Mulvaney Holdings Pty Ltd v Thorne (No 2)

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:  Mulvaney Holdings Pty Ltd & Anor v Thorne (No 2) [2012]
QSC 146
PARTIES:  MULVANEY HOLDINGS PTY LTD
AS TRUSTEE FOR THE MULVANEY FAMILY
TRUST
(First Plaintiff)
AND
OZIBAR PTY LTD
AS TRUSTEE OF THE OZIBAR UNIT TRUST
(Second Plaintiff)
v
BRETT JOHN THORNE
(Defendant)
FILE NO/S:  S54/2011
DIVISION:  Trial Division
PROCEEDING:  Application
ORIGINATING 
COURT: 
Supreme Court Rockhampton
DELIVERED ON:  6 June 2012
DELIVERED AT:  Rockhampton
HEARING DATE:  31 May 2012
JUDGE:  McMeekin J
ORDER: 

1. I fix the amount of interest assessed pursuant to s 47 Supreme Court Act 1995 at $593,849

2.   I order the defendant to pay the costs of the first plaintiff fixed on the standard basis.

3.    The first plaintiff‟s application is otherwise dismissed.

CATCHWORDS: 

EQUITY – EQUITABLE COMPENSATION – INTEREST – whether interest should be awarded – whether there should

be an allowance for the taxation to be imposed on the interest
component
Batchelor v Burke (1981) 35 ALR 15
Dwyer v National Companies and Securities Commission
(1988) 15 NSWLR 285
Exelby & Ors v Tuite & Ors [1994] QCA 506
Hadzigeorgiou v O'Sullivan [1983] 1 Qd R 55
Hungerfords & Ors v Walker & Ors (1989) 84 ALR 119
MBP (S.A.) Pty Ltd. v Gogic (1991) 65 A.L.J.R. 203
Milatos and Anor v Clayton Utz [2007] NTSC 44
Newmont Yandal Operations Pty Ltd v The J Aron
Corporation & The Goldman Sachs Group Inc & Ors [2007]
NSWCA 195
Rabelais Pty Ltd v Cameron & Ors (1995) 95 ATC 4552
Serisier Investments Pty Ltd v English (1989) 1 Qd R 678
Tuite & Ors v Exelby & Ors (1992) 25 ATR 81
WA Fork Truck Distributors Pty Ltd v Jones & Ors [2003]
WASC 102
Constitution of Queensland 2001 s 58(1)
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cwth) ss 96, 97(1)
Supreme Court Act 1995 ss 47, 48
Supreme Court Regulation 2008 s 4
COUNSEL:  Mr PO Land for the Plaintiffs
No appearance for the Defendant
SOLICITORS:  Kelly Legal Solicitors for the Plaintiffs
No appearance for the Defendant
  1. McMeekin J: On 21 March 2012 I handed down my reasons for judgment in

    this matter (“the primary judgment”).[1] I awarded equitable compensation to the

    [1]

first plaintiff against the defendant in the sum of $1,955,884.05 together with
interest pursuant to s 47 Supreme Court Act 1995.
  1. The first plaintiff now applies under the slip rule, or alternatively in the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, to amend that judgment. The judgment is yet to be perfected.

Jurisdiction

  1. At trial the first plaintiff had argued that if I acceded to its arguments then I should award interest pursuant to s 47 of the Supreme Court Act 1995. It was further argued that there would necessarily be a tax liability, in respect of the interest awarded, on the beneficiaries of the trust of which the first plaintiff was trustee, and on whose behalf the first plaintiff brought action and that too should be allowed as compensation. Evidence was led from an accountant of…

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Details
Case
[2012] QSC 146
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Mulvaney Holdings Pty Ltd v Thorne (No 2), the court was tasked with determining the appropriate compensation to be awarded to Mulvaney Holdings for the defendant's deceitful actions. The dispute centred on whether interest should be included in the equitable compensation, and if so, whether there should be an allowance for taxation on the interest component. The case was heard in the Supreme Court, with the court exercising its discretion under section 47(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1995 to order interest for the recovery of money.

The legal issues the court had to address involved the principles of equity and compensation in relation to interest awarded on monetary claims. The court considered whether the defendant's use of the plaintiff's funds without permission constituted a sufficient ground for awarding interest, and if the court should consider the potential taxation on the interest component. The court also evaluated the rate of interest and the period over which it should be allowed, noting the absence of submissions on these matters.

In its reasoning, the court held that interest should be awarded to compensate the plaintiff for the detriment suffered by being deprived of their money. The court found that there were no proper reasons to withhold interest in this case, as the defendant had gained an unfair advantage through deceit. The court noted that while commercial rates of interest might typically include a component to compensate for inflation, the compensation in this case was assessed for a past loss in the equivalent nominal monetary amount. Therefore, the court opted for commercial rates of interest. The court assessed the interest at 10% and fixed the amount at $593,849. The defendant was ordered to pay the costs of the first plaintiff.

In conclusion, the court awarded interest to the plaintiff to fully compensate for the loss caused by the defendant's deceit, and fixed the interest amount at $593,849. The defendant was also ordered to pay the costs of the first plaintiff, while the first plaintiff's application was otherwise dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. I fix the amount of interest assessed pursuant to s 47 Supreme Court Act 1995 at $593,849

2. I order the defendant to pay the costs of the first plaintiff fixed on the standard basis.

3. The first plaintiff‟s application is otherwise dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Here the interest was claimed pursuant to the discretion conferred by statute. Section 47(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1995 provides: “47 Interest up to judgment (1) In any proceedings in respect of a cause of action that arises after the commencement of the Common Law Practice Act Amendment Act 1972 in a court of record for the recovery of money (including proceedings for debt, damages or the value of goods) the court may order that there shall be included in the sum for which judgment is given interest at such rate as it thinks fit on the whole or any part of that sum for the whole or any part of the period between the date when the cause of action arose and the date of the judgment.” It was not necessary to have recourse to the statute necessarily as interest was always able to be awarded in a suit at equity. In Hungerfords & Ors v Walker 4 5 Nonetheless I cannot see that any difference in principle applies to the assessment. I have found that the first plaintiff applied monies to the defendant‟s business Here I have no information on the state of the first plaintiff‟s finances or of the alternative courses it may have taken with its monies but I do not see that as critical. Interest is awarded “to compensate the plaintiff for the detriment that he has suffered by being kept out of his money” (Batchelor v Burke[8]) and not [8] necessarily because they have foregone investment opportunities (MBP (S.A.) 9 Here the defendant through his deceit obtained the use of the plaintiff‟s money. Had he endeavoured to obtain finance through a financial institution to support his business he would have been required to pay interest on the monies so obtained. Hence there is no unfairness to the defendant in requiring that he pay interest. And the first plaintiff has lost the opportunity of applying its money in some other way to its advantage. It seems to me that in the normal course interest ought to be allowed in these circumstances unless there are proper reasons for withholding interest: Hadzigeorgiou v O'Sullivan. There are no such reasons evident to me here. In his pleading the defendant complained of delay in bringing the suit but I found 11 in the primary judgment that there had been no undue delay. In order to provide the first plaintiff with full compensation it appears to me to be just that interest be awarded. The statute leaves the assessment of both the rate of interest and the period over which the interest should be allowed to the discretion of the Court. That discretion has been described as “unfettered” in Serisier Investments Pty Ltd v 12 No submissions were proffered as to how I should arrive at an appropriate rate, it being assumed that 10% was a proper rate to adopt. Nor was any evidence 13 A payment of interest serves a number of purposes. Where the damages to be awarded are in present day money for a past loss then there is a reason not to adopt commercial rates, as interest has, or can have, a component to 14 compensate for inflation: MBP (SA) Pty Ltd v Gogic. That is a factor in favour of commercial rates here as the compensation has been assessed for a past loss in the equivalent nominal monetary amount.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.