Mundell and Saad

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

MUNDELL & SAAD

[2017] FamCA 532

FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – Best interests – Parental responsibility – Spend time with – Supervised time – Where parents are both litigants in person – Where there are two children aged seven and eight – Where the mother seeks sole parental responsibility – Where the father seeks shared parental responsibility – Where family violence – Where parents are unable to communicate – Where the presumption as to shared parental responsibility does not apply – Where the father has a history of illicit drug use – Where the mother is opposed to the children spending unsupervised time with the father – Where the father seeks that the children spend unsupervised time with him on alternate weekends – Where the father’s history raises concerns as to his parenting capacity – Where the father has taken steps to address concerns – Where an indefinite order for supervision is not warranted – Where a further period of three months of supervision is appropriate – Where the requirement for supervision will be lifted providing the father produces clear drug screens – Orders made for the father to ultimately spend time with the children on alternate weekends and overnight.

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 60B, 60CA, 60CC, 61B, 61C, 61DA, 65D, 65DAA, 65DAC

Champness & Hanson (2009) FLC 93-407
H v K [2001] FamCA 687
McCall & Clark (2009) FLC 93-405
Moose & Moose (2008) FLC 93-375
Slater v Light (2013) 48 FamLR 573

APPLICANT:

Mr Mundell

RESPONDENT:

Ms Saad

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER:

Shedden & Associates

FILE NUMBER:

PAC

3612

2014

DATE DELIVERED:

26 July 2017

PLACE DELIVERED:

Sydney

PLACE HEARD:

Parramatta

JUDGMENT OF:

Loughnan J

HEARING DATE:

7 - 9 June 2017

REPRESENTATION

APPLICANT FATHER:

In Person

RESPONDENT MOTHER:	In Person
COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER:	Ms Shearman

SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER:

Shedden & Associates

Orders

The mother shall have sole parental responsibility for the children B (“B”) born … 2008 and D (“D”) born … 2010 (“the children”).
Notwithstanding Order 1, the mother shall:
(a)where practicable, inform the father (by email or text message) at least 21 days before making decisions about any of the following matters:
(i)any change in the children’s school(s);
(ii)any non-emergency or serious medical treatment the children are to undergo; and
(iv)any proposed relocation of the residence of the children that is more than 30 kilometres from their residence.
(b)any response from the father must be provided to the mother in writing within 14 days of receipt of the mother’s information;
(c)the mother must consider the father’s views in exercising her parental responsibility before making any such decision concerning the children.
The children shall live with the mother.
The children shall spend time with the father as follows:
(a)for a period of three months commencing on the first Sunday after the date of making these Orders each alternate Sunday from 10.00 am to 4.00 pm with such time to be in the presence of the maternal grandfather, Mr C Saad, or such other person as agreed between the parties if Mr C Saad is unavailable (“the supervisor”) for the said period. In the event that the supervisor is not available for the duration of the time provided for in this Order then the time shall be reduced to the time during which the supervisor is available. In the event that no supervisor is available for a particular occasion, the father will spend time with the children in accordance with orders 13 and 14 herein.
(b)thereafter but provided the father has produced a negative hair follicle or clear urinalysis result in accordance with Orders 10 and 11 hereof, then each alternate weekend on both the Saturday and the Sunday from 9.00 am to 5.00 pm each day thereof for a further period of six months.
(c)thereafter but provided the father has produced three negative hair follicle or clear urinalysis screens:
(i)each alternate weekend from 9.00 am Saturday to 5.00 pm Sunday during school term;
(ii)for those weekends to be extended until 5.00 pm on the following Tuesday during the short school holidays and on the first, third and fifth weekend that the children spend time with the father during the Christmas school holidays;
(iii)from 12.00 noon to 6.00 pm on Christmas Day 2017;
(iv)from 2.00 pm on Christmas Eve to 2.00 pm on Christmas Day in 2018 and in all even years thereafter;
(v)from 2.00 pm on Christmas Day to 6.00 pm on Boxing Day in 2019 and in all odd years thereafter;
(vi)on Father’s Day from 9.00 am to 5.00 pm;
(vii)on each of the children’s birthdays as follows:
A.on a school day from 4.00 pm to 6.30 pm
B.on a Saturday, from 2.00 pm to 6.00 pm
C.on a Sunday, from 9.00 am to 1.00 pm
(viii)such other or altered periods as may be agreed between the parents in writing.
The father’s time shall be suspended during any of the following times:
(a)on Mother’s Day from 9.00 am to 5.00pm;
(b)on each of the children’s birthdays:
(i)from 9.00 am to 1.00 pm if a birthday falls on a Saturday;
(ii)from 2.00 pm to 6.00 pm on a Sunday;
(c)from 2.00 pm on Christmas Eve to 2.00 pm on Christmas Day in all odd years commencing with 2019 and each alternate year thereafter; and
(d)from 2.00 pm on Christmas Day to 6.00 pm on Boxing Day in all even years commencing with 2018 each alternate year thereafter.
In the event that the father fails to provide the results of a hair follicle test or urinalysis test (the type of test being at his election) as required by the terms of these Orders and requested by the Independent Children’s Lawyer (“ICL”), or in the event that any such test result is positive for an illicit drug such as methyl amphetamine, opiates, amphetamine type substances or, cannabinoids, the father’s time with the children will be limited to the time specified in Order (4)(a) until the parents agree to the contrary in writing or a court otherwise orders.
In the event that there is not substantial compliance with the requirements of the orders for supervised time and/or for day-only unsupervised time the progression to day-only unsupervised time (Order (4)(b)) or overnight time (Order (4)(c)), as the case may be, will be delayed until the orders have been substantially complied with.
For the purpose of Order (7) above, “substantial compliance” means that at least 90 per cent of the ordered occasions were implemented.
For the purposes of facilitating changeover, unless the parties otherwise agree in writing, the mother or her nominee shall deliver the children to the father at his place of residence at the commencement of the father’s time with the children and the father shall return the children to the mother or her nominee at her place of residence at the conclusion of each such period.
The father shall when requested by the ICL submit for hair follicle testing, and provide such hair follicle samples as directed by The Drug Detection Agency for the purposes of analysis of drug use in relation to non-prescription drugs including but not limited to methyl amphetamine, opiates, amphetamine type substances, cannabinoids as follows:
(a)that the father be restrained from taking any steps to interfere with the provision of hair follicle samples, or to interfere with the test results.
(b)that the father shall do things necessary and sign all necessary authority and documents to authorise the Drug Detection Agency to provide the test results to the ICL and the mother forthwith upon those results becoming available.
(c)that the father shall be responsible for meeting his own costs of such hair follicle testing.
If the father is unable or unwilling to submit to a hair follicle test then the father must submit to random urinalysis tests (including under supervision and chain of custody) as follows:
(a)the father must submit to such a request to undergo supervised urine analysis to be conducted in accordance with the Australian/New Zealand Standard 4308:2008: Procedure for the collection, detection and quantitation of drugs of abuse in urine within 48 hours of the father receiving the request from the ICL (by either email or SMS text message).
(b)testing shall be in respect of methyl amphetamine, opiates, amphetamines type substances, and cannabinoids.
(c)testing shall occur randomly but not more than one occasion in a 28 day period and upon 48 hours’ notice at such times as the ICL may request of the father and for the purpose of this Order, the father shall provide his telephone number and email address to the ICL and he shall keep the ICL informed of any changes to those details.
(d)the father shall be solely responsible for the cost of obtaining the supervised urinalysis testing.
(e)the father must provide a copy of the urinalysis test results to the ICL and the mother as soon as reasonable practicable when they are available.
Simultaneous with the commencement of these Orders both parties do all acts and things and sign all documents necessary to complete the intake at E Contact Service (“ECS”) for the purpose of the father spending time with the children if the maternal grandfather is not available and no other agreement can be reached in respect of a supervisor.
Assuming the parties are accepted by ECS, and it becomes necessary to use such service then:
(a)the father shall spend time with the children for two hours per fortnight at the availability of ECS; and
(b)the father shall be solely responsible for all costs associated with spending time with the children at the ECS.
In the event that ECS cannot facilitate the time in accordance with Order (13)(a) hereof then the father’s time with the children at ECS is varied to such periods as can be facilitated by ECS.
The order appointing the ICL is extended for a further period of 12 months and the appointment is thereafter discharged.
Should Legal Aid NSW not be willing to continue to fund the ICL for the purposes of implementation of these Orders, then the mother shall be substituted to facilitate the parts of these Orders with which the ICL is charged.
Each of the parents, their servants and agents are hereby restrained by injunction from:
(a)abusing, insulting, belittling, rebuking, or otherwise denigrating the other parent; and
(b)discussing these proceedings or the contents of any documents filed in or intended for use in these proceedings to, with or in the presence of hearing of the children or either of them, and from permitting any other person to do so.
The father is permitted to telephone or Skype the children between 6.00 pm and 7.00 pm on each Tuesday and Thursday, and on Sunday in the week when the father is not spending time with the children, or such other times as agreed between the parties, and the mother shall do all things to ensure that the children are available to take the father’s telephone or Skype call.
The mother and the father shall provide to each other within seven days, details of his/her address, telephone number or numbers and email address (if any), and each of the mother and the father shall notify the other within seven days of any change to those details.
These Orders operate as an authority for any school attended by the children, or either of them, to forward to each of the mother and the father, at their respective costs (if any), all correspondence, newsletters, school photographs and the like.
The ICL shall cause a certified copy of these Orders to be served upon the children’s current school.
Should the children, or either of them, suffer ill health and miss time to be spent with the father pursuant to these Orders, then the children shall spend makeup time with the father, unless otherwise agreed between the parents in writing, within 14 days of the missed time on a weekend and for an equivalent period of time.
The father is permitted to send to the children or either of them, via the mother’s address, a reasonable amount of correspondence, presents and the like, and the mother shall do all things to ensure that the children receive them.
That for the purposes of communicating information between the parties the mother and the father shall:
(a)communicate by telephone in respect of matters of an urgent nature in relation to the children, or either of them, and otherwise;
(b)communicate by SMS text message or email about day to day matters including arrangements for each party to spend time with the children if not otherwise set out herein.
Should a child suffer a medical emergency requiring medical attention while spending time with, or living with, either party:
(a)that party is to notify the other party as soon as practicable;
(b)that party is to provide to the other party the full details of the practitioner or medical facility upon which the child attended as soon as practicable; and
(c)that party is to advise the treating medical practitioner or medical facility that the other party has authority to access either of the child’s medical records and other significant information upon their request.
The father shall do all things necessary to obtain a mental health treatment plan and referral to a psychologist within 14 days and thereafter shall do all things necessary to comply with any treatment program recommended by his treating psychologist.
The father shall, within 14 days, provide a written authority to the ICL authorising the ICL to obtain information in respect of his treatment and compliance with same directly from the father’s treating psychologist.
The ICL has leave to provide to the father’s treating psychologist copies of the following material:
(a)the reports of Ms F dated 4 March 2015 and 11 March 2016;
(b)the report of Mr G dated 16 May 2016;
(c)discharge summaries from H Hospital for the father’s admissions in 2011; and
(d)these reasons.
Within six months of the date of this Order the mother shall cause to be paid to Legal Aid New South Wales the sum of $4,274.32 representing one half of the costs of the ICL.
Leave is granted to the parties to apply to bring the matter back before the Court within 28 days, or such further time on which the parties may agree, in relation to the wording (as opposed to the import) of these Orders.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Mundell & Saad has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY

FILE NUMBER: PAC3612 of 2014

Mr Mundell

Applicant

And

Ms Saad

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

These are parenting proceedings about the children B and D who are eight and seven years of age, respectively. Their parents are Mr Mundell (“the father”) and Ms Saad (“the mother”).
It is agreed that the mother will have parental responsibility for the children and that they will live with her. The main dispute between the parents is whether the father should share in the exercise of parental responsibility and the extent of time the father should spend with the children, whether that time should be supervised and if so, whether a period or date can be identified, after which supervision will not be required.
The ultimate decision turns on the nature and level of risk to the children from a potential deterioration in the father’s behaviour or capacity, whether through a relapse in his physical or mental health or otherwise.

Applications

The father sought orders as set out in a minute of order submitted on the first day of the trial as follows:
1)That the children live with the mother
2)That the children spend alternate weekends with the father dropped off by the mother Friday 6-7 pm and that the father drop off children at [J Street, Suburb K] Sunday 6-7 pm
3)That the children spend time with the father on father’s birthday and alternate children’s birthday.
4)That the children spend time with the father half of school holidays and half of public holidays alternating each holidays.
5)That both parents retain parental responsibility to make decisions about their long and short term welfare regarding schooling education and health and welfare.
6)That the children be allowed to talk freely with their father about any topic that is suitable to their age and cognition.
7)That the mother not be allowed to take the children overseas without the written permission of the father.
There were different versions of the mother’s orders but ultimately she sought the orders set out in her written submissions handed up on the final day of the trial. She sought orders in the following terms:
1)The children [D] born … 2010 and [B] born … 2008 to live with the mother.
2)The mother to have sole parental responsibility for the children as recommended in the Family Report at item 97 and listed in the recommendations on page 40..
3)The father to spend no unsupervised time with the children.
4)The father to have telephone/Skype contact with the children up to three times per week.
5)The father to have supervised access on one Sunday per fortnight for 3 hours.
6)Nominated supervisors to be acceptable to both parties.
7)Additional supervised access during school holidays and special occasions as agreed between the parties.
The Independent Children’s Lawyer’s (“ICL”) proposals were set out in a draft document submitted during final submissions on 9 June 2017. The ICL sought:
1)That all previous parenting Orders be discharged.
2)That the mother have sole parental responsibility for the children, [B] born … 2008 and [D] born … 2010 be exercised as follows:
a.The mother must inform the father (by email or text message) at least 21 days before making decisions about any of the following matters:
i.Any changes in the children’s school(s);
ii.Any religious instructions the children receive, whether at school or otherwise;
iii.Any non-emergency or serious medical treatment the children is to undergo; and
iv.Any proposed relocation of more than 30 kilometres from her present residence.
b.The father must respond to all information providing his views (if any) in writing within 10 days of receipt of the mother informing him of the issues(s).
c.The mother must consider the father’s view in exercising her parental responsibility before making any final decision concerning the children.
3)That the children live with the mother.
4)That the children shall spend time with the father as follows:
a.For a period of three (3) months commencing on the first Sunday after the date of making these Orders each alternate Sunday from 10.00 am – 4.00 pm with such time to be in the presence of the maternal grandfather, [Mr C Saad], or such other person as agreed between the parties if [Mr C Saad] is unavailable for the said period.
b.Thereafter and provided the father has produced a negative hair follicle result in accordance with Order 5 (sic) hereof, then each alternate weekend on both the Saturday and the Sunday from 9.00 am – 5.00 pm each day thereof for a further period of six (6) months.
c.Thereafter and provided the father has produced three (3) negative hair follicle results in accordance with Order 5 hereof, then:
i.each alternate weekend from 9.00 am Saturday – 5.00 pm Sunday;
ii.on the first weekend that the children spend time with the father and for it to be extended until 5.00 pm on the following Tuesday during the short-term school holidays; and
iii.on the first, third and fifth weekend that the children spend time with the father and for it to be extended until 5.00 pm on the following Tuesday during the Term 4 school holidays.
d.At Christmas 2017 from 12.00 noon – 6pm on Christmas Day.
e.Thereafter provided that the children have commenced overnight time in accordance with these Orders then:
i.From Christmas 2018 from 2.00 pm on Christmas Eve to 2.00 pm on Christmas Day in all even years thereafter; and
ii.From Christmas 2019 from 2.00 pm on Christmas Day to 6.00 pm on Boxing Day in all odd years thereafter.
f.On Father’s Day from 10.00 am until 1.00 pm on the same conditions as Order 4a. and thereafter from 9.00 am – 5.00 pm.
g.On each of the children’s birthdays as follows:
i.Should it occur on a school day from 4.00 pm – 6.30 pm; and
ii.Should it occur on a weekend day then from 10.00 am – 2.00 pm
h.Such other periods as agreed between the parties in writing
5)Should either the mother on behalf of the children, and/or the father be unable to attend a period set out in Order 4 hereof the parties must, where applicable, obtain a medical certificate for such non-attendance or otherwise agree with the other party to such unavailability.
6)If by operation of Order 4 the Father’s time is suspended for any period and it is to resume then the time shall resume at the point in the cycle at which it has been suspended; and the commencement dates of any subsequent period at 4b. and 4c. hereof which had not yet commenced as at the date of supervisions are adjusted in accordance with the dates on which the said period complete after allowing for the supervision.
7)Should the mother not otherwise be spending day time with the children on the following occasions then the father’s time with the children is suspended and the children shall spend time with the mother as follows:
a.on Mother’s Day from 9.00 am;
b.on each of the children’s birthdays from 9.00 am – 1.00 pm on such Saturday and from 2.00 pm – 6.00 pm on such Sunday;
c.from 2.00 pm on Christmas Eve to 2.00 pm on Christmas Day in all odd years commencing in 2019 and each alternate year thereafter; and
d.from 2.00 pm on Christmas Day to 6.00 pm on Boxing Day in all even years commencing in 2018 each alternate year thereafter.
8)For the purposes of facilitating changeover pursuant to Order 4 and Order 7 the mother or her nominee shall deliver the children to the father at his place of residence and the father shall return the children to the mother or her nominee at her place of residence.
9)That the father shall when requested by the Independent Children’s Lawyer (“ICL”) shall submit for hair follicle testing, and provide such hair follicle samples as directed by The Drug Detection Agency for the purposes of analysis of drug use in relation to non-prescription drugs including but not limited to Methylamphetamine, Opiates, Amphetamines type substances, Cannabinoids as follows:
a.That the father be restrained from taking any steps to interfere with the provision of hair follicle samples, or to interfere with the test results.
b.That the father shall do things necessary and sign all necessary authority and documents to authorise the Drug Detection Agency to provide the test results to the ICL and the mother with copies of all results and forthwith upon those results becoming available as soon as reasonably practical.
c.That the father shall be responsible for meeting his own costs of such hair follicle testing.
10)If the father is unable or unwilling to submit to a hair follicle test then the father must submit to random urinalysis tests (including under supervision and chain [of] custody as follows:
a.The father must submit to such a request to undergo supervised urine analysis to be conducted in accordance with the Australian/New Zealand Standard 4308:2008: Procedure for the collection, detection and quantification of drugs of abuse in urine within 48 hours of the father receiving the request from the ICL (by either email or SMS text message).
b.Testing shall be in respect of Methyl Amphetamine, Opiates, Amphetamines type substances, and Cannabinoids.
c.Testing shall occur randomly but not more than one (1) occasion in a twenty-eight (28) day period and upon fort-eight (48) hours’ notice at such times as the ICL may request of the father and for the purpose of this Order, the father shall provide his telephone number and email address to the ICL and he shall keep the ICL informed of any changes to those details.
d.The father shall be solely responsible for the cost of obtaining the supervised urinalysis testing;
e.The father must provide a copy of the result of the urinalysis test results to the ICL and the mother as soon as reasonable practicable when they are available.
f.If the father fails to provide a sample within the timeframe required for the test, or produces a test which displays a drug of abuse in that test sample, for 3 tests within a 3-month period from the date of these Orders, then the father’s time with the children will continue in accordance with Order 4a.
g.Thereafter once the father progresses to Stage two (2) as set out in Order 4b. then if the father fails to provide a sample within the timeframe required for the test, or produces a test which displays a drug of abuse in that test sample, for 3 tests within a 9-month period from the date of these Orders, then the father’s time with the children will continue in accordance with Order 4b.
11)Simultaneous with the commencement of these Orders both parties do all acts and things and sign all documents necessary to complete the intake at [E Contact Service] (“[ECS]”) for the purpose of the father spending time with the children if the maternal grandfather is not available and no other agreement can be reached in respect of a supervisor.
12)Assuming the parties are accepted by [ECS], and it becomes necessary to use such service then:
a.the father shall spend time with the children for 2 hours per fortnight at the availability of [ECS]; and
b.the father shall be solely responsible for all costs associated with spending time with the children at the [ECS].
13)In the event that [ECS] cannot facilitate the time in accordance with the order 12a. hereof then the father’s time with the children at [ECS] should be varied as to such periods as can be facilitated by [ECS].
14)That the Order appointing the ICL be extended for a further period of up to twelve (12) months and is thereafter discharged.
15)Should Legal Aid NSW not be willing to continue to fund the ICL for the purposes of implementation of these Orders, then the mother shall be substituted to facilitate the implementation of these Orders for which the ICL is charged.
16)That each of the parties, their servants and agents be hereby restrained by injunction from:
a.abusing, insulting, belittling, rebuking, or otherwise denigrating the other party and
b.discussing these proceedings or the contents of any documents filed in or intended for use in these proceedings to, with or in the presence of hearing of the children or either of them, and from permitting any other person to do so.
17)That the father be permitted to telephone or Skype the children between 6.00 pm and 7.00 pm on each Tuesday and Thursday, and on Sunday in the other week when the father is not spending time with the children, or such other times as agreed between the parties, and the mother shall do all things to ensure that the children are available to take the father’s call or Skype.
18)That the mother, and the father provide to each other within 7 days details of his/her address, telephone number or numbers and (if any) email address, and that each of the mother and the father notify each other within 7 days of any change to those details.
19)That these orders operate as an authority for any school attended by the children, or either of them, to forward to each of the mother and the father all correspondence, newsletters, school photographs and the like at their own costs (if any).
20)That the ICL cause a certified copy of these Orders to be served upon the children’s current school once issued.
21)Should the children, or either of them, suffer ill health and miss time to be spend with the father pursuant to these Orders, then the children shall spend makeup time with the father within 14 days of the missed time on a weekend and such time is to be equivalent to the time missed.
22)That the father be permitted to send to the children, via the mother’s address, a reasonable amount of correspondence, presents and the like for each of the children, and that the m other do all things to ensure that the children receive them.
23)That for the purposes of communicating information between the parties the mother and the father shall:
a.Communicate by telephone matter[s] of an urgent nature in relation to the children, or either of them, and otherwise;
b.Communicate by SMS text message or email about day to day matters including arrangements for each party to spend time with the children if not otherwise set out herein.
24)Should the children, or either of them, suffer a medical emergency requiring medical attention while spending time with, or living with, either party:
c.The other party is to be notified as soon as practicable.
d.That the other party is to be provided with the full details of the practitioner or medical facility upon which the children, other either of them, attend upon as soon as practicable.
e.That the medical practitioner or medical facility be advised that the other party has authority to access either of the children’s medical records and other significant information upon their request.
25)That the father shall do all things necessary to obtain a mental health treatment plan and referral to a psychologist within 14 days and thereafter shall do all things necessary to comply with any treatment program recommended by his treating psychologist.
26)That the father shall, within 14 days, provide a written authority to the Independent Children’s Lawyer authorising the Independent Children’s Lawyer obtain information in respect of his treatment and compliance with same directly from the father’s treating psychologist.
27)That the Independent Children’s Lawyer shall be given leave to provide to the father’s treating psychologist copies of the following material:
f.The reports of Ms F dated 4 March 2015 and 11 March 2016
g.The report of Mr G dated 16 May 2016
h.Discharge summaries from H Hospital for the father’s admissions in 2011.
28)Deleted.
29)That within three (3) months from the date of this order each of the parties shall cause to be paid to Legal Aid NSW by way of contribution to the costs of the Independent Children’s Lawyer for these proceedings in the sum of $4,274.33.

Written Evidence

The father relied on:
·Affidavit of the father filed 17 January 2017; and
·Affidavit of the father filed 8 March 2017
The mother relied on:
·Affidavit of the mother filed 1 September 2014;
·Affidavit of the mother filed 16 February 2017;
·Affidavit of Mr L (the mother’s partner) filed 19 July 2016;
·Affidavit of Ms M Saad (maternal grandmother) filed 19 July 2016;
·Affidavit of Mr C Saad (maternal grandfather) filed 19 July 2016;
·Affidavit of Ms N Saad (maternal aunt) filed 19 July 2016;
·Affidavit of Ms O Saad (maternal aunt) filed 19 July 2016;
·Affidavit of Ms P filed 19 July 2016;
·Notice of Risk filed 1 September 2014; and
·Mother’s Case Information dated 7 June 2017.

The Hearing

The hearing commenced on 7 June 2017. Each of the parents appeared without legal representation. The ICL was represented by counsel. The parents were at a significant disadvantage in not having legal representation. On at least two occasions the father said that he felt he was disadvantaged by not having representation. I should acknowledge the role played by the ICL and her counsel in the management of the hearing. The ICL’s counsel settled a trial plan, for example and I have no doubt that the parents were assisted when she took the lead in relation to cross-examination and submissions.
At the conclusion of the trial on 9 June 2017, interim orders were made in terms agreed between the parents and the ICL. Otherwise judgment was reserved.

Short History

The father was born in 1967 and is 50 years of age. The mother was born in 1981 and is 36 years of age. The parents commenced their relationship in approximately 2003, were married in 2007 and separated in 2011. On 7 September 2012 the parents were divorced.

Credibility

The father

During cross-examination the father had some difficulty in limiting himself to the questions asked. He was not confident about the times and dates of some events. It was distracting that the father gave different explanations for his failure to comply with a recent request from the ICL for a drug test. He variously said that he could not afford the test; that he did not appreciate that the request was made pursuant to an order for drug testing; and that it was unnecessary as ‘someone’ could simply observe him and thereby realise that he has not been using drugs. The last proposition is ridiculous but I had some difficulty in having the father agree. The father was obliged to concede that the request for the test came with a reference to the order under which it was made.
In any event, I accept that those matters may go more to a lack of insight or judgment rather than creditworthiness.
It is the father’s case that he last used amphetamines or a related drug, in early 2013. However, it was asserted, without complaint, that he previously reported that he had used such a drug in the middle of 2014.
At times during his cross-examination the father conceded some failings in his memory with comments to the effect of “don’t hold me to that” and “I was pretty well out of it (at that time)”. Otherwise, the father presented as a cooperative witness who made an effort to accurately respond to the questions he was asked. He did not resile from any of his written evidence.

The mother

As with the father, the mother was over-inclusive in her answers during cross-examination. However, like the father, it was my impression that the mother sought to candidly address the questions asked of her. The mother did not resile from any of her evidence.

Mr L (the mother’s partner); Ms M Saad (maternal grandmother); Mr C Saad (maternal grandfather)

These witnesses were briefly cross-examined. Their written evidence was not challenged.

Mr Q (married to maternal aunt)

Mr Q was not on affidavit but gave brief oral evidence in chief as to his availability as a potential supervisor. His evidence was not challenged.

Ms F

Ms F gave evidence as an expert. She was challenged by the father as to her conclusions, expertise and qualifications but her credit was not called into question.

Background Facts

The father was born in 1967.
The mother was born in 1981.
The father’s son, Mr R was born in 1989 and is currently 28 years old.
The parents met and commenced a relationship in approximately 2003.
In 2007 the parents were married.
In 2008 B was born.
In 2009 the father attended a rehabilitation centre for the treatment of gambling addiction.
In 2010 D was born.
In April 2011 the parents separated. The mother and the children moved to the maternal grandparents’ home. The father used amphetamines at or around this time.
The mother organised for the children to spend time with the father in her presence, approximately twice per week for two to four hours until July 2011 at which point she arranged for the father to spend time with the children unsupervised. In August 2011 the mother reinstated supervision.
During August, September and October 2011 the father was admitted to hospital on numerous occasions for treatment of mental health issues.
On 4 November 2011 the father spent time with the children in the presence of the mother at a park. After an argument between the parents the father took D back to the former matrimonial home. The mother called the police. After some time the police arrived and the father was arrested. The police issued a provisional Apprehended Violence Order (“AVO”) against the father for the protection of the mother and the children.
The father was admitted to a private psychiatric hospital for treatment where he remained from 8 to 28 November 2011. The mother took the children to see the father on two occasions.
On 30 November 2011 the father attended Suburb S Local Court and consented to the issue of a final AVO, without admissions.
On 20 December 2011 the mother commenced proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court (as it was then). On 28 February 2012 interim orders were made that the mother have sole parental responsibility, that the children live with the mother and spend no time with the father. The father was not present at court on that occasion and the proceedings were listed for an undefended hearing on 29 March 2012. On that occasion the mother and father were present. The mother withdrew her application for final orders and the proceedings were discontinued.
In April 2012 the father relocated to T Town where he attended a rehabilitation facility.
On 7 September 2012 the parents were divorced.
It was the father’s evidence that he has abstained from taking amphetamines since late 2012 or early 2013. Later in the hearing he seemed less confident about that. It was asserted, without complaint, that the father had previously reported that he had used amphetamines in mid-2014.
In February 2014 the mother met her current partner, Mr L through an online dating service, and they commenced a relationship thereafter. Mr L has two children who live with him four days per week.
On 4 August 2014 the father commenced these proceedings.
On 2 September 2014 interim orders were made to the following effect:
(a) that the mother have sole parental responsibility for the children;
(b) that the children live with the mother;
(c)that the children spend time with the father from 10.00 am until 4.00 pm on two consecutive days on one weekend in each of October, December and once in each three month period during 2015;
(d)that such time be supervised by Mr R (the father’s adult son);
(e)that the father undertake urinalysis drug testing as requested by the mother’s solicitor not more than once per month, such costs to be paid for by the mother.
On 27 April 2015 orders were made for the appointment of an ICL.
On 19 June 2015 orders were made for the preparation of a family report. The urinalysis orders made on 2 September 2014 were discharged and orders were made that the father undertake urinalysis drug screening within 48 hours of a request by the ICL, not more than once per month.
In February 2016 the mother and the children moved from the maternal grandparents’ home to the home of the mother’s partner, Mr L. The children commenced attending a new school at this time.
On 14 March 2016 the family report dated 11 March 2016 was released to the parties.
On 19 May 2016 orders were made requiring the father to obtain a referral to a clinical psychiatrist for review of his mental health circumstances and to obtain a report. Trial directions were made.
In March 2017 the father moved from T Town to live at Suburb U, Sydney.
On 7 March 2017 the proceedings were set down for final hearing over three days commencing 7 June 2017.
On the last day of the hearing, 9 June 2017 orders were made in terms of an agreement reached between the parties as follows:
1.By consent and until further order, orders are made in the terms of the document titled “Interim Consent Orders” (Exhibit 1 dated 9 June 2017), as set out hereunder:
1.That the children, [B] born … 2008 and [D] born … 2010 (“the children”) continue to live with the mother.
2.That the children shall spend time with the father each alternate Sunday from 11am-1pm with such time to be in the presence of the maternal grandfather, [Mr C Saad] or such other person as agreed between the parties if [Mr Saad] is unavailable for such period commencing 11 June 2017.
3.For the purposes of facilitating such time pursuant to Order 2 hereof the father shall meet the maternal grandfather at Hungry Jacks at [Suburb V] unless otherwise agreed as between the father and the mother and the maternal grandfather.
4.That within 7 days of the making of interim orders, that the mother and the father shall contact [W Group] (contact number …) and complete an intake to be enrolled in the Post-Orders Intervention Pilot.
5.As part of the enrolment process the mother and the father provide any interim orders pending the delivery of the final orders.
6.If successful with the parties being accepted into the Pilot then the mother and the father shall complete such Pilot.

The Expert Evidence

The Family Consultant is Ms F. Ms F prepared a family report dated 11 March 2016.
Ms F’s formal qualifications include the degrees of Bachelor of Social Work and Master of Social Work
Ms F worked as the Co-ordinator in counselling and relationship education from 1999 – 2007. In 2006-2007 she was university lecturer in social work with families and groups. From February 2009 Ms F has worked as a Family Consultant at the Family Law Courts Registry at Parramatta.

The Legislation

The law to be applied in parenting proceedings is found in Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”).
Section 60CA provides that parenting proceedings are determined on the basis that the best interests of the child are the paramount consideration. Section 60CC identifies the matters that are relevant to the determination of what is in a child’s best interests. Section 60CC(1) requires the Court to consider the “primary considerations” and “additional considerations” articulated in ss 60CC(2) and 60CC(3) respectively.
The sequence of decision making for identifying appropriate parenting orders under Part VII starts with parental responsibility. Section 61DA of the Act creates a presumption in favour of equal shared parental responsibility. The presumption may not apply but if it does apply, it can be rebutted. If an order will be made for equal shared parental responsibility, s 65DAA requires that the court consider making an order for equal time and if that is not ordered, for each party to have substantial and significant time. Findings are made by reference to what is in the child’s best interests.
In order to give some structure to these reasons I will adopt the following approach:
(a)set out the proposals, including any options not advanced by a party that the parties addressed or could have addressed;
(b)where possible and relevant, consider and make findings about matters set out in s 60CC;
(c)consider and make findings about parental responsibility, including considering the presumption in s 61DA;
(d)apply s 65DAA if relevant and assess the proposals in light of that provision;
(e)if 65DAA is not relevant, assess the proposals against the best interests criterion;
(f)consider and make findings about living arrangements; and
(g)make orders.

The Parties’ Proposals

The ICL proposes that the mother have sole parental responsibility and that the children live with the mother. The ICL proposes that the children spend time with the father during day times only and supervised for three months, leading to unsupervised day time for a further six months. The first two tranches of the time are on the basis of an accompanying drug testing regime. Assuming the father has produced negative drug testing results, the ICL proposed that the children spend time with the father overnight on each alternate weekend.
The parents agree that the mother will have parental responsibility for the children and that they will live with her and spend time with the father.
The father seeks orders which include him sharing parental responsibility with the mother, and him spending time with the children unsupervised, each alternate weekend during school term from Friday evening to Sunday evening, for one half of the school holidays and on some special days.
The mother seeks orders whereby the father spends no unsupervised time with the children. The orders she seeks include provision for the father to have supervised time on one Sunday per fortnight for three hours with the supervisor/s to be acceptable to both parties. She also seeks additional supervised time during school holidays and special occasions as agreed between the parties.
The range of dispute on the key areas seems to be:
(a)whether the father should share in the exercise of parental responsibility for the children;
(b)whether the father’s time with the children should be unsupervised, supervised for a further limited period or supervised indefinitely;
(c)in part depending on the fact or duration of supervision, the frequency and duration of the times the father will spend with the children; and
(d)any other conditions, such as drug testing, that might be imposed on the father’s time.

Section 60CC Considerations

Section 60CC specifies the following considerations:

Primary considerations:

Note: Making these considerations the primary ones is consistent with the objects of this Part set out in paragraphs 60B(1)(a) and (b).

(2)(a) the benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both of the child‘s parents

A meaningful relationship or a meaningful involvement is one which is important, significant and valuable to the child.[1] That enquiry is “prospective” which requires a court to evaluate the extent to which a meaningful or significant relationship with both parents is going to be of advantage to a child.
[1] McCall & Clark (2009) FLC 93-405.
The Court’s obligation is to make the orders most likely to promote the child’s best interests. In seeking to achieve that objective, s 60CC(2)(a) directs the Court to consider “the benefit to the child” of having a meaningful relationship with both parents. Even if such a benefit is established, it must still be weighed along with all of the other relevant factors. The expression ‘meaningful relationship’ is a legal construct, not a psychological one. It is for the Court, not an expert, to determine what constitutes a ‘meaningful relationship’.[2]
[2] Champness & Hanson (2009) FLC 93-407.
The agreed facts suggest that there is meaning in the relationships between the children and each of their parents. Ms F observed loving and comfortable interaction between each of the parents and the children. The parties seek orders that would have both parents spending time with the children and communicating with them.
Provided that the children are safe, any orders made should promote those relationships.

(2)(b) the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence.

‘Abuse’ and ‘family violence’ are defined terms.
“abuse” , in relation to a child, means:
(a) an assault, including a sexual assault, of the child; or
(b) a person (the first person ) involving the child in a sexual activity with the first person or another person in which the child is used, directly or indirectly, as a sexual object by the first person or the other person, and where there is unequal power in the relationship between the child and the first person; or
(c) causing the child to suffer serious psychological harm, including (but not limited to) when that harm is caused by the child being subjected to, or exposed to, family violence; or
(d) serious neglect of the child.
Section 4AB provides:
(1) For the purposes of this Act, family violence means violent, threatening or other behaviour by a person that coerces or controls a member of the person’s family (the family member ), or causes the family member to be fearful.
(2) Examples of behaviour that may constitute family violence include (but are not limited to):
(a) an assault; or
(b) a sexual assault or other sexually abusive behaviour; or
(c) stalking; or
(d) repeated derogatory taunts; or
(e) intentionally damaging or destroying property; or
(f) intentionally causing death or injury to an animal; or
(g) unreasonably denying the family member the financial autonomy that he or she would otherwise have had; or
(h) unreasonably withholding financial support needed to meet the reasonable living expenses of the family member, or his or her child, at a time when the family member is entirely or predominantly dependent on the person for financial support; or
(i) preventing the family member from making or keeping connections with his or her family, friends or culture; or
(j) unlawfully depriving the family member, or any member of the family member‘s family, of his or her liberty.
(3) For the purposes of this Act, a child is exposed to family violence if the child sees or hears family violence or otherwise experiences the effects of family violence.
(4) Examples of situations that may constitute a child being exposed to family violence include (but are not limited to) the child:
(a) overhearing threats of death or personal injury by a member of the child‘s family towards another member of the child‘s family; or
(b) seeing or hearing an assault of a member of the child‘s family by another member of the child‘s family; or
(c) comforting or providing assistance to a member of the child‘s family who has been assaulted by another member of the child‘s family; or
(d) cleaning up a site after a member of the child‘s family has intentionally damaged property of another member of the child‘s family; or
(e) being present when police or ambulance officers attend an incident involving the assault of a member of the child‘s family by another member of the child‘s family.
Section 60CC (2A) provides that in applying the considerations set out in subsection (2), the court is to give greater weight to the consideration set out in paragraph (2)(b).
The father has a background that includes criminal activity, substance abuse and mental health issues which have led to or resulted from aberrant or concerning behaviour. In one way or another that gives rise to a justifiable concern about the risks to the children from contact with their father. In some instances the father’s behaviour has met the definition of abuse and/or family violence.
The basic facts are not disputed. The disputed issues relate to the implications and potential risks for the children, if any, arising from those circumstances.
The relevant events are:
·In 1982, the father, who was then 15 years of age, was convicted by the X Children’s Court of stealing, taking and driving a motor vehicle and driving while unlicensed. He was placed on 12 months’ probation, to be of good behaviour during that time and had the supervision of a District Officer.
·In 1989 the father was convicted by the Suburb Y Local Court of offensive behaviour and was fined $100.
·In 1992 the father was convicted by the Suburb Z Local Court of offences including, driving while his licence was cancelled and while disqualified, and driving an unregistered and uninsured vehicle. He was placed on a $500 recognisance to be of good behaviour for 18 months, disqualified for driving for 12 months and was fined $1,100.
·In 1994 the father was convicted by the AA Local Court of breaching an Apprehended Domestic Violence Order and was placed on a $100 recognisance to be of good behaviour for six months.
·In 2006 the father was convicted by the Suburb Y District Court of Attempted Aggravated Sexual Assault of a victim under 16 years of age. The father pleaded guilty to the charge and on that basis, more serious charges were not pursued. The offence occurred between 18 June 2004 and 4 July 2004. The father was sentenced to 20 months imprisonment. Ten months of the sentence was suspended on the father entering into a bond. For 20 months the father was to accept supervision by the NSW Probation and Parole Service and comply with directions about treatment and counselling for a substance abuse issue and the sexual offenders program.
·In April 2011 the parents had an argument and the father broke a guitar. He then left the house and did not return home that night. The next morning the mother left the former matrimonial home and went to her parents’ home. That was the parents’ separation.
·In May 2011 the father was involved in an incident to which police were called. The father was arrested by police and conveyed to GG Hospital. They reported that the father appeared to be quite agitated and made statements relating to his mental instability. The father was later discharged from GG Hospital and he was thereupon arrested and questioned. The father told the police that he could not remember anything that happened on during the incident as he had been on a drug binge. He was charged with a number of offences. The discharge summary notes that the father had post-amphetamine psychosis and narcissistic personality traits.
·In July 2011 the father was convicted by the Suburb S Local Court in relation to the events described above, of making false representations in a police investigation, threatening to destroy or damage property to injure another person and possessing or using a prohibited weapon, without a permit. He was placed on an 18 month bond on each charge.
·The mother annexed to her affidavit an email sent by the father to the mother on 5 September 2011 with the subject “Last and final message”. The body of the message read as follows:
Well, I’m sitting here now and this is my final message to you.
I’ll be dead by the time you get this, but you knew that was always going to be the outcome. I have done this for one reason and one reason only, to show you how severe the impact of your behaviour and lack of accountability can be on another human being. I want you to face my children every day knowing that all it would have taken is for you to actually see a human being on the other side of this illness. That I was sick and you couldn’t have done anything to stop it, that if only I had God in my life and that you had no control over it. Well guess what, it’s all bullshit, if you had given me 3 hours of your life, it actually would have saved mine and I wouldn’t feel as though I had to kill myself to get you a message that would have ensured my children’s personal freedoms.
So here it is [Ms Saad], the big message – next time you tell someone you love them, you will be absolutely sure they don’t have any drug, alcohol or any other addictions that will impact on my kids. And you will get counselling until you understand completely what it means to be accountable, and it just so happens, you won’t be able to get over this until you do. Why? Because I just won’t give up on you until you do. I want you to know, that if there is anything after this life, and for your sake I hope not. I want you to know that I will watch you every minute of every day and that if you ever as negatively criticise them once in their beautiful lives and destroy their self esteem the way you did mine or try to fill their fragile minds with any sort of religious rubbish until they have the mental capacity to decipher information critically (around 18 actually) or continue to allow your family to destroy their health in any way, I will do everything I can do to remind you over and over again what a stubborn and unaccountable bitch you really are. And you will remember what your stubborness cost me. Of course your stubborness in being able to clearly identify your responsibility to your relationship has contributed to this mess that your now going to have to clean up but don’t tell me I never warned you.
Tell [Mr BB] it was bad advice to tell someone who is suicidal that they should just go ahead and get it over with, but then again that’s why you brought [Mr BB] isn’t it.
I want you to know that I did everything I could to give you the information to ensure that this didn’t happen and that you have forced me into a situation where I had no choice left. And this is why.
I have no desire to live anymore because I am no good. I am no good because I have nothing left to offer, you, my children, my family and the community or any other living thing that is not tainted with pain, resentment and hostility. The only value you placed on me was what I could provide to you in the way of money. Once I held the money from you completely, you dumped me. Deny it all you like and if you somehow manage to eventually justify it without understanding accountability, I hope it rots you to your core. You see guilty will wear down all your stubborness the way my love for you couldn’t.
Enjoy your meagre possessions –
PS left all the money I had been saving to everyone but you.
I’ll be watching
·On 26 September 2011 the mother contacted police after the father had spoken to her about wanting to “end his life to end his misery”. The father was admitted to the mental health wing of a hospital under police schedule. The father walked out of the hospital saying that he “couldn’t be bothered to wait”. The father was again picked up by police and was placed in a bed at the D Centre, an acute mental health unit at Suburb S Hospital. There he was assessed and was admitted under police schedule. The police reported that the father was very cooperative. Several hours later the father tried to leave hospital, he said to security guards that he could not sleep. The father was prevented from leaving, there was a struggle with security staff and the father was sedated.
·On 27 September 2011, I assume in the context of the events described in the previous paragraph, the father was assessed at Suburb S Hospital Emergency Department. He described being depressed for 12 months or more. He said that he had found his job too demanding and had changed his vocation to computer repair. He said that the reduction in his income caused unhappiness in this marriage. At the point his wife was about to leave him, he had staged an incident in order to bring the wife’s family into a dialogue about the problems. The marriage did break down. The father lost his marriage and his house and “his self-esteem is ‘shot’”. The father said that he tried to combat his low mood with the use of amphetamine and methamphetamine. I assume that it was later that day that the father complained about his treatment by hospital staff. No charges were laid against hospital security staff and the father was taken home by police during which time he continued to be abusive to police.
·On 31 October 2011 Dr EE of the Suburb FF Medical Centre wrote to the casualty department at GG Hospital. He expressed concern about the father who he said had severe depression and was suicidal. Dr EE said that the father was last seen at the practice on 22 August 2011. The father had not been taking his prescribed medication for a “long time”. The father told the practice that he stopped taking the drug ICE three days earlier.
·On 4 November 2011 the police were told that the father made several phone calls to the mother. In one of those calls he is alleged to have made a threat: “If you don’t let me see my children I am going to fucking murder you.” The mother agreed to let the father see the children on 4 November 2011. The parties and the children went to two parks near the father’s premises. At the first park the parties had a verbal argument. The mother felt intimidated by the father. The family went to the second park and concluded the visit. The father said that he was going to take one of the children with him and retain that child. He walked off with one child in his arms. The mother called police. The mother followed the father to his house, to the local shops and back to his house. The father is reported to have said: “If you keep calling the cops on me you will never see me and (the child) again.” Ultimately the police arrived and the father was arrested. On the mother’s statement there was insufficient evidence to support a charge of intimidation but the police applied for and obtained an urgent AVO. The father was treated in a mental health facility from 8 to 28 November 2011.
·On 15 December 2011 police attended at the mother’s home because she had reported receiving threatening phone calls from the father. She thought that he might have been breaching an AVO. The mother refused to make a statement and said that she did not want the father to be locked up. The police read some text messages sent by the father to the mother and reported that there were no threats and that they all related to the custody of the parties’ children and when the father would be able to see them. The mother confirmed that the messages were just annoying and she held no fears for herself or her family.
·On 27 March 2012 the father was brought by ambulance to GG Emergency Department. The hospital records show that he had allegedly injected Oxycontin and had episodes of associated vomiting. The father became belligerent and exhibited persecutory delusions. The father was swearing and not speaking coherently. He was asked to stop swearing and became angry and non-compliant.
·On 29 March 2012 the father was taken to GG Hospital by the police. The father’s brother had called police after a fight between them. The hospital notes record that the father presented as “not coping with issues” and “denies suicide ideation or self-harm”. He was treated for depression. The hospital notes record that the father had been seen several times over the preceding days and “recent eviction from department for aggression. During consultation patient began to get physically aggressive especially when the request for a taxi voucher was denied. Asked to leave, but some ‘encouragement’ was required.”
·On 3 April 2012 the father was admitted to H Hospital by ambulance. The hospital notes refer to the father as presenting with paranoid thoughts, in particular that people were trying to break into his house and kill him. The hospital notes included a reference to the father having some persecutory delusions following in context of some issues with drug dealers. It was thought that the exacerbation of his mental state was secondary to amphetamine abuse. The summary included: “Currently he is low risk of harm to self and others however with variable risk with illicit drugs”. The key investigation and results were “UDS (I assume Urine Drug Sample) – positives for Amphetamines”. The father was discharged on 4 April 2012.
·November 2012:
·On 26 November 2012 the police recorded that the mother advised that she had received a number of emails from the father about him having access to the children over Christmas. In those emails the father allegedly said that the mother was not acting fast enough to resolve the issues about the father’s time with the children and he “wished that she would die”. The mother tried to contact the father’s probation officer, he was not available and she was referred to the police. The police spoke to the father by phone.
·On 28 November 2012, the police were contacted by the father’s probation officer and he reported that the father said “ ... I’m at the end of my tether? I’m going to go and smash her head in? I’m going to kill her? I don’t care a piece of paper is not going to stop me.” The probation officer contacted the mother to warn her. The COPS entry records that the current AVO was to expire on 29 November 2012 and they were going to apply for a new provisional order.
·On 29 November 2012, the police were told that when the father spoke to his probation officer on 28 November he appeared to be severely agitated and angry “regarding a Family Court Law matter relating to custody of his children”. The probation officer reported that the father continued to make serious threats against the mother, stating that he wanted her dead and that a piece of paper would not stop him. The probation officer told the father that he would report those threats to the police. He said that this appeared to please the father and that the father said: “Good, I want to be put before a Magistrate, I want them to listen to me”. The probation officer said that the father referred to the incident from 2011 and the probation officer was of the belief that the father might use a similar incident to seek public attention about the family law dispute. The father told the probation officer that he had used amphetamines two weeks before.
·On 30 November 2012 a provisional AVO was granted and served on the parents.
·In May 2013 the father was convicted by the T Town Local Court of dishonestly obtaining property by deception. He was placed on a 12 month bond. The father conceded in his oral evidence in these proceedings that this related to stealing petrol.
·In July 2014 the father was convicted by the T Town Local Court of failing to comply with his reporting obligations. He was placed on a 12 month bond.
·On 20 March 2017 the ICL sent an email to the father that included the following terms:
Pursuant to interim Orders made 19 June 2015, I ask that you complete a urinalysis test pursuant to Order 10 in accordance with the Australian/NZ Standard 4308:2008 by no later than 5:00pm Wednesday 22 March 2017.
Kindly provide both myself and the mother with a copy of the results obtain (sic) for such urinalysis testing when they become available and within 48 hours of receipt of same.
I again remind you that the ICL is not responsible for the cost of such testing and you are required to meet all associated costs including the costs incurred by you for [HH] Pathology.
On 23 March 2017 the father responded:
[Ms II] why am I being asked to undergo urinalysis test again, I passed every other test that was requested of me and unless. You have some specific reason to request it I respectfully decline. These tests cost me at least $100 per test and unless you pay for it. I refuse.
Later that day the ICL wrote:
There is an existing order for urinalysis as a consequence of allegations raised in these proceedings which require you to undergo random testing.
To date I have been extremely random in my requests but in circumstances where your matter has been listed for final hearing the Court would be assisted by updated results.
Importantly, on 30 March 2017 the father responded:
[Ms II] I have remained clean for a period of four years, all previous random drug tests have proved I have not used illegal drugs. These are costs I cannot afford and as they are merely allegations I choose to no longer participate in this ridiculous witch hunt as I have done nothing wrong. If you or the court wishes me to take drug tests despite the fact that I have been drug free for several years, then you pay for them as I refuse to pay for them anymore.
Unless you can demonstrate to me that you have reasonable grounds to force me to pay for drug test that I strongly and most vehemently deny are even required. Then you can go eat your hat because I refuse.
I will take any drug test you like as long as you or the Court or [Ms Saad] pays for it.
The burden of proof is on the accuser and I do not accuse myself of taking drugs.
Respectfully
[Mr Mundell]
Ps, I have moved and fulfilled every promise I have made in good faith and told you from the beginning, this woman ([Ms Saad]) will not negotiate, she will not make a reasonable arrangement and she will deny me access to my children until the cows come home. Why don’t you get her drug tested, she has used illegal drugs before. I can’t see my children simply because she says so, no arrangement in 3 years has been made other than work it out with her, well I’ve done my best to work it out with her and we worked out nothing. Neither have you worked out anything with her, the only thing anyone has worked out is when the Judge ordered her to send me school reports. So far as I am concerned you have done nothing to resolve this issue and I believe only a judge can solve this problem. I will have to wait Until the trial to even know if I will ever see them again, what should I tell them when they ask me Daddy when are we going to see you?
Please tell me again how you are working in the best interest of our children.
For completeness, the ICL responded later that day in the following terms:
Regarding the issue of your compliance with further urinalysis requests, I advise that such requests are made pursuant to an order of the Court for random testing not something that I am required to substantiate before making a request of you.
To date you have not brought any application to the Court to formally discharge such order & as I have previously indicated the order remains and I am entitled to continue to make such requests.
I appreciate you position that you have not used any illegal substances for a period of 4 years, but the allegations were made at the time the order was made, & the best evidence the Court can consider is you providing clean samples.
In respect of your allegations against the mother’s purported drug use, there were no orders made in this regard as the proposition was not put to the Court at the time the orders were made requiring you to complete such testing. No orders were therefore made requiring the mother to submit to such testing.
As to arrangements for the children to spend time with you now that you have relocated to Sydney, you have not presented any offers to me although you seem to suggest that you have raised such matters with the mother. I am not aware of this.
For now the Court has to hand competing accounts in your affidavit material relied on. Such accounts are yet to be tested before a final decision is made in circumstances where each of the parties do not agree.
I am not the judge & and this time, in the absence of tested evidence, can only consider whether proposals made by each of you are reasonable for the children, & if you both agree, & if so, whether such proposal could be considered practical & in the best interests of the children.
Kindly advise if you intend to do further testing & if you intend to forward to me your most recent proposal now you are living in Sydney to spend time with the children.

As I say, the basic facts are not disputed. The COPS entries provide relevant background evidence but much of that detail was never tested and some of it may well be contested by the father. That said there was no real challenge to that material but it is neither possible nor necessary to make definite findings about every alleged incident.

The Risks

A number of categories of risk arise from that background evidence.
In 2006 the father was convicted of attempted sexual assault of a person under 16 years of age. There is no other evidence of sexual abuse or assault. Importantly, the mother does not consider that the children are at risk of sexual abuse or sexual assault by the father. The potential harm to the children from sexual assault is very serious but the risk in this instance is very low.
The father has abused amphetamines over the years. The major periods of his behavioural problems seem to be linked to periods of amphetamine abuse. Thankfully, the father has not inflicted serious harm on himself or another person during the periods when he has acted in aberrant ways. However, he has been scheduled on at least two occasions and has been sedated. If not physical harm, being exposed to their father when behaving in that manner, whether in the grip of a drug of addiction or otherwise, would be very frightening for the children and poses a risk of harm to them.
Adding to the concerns arising from that background, the father was not fully compliant with the orders about testing. None of the random tests provided by the father were chain of custody tests as required by Court orders and that gives rise to a doubt as to whether the samples were provided by the father. However, as was noted by the ICL’s counsel, the fact that one of the previous tests proved positive for a morphine based medicine of the type used at that time by the father, suggests that the sample given in that instance belonged to the father. The father refused to comply with the most recent request. He said that he did not have the funds to pay for the test but the content of his email to the ICL dated 30 March 2017 reveals that he had additional objections to the test.
As to the risks of a further relapse, during cross-examination the father dismissed that possibility. That seems completely unrealistic but care is needed with this issue. The father would have it that he has remained drug free since his last conceded relapse in late 2012/early 2013. There was also reference during the hearing to amphetamine use by the father in 2014.
There is nothing to suggest that the father has used illicit drugs since the middle of 2014. If that is the case, he is entitled to be very proud of that achievement. It is possible that a strongly held conviction that he would never again relapse is one part of the strategy that has contributed to that achievement. Rather than looking for a verbal concession about the risks, so as to be confident of the father’s appreciation of his vulnerability, the record of him maintaining support can perhaps be seen to reflect that appreciation. He established and maintained until his recent move, a therapeutic relationship with his psychologist in T Town. He has apparently found support through the organisation, C Group. Finally, he has regularly attended Narcotic Anonymous meetings. The father’s categorical rejection of the risk of a relapse should be seen in context. Comfort can be taken from those matters and importantly, in the lack of any background evidence to support or suggest the fact of a relapse by the father into amphetamine use at any point after mid-2014.
The father came to the attention of the police and hospital authorities on many occasions. It is therefore a very positive sign and a further corroboration of his drug free status, that there has been no police involvement or involuntary hospital admissions in recent times. The potential harm to the children from the father’s use of amphetamines or related drugs is serious but in my view, the risk of that exposure is moderate.
The father can be angry and can unfairly blame others for circumstances that might arise. However, it seems that the father has generally managed to insulate the children from that aspect of his personality. That said, once removed from the artificiality of short, day-only, supervised visits, there is the potential for the father to verbally lash out at the children. The children are only eight and seven years of age now and are likely to present more challenges to the authority of both parents as they grow older. In any event it will be a test for the father to avoid those displays in their presence.
On occasions, the children have been exposed to family violence because of the father’s conduct.

Additional considerations

(3)(a) any views expressed by the child and any factors (such as the child’s maturity or level of understanding) that the court thinks are relevant to the weight it should give to the child’s views;

The children were seven and six years of age respectively when Ms F spoke to them for her report. B said that she wanted to see her father. D told Ms F that he was not fearful of spending unsupervised time with the father. He would spend three weeks with his father in T Town but he would miss his mother.
The children are too young for their views to carry significant weight. If it is safe and beneficial for them to spend unsupervised time with their father then any view expressed by either child not to spend that time should be given little or no weight. Similarly, if it is not safe and beneficial for the children to spend unsupervised time with the father a wish they express to spend that time should also be accorded little or no weight.
(3)(b) the nature of the relationship of the child with:
(i) each of the child’s parents; and

(ii) other persons (including any grandparent or other relative of the child);

Each of the parents has a loving relationship with each of the children. The mother has been and will continue to be their primary care giver. Ms F observed that the children appeared comfortable with the mother, Mr L and the maternal grandparents.
Ms F observed that the children appeared pleased to see the father during her sessions with the family in 2016. D hugged his father. The father managed the play session with the children well and maintained his attention of both of them. The background facts describe the interruptions to the children’s time with their father. Given those interruptions it is remarkable that the children have such an apparently unqualified positive view of their father.
Both parents deserve credit for the state of the relationship between the children and their father. Given the father’s verbal attacks on the mother and her justified fears in relation to his behaviour, it reflects particularly well on the mother that she has insulated the children from her concerns about those matters. It would have been very easy for the mother to reveal her concerns about the father to the children whether expressly or by implication. On the face of it, she has assiduously avoided doing so. She apparently gets no credit from the father for that important aspect of her parenting since the parties separated but credit is due.
(3)(c) the extent to which each of the child’s parents has taken, or failed to take, the opportunity:
(i) to participate in making decisions about major long‑term issues in relation to the child; and
(ii) to spend time with the child; and

(iii) to communicate with the child;

There is no issue in relation to the mother’s involvement with the children.
As to the father, this is a matter of some contention. It is the father’s view that he has done whatever he could and remains ready to do whatever he can, to participate in the children’s lives, to spend time with them and to communicate with them. He has not always acted in that way. For example, after he returned to Sydney, the mother offered to bring the children to his house to see him. When the mother would not agree to drop the children and leave them with him, the father hung up on the mother.
The father was asked about having supervised time with the children in the future. He said if he had to do that for three months he would. He was asked about that requirement extending beyond three months and he said something to the effect that he would do whatever it took, to have a relationship with his children. Unfortunately he also conceded that when he had recently been offered time, supervised by the mother or members of her family, he refused. He said that his reason for refusing was that the mother or her relative would make up lies about him. Two things arise from that. Firstly, there is no evidence that anyone has made up lies about the father. Secondly, the father’s reaction to the mother’s proposal was not consistent with him doing anything he could, to engage with the children.
The father relocated to T Town in April 2012. The father said he spent time with the children on three or four occasions in 2015 and 2016. On one occasion in late 2016 when the father drove from T Town to Sydney, he spent a few hours with the children and then drove straight back to T Town. I understood him to say that he had no accommodation available to him in Sydney, whether through his extended family or otherwise. The father agreed with a proposition put to him that there have been periods of up to four months with no contact with the children. It could be that it was not feasible for the father to attend on the children more frequently during the period he lived in T Town.

(3)(ca) the extent to which each of the child’s parents has fulfilled, or failed to fulfil, the parent’s obligations to maintain the child;

Again there is no issue about the mother meeting her obligations.
The father has not had the opportunity to provide housing and sustenance for the children. He works two days a week and otherwise receives Centrelink benefits. As a result he has not been able to provide fulsome financial support to the children. That said, during her evidence the mother volunteered that the father makes payments to her for the children from time to time. I understood that she was genuinely grateful for that assistance.
(3)(d) the likely effect of any changes in the child’s circumstances, including the likely effect on the child of any separation from:
(i) either of his or her parents; or

(ii) any other child, or other person (including any grandparent or other relative of the child), with whom he or she has been living;

Any orders for unsupervised time would necessitate a level of separation for the children from their mother. For a time at least, those occasions would make the mother very anxious. However, when asked about that the mother said something to the effect that she would ensure that the children were not affected by her anxiety.

(3)(e) the practical difficulty and expense of a child spending time with and communicating with a parent and whether that difficulty or expense will substantially affect the child’s right to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis;

The father has recently moved from T Town to Sydney, thereby making practical and flexible contact arrangements, much easier.
As to supervision, the father said that he was not sure that any members of his family would be willing to supervise his time with the children. The father has no supporting witnesses and I understood that he is not confident that his brother or his older son would agree to supervise, for example.
The ICL suggests the maternal grandfather as a logical choice. The father said that the maternal grandmother would not be suitable because of his concern about her health (a heart condition). He said that he was concerned about her health on the day she supervised him with the children at or around the day of the interviews with Ms F. The only other member of the mother’s family that the father thought would be suitable is the mother’s brother in law, Mr Q. Otherwise, if supervision is needed there would need to be agency supervision. The father readily agreed that he could not afford any significant expense, such as that associated with personalised supervision through one of the commercial services.
(3)(f) the capacity of:
(i) each of the child’s parents; and
(ii) any other person (including any grandparent or other relative of the child);

to provide for the needs of the child, including emotional and intellectual needs;

It is common ground that the mother will continue to exercise parental responsibility for the children and that they will continue to live mainly with her. Although the father is very critical of the mother in various ways and although the father seems incapable of expressing positive sentiments in relation to the mother’s parenting, it follows from the orders he seeks that he believes that the mother is a capable parent and able to provide for the needs of the children. The evidence strongly supports that conclusion.
No orders are sought that would interfere with the relationship between the mother’s partner and the children, nor those of the other members of the maternal family and the children. I take it as an agreed fact that the children are well served by all of those relationships.
As to the father, he does not have unqualified physical health. He has a bad back from a motor cycle accident in 1990 which resulted in a spinal fracture. That has left him unable to sit or stand for significant periods. The father had a misadventure with an operation in January 2015 that needed to be repeated and corrected. As a result of those problems the father has been unable to undertake full-time or more extensive part-time work.
The agreed chronology justifies certain concerns about the father’s parenting capacity. The evidence reveals that in the past he has suffered from and relapsed into addictive behaviours including gambling and substance abuse which have adversely impacted on his life. Whether as a symptom of those behaviours or as a catalyst for them, the father has had periods of deterioration in his mental health. He has had suicidal ideation, paranoid delusions and depressive periods. He has been scheduled at a mental health facility on at least two occasions, including a period of eight days at GG Hospital. In addition to criminal activity – including convictions for stealing petrol and attempted sexual assault of a minor, he has come to police attention on several occasions.
The father’s evidence, including his affidavit contains statements to the effect that he takes full responsibility for his conduct and does not blame others. He repeated that sentiment in addressing the Court. However, the wording of the father’s affidavit, the tenor of his email interactions with the mother, the statement he made to his probation officer in 2012, the email he sent to the ICL on 30 March 2017 and other parts of his evidence before the Court suggest that he has not consistently taken responsibility for his own conduct. He has said things that suggest that he sheets home to the mother, responsibility for many of the situations in which he has found himself. During cross-examination he said something to the effect that the mother was responsible for his estrangement from his adult son, Mr R and from his brother, Mr JJ. There is no evidence to support the father’s contention and it is not credible that the mother has damaged healthy relationships between the father and his brother and between the father and his adult son. The father has had life-long relationships with his 40 year old brother and his 28 year old son whereas the mother has had relatively little contact with them.
The father annexed to his affidavit a report supplied by his treating psychologist, Mr G dated 12 May 2016. The father attended on Mr G from 2012 until early 2017 when he departed T Town. Mr G was not cross-examined. The ICL submitted that Mr G is the only long-term treater of the father from whom the Court has the benefit of a report, and that in the preamble of the report, Mr G said that he has “significant experience in forensic and private clinical settings”. In those circumstances, it was submitted on behalf of the ICL that it is the best evidence before the Court, of the father’s current mental health status. Mr G did not diagnose a psychiatric illness at the time of writing the report (although as was noted in submissions, Mr G is not a psychiatrist). Under the heading “Summary and Opinion” Mr G said:
...
[Mr Mundell] has been under the care of this service for almost four years. A short relapse was observed in early 2013. He has remained abstinent from illicit drugs since that time and given my continued psychological review over the treatment period, I am confident that this is a true representation. It is a noteworthy period of time comprising significant psychological intervention providing the tools needed to maintain a drug free lifestyle. These gains are reflected in a battery of psychometric testing which has identified [no] diagnosable psychopathology other than historically observed from his drug use, no significant anger management issues, minimal current anxiety or depression, and a low risk drug and alcohol screen relating to recent use. It is my opinion that given the lengthy period of abstinence (3 years); his strong motivation to remain drug free and continue using maintenance psychological support, and in the absence of diagnosable psychopathology, [Mr Mundell] does not pose an unacceptable risk of harm to his children or to others.
The submission made on behalf of the ICL was that Mr G’s opinion is not unrealistic or supportive in an “over the top” manner, and therefore it provides some comfort about the stability of the father’s mental health. I agree that weight can be placed on those opinions.
Dr KK is a consultant psychiatrist. He prepared a report on the father’s mental health dated 10 November 2016 which is annexed to the father’s affidavit. The report was obtained in the context of orders made on 19 May 2016 requiring the father to obtain a report from a psychiatrist pertaining to his mental health. The father was probably restricted in complying with that order by his financial circumstances and the limits of what was available to him through Medicare. In any event the father was referred to Dr KK. Dr KK was not on affidavit and he was not cross-examined. Dr KK consulted with the father over a 45 minute Telehealth video link. The father provided to Dr KK a referral from his general practitioner, discharge summaries from two hospital admissions and a letter from 2012 from the father’s psychologist. In the preamble to his report, Dr KK said that he was the father’s “treating Psychiatrist”. Dr KK expressed the opinion that the father does not suffer from any mental illness. In particular Dr KK reported:
...
My assessment revealed that over the last four years [Mr Mundell] has been under some stress as he misses his two younger children age 8 and 6 who reside with their mother in Sydney. He has limited supervised access. Apart from the understandable sadness he feels because of this situations in my opinion there is no evidence of any active mental illness.
It is my opinion that [Mr Mundell] currently does not suffer any mental illness. His mood is stable and he is leading a constructive life volunteering for ‘[C Group]’, and organisation assisting men with mental health issues. He also plays guitar in a band with friends.
...
I would assert that he is suitable to have unsupervised shared care with his children.
..
The submission on behalf of the ICL was to the effect that Dr KK is not the father’s treating doctor; that he was provided with little relevant background material; that the report was provided after one, 45 minute electronic conversation; Dr KK was not cross-examined and therefore, that the report is of limited use and the Court could not give much weight to it. The mother submitted that the report provided by the father fell short of what was ordered on 19 May 2016 and in particular, that Dr KK was not provided with a comprehensive list of documents on which to base his assessment. I have no reason to think that Dr KK did other than the best he could with the material he had. Nevertheless, his report is apparently very much dependant on what the father told him and he did not have access to a representative proportion of the relevant background. As to Dr KK being the father’s treating practitioner, it is not clear to me how that could be so, given as I understand it, that there has only been one consultation for the father with Dr KK. Little weight can be placed on Dr KK’s report.

The father has complained that the mother set out to interfere with his relationship with his children. That suggestion can be rejected out of hand. The COPS records contain several instances when the mother refused or failed to make a statement to police about the father. Had the mother been motivated to cause the father harm she would presumably have taken each of those opportunities to have action prosecuted by the police.
I am very confident that the father would have no working relationship with his children if it was not for the mother promoting those relationships and promoting him to B and D. Not one cross or critical word about the father was addressed to Ms F by either child during the family report interviews. Quite the contrary and that was not the case with the other adults in their lives. At paragraph 62 of Ms F’s report, D is recorded as saying that his mother did not want him to spend time with the father at T Town but he did not know why. There D described an ideal opportunity for the mother to inculcate the boy with an adverse view of his father. In their discussions with Ms F, the children described adverse aspects of the behaviour of the mother, Mr L and the maternal grandparents. Each of them can be “grumpy” at times. There was no similar complaint about the father. To the children, he is in effect “the best in the whole wide world”. The children live with the mother. It beggars belief that they had nothing critical to say to Ms F about their father if the mother has consistently denigrated or demonised him, expressly or implicitly, to or in the presence or hearing of either child.
As I understood the father’s submissions, he insists that he knows that the mother is not responsible for all of the problems in his life. Trying to make sense of that submission and his past statements about the mother, they might have arisen from his struggles to understand and manage the deteriorations in his mental health. As part of his approach to maintaining good mental health the father said that he looks to identify circumstances or events that have triggered or could trigger a deterioration in his mental health. Some of those circumstances or events involved the mother. I understood him to say that although he may not have expressed it well when communicating with others but the mother has been associated with, rather than being responsible for, those triggering events or circumstances. If the father is being candid about that, perhaps he will be able to avoid future verbal attacks on the mother.
The father’s evidence is replete with situations that have caused him stress. A recent example apparently arose from his receipt of an email from the ICL asking that he provide a sample for a drug screen. I have set out the father’s response of 30 March 2017 earlier in these reasons. The father was asked about his response and I understood him to agree that his response was “over the top”. Happily the children were not involved in that communication.
The mother gave evidence about an incident in early 2014 when after an unsuccessful mediation the father returned a box of gifts the children had given to him for Father’s Day. B opened the box and became upset. The mother conceded that the box was probably addressed to her (rather than the children). The ICL submitted that this showed uncontained, inappropriate behaviour, but pointed out that the father did not say anything to the children outright.
The father thought the mother was unreasonable in withholding the children from his unsupervised care in 2011, because he had been clean (had not used amphetamines) for seven days. The mother’s resistance was entirely reasonable.
A series of agreed incidents were put to the father and in one breath he said he could not understand the mother or the Court being worried about what he had done and in the next breath he conceded that those incidents established an objective basis for concern for the children.
The father seeks an order in the following terms:
6)That the children be allowed to talk freely with their father about any topic that is suitable to their age and cognition.
The application is misconceived and no such order will be made but the wording reveals the problem. The issue of topics that are suitable to the “age and cognition” of a child is a matter of careful judgment. What we do know is that B was upset when the father sought to engage her in respect of religious beliefs.

(3)(g) the maturity, sex, lifestyle and background (including lifestyle, culture and traditions) of the child and of either of the child’s parents, and any other characteristics of the child that the court thinks are relevant;

It appears that the children have been raised by the mother in accordance with the rites of the Roman Catholic church. The children attend a Roman Catholic school. I have referred above to the father having at least one telephone conversation with B, regarding religion as a result of which B became upset.
As was submitted by the ICL’s counsel nothing of that nature seems to have occurred recently. I understood the father to say that he is an atheist and would want the children to appreciate that there are differing views about religious observance. However, the father said he does not oppose the children attending Roman Catholic schools.

(3)(h) if the child is an Aboriginal child or a Torres Strait Islander child:

(i) the child’s right to enjoy his or her Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander culture (including the right to enjoy that culture with other people who share that culture); and

(ii) the likely impact any proposed parenting order under this Part will have on that right

This does not apply.

(3)(i) the attitude to the child, and to the responsibilities of parenthood, demonstrated by each of the child’s parents;

B was under three years of age when the parents separated. For most of the children’s lives their parents were separated. They mainly lived with their mother and from April 2011 had restricted time with their father.
The children are doing well, are meeting their developmental milestones and have loving relationships with their parents and with members of their extended family. As is referred to above, that is a tribute to the efforts of their parents and particularly, to the efforts of the mother.
There have been periods when the father has not been able to take up the responsibilities of parenthood. In my view, that does not reflect a poor attitude to the children or to the responsibilities of parenthood. The father has been ill. To his great credit he has had the insight and courage to address his drug addiction and to seek out professional help for his mental health.

(3)(j) any family violence involving the child or a member of the child’s family;

As is referred to earlier in these reasons there has been conduct by the father that would fall within the definition of family violence. On 27 April 2011 the father broke his guitar. The father has threatened suicide. The father made statements to his probation officer about causing harm to the mother. On 4 November 2011 there was an incident at a park involving the physical retention of a child and threatening language.
The father makes allegations of violence against the mother. He does not include any detailed evidence in his affidavits but makes general statements. At paragraph 45 of his trial affidavit the father says:
During the time of my relationship with [Ms Saad] I was assaulted physically and verbally on many occasions by [Ms Saad] but stayed in the relationship due to the love I felt for her and the children. I tried talking to her on more than 100 occasions about her abuse and believed I was making inroads but it was a long and difficult time.
No findings are possible about any specific incident of violence by the mother based on that evidence. Suffice it to say, although there is no agreement about some allegations, the parties each contend that their relationship has been characterised by incidents of violence.
(3)(k) if a family violence order applies, or has applied, to the child or a member of the child’s family—any relevant inferences that can be drawn from the order, taking into account the following:
(i) the nature of the order;
(ii) the circumstances in which the order was made;
(iii) any evidence admitted in proceedings for the order;
(iv) any findings made by the court in, or in proceedings for, the order;

(v) any other relevant matter;

I have referred earlier in these reasons to Apprehended Violence Orders made. The only orders made, restrained the father in respect of the mother.
I have set out what I know of those orders.

(l) whether it would be preferable to make the order that would be least likely to lead to the institution of further proceedings in relation to the child;

It is not apparent to me what orders could be made that would be least likely to lead to further proceedings.

(3)(m) any other fact or circumstance that the court thinks is relevant.

Nothing comes to attention here.

Parental Responsibility

Parental responsibility is defined by s 61B of the Act to mean “all the duties, powers, responsibilities and authority which, by law, parents have in relation to children”.
If no order is made in respect of parental responsibility then the position as to the parents of a child is as follows:
SECT 61C
Each parent has parental responsibility (subject to court orders)
(1) Each of the parents of a child who is not 18 has parental responsibility for the child.
Note 1: This section states the legal position that prevails in relation to parental responsibility to the extent to which it is not displaced by a parenting order made by the court. See subsection (3) of this section and subsection 61D(2) for the effect of a parenting order.
Note 2: This section does not establish a presumption to be applied by the court when making a parenting order. See section 61DA for the presumption that the court does apply when making a parenting order.
Note 3: Under section 63C, the parents of a child may make a parenting plan that deals with the allocation of parental responsibility for the child.
(2) Subsection (1) has effect despite any changes in the nature of the relationships of the child‘s parents. It is not affected, for example, by the parents becoming separated or by either or both of them marrying or re-marrying.
(3) Subsection (1) has effect subject to any order of a court for the time being in force (whether or not made under this Act and whether made before or after the commencement of this section).
Note: Section 111CS may affect the attribution of parental responsibility for a child.
An order for shared parental responsibility has the following effect:
SECT 65DAC
Effect of parenting order that provides for shared parental responsibility
(1) This section applies if, under a parenting order:
(a) 2 or more persons are to share parental responsibility for a child; and
(b) the exercise of that parental responsibility involves making a decision about a major long-term issue in relation to the child.
(2) The order is taken to require the decision to be made jointly by those persons.
Note: Subject to any court orders, decisions about issues that are not major long-term issues are made by the person with whom the child is spending time without a need to consult the other person (see section 65DAE).
(3) The order is taken to require each of those persons:
(a) to consult the other person in relation to the decision to be made about that issue; and
(b) to make a genuine effort to come to a joint decision about that issue.
(4) To avoid doubt, this section does not require any other person to establish, before acting on a decision about the child communicated by one of those persons, that the decision has been made jointly.

Discussion

In the context of this case, s 61DA requires that I apply a presumption that it is in the children’s best interests for their parents to have equal shared parental responsibility for them unless there are reasonable grounds to believe that the father or the mother have abused them or engaged in family violence. As is referred to above, the parents agree that there has been family violence. For the reasons given above, I am satisfied that there has been family violence, if only violence perpetrated by the father. Therefore the presumption does not apply.
Where the presumption does not apply, s 65D(1) requires the Court to make such order with respect to parental responsibility, and/or time to be spent with each of the parties as it “thinks proper”. What is proper is what is in the best interest of the child - determined by reference to s 60CC of the Act.
Ms F recommended that the mother have sole parental responsibility for the children. She said that the parents are not able to engage in proactive discussions about the children. In particular, Ms F expressed the concern that the father may have difficulties remaining child-focussed when discussing issues on which he and the mother do not agree.
The parties do not have a good relationship and their communication is poor. The father conceded that generally, conversations with the mother are arguments. He said that at the moment they are unable to have civil conversations and that their last civil discussion was some years ago. It is logical that the parent with whom the children mostly live should have parental responsibility. It is agreed that the children will mainly live with the mother.
I will make an order that the mother have sole parental responsibility. However, the father should be consulted on important decisions, where that is practicable. The ICL proposed the following additional orders:
a.The mother must inform the father (by email or text message) at least 21 days before making decisions about any of the following matters:
i.Any changes in the children’s school(s);
ii.Any religious instructions the children receive, whether at school or otherwise;
iii.Any non-emergency or serious medical treatment the children is to undergo; and
iv.Any proposed relocation of more than 30 kilometres from her present residence.
b. The father must respond to all information providing his views (if any) in writing within 10 days of receipt of the mother informing him of the issues(s).
c. The mother must consider the father’s view in exercising her parental responsibility before making any final decision concerning the children.
There were no specific submissions about those proposals but they provide a mechanism for the father to have input to important decisions about the children. I would qualify the obligation with “where practicable” to deal, for example, with medical treatment that might be available and recommended for a time earlier than the timeframe fixed for obtaining the father’s input. I will allow the father 14 days to respond rather than 10 days. I do not understand what is meant by “religious instructions” and for the avoidance of uncertainty will not impose that requirement. Otherwise, I will include those conditions in the orders.

Conclusion

The presumption that the parents having equal shared parental responsibility would be in the best interests of the children does not apply. The proper order is one that places parental responsibility with the mother but that provides the father with the opportunity to be involved. I will make an order based on that proposed by the ICL.

Living Arrangements

In that the Court will not make an order that the parties have equal shared parental responsibility, it is not necessary to consider any particular pattern of living arrangements. In any event, it is agreed that the children will live mainly with the mother.
In broad terms, the mother proposes that the father’s time with the children be day-only and it is her strong view that the time should be supervised indefinitely. The father seeks orders whereby he would spend time with the children overnight, and on an unsupervised basis from the date of the orders. Ms F’s recommendations were made in the alternative, depending on the Court’s finding of risk in relation to the father. She recommended that if the Court finds no unacceptable risk of harm, the children commence spending regular, day time only, unsupervised time with the father for nine to 12 months, moving to overnight time in blocks of one to three days. Should the Court determine that there is an unacceptable risk of harm to the children if they spent unsupervised time with the father, Ms F recommended that the children spend time with him supervised by members of the maternal family, or by the E Contact Centre.
Any form of supervision of time between a parent and child is likely to restrict their interaction. Depending on the structure of the supervision, it can render the time unaffordable and in any event is likely to limit the duration and venue of time spent, add to the rigidity of the arrangements and can make the potential interaction between parent and child, very artificial. It is generally accepted that indefinite supervision is unlikely to be in a child’s best interests. See Moose & Moose (2008) FLC 93-375, H v K [2001] FamCA 687, and Slater v Light (2013) 48 FamLR 573.
In my view a further period of supervision is warranted but not into the indefinite future. There are risks associated with the father having time with the children but in my view they are not risks that warrant an indefinite order for supervision. In my view the risk of harm arising from unsupervised time with the father is not an unacceptable one. I will make orders that are generally in the terms proposed by the ICL.
In terms of practical supervision arrangements, the only person with whom the father said he was comfortable was Mr Q. He is the husband of the mother’s sister, Ms O Saad. He gave brief oral evidence. Unfortunately he is very busy with work and family. He has children’s activities on Saturdays, church from 11.00 am to 1.00 pm on Sundays and he regularly has other family commitments. The wife’s partner, Mr L said he would be willing to supervise but under an arrangement with his former spouse he has his own children for four days each week, including every Saturday and part of every Sunday. On Sundays his children sometimes go to their mother at 9.00 am, sometimes at 12.00 noon and sometimes at 5.00 pm. On average they leave to be with their mother at midday.
Suffice it to say that even in combination, Mr Q and Mr L could not guarantee that they will be available every alternate weekend.
As to the maternal grandmother acting as supervisor, the father has expressed concern about her health. He is concerned that she has a heart condition and that it might be difficult for her to undertake the role. The maternal grandfather, Mr C Saad, is apparently willing to be a supervisor. He is the supervisor proposed by the ICL, albeit for only three months, and the father made no complaint about him as a supervisor in his submissions. Importantly, it was Mr C Saad that the parties agreed on for the purposes of the orders made on 9 June 2017.
By consenting to the orders of 9 June 2017, the parties agreed that the children would spend time with the father each alternate Sunday from 11.00 am to 1.00 pm with that time to be in the presence of the maternal grandfather, or such other person as agreed between the parties if Mr Saad is unavailable. The first occasion was to be 11 June 2017 and each session was to commence at a restaurant at Suburb V, unless otherwise agreed by the parents and the maternal grandfather.
By way of final orders, the ICL proposed that the father’s time be supervised for at least a further period of three months, on each alternate Sunday from 10.00 am to 4.00 pm. I presume that there was some indication given by the maternal grandfather that he would be available to provide that level of supervision. In case there was no such indication, I will order that the duration of each period be up to the six hours proposed by the ICL, subject to the availability of a suitable supervisor.

During final submissions, the father requested that any supervised time exercised under the orders of 9 June 2017 be taken into account in calculating any further period of supervision. I appreciate that the father and the children will become frustrated with supervision but by the same token the mother is justifiably worried about the safety of the children. She is entitled to experience a further period of the children attending and enjoying time with the father supported by a trusted supervisor. I will order that, provided the drug screens are negative, the supervision conclude after three months from the date of the orders.
The orders proposed by the ICL have the progression of time spent between the father and the children dependent on a regime of drug testing of the father. The ICL indicated in submissions that the father is willing to undergo further drug testing. It was submitted by the ICL that in the circumstances, hair follicle testing is best practice and can verify use or abstinence over the immediate past three months. The submission of the ICL was to the effect that such testing would ensure that the father is not using drugs, monitor him effectively, and eliminate the possibility that he is a “functioning user”. In any event, the orders proposed by the ICL include urinalysis drug testing, on a more frequent basis, as an alternative.
An issue in the proceedings has been the father’s compliance with court ordered drug testing. It is the father’s case that it has been financially difficult for him to comply with those orders. The father’s written exchanges with the ICL in 2017 were recorded earlier in these reasons. Nonetheless, in closing submissions the father said that he will comply with orders for drug testing “if it needs to be done”. The orders proposed by the ICL would require the father to submit to drug testing for nine months, assuming there are no positive results. In my view, that would be appropriate.
The ICL proposes that after the initial period of time on alternate Sundays, and provided the father has produced a negative hair follicle or urinalysis result, then he spend time with the children, unsupervised, each alternate weekend on both the Saturday and the Sunday from 9.00 am to 5.00 pm each day, for a further period of six months. I will make that order. Largely based on the ICL’s proposals which require the father to provide three negative hair follicle results or urinalysis results, the father’s time with the children will increase as follows:
i.each alternate weekend from 9.00 am Saturday to 5.00 pm Sunday during school term; and
ii.for those weekends to be extended until 5.00 pm on the following Tuesday during the short-term school holidays and on the first, third and fifth weekend that the children spend time with the father during the Christmas school holidays;
iii.from 12.00 noon to 6.00 pm on Christmas Day 2017;
iv.from 2.00 pm on Christmas Eve to 2.00 pm on Christmas Day in 2018 and in all even years thereafter;
v.from 2.00 pm on Christmas Day to 6.00 pm on Boxing Day in 2019 and in all odd years thereafter;
vi.on Father’s Day from 9.00 am to 5.00 pm;
vii.on each of the children’s birthdays as follows:
a.should it occur on a school day from 4.00 pm to 6.30 pm; and
b.should it occur on a weekend day then from 10.00 am to 2.00 pm; and
viii.such other or altered periods as may be agreed between the parents in writing
The ICL proposes that, where applicable, the father’s time be suspended during any of the following times:
(a)on Mother’s Day from 9.00 am;
(b)on each of the children’s birthdays from 9.00 am – 1.00 pm on such Saturday and from 2.00 pm – 6.00 pm on such Sunday;
(c)from 2.00 pm on Christmas Eve to 2.00 pm on Christmas Day in all odd years commencing in 2019 and each alternate year thereafter; and
(d)from 2.00 pm on Christmas Day to 6.00 pm on Boxing Day in all even years commencing in 2018 each alternate year thereafter.
I am not sure why the Mother’s Day provision is open ended. I will make the same provision as is made for Father’s Day, which is ultimately 9.00 am to 5.00 pm. I do not understand the proposal for the children’s birthdays. It may be that the mother has indicated that she does not want to spend any time with the children on a birthday that falls on a weekday when the children are with the father. Assuming that to be correct I will make the orders as asked but provide for the proposed distinction between Saturdays and Sundays.
There is no right or wrong about the particular times and of course the parents are free to adjust them by written agreement to suit their needs and the needs of the children. As the orders are complicated I will also make provision for the parties to bring the matter back within a short time after the orders are made in order to address any agreed changes or refinements or to correct any errors.
The ICL proposed that an order be made in the following terms:
5)Should either the mother on behalf of the children, and/or the father be unable to attend a period set out in Order 4 hereof the parties must, where applicable, obtain a medical certificate for such non-attendance or otherwise agree with the other party to such unavailability.
In my view such an order is not required. The device “where applicable” would make the order almost impossible to enforce and in any event, in my view, the children should not be taken to a doctor for any reason other than necessary medical attention. In the case of the father, if he does not attend because he is ill, he should be accepted on his own report. In any event, I do not recall any evidence of significant problems with the children’s time with the father based on contested claims that either of the children or the father suffered an illness.
The ICL proposed that an order be made in the following terms:
6)If by operation of Order 4 the Father’s time is suspended for any period and it is to resume then the time shall resume at the point in the cycle at which it has been suspended; and the commencement dates of any subsequent period at 4b. and 4c. hereof which had not yet commenced as at the date of supervisions are adjusted in accordance with the dates on which the said period complete after allowing for the supervision.
I understand that the intention of this provision is to ensure that the program of more extensive and less restrictive arrangements for the children’s time with the father is fully implemented. The suggested wording will not achieve that outcome because the only provision for suspension of the father’s time in the proposed orders is for the purposes of special days with the mother under proposed Order 7. The significance of the overall program is that:
(a)there will be a further period of three months of supervised day-only time;
(b)there will then be a period of six months of unsupervised time but on a day-only basis;
(c)thereafter there will be overnight time; and
(d)the progression through the program is dependent on the father providing clear results of testing for substance abuse either by three or four hair follicle tests or by urinalysis testing, the type of testing to be at the election of the father.
In order to address those aims I will make orders to the effect that:
(6)in the event that the father fails to provide the results of a hair follicle test or urinalysis test (the type of test being at his election) as required by the terms of these orders and requested by the ICL, or, in the event that such a test is positive for an illicit drug such as methylamphetamine, opiates, amphetamine type substances or, cannabinoids, the father’s time with the children will be limited to the time specified in order 4(a) until the parents agree to the contrary or a Court otherwise orders;
(7)In the event that there is not substantial compliance with the requirements of the orders for supervised time and/or for day-only unsupervised time the progression to day-only unsupervised time (Order 4(b)) or overnight time (Order 4(c)), as the case may be, will be delayed until the orders have been substantially complied with; and
(8)For the purpose of Order 7 above, “substantial compliance” means that at least 90 per cent of the ordered occasions were implemented.
The ICL proposed that an order be made in the following terms:
(8)For the purposes of facilitating changeover pursuant to Order 4 and Order 7 the mother or her nominee shall deliver the children to the father at his place of residence and the father shall return the children to the mother or her nominee at her place of residence.
That is a different arrangement to the arrangement put in place by agreement for the purposes of the orders of 9 June 2017. I will make the order now proposed by the ICL but will refer to the option for the parents to put in place another arrangement by written agreement.
The ICL proposed that an order be made in the following terms:
(9)That the father shall when requested by the Independent Children’s Lawyer (“ICL”) shall submit for hair follicle testing, and provide such hair follicle samples as directed by The Drug Detection Agency for the purposes of analysis of drug use in relation to non-prescription drugs including but not limited to Methylamphetamine, Opiates, Amphetamines type substances, Cannabinoids as follows:
a.That the father be restrained from taking any steps to interfere with the provision of hair follicle samples, or to interfere with the test results.
b.That the father shall do things necessary and sign all necessary authority and documents to authorise the Drug Detection Agency to provide the test results to the ICL and the mother with copies of all results and forthwith upon those results becoming available as soon as reasonably practical.
c.That the father shall be responsible for meeting his own costs of such hair follicle testing.
10)If the father is unable or unwilling to submit to a hair follicle test then the father must submit to random urinalysis tests (including under supervision and chain [of] custody as follows:
a.The father must submit to such a request to undergo supervised urine analysis to be conducted in accordance with the Australian/New Zealand Standard 4308:2008: Procedure for the collection, detection and quantitation of drugs of abuse in urine within 48 hours of the father receiving the request from the ICL (by either email or SMS text message).
b.Testing shall be in respect of Methylamphetamine, Opiates, Amphetamines type substances, and Cannabinoids.
c.Testing shall occur randomly but not more than one (1) occasion in a twenty-eight (28) day period and upon fort-eight (48) hours’ notice at such times as the ICL may request of the father and for the purpose of this Order, the father shall provide his telephone number and email address to the ICL and he shall keep the ICL informed of any changes to those details.
d.The father shall be solely responsible for the cost of obtaining the supervised urinalysis testing;
e.The father must provide a copy of the result of the urinalysis test results to the ICL and the mother as soon as reasonable practicable when they are available.
f.If the father fails to provide a sample within the timeframe required for the test, or produces a test which displays a drug of abuse in that test sample, for 3 tests within a 3-month period from the fate of these Orders, then the father’s time with the children will continue in accordance with Order 4a.
g.Thereafter once the father progresses to Stage two (2) as set out in Order 4b. then if the father fails to provide a sample within the timeframe required for the test, or produces a test which displays a drug of abuse in that test sample, for 3 tests within a 9-month period from the date of these Orders, then the father’s time with the children will continue in accordance with Order 4b.
I will make those orders proposed by the ICL but have hopefully addressed 10(f) and (g) with the terms of order 7 proposed by me above.
The ICL proposed that an order be made in the following terms:
11)Simultaneous with the commencement of these Orders both parties do all acts and things and sign all documents necessary to complete the intake at [E Contact Service] (“[ECS]”) for the purpose of the father spending time with the children if the maternal grandfather is not available and no other agreement can be reached in respect of a supervisor.
12)Assuming the parties are accepted by [ECS], and it becomes necessary to use such service then:
a.the father shall spend time with the children for 2 hours per fortnight at the availability of [ECS]; and
b.the father shall be solely responsible for all costs associated with spending time with the children at the [ECS].
13)In the event that [ECS] cannot facilitate the time in accordance with the order 12a. hereof then the father’s time with the children at [ECS] should be varied as to such periods as can be facilitated by [ECS].
I will make those orders.
The ICL proposed that orders be made in the following terms:
14)That the Order appointing the ICL be extended for a further period of up to twelve (12) months and is thereafter discharged.
15)Should Legal Aid NSW not be willing to continue to fund the ICL for the purposes of implementation of these Orders, then the mother shall be substituted to facilitate the implementation of these Orders for which the ICL is charged.
The ICL submitted that this would allow third party monitoring of the implementation of the Court’s orders for time to be spent between the father and the children. I will make orders to that effect.
The ICL proposed that orders be made in the following terms:
16)That each of the parties, their servants and agents be hereby restrained by injunction from:
a.abusing, insulting, belittling, rebuking, or otherwise denigrating the other party and
b.discussing these proceedings or the contents of any documents filed in or intended for use in these proceedings to, with or in the presence of hearing of the children or either of them, and from permitting any other person to do so.
17)That the father be permitted to telephone or Skype the children between 6.00 pm and 7.00 pm on each Tuesday and Thursday, and on Sunday in the other week when the father is not spending time with the children, or such other times as agreed between the parties, and the mother shall do all things to ensure that the children are available to take the father’s call or Skype.
18)That the mother, and the father provide to each other within 7 days details of his/her address, telephone number or numbers and (if any) email address, and that each of the mother and the father notify each other within 7 days of any change to those details.
19)That these orders operate as an authority for any school attended by the children, or either of them, to forward to each of the mother and the father all correspondence, newsletters, school photographs and the like at their own costs (if any).
20)That the ICL cause a certified copy of these Orders to be served upon the children’s current school once issued.
21)Should the children, or either of them, suffer ill health and miss time to be spend with the father pursuant to these Orders, then the children shall spend makeup time with the father within 14 days of the missed time on a weekend and such time is to be equivalent to the time missed.
22)That the father be permitted to send to the children, via the mother’s address, a reasonable amount of correspondence, presents and the like for each of the children, and that the mother do all things to ensure that the children receive them.
23)That for the purposes of communicating information between the parties the mother and the father shall:
a.Communicate by telephone matter[s] of an urgent nature in relation to the children, or either of them, and otherwise;
b.Communicate by SMS text message or email about day to day matters including arrangements for each party to spend time with the children if not otherwise set out herein.
24)Should the children, or either of them, suffer a medical emergency requiring medical attention while spending time with, or living with, either party:
a.The other party is to be notified as soon as practicable.
b.That the other party is to be provided with the full details of the practitioner or medical facility upon which the children, other either of them, attend upon as soon as practicable.
c.That the medical practitioner or medical facility be advised that the other party has authority to access either of the children’s medical records and other significant information upon their request.
I will make orders to the effect of those proposed orders.
The ICL proposed that an order be made requiring that the father do all things necessary to obtain a mental health treatment plan and referral to a psychologist within 14 days and thereafter shall do all things necessary to comply with any treatment program recommended by his treating psychologist. It is my understanding that the father plans to take that action in any event. Nevertheless I will make the proposed order.
The ICL proposed that orders be made in the following terms:
26)That the father shall, within 14 days, provide a written authority to the Independent Children’s Lawyer authorising the Independent Children’s Lawyer obtain information in respect of his treatment and compliance with same directly from the father’s treating psychologist.
27)That the Independent Children’s Lawyer shall be given leave to provide to the father’s treating psychologist copies of the following material:
f.The reports of [Ms F] dated 4 March 2015 and 11 March 2016
g.The report of [Mr G] dated 16 May 2016
h.Discharge summaries from [H Hospital] for the father’s admissions in 2011.
I will make orders to the effect of those proposed orders.
The father sought an order in the following terms:
6)That the mother not be allowed to take the children overseas without the written permission of the father.
An order in those terms would be redundant as that same requirement is imposed in the circumstances that will apply here, by s 65Y of the Act.

The Costs of the Independent Children’s Lawyer

The ICL sought an order that each of the parents pay one half of her costs at $8,548.65. Each of the parents objects to making that payment.
As to the s 117 (2A) considerations:
There are no formal records about the parents’ financial circumstances. The father gave evidence that he works two days. Otherwise he is in receipt of Centrelink benefits. I understand that he receives a disability pension. I also understand that the father receives the benefit of subsidised housing. His evidence would be that he has no assets of significant value. It would be the father’s evidence that he does not have the capacity to pay the $4,274.33 claimed by the ICL against him. I take it that the father is not optimistic that he will be in a position to make that payment in the foreseeable future.
The mother is in full-time employment. Her evidence would be that she and her partner, Mr L, own their home, subject to a loan secured by a mortgage. The mother receives some financial support from the father in respect of B and D. The mother has some savings. I understand that she would be able to pay the $4,274.32 claimed by the ICL against her. I asked whether giving her some time to pay would be of assistance and she said that it would.
Neither parent is in receipt of a grant of legal aid. There is nothing to be said about the conduct of the proceedings by the parties. The catalyst for the proceedings was not a failure by one of the parents to comply with court orders. Neither of the parents can be said to be wholly unsuccessful in the proceedings; I was not told of any written offers of settlement.

To my observation the ICL provided significant assistance to parents, to the Court and through those efforts, to the community. In submissions the mother made reference to the fact that she had decided not to have legal representation because she had borne substantial legal fees at and soon after the parents’ separation. In effect the tax payer has incurred cost in circumstances where the parents could not or chose not to incur those costs. The ICL’s application for costs is an entirely meritorious application.
The father does not have the capacity to make any meaningful contribution to the ICL’s costs now or in the foreseeable future and I will make no order against him. The mother has the capacity to contribute and I will order that she do so. I will order that she pay to the ICL one half of the costs of the ICL, which half is assessed in the sum of $4,274.32 and that the payment be made within six months from the date of this order.

Conclusion

The main dispute between the parents is whether the father should share in the exercise of parental responsibility and the extent of time the father should spend with the children, whether that time should be supervised and if so, whether a period or date can be identified, after which supervision will not be required.
I have decided that it would not be in the best interests of the children for their parents to share parental responsibility. That said, in exercising sole parental responsibility the mother will be required to consult in a meaningful way, with the father. The parties’ histories give rise to reasonable concerns about the potential risks to the children from unsupervised time with their father. That said, in recent years he has made significant progress by avoiding drugs of addiction and attending to his mental health. I have decided that the orders in these proceedings should offer a plan towards overnight time with the father. Although there has been a long period of supervised time, that plan will be safeguarded by a further three month period of supervision and by drug testing over the next nine months. After the three months of supervised time, there will be a period of six months of day only time, leading to overnight time. In my view, those orders will achieve an arrangement in the best interests of the children.
As is referred to earlier in these reasons, the orders are complicated and there should be an opportunity for the parties to bring the matter back within a short time after the orders are made in order to address any agreed changes or refinements or to correct any errors. Leave will be granted to the parties to bring the matter back before me within 28 days, or such further time on which the parties may agree, in relation to the wording of the orders.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and eighty-three (183) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Loughnan delivered on 26 July 2017.

Associate:

Date: 25 July 2017

[2017] FamCA 532

26 July 2017

Key Legal Topics

Areas of Law

Family Law

Civil Procedure

Legal Concepts

Costs

Injunction

Procedural Fairness

Standing

Jurisdiction