Mulligan & Stello (No 2)
[2023] FedCFamC1F 659
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Mulligan & Stello (No 2) [2023] FedCFamC1F 659
File number: ADC 4536 of 2022 Judgment of: KARI J Date of judgment: 11 August 2023 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW –COSTS –Where the mother seeks an indemnity costs order - Where the father was wholly unsuccessful – Where the father is a sophisticated litigant – Where the father should have been aware and/or properly advised that his applications had no chance of success – Where the father’s conduct favours the making of a costs order - Consideration as to an order for indemnity costs - Where the Court is not satisfied that the circumstances of the case warrant an order for indemnity costs – Costs ordered fixed at $45,000 Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 117, 117(2A),
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth),
Family Court Act 1997 (WA).
Cases cited: Colgate-Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 118 ALR 248,
Fountain Selected Meats (Sales) Pty Ltd v International Produce Merchants Pty Ltd (1988) 81 ALR 397,
Medlon & Medlon (No 6) (Indemnity Costs) [2015] FamCAFC 157,
Mulligan & Stello [2022] FedFamC1F 1042,
Munday & Bowman (1997) 22 Fam LR 321,
Ragata Developments Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation [1993] FCA 72,
Rice & Asplund (1979) FLC 90-725,
Tetijo Holdings Pty Ltd v Keeprite Australia Pty Ltd [1991] FCA 225.
Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 75 Date of hearing: 23 June 2023 Place: Adelaide Counsel for the Applicant: Ms Lewis Solicitor for the Applicant: Barkus Doolan Winning Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Hooper SC Solicitor for the Respondent: Carr & Co ORDERS
ADC 4536 of 2022 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MR MULLIGAN
Applicant
AND: MS STELLO
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
KARI J
DATE OF ORDER:
11 AUGUST 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.That the father do pay the mother’s costs fixed in the amount of $45,000.
2.The payment pursuant to order 1 be made as follows:
(a)Within twenty-eight (28) days; and
(b)To the Barkus Doolan Winning solicitors trust account, or as otherwise directed in writing by the mother and/or her legal representatives.
3.That the proceedings otherwise be dismissed as finalised.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Mulligan & Stello has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
KARI J
INTRODUCTION
These reasons relate to the costs applications brought by the mother arising from parenting proceedings relating to the parties’ two children.
Two applications were listed before me for determination on 23 June 2023:
(a)An Application in a Proceeding filed by the mother on 30 September 2022; and
(b)An Application in a Proceeding filed by the mother on 19 January 2023.
By each of those applications, the mother seeks an order that the father pay her costs on an indemnity basis arising from separate aspects of the parenting proceedings.
As these reasons bear out, an order for costs shall be made in relation to each application. However rather than the payment of costs on an indemnity basis, the costs to be paid by the father shall be fixed.
BACKGROUND
The father, Mr Mulligan, was born in 1948. He is 74 years of age.
The mother, Ms Stello, was born in 1981. She is 42 years of age.
The father was the applicant in the substantive parenting proceedings that he commenced on 3 June 2022.
On 21 December 2022 I delivered reasons and made orders dismissing those parenting proceedings save as to the question of costs (Mulligan & Stello [2022] FedFamC1F 1042).
As those reasons bear out, those parenting proceedings were dismissed on the basis of an application of the principle in Rice & Asplund (1979) FLC 90-725 (‘Rice & Asplund’).
The parenting proceedings instituted by the father had been commenced against a background of final parenting orders which were made by consent on 18 August 2020 which provided as follows:
1.The wife have sole parental responsibility for the two children of the marriage namely [X] born […] 2007 and [Y] born […] 2009 ("the children").
2.The children live with the wife.
3.The children spend time with the husband at times agreed between the parties.
As in any proceedings where a party seeks to invoke the Rice & Asplund principles, the focus of the parties and the court was whether or not there were changed circumstances of sufficient magnitude to warrant further parenting proceedings.
In that context, a significant factual dispute between the parties was whether or not an intermediary (Mr M) had been engaged by the mother to negotiate the resolution of the parenting proceedings in August 2020 when the final parenting orders were made. From the father’s perspective this evidence was central to his assertions as to changed circumstances. It was the father’s position that when the final orders were made and on the strength of Mr M’s representations he held a reasonable belief that his time spending with the children would resume, and the fact that it had not was asserted to be the changed circumstance. On the topic of Mr M, the reasons bear out:
(a)That neither of the parties chose to put any evidence before the court from Mr M to resolve the factual dispute between them about the alleged representations made by Mr M;[1]
(b)There was some significance to the father failing to put any evidence from Mr M before the court,[2] given the centrality of this evidence to the father’s assertions that there had been a significant change of circumstances; and
(c)The failure of the father to put evidence before the court from Mr M was not determinative of the application.[3]
[1] Mulligan & Stello [2022] FedFamC1F 1042 [51].
[2] Ibid [52] – [55].
[3] Ibid [56], [62].
In my reasons delivered on 21 December 2022, two specific factors resulted in my decision to refuse the re-opening of parenting proceedings in relation to the children. Those factors were:
(a)Firstly, my conclusion that there had not been a significant change of circumstances. This conclusion was informed by my view that the father could not have had any expectation when the final orders were made that time spending would resume after the orders were made. I was satisfied that this was the case because of the absolute nature of the final orders that were made, but also because the father is a sophisticated litigant who should have understood the terms of the final orders that had been made. In particular the father should have understood that the effect of the final orders was that the question of any time spending between the children and the father would be left entirely to the mother.[4]
(b)Secondly, my conclusion that, even if the court was satisfied that there had been a change of circumstances, it would not be in the children’s best interests for there to be further parenting proceedings.[5]
[4] Ibid [56], [59] – [66].
[5] Ibid [67] – [77].
THE BACKGROUND TO THE COSTS CLAIMS
As earlier identified, the mother has made two separate costs applications.
To understand each application more must be understood about the litigation and the parties.
As identified in my earlier reasons:
[The parents are highly educated. They both have a tertiary education. The mother holds a postgraduate degree. She is currently employed as a public servant. The father is currently a senior level public servant.].[6]
[6] Ibid [10].
The final order was made by consent between the parties in the Family Court of Western Australia, in circumstances where the parties and the children reside in that state.
By Initiating Application filed on 14 June 2022 the father commenced fresh parenting proceedings in the Family Court of Western Australia.
The mother filed her Response to that application on 25 July 2022. Of significance for present purposes, the mother sought orders in her Response as follows:
1.The Honourable Justice Moncrieff be recused from determining these proceedings.
2.The proceedings be heard and determined by a Family Court Judge who sits in a Registry other than the Family Court of Western Australia.
3.…
4.That after the determination of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Response, these proceedings be listed for determination of the Rice v Asplund [sic] threshold issue.
5.That the Applicant pay the Respondent’s costs.
The basis for the orders sought by the mother at paragraphs 1 and 2 of her Response principally related to the husband’s position and possible conflicts of interest.
The father opposed the mother’s application for the recusal of Justice Moncrieff from hearing the proceedings, together with the transfer of the proceedings outside of the Family Court of Western Australia.
On 7 September 2022, Justice Moncrieff favourably heard and determined paragraphs 1 and 2 of the mother’s Response. I do not have the benefit of the transcript from that hearing, nor any reasons, however the orders that His Honour made were as follows:
1.The proceedings be transferred to the Adelaide Registry of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) for the purpose of allocation to a Judge of that Court as soon as practicable.
2.Subject to any order to the contrary, the matter be listed to a directions hearing by the Judge as soon as practicable.
3.Subject to any further order by the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1), a copy of the subpoenaed documents be retained by the Family Court of Western Australia for the purpose of inspection.
Following the transfer of the proceedings to the Adelaide Registry of Division 1 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, the matter was ultimately listed for a substantive hearing on 1 December 2022 in relation to the Rice & Asplund aspect of the mother’s Response. By reasons delivered on 21 December 2022, the proceedings were dismissed and finalised, save as to the question of costs.
THE COSTS APPLICATIONS
In relation to both aspects of the mother’s Response filed on 25 July 2022, the mother asserts that she was wholly successful and the father was wholly unsuccessful. As a result, the mother now seeks costs in relation to both aspects of the proceedings.
In relation to the recusal/transfer aspect of the proceedings which was finalised by the transfer order made by Justice Moncrieff on 7 September 2022:
(a)On 30 September 2022 the mother filed an Application in a Proceeding in which she asks the court to make an order that the father pay her costs on an indemnity basis, together with her costs of the cost proceedings.
(b)The quantum of the mother’s costs claim on an indemnity basis totals $35,238.18 and includes solicitors’ fees of $30,107.54, counsel fees of $4,400 and other fees of $730.64.[7]
[7] See the affidavit of Ms Stello filed 24 January 2023 at paragraph 19.
In relation to the Rice & Asplund aspect of the proceedings, which was finalised by the orders made on 21 December 2022:
(a)On 19 January 2023 the mother filed an Application in a Proceeding in which she asks that the court make an order that the father pay her costs on an indemnity basis, or in the alternative on a party/party basis as fixed by the court.
(b)The quantum of the mother’s costs claim on an indemnity basis totals $22,038.50 and includes solicitors’ fees of $9,916.50, counsel fees of $10,945, legal fees and disbursements of $1,177.[8]
[8] Ibid.
With reference to those separate aspects of the proceedings, the total cost claim of the wife is in the sum of $57,276.68.[9]
[9] See the affidavit of Ms Stello filed 24 January 2023 at paragraph 20.
The mother additionally, through her counsel, made an oral application for the costs of attendances on each 11 May 2023, 23 May 2023 and the hearing on 23 June 2023 pursuant to the scale provided for in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (‘the Rules’) at the rate provided for junior counsel in the amount of $660 for each of the first two hearings and an amount of $1,300 for the hearing on 23 June 2023 (a total of $2,620 for the three hearings). In relation to the same, there was no hearing on 23 May 2023. Rather, the court assumes that this date was referenced in error, and that the hearing for which the costs application relates is that which was held on 28 March 2023.
Accordingly, the total costs claim now made by the mother is in the amount of $59,896.68.
The father opposes the costs applications that have been made. He asserts that the parties should each bear their own costs of these proceedings.
Additionally, the father asserts that this court should not entertain the mother’s costs application in relation to the recusal/transfer aspect of the matter, as those matters were heard and determined by the Family Court of Western Australia.
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Costs applications in respect of proceedings under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (‘the Act’) are governed by s 117 of the Act.
The factors that are to be considered when contemplating the making of a costs order are those set out in s 117(2A) of the Act; albeit the Court may give such weight as it considers appropriate to any relevant factor (Medlon & Medlon (No 6) (Indemnity Costs) [2015] FamCAFC 157 at [24]).
The Rules also provide assistance when considering the making of an order for costs. In particular, r 12.17(1) provides the method for the calculation of costs:
12.17 Method of calculation of costs
(1) The court may order that a party is entitled to costs:
(a) of a specific amount; or
(b)as assessed on a particular basis (for example, party and party, solicitor and client or indemnity); or
(c)to be calculated in accordance with the method stated in the order; or
(d)for part of the proceeding, or part of an amount, assessed in accordance with Schedule 3.
In addition, Rule 12.17(3) sets out the matters that may be considered in the calculation of costs:
(3)In making an order under subrule (1), the court may consider the following:
(a) the importance, complexity or difficulty of the issues;
(b)the reasonableness of each party’s behaviour in the proceeding including by having regard to the matters set out in subrule 12.08(2);
(c)the rates ordinarily payable to lawyers in comparable proceedings;
(d)whether a lawyer’s conduct has been improper, unfair, unreasonable or disproportionate;
(e)the time properly spent on the proceeding, or in complying with pre-action procedures;
(f)whether expenses (paid or payable) are fair, reasonable and proportionate.
DISCUSSION
Before turning to s 117(2A), consideration must be given to the father’s assertion that this court should not entertain any costs application in relation to the portion of the proceedings heard and determined in the Family Court of Western Australia.
This submission can be dealt with in relatively short compass, by identifying that the orders made by Justice Moncrieff on 7 September 2022 were ones that transferred the “proceedings” to the Adelaide Registry of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1).
The word “proceedings” is defined in section 4(1) of the Act as follows:
proceedings means a proceeding in a court, whether between parties or not, and includes cross-proceedings or an incidental proceeding in the course of or in connexion with a proceeding.
On any view, a costs application made in the proceedings is an application made incidental to and/or in connexion with the substantive relief sought by a party.
Accordingly, there is no substance to the assertion now made by the father that this court should not hear any application made in the proceedings; costs or otherwise.
The parties’ respective financial circumstances
The father remains a senior public servant and he asserts that his income is $265,170 per annum.[10]
[10] See the written submissions on behalf of Mr Mulligan filed on 27 March 2023 at paragraph 24.
The mother, however, became unemployed on or about early 2023. Prior to her unemployment the mother had been earning approximately $237,371 per annum. The mother is now reliant on modest rental income and share dividends.[11]
[11] See the affidavit of Ms Stello filed on 14 April 2023 at paragraphs 3 and 5.
Conduct of the parties in relation to the proceedings
The mother asserts that the father’s conduct in relation to the proceedings is one that warrants not only the making of a costs order, but it also grounds her application that the father meet her costs on an indemnity basis.
In relation to the recusal/transfer aspect of the proceedings, the mother asserts that the father’s conduct was particularly egregious given his position as a senior level public servant. To that end the mother points to:
(a)The sending of “Private and Confidential” correspondence by the father’s solicitors to the Family Court of Western Australia prior to the first listing of the matter, identifying that it was not appropriate that the file be allocated to a sitting judge in that registry. While the mother took no issue with the inappropriateness of any such judge hearing the proceedings, the mother was troubled by the fact that confidential communications had been sent to the court, to which she was not privy to nor aware of.
(b)The father (she says without proper basis) sought orders to dispense with the need to personally serve the mother with the proceedings, and instead obtained an order for service to be effected by email. This irregularity was further compounded as the mother asserts she was not aware of the proceedings until her solicitors were contacted by the court on the day prior to the first hearing in the matter.
(c)The father effecting and then relying on an invalid instrument to enable the proceedings to be heard in the Family Court of Western Australia.[12]
(d)The father [13] should have been aware and/or properly advised that his application to have the proceedings remain in the Family Court of Western Australia had no chance of success, and moreover that an application for costs would follow.
(e)The father failing to act prudently and withdraw his opposition to the recusal/transfer application of the mother after receiving the written submissions prepared by the mother’s counsel and filed 6 September 2022, which identified in “clear terms” the father’s inability to delegate his responsibilities.
[12] See the written submissions on behalf of Ms Stello filed on 6 September 2022.
[13] See the written submissions on behalf of Ms Stello filed on 10 May 2023 at paragraph 26.
In relation to the forceful submissions made on behalf of the mother criticising the father’s conduct, the father’s submissions appeared to be that because the mother’s recusal/transfer application was determined on the basis of a legal technicality (the invalid delegation instrument), in some way the mother’s application for a recusal/transfer of the proceedings was somehow diminished because the other concerns the mother had raised in support of her application had not been considered.
I do not have the benefit of the transcript from the hearing before Justice Moncrieff, nor any published reasons, and accordingly it is not clear to me the basis upon which the application was determined. I accept however that in principle the conduct complained of by the mother appears to be particularly egregious; whether limited to the invalid delegation instrument or more broadly. In particular I accept that the husband, properly advised, would have understood that his opposition to the application had no prospect of success.
In relation to the Rice & Asplund aspect of the proceedings, the mother again submits that the father’s conduct as a litigant warrants consideration. To that end, and of particular significance from my perspective, the mother identifies that:
(a)The father failed to engage with the mother and failed to respond to correspondence sent to the father prior to the making of the final order in which she raised her concerns and sought some reassurance the father was prepared to address those concerns (as discussed in the reasons at [18-19]).
(b)The final orders pleaded by the father were incompetent.
(c)The father did not once attended any hearing in the matter (remotely by Microsoft Teams), whereas the mother has attended each and every hearing. This is something that particularly troubles me, as no permission had been sought for the father to be excused from attending hearings.
(d)The father appears to have failed to consider the expert reports obtained by the mother, in circumstances where any prudent litigant would have read and understood that the views of the children conveyed in those reports would be fatal to his application to reopen the parenting proceedings.
In relation to these matters, while the father’s counsel gallantly put up some opposition to the submissions made on behalf of the mother, I do not accept those submissions. Importantly, I am satisfied and I agree with the concerns raised by the mother.
In light of all of these matters, I am satisfied that the father’s conduct in the proceedings is such that favours the making of a costs order.
I shall separately consider whether the conduct is such that it speaks in favour of an order for indemnity costs.
Whether any party has been wholly unsuccessful in the proceedings
As earlier identified, the father has been wholly unsuccessful in every aspect of the litigation. In the first instance he unsuccessfully opposed the recusal/transfer application, and otherwise he was wholly unsuccessful in establishing a basis to reopen parenting proceedings in relation to the parties’ two children.
This factor points in favour of a costs order being made.
Whether either party to the proceedings has made an offer in writing to the other party to the proceedings to settle the proceedings and the terms of any such offer
The court was not advised of any formal offers made to settle either the recusal/transfer aspect or the Rice & Asplund aspect of the proceedings.
However, as referred to later in these reasons, the court understands that the mother’s solicitors wrote to the father’s solicitors on 2 February 2023 setting out the costs claims and invited the father to make an offer to resolve the matter.
The court was not advised of the father making any offer to resolve the costs applications.
Conclusion as to whether a costs order should be made
For all of the reasons that I have identified, I am satisfied that the circumstances favour the making of a costs order in favour of the mother.
For all of the reasons that I have identified I consider it appropriate that there be an order for costs to cover all aspects of the proceedings, in particular:
(a)The recusal/transfer aspect of the proceedings;
(b)The Rice & Asplund aspect of the proceedings;
(c)The costs applications; and
(d)The 3 hearings in relation to the costs applications.
On what basis should the costs order be made?
As I have earlier identified the mother seeks that any costs order be made on an indemnity basis. In the alternative, the mother’s counsel submitted that if the court was not satisfied to make an order for indemnity costs, then the court should fix the costs to be paid. The father’s counsel agreed with this latter course.
It is well understood that an order for indemnity costs is a “very great departure” from the “normal standard”.[14]
[14] Kohan & Kohan [1992] FamCA 116.
I have had regard to those matters discussed in Colgate-Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 118 ALR 248, particularly at 262.
I have also had regard to the helpful summary of the circumstances that might justify an order for indemnity costs, enunciated by Holden CJ in Munday & Bowman (1997) 22 Fam LR 321 at 322:
(a)Where it appears that an action has been commenced or continued in circumstances where a party properly advised should have known that he had no chance of success. In such cases the action must be presumed to have been commenced or continued for some ulterior motive or because of some wilful disregard of the known facts: see Fountain Selected Meats (Sales) Pty Ltd v International Produce Merchants Pty Ltd (1988) 81 ALR 397.
(b)Making allegations of fraud, knowing them to be false, and the making of irrelevant allegations of fraud: see Fountain Selected Meats (Sales) Pty Ltd.
(c) Evidence of particular misconduct causing loss of time to the court and to other parties: see Tetijo Holdings Pty Ltd v Keeprite Australia Pty Ltd (French J, Fed C of A, 3 May 1991, unreported).
(d)The making of allegations which ought never to have been made or the undue prolongation of a case by groundless contentions: see Ragatta [sic] Developments Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (Davies J, Fed C of A, 5 March 1993, unreported).
(e)An imprudent refusal of an offer to compromise.
As I have already identified, there is significant merit to the mother’s complaints about the father’s conduct in relation to both aspects of the proceedings. I accept the submissions, made with some force, that the father, properly advised, should have known that he had no chance of success with respect to each application determined by the court.
In my view, this enlivens the possibility of an order for costs on an indemnity basis.
However in all of the circumstances of these proceedings, this is not the only factor to be brought to account.
I have had regard to the quantum of costs sought by the mother, and the basis for the calculation of those costs as set out in her affidavit material filed in support of each application. From those documents it is understood that the mother has entered into a costs agreement with her solicitors and counsel for the payment of fees that are above the scale of costs provided for in either the Family Court Rules 2021 (WA) and/or the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
In the joint court book prepared for the hearing of the costs applications, the mother included a copy of correspondence sent by her solicitors to the father’s solicitors on 2 February 2023. By that correspondence the mother’s solicitors identified the quantum of the mother’s costs claim in relation to each aspect of the proceedings as follows:
(a)In relation to the recusal/transfer aspect of the proceedings and pursuant to the Family Court Rules 2021 (WA) the mother identified an amount of $14,560.51 (comprised of counsel fees of $2,213.99, solicitors’ fees of $9,926.84 and disbursements of $2,419.68)
(b)In relation to the Rice & Asplund aspect of the proceedings and pursuant to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules2021 the mother identified an amount of $11,573.70 (comprised of counsel fees of $8,170.02 and solicitors’ fees of $3,403.68).
In addition, and by that same correspondence, the mother identified costs pursuant to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules2021 in relation to her costs application in the amount of $404.17.
From those calculations it is understood that the quantum of costs calculated pursuant to the relevant scale is an amount of $29,158.38 ($14,560.51 + $11,573.70 + $404.17 + $2,620 for counsel’s attendances at the three hearings).
The correspondence from the mother’s solicitors to the father’s solicitors of 2 February 2023, while not an offer by her, was sent in an attempt at the mother’s end to resolve her outstanding costs applications, as it concluded with the words “We invite your client to make an offer to our client for resolution of the outstanding costs applications, noting that our client is seeking indemnity costs (of not less than $57,276.68).” The court was not informed that the father responded with any offer to resolve the costs applications.
In any event and when regard is had to the claim for costs now made, it appears that the claim for indemnity costs for each aspect of the proceedings is roughly double the amount calculated pursuant to each relevant scale. I do not consider the same to be excessive.
However, as I commented in my reasons, the parties each “filed extensive documents in the proceedings, including but not limited to affidavits, subpoena and objections to subpoena.”[15] Ultimately however, the parties relied on limited material when the Rice & Asplund issue was determined.[16] From my perspective the fact that the mother did not rely upon a number of documents filed at her end, has some bearing on the question of whether an indemnity costs order should be made to cover all of the work that was undertaken on her behalf.
[15] Mulligan & Stello [2022] FedFamC1F 1042 [24].
[16] Ibid [26 – 27].
While it is difficult to be precise, in circumstances where the mother elected not to rely on a range of documents filed on her behalf, there must be some questions raised over the reasonableness of that work being undertaken at that point in time. Obviously, if the mother had been unsuccessful in the early finalisation of the proceedings, then it may be that the additional work was reasonably undertaken. However part of the reason for the application of the principles in Rice & Asplund is to avoid repetitive litigation with all its concomitant impacts, of which costs is but one.
It is this latter reason that weighs against the making of an order for indemnity costs in all of the circumstances of these proceedings.
In light of all the matters discussed herein, and taking a broad brush approach, I have determined that it is appropriate that the father pay costs fixed in the amount of $45,000.
For all of these reasons, I make the Orders that appear at the commencement of these reasons.
I certify that the preceding seventy-five (75) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Kari. Associate:
Dated: 11 August 2023
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