Mullins & Ors and Mullins & Ors

[2017] FamCA 786

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

MULLINS AND ORS & MULLINS AND ORS [2017] FamCA 786

FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – INTERIM – Where orders are made requiring an accountant to examine and evaluate company records for the purposes of valuing the interests of the parties – Where the Husband is no longer able to pay his solicitors from his own resources – Where a dollar for dollar litigation funding order is made. 

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

FIRST APPLICANT: Mr A Mullins

SECOND APPLICANT: B1 Pty Ltd

THIRD APPLICANT: B2 Pty Ltd ATF B Trust

FIRST RESPONDENT: Ms Mullins

SECOND RESPONDENT: Mr C Mullins

THIRD RESPONDENT: Mr D Mullins

FOURTH RESPONDENT: B3 Pty Ltd

FILE NUMBER: BRC 1999 of 2017

DATE DELIVERED: 4 October 2017

PLACE DELIVERED: Brisbane

PLACE HEARD: Brisbane

JUDGMENT OF: Forrest J

HEARING DATE: 18 September 2017

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE FIRST AND THIRD APPLICANTS: Mr Alexander

SOLICITOR FOR THE FIRST AND THIRD APPLICANTS: Moloney MacCallum Lawyers

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENTS: Mr Jennings

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENTS: Nyst Legal

Orders

1. That the Application for the Fourth Respondent, B3 Pty Ltd, to be removed as a party to the proceedings, is dismissed.

2. That the company, E Pty Ltd ACN …, be joined as the Fifth Respondent to the proceedings.

3. That the instructions to Mr F of G Accountants be enlarged to include instructions to undertake a forensic examination and evaluation of the records of the Second Applicant and of the Fourth and Fifth Respondents from the 2013 financial year to the financial year ended June 2017 to determine, as far as is practicably possible, the value of the husband’s and the wife’s interests in B1 as at 30 June 2017, including having regard, in particular, to any amounts owing as at that date to the Second Applicant by either the Fourth or Fifth Respondents.

4. That each of the parties has liberty to apply to the Court for further orders in respect of the instructions to be given to Mr F, should that be necessary.

5. That Mr F’s reasonable costs and outlays in discharging his task shall be paid, in the first instance, by the Respondents, jointly or severally, with the determination as to which party or parties shall bear the ultimate burden for such costs and outlays to be a matter for the Trial Judge.

6. That whilst Nyst Legal continues to represent the respondents in these proceedings, each time Nyst Legal is paid in respect of any of the accounts rendered to any of the Respondents, then the Respondents, jointly or severally, shall cause the exact same amount to be paid to Moloney MacCallum Lawyers, solicitors for the husband, such money to be held in trust by them for the husband and only applied to the payment of legal costs and outlays incurred by the husband in conducting his case in the proceedings in this Court.

7. That just how any payments made to the husband’s solicitors pursuant to paragraph (6) of these orders are treated in the determination of final orders as to property settlement between the husband and the wife shall be a matter for the Trial Judge.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Mullins and Ors & Mullins and Ors has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE

FILE NUMBER: BRC 1999 of 2017

Mr A Mullins

First Applicant

And

B1 Pty Ltd

Second Applicant

And

B2 Pty Ltd
ATF B Trust

Third Applicant

And

Ms Mullins

First Respondent

And

Mr C Mullins

Second Respondent

And

Mr D Mullins

Third Respondent

And

B3 Pty Ltd 

Fourth Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. There are a number of interim applications to be determined in these property proceedings that are pending in this Court. The parties were heard by me in the Judicial Duty List on Monday 18^th September, 2017 and written submissions were also provided to the Court by counsel on each side.

2. The applicant in the substantive proceedings is Mr B Mullins (“the husband”). The Second Applicant is B1 Pty Ltd (“B1”). The Third Respondent is B2 Pty Ltd (“B2”). The First Respondent is Ms Mullins (“the wife”). The Second Respondent is Mr C Mullins (“Mr C”). The Third Respondent is Mr D Mullins (“Mr D”) and the Fourth Respondent is B3 Pty Ltd (“B3”).

3. By an Application in a Case filed on 2 June 2017, B3 seeks an order that it be removed as a party to the proceedings. By that same Application in a Case it also seeks an order for the return of a motor vehicle asserted to be its property that is in the possession of the husband. At the hearing, counsel for B3 conceded that if it remains a party and is not successful in being removed, the ownership of the car will be an issue in the proceedings and is, therefore, not pursued in this application. 

4. By a Response to an Application in a Case, the husband seeks orders that:

   (i)B3’s application to be removed as a party be dismissed;

   (ii)E Pty Ltd (“EPL”) be joined as the Fifth Respondent to the proceedings;

   (iii)Mr F of G Accountants, who the parties have already agreed is to value “any interest either of them hold in any corporate or other entity, including any trust”  be appointed to undertake a forensic investigation into the “financial affairs” of B1 to be paid for by B3; and

   (iv)B3 pay interim litigation costs of the husband on a dollar for dollar basis equal to those it pays for the wife, Mr C and Mr D and itself.

Some Background

1. The 57 year old husband married the 57 year old wife in 1979 when they were both very young adults. They separated on a final basis in January 2016, after a long marriage, but are not yet divorced. Mr C, who is 36 years old, and Mr D, who is 34 years old, are their only children.

2. The husband qualified tradesman as a young man. The wife had a career in finance and worked her way up to management level.

3. In 2002, the husband began a manufacturing business. He called the business “B”. As demand grew, he employed Mr C and Mr D. At some time, the wife began working for the business as well. From around 2007/2008, the business was owned and operated by the company, B1. All of B1’s shares were owned by B2 Pty Ltd (“B2”), the corporate trustee of the B Trust, a discretionary family trust of which the husband was the appointor and he, the wife, Mr C and Mr D were beneficiaries.

4. The husband was the sole director of B1.

5. In or around 2011, the wife became ill and half of the shares in B1 were sold by B2 to a private equity group.

6. In or around 2013, after concerns with mismanagement by staff put in place by the private equity group, the shares held by that group were bought back by B2 as trustee for the family trust.

7. Sometime around then, B3 was formed to deal with the sales and servicing side of the business. B1 continued manufacturing and B3 held the dealer’s license, selling the products for B1. It also carried out warranty repairs, provided servicing, and sold trade-in and some consignment sales. Mr D is B3’s sole director and its only shareholder is another company of which Mr D is the sole director and shareholder, Mullins Pty Ltd.

8. It seems accepted that since 2008, at least, the wife, Mr C and Mr D have been responsible for the day to day management of the business.

9. According to the wife, she and the husband, Mr C and Mr D reached an agreement in the middle of last year to “split the shareholdings” of B1 equally between the four of them and for each of the four of them to become directors. This was to be affected by B2 transferring its shares in B1 to each of the four of them in equal shares. A formal Shareholders Agreement evidencing that agreement was executed in late October last year. It also provided for each party to receive a director’s salary of $165,000 per year.

10. The week of the signing of the Shareholders Agreement was seriously tumultuous for the family. The wife alleges the husband came to their former home that she still occupies on several occasions and physically assaulted her as well as a friend of hers. The husband was charged by police with numerous assault charges and breaches of a family violence protection order that had previously been made in the wife’s favour. Those charges are not yet finalised, as I understand the evidence.

11. As part of these proceedings, the husband seeks to set aside the Shareholder Agreement asserting that there was something surrounding the circumstances under which he signed the Agreement that supports his claim for such relief. The full particulars of that are not clear at this point in time.

12. Sometime thereafter, the agreed changes to the ownership and control structure apparently came to the attention of one of the largest secured creditors of the business, who became concerned. Early in 2017, tensions between the husband and the other three family members increased and began to impact upon the operation of the business and the largest secured creditor called in the debt of $750,000 owed by B1. At around this time, the wife asserts that the husband made unilateral changes to B1’s banking arrangements. This led to the wife, Mr C and Mr D removing the husband as a director of B1 and appointing themselves as its directors. B1’s bank froze the company’s accounts and the company that provided its labour force asked for some guarantees and security.

13. In the turmoil, the wife, Mr C and Mr D then resigned as directors and urgent efforts were made to satisfy the secured creditor. In late February, the husband wrote to the wife, through solicitors, demanding an understanding of B1’s cash flow position and threatening to appoint a receiver.

14. On 21 February 2017, solicitors for the wife, Mr C and Mr D wrote to the husband giving him notice of an extraordinary general meeting of B1 where resolutions for his removal as a director and the secretary would be put and voted on. The wife, Mr C and Mr D then applied to the Federal Court for the appointment of receivers to B1. That application was heard by Greenwood J of the Brisbane Registry of that Court. He was satisfied, on a prima facie basis, that the affairs of B1 were being conducted in a manner contrary to the interests of the members of B1 as a whole.

15. On 1 March this year, Greenwood J ordered that receivers be appointed as receivers of the property and undertaking of B1 pursuant to the provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), that the receivership and management continue until otherwise ordered and that the proceedings be transferred to this Court to be heard together with the property settlement proceedings that the husband had already commenced in this Court.

16. The major secured creditor, H Pty Ltd (“HPL”) applied, soon after, to this Court for the appointment of its own receivers to receive the assets of B1 in order to secure a significant debt owed by B1 to it. HPL relied upon evidence that about 20 units of stock were removed from B1’s business premises one evening in March and taken to the property occupied by the wife.

17. I made an order on that application on 10 March 2017.

18. On 18 April 2017, I made further orders in the proceedings with the consent of the parties, in terms agreed between the parties. Those orders fixed the remuneration of the receivers earlier appointed by the Federal Court’s Order and provided for their payment and discharge from their appointment. They also provided for disclosure, the appointment of a real property valuer to value the home of the wife, the appointment of an accountant to value the entities in which the husband and wife have interests, and they provided for B1 to file a Statement of Case in which any relief against B3 is sought by 5 May 2017 and for B3 to file a Statement of Defence if B1 filed any such Statement of Case. The orders also provided for a mediation to take place between the parties.

These Applications

1. Counsel for B3 (who also appeared for the wife, Mr C and Mr D) in his submissions pointed out that the husband, who filed an Amended Initiating Application in these proceedings on 10 August 2017, does not at this point in time seek any specific relief against B3. He also referred to the April Orders that provided for B1 to plead any case it had against B3 by 5 May and the fact that no such case had been pleaded. He submitted that in these circumstances B3 should be removed as a party to these proceedings. 

2. In opposition to that, counsel for the husband submits that the husband has formally sought an order that he (and B1) be excused from further particularising the final orders sought in the proceedings until the Respondents have made full and frank disclosure, a forensic accounting exercise is performed and the property of the parties ascertained.

3. As counsel for the husband submits, it is the husband’s case that B3 currently owes a significant amount of money to B1. Quite apart from the issue of whether the Shareholders’ Agreement is to be set aside, as it stands, the husband and the wife currently own half of the shares in B1. Clearly, whether B3 owes large amounts of money to B1 is relevant in determining the value of B1.

4. Counsel for B3 pointed to evidence that showed that the receivers appointed by my Order of March 10 to receive and manage the assets of B1 also asserted that B3 owed large sums of money to B1 and that B3 through Mr D denied that and went about demonstrating to those receivers that B3 did not. Counsel submitted that as those receivers had not caused B1 to file any claim for relief against B3 by 5 May and as the receivers did not even appear or cause an appearance before the Court on 18 September on the hearing of these applications, the Court should accept that the receivers have determined their position in the matter.

5. That may be so, but the evidence also shows that a meeting had been scheduled between Mr D, Mr C and the wife and the receivers with a view to discussing a resolution of the issues so as to avoid more proceedings. In this regard, I observe that the receivers were appointed on the application of HPL, a secured creditor with an interest in recovering a particular amount of money owed to it. HPL was only ever going to be interested in recovering from the assets of B1 or the parties with interests in B1 the amount actually owed to it. Clearly, the husband himself, if not the wife as well, has an interest in B1 having residual value after the receivers currently appointed have concluded their work. 

6. There was no evidence before me as to the outcome of the meeting between Mr D, Mr C and the wife and the receivers of B1 or as to whether or not the receivers have recovered sufficient money to satisfy HPL. There was some disagreement between the parties on the day of the hearing as to whether the receivers had already sold the business as a going concern. The receivers have not sought to be discharged at this point in time.

7. There is much evidence before the Court that, prima facie, raises concerns about the relationship between B1 and B3 and the issue of the impact of that relationship on the value of the husband’s and the wife’s interests in B1.

8. The evidence that was before Greenwood J caused him to say in his reasons for judgment in March this year that:

   [B1] and [B3] operate a business of manufacturing and selling [products] and providing associated services from common premises.  …

   …

   The business operated by B1 and B3 is substantial.

   In the last financial year, B1 had a turnover of more than $11 million and B3’s turnover was more than $5 million. The operations of B1 and B3, known as the “[B] Group”, overlap.

9. The husband adduced into evidence before me an email letter from the Manager of a firm of accountants and business advisers who formerly acted for the B Group to B1 dated 20 October 2015. Relevantly, it says:

   Attached are the [B1] and [B3] financial statements and income tax returns for the year ended 30 June 2015.

   The unsecured inter entity loan balance at 30 June 2015 was reconciled as $1,120,486 (owed by [B3] Pty Ltd), this loan has been accumulated since the incorporation of [B3] with the balance at 30 June 2014 and 30 June 2013 being $1,008,632 and $727,685 respectively.

   This loan has come about via payments made by [B1] on behalf of [B3] and recognising [stock] sold by [B3] where a physical cash payment was not been (sic) made to [B1] for cost of the [stock].

   However from a management perspective the two entities have traditionally been operated as a single entity (particularly prior to ownership change), because of this fact there are many additional considerations to this balance.

   In effect [B1] has received the benefit of operating with a …dealer without paying for this service, and as has previously been discussed has recognised service/insurance income “earned” by [B3] (note until the June 15 year was bearing all service labour/employee costs so this revenue recognition was correct). On the other hand [B3] has not borne any of its own running costs rent, electricity, only commenced paying wages in FY15, and has not been making cash payment for the [stock] sold.

   I believe that coming to a “final” position between the entities would be a time consuming, costly and potentially difficult process.  It would require reconstructing the records of FY15, FY14 and FY13 and also require reaching agreement between the two owners as to reasonable allocations of expenses and income.

10. Attached to the affidavit of Brendan Nyst, solicitor for B3, the wife, Mr D and Mr C, filed on 12 September, 2017, is an email sent from solicitors acting for the current receivers to Mr Nyst dated 23 March, 2017. It points out that financial reports for B1 and B3 disclose that at 30 June 2016 B3 was indebted to B1 in the sum of $797,602. That letter referred to assertions by B3 that as at that time (March 2017) B1 was actually indebted to B3 in the amount of approximately $800,000 and pointed out that it seemed “inconceivable” that there could be a $1.6M swing in the loan balances between the two companies in less than nine months.

11. Counsel for the husband referred to the affidavit filed on 20 July 2017 in support of his client’s case affirmed by Ms J. In that affidavit, Ms J says:

    2.I provide this Affidavit deposing to events that I have witnesses (sic) at [B1] over the last few months prior to the closure of [B1] on Friday, 10 March 2017.

    3. At that time, staff members were not informed about what was happening to [B1].

    4. Prior to the closure of [B1], we (the staff and I) were told by [Mr D Mullins] that new purchase contracts and terms and conditions were to be drawn up under [B3] Pty Limited, I witnessed paperwork from customer files being removed from customer folders, that all the second hand and consignment customer folders being removed from the office and that any customers with … trade ins were to be put in the family members respective names.

    5.[Goods], …, that were previously traded in by customers for [products] were taken by [Mr D] and [Ms Mullins] and removed from the premises.

    6.Any new customer contracts that were drawn up under [B3], I was told by [Ms K] to put them into red folders which was not the normal practice.

    7. All new deposits for [products] were put through [B3] bank accounts and their EFTPOS machine. Again, this was not normal procedure as these deposits would normally would (sic) go into the bank account of [B1].

    8. I also observed that [B1] [products] that were built and paid for by [B1] were sold by [B3] and the money went into the accounts of [B3].

    9. Since I had access to the computer database, part of my job description and duties was to input customer data onto the relevant computer system. I say that [B1] and [B3] both shared the same system which I had access to on my computer. During my access to that computer software, I noticed that various customer files were being transferred from [B1] to [B3] section of the database.

    10. On two separate occasions, I witnessed large sums of cash money being counted.

    11. The password for [B3] MYOB, was changed and moved away from [B1] MYOB so that it couldn't be accessed by any other person other than [Ms Mullins].

    12. [Mr D Mullins] began doing all of the banking when normally it was a job performed by the office girls.

    13. On 22 February, 2017 the Forensic Accountants turned up to look at the accounts, [Mr D Mullins] told them that he didn't have notification that they were coming (but he did given that I and some other staff received an email from [Mr C Mullins] enclosing an email sent to [Mr D], [Ms Mullins] and [Mr C Mullins] from his Commercial Lawyers advising them of this) and he wouldn't let them in.

    14. The Forensic Accountants then drove out of the driveway and stopped on the road outside [B1]. [Mr D] and [Ms Mullins] then left the premises. I saw another employee, [Ms K], watching the Accountants from upstairs. The Accountants had initially left the building but started to reverse back as if they were coming back onto the premises. [Ms K] then rang [Mr D] straight away to tell him that the Accountants were coming back. About 15 minutes later, [Mr D] drove back in and told everyone to shut down their computers and told us all to go home.

    15. On Friday, 10 March 2017, I arrived at work and all of the [products] approximately twenty (20) had been removed from the premises the previous night (Thursday night).

    16. When I went into the office on the Friday morning, I observed that goods belonging to [B1] had been removed. I observed [Mr D Mullins] continuing to remove goods belonging to [B1] whilst I was working.

1. Counsel submitted that the content of that affidavit was very damaging to B3’s case to be removed from the proceedings at this point in time. He submitted, with some merit I consider, that it was extremely telling that not one of Mr D, Mr C or the wife had filed an affidavit deposing to evidence in any way challenging or refuting the assertions of the former employee, Ms J.

2. Having regard to all of that evidence that I have just referred to, I consider that unravelling of the history of transactions as between these two entities will be quite critical in the process of putting a value to the interests of the husband and the wife in B1 whether it is owned by the four family members equally or whether it is owned again by the discretionary family trust that the husband controls as appointor.

3. That will require greater expert accounting assistance than simply the provision of opinion as to valuation. It will require the provision of documents and information by Mr D and the others involved in the operation and management of B3 over the last few years. B3’s rights , I am satisfied, are more likely than not going to be directly affected by this valuation exercise and its participation in these proceedings is necessary, in my judgment, to be able to determine all issues in dispute in this case. Accordingly, I am satisfied that although neither the husband nor B1 have expressly sought relief against B3 at this point in time that it is not appropriate to allow B3 to be removed as a party.

4. At the same time, the husband seeks to join EPL as another respondent. He gives evidence that EPL was created on 28 March 2017 and that Mr C is its sole director with Mr C and Mr D being equal shareholders. EPL trades as “LPL” and the husband says that Mr D and Mr C are not able to use the word “B” in their business name as it is the intellectual property of B1. The husband says LPL and B3 are operating from the same premises now. He also gives evidence that the floor plan being used to construct one of LPL’s product offerings is the same as one that he developed for B1 and he attaches B1 documents and pages downloaded from LPL’s website that, prima facie, reflect distinct similarities in the floor plan and layout.

5. The husband also adduced into evidence copies of other documents downloaded from LPL’s website that clearly reflect that LPL is representing that its business is just an extension of the B Group’s business and just a continuation of the same “family run” business.

6. The Court was informed at the hearing of these applications that the husband had caused a subpoena to issue from the Court directed to EPL requiring it to produce all of its records and that EPL was objecting on the grounds of relevance.  At the hearing it was accepted that if EPL is joined as a respondent to the proceedings that the argument about the subpoena will be moot as the disclosure rules would require the documents to be disclosed.

7. Of course, the same argument as I have previously observed was made by counsel for B3 as to why B3 should not be joined, namely that no relief is expressly sought against B3 at this point in the proceedings, could be raised against joining EPL. No relief is yet sought by any of the current parties to the proceedings against EPL.

8. As EPL has come into existence since receivers were appointed to B1 and it is being used by Mr C, Mr D and the wife, alongside B3, to run the same business that was being operated and run by B3 alongside B1, I consider that the same sort of issues as arise between B3 and B1 that go to B1’s valuation in these proceedings arise in respect of EPL, particularly having regard to Ms J’s evidence. Just as I consider thorough investigation and assessment of all that has gone on between B1 and B3 to be critical to properly and accurately determining B1’s value in the proceedings as between the husband and the wife, so, too, do I consider that EPL’s financial and operational affairs since it came into existence earlier this year might very well impact upon the proper and accurate valuation of the parties’ interests in B1.

9. I consider it necessary to join EPL as a respondent to the proceedings at this stage. That is not to say that the question of whether they remain a party to the proceedings cannot be revisited prior to the matter being listed for trial. At some point before this matter is listed for trial, the husband and B1 will have to clarify and, most likely, plead with particularity any relief they actually seek against B3 and EPL. Whilst I appreciate that is almost impossible to do at the moment without having the benefit of the forensic accounting exercise that the husband seeks, at its completion, there will be an expectation that the husband pleads his case against entities in which neither he nor the wife has any legal interest.

10. It follows from what I have said that I am persuaded that it is appropriate to make orders that require the accountant, Mr F, to undertake the examination and evaluation of the records of B1, B3 and, now, EPL, so that the interests of the husband and the wife in B1 can be properly valued for the purposes of the property settlement proceedings.  As Mr M said in his email of 20 October 2015 it will be a “time consuming, costly and potentially difficult process” and will likely require “reconstructing the records” and some discussion between the parties about reasonable allocations of expenses and income. I appreciate that will not all be easy for Mr F. Nevertheless, I consider that determining orders that are just and equitable between the husband and the wife in the property settlement proceedings of this family requires this exercise to be undertaken. Accordingly, I will order it.

11. Should there be no agreement as to the terms of the letter of instruction to go to Mr F, there will be liberty to apply to this Court for orders settling such terms. As for the question of payment of Mr F’s reasonable costs, in the first instance I will order that those who have effectively retained the business to the exclusion of the husband (who now receives no income from it as he did until earlier this year) pay those costs with determination as to how those costs should ultimately be borne being a matter for the trial judge. 

12. As for the interim litigation costs funding application of the husband, his counsel effectively makes a submission along similar lines as I have just decided in respect of the accountant’s fees. He submits that as Mr D confirms in his evidence that he has caused B3 to attend to payment of the legal fees incurred by him, Mr C, the wife and B3 up to 17 July 2017 that the husband’s fees should also be paid from the same source, essentially the family business, even if it is no longer being run by B1.

13. The husband has deposed to no longer being able to pay his own solicitors from his own resources. He has exhausted his savings. He has drawn and used all of his superannuation. He has been borrowing from family and friends. His counsel submits that where the other parties are using the resources of “a matrimonial asset” to pay their legal fees, the same resources should be used, on an equal basis, to pay the husband’s legal fees.

14. Mr D deposes in an affidavit filed 11 September 2017, that B3 had less than $5,000 in its bank accounts at that date and is “not presently in a financial position to pay for ongoing legal fees in this matter”. He says nothing about EPL.

15. Counsel for all of the respondents submits that the husband has not established that the wife controls the assets and funds of the parties or that her financial position when compared and contrasted with his is such that such an order is justified under s 117 of the Family Law Act 1975 (“the Act”).

16. I am already satisfied, prima facie, that Mr D and Mr C, with the acquiescence and support of the wife, continue to operate the family business of manufacturing, selling and servicing, albeit through B3 and EPL rather than B3 and B1. The business was generating income for all four members of the family until this relationship dispute spilled over into a commercial dispute as well and B1 was put into receivership by the wife, Mr D and Mr C. Since then, things appear to have deteriorated commercially but Mr D, Mr C and the wife continue to operate the same business, just under a different name. Now, it is clear, the husband definitely receives no income from it.

17. I consider these circumstances justify the use of the power available pursuant to s 117(2) of the Act to make such order as to costs as the Court considers just. I consider that whilst one firm of solicitors represents all of the respondents that an order matching dollar for dollar any legal fees paid for the wife, Mr D, Mr C, B3 or EPL sourced from funds earned or held by either B3 or EPL is a just order. I will make such an order.

I certify that the preceding fifty (50) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Forrest delivered on 4 October 2017.

Associate: 

Date:  4 October 2017