dispute in relation to the weight that should be given to the evidence of Mr McKenzie.  In particular, the weight that should be given to his evidence of what happens on shore will be affected by what particular circumstances there may be at sea which will distinguish his expertise from the expertise of a person who has actually carried out research on a ship at sea.

  3. So far as expertise is concerned, I am satisfied that Mr McKenzie has expertise in the area and I also think his evidence is material in relation to what he may have passed on to other persons of various ranks in the Royal Australian Navy.  I am therefore prepared to allow his evidence.  However, I can see that there is a great deal of room for debate in relation to whether Mr McKenzie’s knowledge is the knowledge of the Navy as such, and whether the material which was passed on to other officers in the naval service was to personnel who were of sufficient seniority to be identified with the Navy so far as the question of notice is concerned.

  4. At the moment, on this issue of his expertise, I am satisfied Mr McKenzie has the expertise and the experience to speak about the subject matter of his report.  Of course, he needs no expertise to give evidence as to what he passed on to other persons.

I certify that the preceding four (4) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Tamberlin.

Associate:

Dated:  10 July 2001

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr D T Kennedy SC
Mr E G Romaniuk
Mr A C M Iuliano
Solicitor for the Applicant: William Szekely
Szekely & Associates
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr C C Branson QC
Mr P S Jones
Ms S Thode
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Date of Hearing: 28 June 2001
Date of Judgment: 28 June 2001
Details
AGLC
Mundraby v Commonwealth of Australia [2001] FCA 834
Case
[2001] FCA 834
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Federal Court of Australia dealt with two consolidated appeals brought by Ellis Mundraby and David Mark Lewis against the Commonwealth of Australia. The applicants were challenging decisions related to their employment and subsequent dismissal from the Royal Australian Navy, specifically regarding the handling of a bilge water incident and the generation of gas in 1985. The central issue before the court was whether the evidence of Mr. McKenzie, an expert on gas generation in bilge water, could be admitted and whether it was relevant and reliable in establishing the Navy's knowledge of the risks involved.

In considering the admissibility of Mr. McKenzie's evidence, the court acknowledged his expertise in the area, noting that his experience and research were pertinent to the issues at hand. Justice Tamberlin held that Mr. McKenzie's general experience with gas generators, although not directly related to the specific incident at sea, was relevant to the broader understanding of the risks involved. The court recognised the potential for debate regarding the weight to be given to Mr. McKenzie's evidence, particularly concerning the distinction between his onshore research and the conditions at sea. However, the court concluded that his evidence was material and should be allowed, albeit with an understanding that its application to the specific circumstances of the incident would be subject to scrutiny.

The court further examined whether Mr. McKenzie's knowledge could be attributed to the Navy as a whole and whether the information he shared with other officers was sufficient to establish notice of the risks within the Navy. The court found that while Mr. McKenzie had the necessary expertise, there were significant issues regarding the extent to which his knowledge and communications could be considered representative of the Navy's overall knowledge. The court allowed Mr. McKenzie's evidence but highlighted the substantial room for debate on its applicability and weight in the context of the Navy's notice of the risks.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

TAMBERLIN J

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: TAMBERLIN J

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