Mullen v Director of Public Prosecutions (SA)

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Magistrates Appeals: Criminal)

MULLEN v DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (SA)

[2020] SASC 10

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Lovell

31 January 2020

MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT

CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - JUDICIAL DISCRETION TO ADMIT OR EXCLUDE EVIDENCE

CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON - ASSAULT - CIRCUMSTANCES OF AGGRAVATION AND AGGRAVATED ASSAULTS

The appellant, a carer at a nursing home, was convicted of aggravated assault causing harm. The victim was a resident of the nursing home. The prosecution relied on two statements of another resident which implicated the appellant in the offence. The witness was unable to give evidence in court and the statements were admitted pursuant to s 34KA of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA). The appellant appeals his conviction on the basis that the Magistrate erred in admitting the statements and impermissibly used prior consistent statements to bolster her credibility and reliability. Further, he contends the Magistrate erred in admitting the opinion evidence of the victim’s general practitioner as to how the injuries were sustained and that the verdict is unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence.

Admissibility of statements when witness not able to be called - general unfairness discretion - bolster rule - forensic disadvantage caused by inability to cross-examine - process error - outcome error - opinion evidence - whether the verdict is unreasonable or unsupported having regard to the evidence

Held, dismissing the appeal:

1. The Magistrate did not err in admitting the statements.

2. The Magistrate did not improperly use the bolster rule to support the reliability of the statements.

3. The Magistrate did not err in admitting the opinion evidence of the general practitioner.

4. The verdict was not unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence.

Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 20(4), 269Y; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) ss 34KA, 34KB, 34KC, 34KD; Controlled Substances Act 1984 (SA) s 52A; Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) s 42, referred to.
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; R v Lutze (2014) 121 SASR 144; R v Haines [2016] SASC 96; R v Fagan & Anor [2012] EWCA Crim 2248; Al-Khawaja & Anor v United Kingdom (2012) 54 EHRR 23; R v Ibrahim [2012] EWCA Crim 837; R v Lobban (2000) 77 SASR 24; Police v Dunstall [2015] HCA 26; Rozenes v Beljajev [1995] 1 VR 533; R v Christie [1914] AC 45; Dietrich v R (1992) 177 CLR 292; R v Turner [1975] QB 834; Palmer v R (1998) 193 CLR 1; Rowland v Police (2001) 79 SASR 569; R v Taylor [2014] SASCFC 112; Barca v The Queen (1975) 133 CLR 82; The Queen v Baden-Clay [2016] HCA 35; Police v Rosales [2017] SASC 118; Le Cornu v Thomas (DEWNR) [2019] SASCFC 154, considered.

MULLEN v DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (SA)
[2020] SASC 10

Magistrates Appeal:  Criminal

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Details
Case
[2020] SASC 10
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Mullen v Director of Public Prosecutions (SA), the appellant, Mullen, a carer employed at the Lourdes Valley Nursing Home, was convicted in the Magistrates Court of South Australia for aggravated assault causing harm to Ms Elizabeth Hannaford, a resident of the nursing home who suffered from dementia. Mullen appealed against his conviction, asserting that the Magistrate had made several factual and legal errors during the trial. The appeal focused on the admissibility of certain evidence, particularly statements made by unavailable witnesses, and the fairness of the trial process.

The legal issues central to this appeal revolved around the application of Section 34KA of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), which pertains to the admissibility of out-of-court statements by unavailable witnesses. Specifically, the appeal questioned whether the Magistrate had correctly exercised his discretion under Section 34KD of the Act, which allows for the exclusion of such statements if their admission would cause unfairness to the accused. Mullen's counsel argued that the Magistrate failed to adequately weigh the disadvantages faced by Mullen in cross-examining the unavailable witnesses, particularly Ms Rogers, who was a fellow resident of the nursing home and had her own mental health issues.

The Supreme Court of South Australia examined the Magistrate's decision to admit the statements of Ms Rogers, despite Mullen's objections. The court assessed whether the Magistrate appropriately exercised his discretion to exclude these statements, considering the potential forensic disadvantage to Mullen and the reliability of the statements. The court found that the Magistrate had adequately considered the evidence and the potential unfairness to Mullen, and thus upheld the decision to admit the statements. The court also addressed other grounds of appeal, including whether the verdict was unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence, but found no merit in these arguments.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court of South Australia dismissed the appeal, affirming Mullen's conviction. The court held that the Magistrate's decision to admit the statements of Ms Rogers was justified under the Act, and that the verdict was supported by the evidence presented. Mullen's appeal was thus unsuccessful, and his conviction for aggravated assault causing harm stood.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant, a carer employed at the Lourdes Valley Nursing Home (‘the Home’) was charged with assaulting a resident of the Home, Ms Elizabeth Hannaford on 19 November 2015. Ms Hannaford suffered from dementia. The appellant pleaded not guilty to one count of Aggravated Assault Causing Harm to Ms Hannaford contrary to s 20(4) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA). After a trial in the Magistrates Court the appellant was convicted. He appeals the conviction contending that the Magistrate made a number of factual and legal errors.Background The general background facts were not in dispute. Ms Hannaford, the alleged victim, was admitted to the Home in February 2015 due to a decline in her ability to care for herself. At the time of her admission Ms Hannaford suffered from:·Alzheimer’s disease with symptoms such as confusion, anxiety and delirium;·depression;·eyesight difficulties; and·impaired cognitive functioning which functioning declined further prior to 19 November 2015. It was common ground that while at the Home, and prior to 19 November 2015, Ms Hannaford suffered a number of falls. Ms Sumalpong, a registered nurse who worked at the Home, gave evidence about falls Ms Hannaford suffered. The occurrence of each fall was noted and summarised in the records of the Home, in particular the Accident and Incident Reports.[1] The records demonstrated that Ms Hannaford would deliberately fall on some occasions. For example, she would slide from her chair to the ground and remain there. This was regarded as attention seeking behaviour. On occasions, she would deliberately roll out of bed. The staff regarded, and recorded, that this was “normal” behaviour for Ms Hannaford. However, not all the falls documented were necessarily deliberate acts by Ms Hannaford. It was recorded that Ms Hannaford did not suffer any injuries due to the falls.[1] Exhibit D1. Ms Hannaford’s depression affected her motivation to move around the Home and this contributed to her physical and mental deterioration while a resident. Ms Hannaford would sometimes vocalise with strange sounds which were incomprehensible. Sometimes her response to a question was incoherent. At the relevant time, Ms Hannaford shared room 124 with Ms Rogers in the Tollgate Ward of the Home. Ms Rogers suffered from a disease of the lungs and was continuously on oxygen. She also suffered from a bipolar disorder and anxiety. At that time, there were no concerns about her mental competency. The room Ms Hannaford and Ms Rogers shared contained their beds, separated by a set of drawers. A curtain could be pulled across between the beds if privacy was required. Both residents had access to their own “call button” which could be activated to alert staff to attend room 124. Ms Hannaford’s bed had been lowered and sensor mats placed on each side of her bed as she had been assessed as a “falls risk”. How the alarm system operated was an issue on appeal. A mattress was placed on one side of Ms Hannaford’s bed to prevent injury if she fell out.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Before turning to the particulars of Ground 1, it is necessary to consider s 34KA of the Act. Section 34KA of the Act is a fundamental alteration to the rules of evidence which has the potential to cause unfairness to an accused. It relevantly states:34KA—Admissibility of evidence of out of court statements by unavailable witnesses(1) Subject to this section, in prescribed proceedings, a statement not made in oral evidence in the proceedings (an out of court statement) is admissible as evidence of any matter stated if—(a) oral evidence given in the proceedings by the person who made the out of court statement would be admissible as evidence of that matter; and(b) the person who made the out of court statement (the relevant person) is identified to the court's satisfaction; and(c) any 1 of the conditions specified in subsection (2) is satisfied.(2) The conditions are as follows:(a) that the relevant person is dead;(b) that the relevant person is unfit to be a witness because of a bodily or mental condition;(c) that the relevant person is outside of the State and it is not reasonably practicable to secure his or her attendance;(d) that the relevant person cannot be found although such steps as it is reasonably practicable to take to find him or her have been taken;(e) that through fear the relevant person does not give (or does not continue to give) oral evidence in the proceedings, either at all or in connection with the subject matter of the out of court statement, and the court gives leave for the out of court statement to be given in evidence.(3) For the purposes of subsection (2)(e) fear is to be widely construed and includes, for example, fear of the death or injury of another person or of financial loss.(4) Leave may be given under subsection (2)(e) only if the court considers that the out of court statement ought to be admitted in the interests of justice, having regard to—(a) any information (whether or not given in evidence, or of a kind that could be given in evidence) suggesting threats have been made to the witness, whether directly or indirectly; and(b) the statement's contents; and(c) any risk that its admission or exclusion will result in unfairness to a defendant in the proceedings (and in particular to how difficult it will be to challenge the statement if the relevant person does not give oral evidence and the defendant is not able to cross‑examine the person); and(d) any other measures that could be taken by the court in relation to the relevant person; and(e) any other relevant circumstances.(5) A condition set out in any paragraph of subsection (2) which is in fact satisfied is to be treated as not satisfied if it is shown that the circumstances described in that paragraph are caused—(a) by the person in support of whose case it is sought to give the out of court statement in evidence; or(b) by a person acting on his or her behalf, in order to prevent the relevant person giving oral evidence in the proceedings (whether at all or in connection with the subject matter of the out of court statement).(6) Nothing in this section makes an out of court statement admissible as evidence if it was made by a person who was not competent at the time when he or she made the statement.(7) This section is in addition to, and does not derogate from, any other power of a court to admit an out of court statement into evidence.(8) In this section—prescribed proceedings means—(a) proceedings for a criminal offence; or(b) proceedings under the Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008.

Decision

Reasons for decision

LOVELL J
The appellant also contends that the Magistrate’s verdict was unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence (Ground 4). The Magistrate’s judgment At the beginning of the trial, the appellant objected to a statement of Ms Hannaford and two statements of Ms Rogers being tendered by the prosecution pursuant to s 34KA of the Act. It was conceded at trial, and on appeal, that neither witness could give oral evidence and therefore the statements were potentially admissible. Mr Barklay SC, for the appellant, submitted that the Magistrate, exercising the “general unfairness discretion” preserved pursuant to s 34KD of the Act, should exclude the statements. He was successful in relation to the statement of Ms Hannaford. The Magistrate refused to exercise his discretion to exclude the two statements of Ms Rogers. On appeal, the appellant challenged that ruling and submitted that the Magistrate erred in not excluding from evidence the two statements of Ms Rogers. The Magistrate, appropriately, heard all the evidence led by the prosecution before considering the issue as to whether the two statements should be excluded in the exercise of his discretion. Although he delivered separate reasons for his ruling on the application to exclude the statements, it is clear that his reasons need to be read in conjunction with his reasons for his verdict.Ground 1The admission of Ms Rogers’ statements Mr Barklay SC submitted that the Magistrate erred in admitting the statements of Ms Rogers. His fundamental submission was that the Magistrate ought to have excluded the statements in the exercise of the “general unfairness discretion”. In particular, he submitted that the Magistrate:(a)failed to give sufficient weight to the forensic disadvantage suffered by the appellant because of his inability to cross-examine Ms Rogers;(b)placed too much emphasis on the evidence said to have “corroborated” Ms Rogers’ account;(c)misapplied the evidence as to how the alarm system worked and applied the evidence unfairly against the appellant;(d)placed too much reliance on the medical evidence and, in particular, the evidence of Dr Kilmartin as to the cause of the injuries to Ms Hannaford;(e)used prior consistent statements to conclude the statements were more reliable and therefore offending the “bolster rule”;(f)gave insufficient weight to the fact that Ms Hannaford was a high falls risk, making her injuries from a fall more likely;(g)gave insufficient weight to lies told by Ms Rogers and the forensic disadvantage to the appellant in not being able to pursue that topic;(h)gave insufficient weight to Sergeant Cooper’s evidence generally and to her opinion that, having proofed Ms Rogers, she was an unreliable witness; and(i)placed too little weight on the significant forensic disadvantage to the appellant in admitting the statements. Some of the matters raised by Mr Barklay SC on this ground overlap with other grounds of appeal. In particular, a number of the matters raised are also relevant to Ground 4, namely, whether the verdict was unsafe and unsatisfactory.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: LOVELL J