Mule v The State of Western Australia - [2017] WASC 143

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CRIMINAL

CITATION : MULE -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

[2017] WASC 143

CORAM : FIANNACA J

HEARD : 2 & 17 MAY 2016, 25 MAY 2017

DELIVERED : 25 MAY 2017

FILE NO/S : MBA 11 of 2017

BETWEEN : PELLEGRINO PAUL MULE

Applicant AND
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

Catchwords:

Criminal law - Bail application - Exceptional reason - Delay to trial - Arguable injustice

Legislation:

Bail Act 1982 (WA), s 13, s 14(2), sch 2, cl 3A pt C sch 1

Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA), s 6(1)(a), s 6(2), s 7B(6)

Result:

Bail granted on strict conditions, including home detention

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant : Mr T Percy QC & Mr S Nigam Respondent : Mr D T Carlson & Mr J Newton-Palmer

Solicitors:

Applicant : Nigams Legal Barristers & Solicitors
Respondent : Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Cases referred to in judgment:

Firkins v The Director of Public Prosecutions [2002] WASC 203; (2002) 132 A

Crim R 321

Milenkovski v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 99; (2011) 42

WAR 99
Oatesv The Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions [2003] WASCA 329

Outman v The Queen [2001] WASC 162

Saka v The State of Western Australia [2001] WASC 92 The State of Western Australia v Oates [2004] WASC 214

FIANNACA J:

The application

The applicant has applied for bail in respect of 21 charges pending in the Joondalup Magistrates Court, being JO 4600/17 ‑ JO 4620/17. The offences are alleged to have been committed by the applicant on 12 April 2017 at his home in Landsdale. They arise from a police search of his home on that date and relate to his alleged possession of firearms, ammunition and related items and his alleged possession of drugs.

The charges

The charges consist of (showing the maximum penalty in each case):
(1)Two counts of possession of bulletproof clothing: s 557I(2) Criminal Code (WA) (Criminal Code) ‑ $6,000;
(2)Five counts of unlicensed possession of a firearm in circumstances of aggravation, in that in each case the number or identification mark on the firearm was defaced, in two instances the firearm had been altered from the design or characteristics of its original design by the barrel being shortened, and in one instance the firearm was a handgun: s 19(1)(c) Firearms Act 1973 (WA) (Firearms Act) ‑ 7 years' imprisonment (s 19(1ac));
(3)One count of unlicensed possession of more than three firearms: the prosecution notice specifies this as being an offence under s 19(1)(b) Firearms Act, but that is incorrect, and this charge appears to be misconceived for reasons set out below;
(4)Four counts of unlicensed possession of a firearm: s 19(1)(c) Firearms Act ‑ 5 years' imprisonment (s 19(1ad));
(5)Three counts of unlicensed possession of ammunition: s 19(1)(c) Firearms Act ‑ 5 years' imprisonment (s 19(1ad));
(6)One count of possession of a contrivance known as a silencer: s 23(7) Firearms Act ‑ 3 years or a fine of $12,000;
(7)Three counts of possession of a prohibited weapon, being two knives disguised as a belt buckle and a credit card respectively, and an electric shock weapon disguised as a mobile telephone: s 6(1)(b) Weapons Act 1999 (WA) (Weapons Act) ‑ 3 years' imprisonment and a fine of $36,000;
(8)One count of possession of a prohibited drug namely cannabis: s 6(2) Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA) (MDA) ‑ 2 years' imprisonment or $2,000 or both (s 34(1)(e) MDA); and
(9)One count of possession of drug paraphernalia in or on which there was a prohibited drug or plant: s 7B(6) MDA ‑ 3 years' imprisonment or a fine of $36,000 or both.
The offences under the Weapons Act and the MDA are simple offences and will be dealt with summarily. All of the offences under the Firearms Act are crimes, and therefore indictable offences, except the offences of possessing bulletproof clothing and possessing a contrivance known as a silencer. In respect of the five counts of aggravated unlicensed possession of a firearm, there is a summary conviction penalty provided by s 19(1ac) of the Firearms Act of 3 years' imprisonment or a fine of $12,000. The same applies to the charges of unlicensed possession of firearms and unlicensed possession of ammunition: s 19(1ad). Accordingly, all of those charges are 'either way' offences that could be dealt with summarily. However, there is a complication that the prosecution will need to address.
Charge JO 4603/17 purports to be for an offence of unlicensed possession of more than three firearms. This is misconceived. There is no specific offence to that effect. Section 19(1ab)(b) provides a maximum penalty of 10 years' imprisonment when an offence under s 19(1) is committed in circumstances in which the accused was in possession of three or more firearms without a licence or a permit. In those circumstances there is no summary conviction penalty provided, so the charge must be dealt with on indictment. However, the charge should be under s 19(1). Subsection (1ab) is a penalty provision. It does not establish a separate offence. The circumstance of being in possession of three or more firearms without a licence or a permit is a circumstance of aggravation separate (and with consequences that are different) from the circumstances of aggravation in s (1ac). In this case, the allegation is that all nine firearms that were found at the applicant's premises were in his possession. Therefore, the circumstance of being in possession of three or more firearms without a licence or a permit would apply in respect of each of the alleged offences of unlicensed possession of a firearm, and indeed in respect of the alleged offences of unlicensed possession of ammunition. If those offences were charged accordingly, each would carry a maximum penalty of 10 years' imprisonment and they could only be dealt with on indictment. Those matters would be relevant to the determination of the bail application.
When these matters were brought to the attention of the parties, counsel for the State sought to discontinue JO 4603/17 and to amend the nine charges under s 19(1) of the Firearms Act. I am not persuaded that I have jurisdiction on a bail application to dismiss a charge that has not been committed from the summary jurisdiction, or to amend charges in prosecution notices in those circumstances.[1] The discontinuance and the application to amend the charges should be dealt with in the Magistrates Court when the applicant is next required to appear there. At this stage, to avoid delay in these proceedings, I will deal with the application on the basis that the charges of aggravated unlicensed possession of firearms are confined to the circumstances of aggravation under s 19(1ac) of the Firearms Act, and that charge JO 4603/17 alleges an offence under s 19 of the Firearms Act that purports to rely on the circumstance of aggravation under s 19(1ab). As the applicant is charged with a number of offences of a similar kind, I do not consider that the problem I have identified with JO 4603/17 will result in any prejudice to him.

The application for bail
[1] See Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) ss 25 and 132.

The applicant was charged with the offences in the prosecution notices on the day of the search, 12 April 2017. At his first appearance in the Magistrates Court the following day, he applied for bail. The application was opposed. The magistrate refused bail. His Honour was of the view that a grant of bail was not appropriate because of the seriousness of the alleged offences, which his Honour considered would attract 'very significant terms of imprisonment' if the applicant were convicted, and the strength of the prosecution case. His Honour further considered that 'interference with the prosecution case' was also a concern.[2]
[2] ts 16.
The present application was brought under s 14(2) of the Bail Act 1982 (WA) (Bail Act). It invokes this court's jurisdiction under s 14(1), by which the court may exercise afresh the power to grant bail conferred on the magistrate by s 13 and sch 1 pt A of the Bail Act. It is not an appeal.
The application was heard on 2 and 17 May 2017. The State opposed the application. As the application had been brought on at short notice, it was adjourned on the first day to enable the State to file materials in response to materials that had been filed on behalf of the applicant and in support of its submissions.
The State's argument is that:
(i)the case against the applicant is strong;
(ii)the offences are very serious, in that the applicant is alleged to have been using his home as an armoury and the nature and number of weapons and ammunition are consistent with an intention to use the weapons for unlawful and harmful purposes; and
(iii)there is a substantial risk the applicant will commit an offence if released on bail.
The State did not submit that the applicant is a flight risk.
The applicant's argument is that, while it may be accepted that the alleged offences are serious, the circumstances do not come within any of the statutory provisions which require an applicant for bail to show exceptional reasons why bail should be granted. He argues that the seriousness of the offending should not be regarded as sufficient to deny the applicant bail, if there is no evidence that the applicant is a flight risk, and if other concerns, such as the possibility that the applicant may commit an offence, can be sufficiently overcome by conditions imposed on bail, including a condition that he be subject to home detention. He submits that, even if the court considers the case against the applicant to be strong, he should be accorded the full benefit of the presumption of innocence.
The applicant submits that if the charges are prosecuted on indictment (which will now be inevitable), the delay before he could be tried in the District Court will be significant, and there is a possibility that he will have been in custody for a longer period than the custodial part of any sentence that may be imposed on him for the offences with which he is charged, if he were to be convicted, so that the refusal of bail will result in an injustice if he is ultimately acquitted. Further, the applicant submits that there is humanitarian ground which favours the grant of bail, in that the applicant's partner is pregnant and due to give birth in July and the applicant is expected to provide emotional and practical support after the baby is born.

Evidence at the hearing

The evidence at the hearing of the bail application consisted of a number of affidavits filed on behalf of the applicant and an affidavit affirmed by the prosecutor, Mr Newton-Palmer, who appeared for the respondent at the hearing.
The affidavits filed on behalf of the applicant were from:
(1)Mr Nigam, the solicitor having the conduct of the matter on behalf of the applicant;
(2)Ms Perling, a solicitor assisting in the conduct of the matter on behalf of the applicant;
(3)Lucy Chanel Veccia, who is Mr Mules de facto partner; and
(4)Steven Mule, who is Mr Mule's son.
The affidavits from Mr Nigam and Ms Perling provide information about the charges that have been brought against the applicant. The information includes an outline of the proceedings in respect of the charges in the Magistrates Court and the reasons given for the refusal of bail. Ms Perling's affidavit annexes a statement of material facts in respect of the charges.
Ms Perling's affidavit also sets out the applicant's instructions in respect of his personal circumstances and his proposed defence in relation to the charges.
Ms Veccia and Mr Steven Mule attest to facts that may be relevant to a consideration of the applicant's proposed defence in respect of the charges.
Mr Newton-Palmer's affidavit annexed materials on which the State relies. They include the exhibits log from the search, documents establishing the applicant's ownership of the property that was searched and the fact that he was the person who was granted the building licence for an extension to the house, which included one of the areas where firearms were found concealed, and photographs from the search. The State has also tendered ‑
(1)an evidential statement dated 15 May 2017 from the officer in charge of executing the search warrant on the applicant's premises, Detective Senior Constable Richardson (now Acting Detective Sergeant);
(2)photographs taken during the search; and
(3)three discs of the video recording of the search and discovery of the items the subject of the charges.
I have watched the video recording.
At the hearing on 17 May 2017, one of the matters that arose which may be relevant to the court's consideration was the applicant's membership of the Coffin Cheaters Outlaw Motorcycle Club. He instructed his legal representatives that he was previously a member, but has ceased to be a member. The State informed the court that the police investigating this matter contend the applicant remains a member of that club. The parties were given leave to file further evidence.
The State then filed an affidavit sworn 18 May 2017 by Acting Detective Sergeant Richardson concerning the applicant's membership of the club. Annexed to the affidavit were a copy of a document purporting to be the constitution of the club, a statement from Detective Sergeant Knight from the National Anti-Gangs Squad concerning the operations of outlaw motorcycle clubs, in particular the Coffin Cheaters, and photographs of the applicant showing his tattoos related to his membership of the Coffin Cheaters.
In response, an affidavit was filed on behalf of the applicant, sworn by Ms Perling on 23 May 2017, setting out the applicant's instructions in response to the matters raised by the police about his membership of the Coffin Cheaters and related issues.
I have also received, pursuant to a request made by me under s 24A(2) of the Bail Act on 2 May 2017, a bail assessment report, dated 12 May 2017, by an Acting Senior Community Corrections Officer (ASCCO) with the Department of Corrective Services about the suitability of the applicant to be subject to a home detention condition.

Legal principles

In this State, the subject of bail is governed by the provisions of the Bail Act, which is intended to be a comprehensive code on the subject.[3] Any common law or inherent power to grant bail has been abolished.[4]
[3] Milenkovski v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 99; (2011) 42 WAR 99, 108 [31].
[4] Milenkovski v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 99; (2011) 42 WAR 99, 108 [32].
The exercise of my discretion to grant bail in the present case is governed by cl 1 of pt C of sch 1 of the Act.

Clauses 1 and 3 of sch 1 pt C of the Bail Act

Clause 1 provides that the grant or refusal of bail to the applicant is in the judicial officer's discretion. It requires that the discretion be exercised having regard to questions posed by pars (a) to (g) of that clause, as well as to any others which the judicial officer considers to be relevant.
For the purposes of this application, the following paragraphs are potentially relevant:
(a)whether, if the accused is not kept in custody, he may ‑
(i)fail to appear in court in accordance with his bail undertaking; or
(ii)commit an offence; or
(iii)endanger the safety, welfare, or property of any person;
…
(c)whether the prosecutor has put forward grounds for opposing the grant of bail;
…
(e)whether there is any condition which could reasonably be imposed under Part D which would:
(i)sufficiently remove the possibility referred to in paragraphs (a) and (d); or
(ii)remove the grounds for opposition referred to in paragraph (c).
The matters specified in those paragraphs are non‑exclusive, mandatory, relevant considerations.[5]
[5] Milenkovski v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 99; (2011) 42 WAR 99, 108 [24].
The proper construction of cl 1 and the manner in which the discretion is to be exercised was elucidated by McLure P in Milenkovski, as follows:[6]
… First, the matters in pars (a) - (g) are characterised as 'questions' rather than the more common 'matters' or 'considerations'. The answers to the mandatory and other relevant questions (or findings as the case may be) provide the factual basis for the exercise of the discretion. The court is required to consider and answer the mandatory questions before commencing the weighing or balancing process inherent in the exercise of a discretionary power.
Secondly, with the exception of par (e), all of the mandatory questions are directed to whether there are positive grounds for refusing bail. The matters in (e) go to the question of whether it is possible to neutralise, wholly or sufficiently, the positive grounds for refusing bail. The court is not required to consider questions directed to whether there are positive grounds for granting bail. The focus of the questions, which direct attention to whether there are proper grounds to refuse bail, is the means by which the legislature has chosen to acknowledge the presumption that an accused person is innocent until proven guilty.
[6] Milenkovski v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 99; (2011) 42 WAR 99, 108 [39] - [41].
As I noted earlier, the questions in cl 1(a)(i), (ii) and (iii) are potentially relevant in this case. Clause 3 of sch 1 pt C provides that, in considering whether the accused may do any of the things set out in cl 1(a), the judicial officer shall have regard to the following matters, as well as any other matters that the judicial officer considers relevant:
(a)the nature and seriousness of the offence or offences (including any other offence or offences for which he is awaiting trial) and the probable method of dealing with the accused for it or them if he is convicted; and
(b)the character, previous convictions, antecedents, associations, home environment, background, place of residence, financial position of the accused; and
(c)the history of any previous grants of bails to him; and
(d)the strength of the evidence against him.
Those matters are non‑exclusive, mandatory considerations.[7]
[7] Milenkovski v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 99; (2011) 42 WAR 99, 108 [25].
While the questions in cl 1 are framed in terms of whether there are grounds why bail should not be granted, so that a negative answer would necessarily result in the grant of bail, when the court has considered the matters in cl 3 and answered the questions in cl 1 and there are competing considerations, there is no presumption either for or against bail when exercising the discretion.[8]
[8] Milenkovski v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 99; (2011) 42 WAR 99, 108 [39].
It is convenient to commence a consideration of the merits of the application with the matters specified in cl 3, which inform the answers to the questions in cl 1(a).

Clause 3(a) ‑ The nature and seriousness of the offences and probable method of dealing with the accused if convicted

The alleged facts

The facts alleged in respect of the offences are set out in the statements of material facts prepared by the police. I also have regard to the statement of Acting Detective Sergeant Richardson, and the photographs and video recording of the search.
The applicant has not disputed that the relevant items were found as alleged by the police. He disputes, through his legal representatives, that he was in possession of the firearms and ammunition or the other items that were found.
The evidence discloses that that police conducted a search at the applicant's home in Landsdale on the morning of 12 April 2017. The premises were well‑secured, with motorised steel double gates at the entry to the driveway and a further gate (referred to by the police as a 'personnel gate') with an electronic intercom between the driveway and the courtyard leading to the front door. That gate was in the form of full height double wooden doors fixed on a steel frame within a brick fence which was topped with steel decorative spikes. The gate was secured by metal deadbolts with a five lever lock. Two signs on the gate warned of guard dogs and the presence of CCTV cameras. Multiple closed circuit cameras had the front and rear of the premises under surveillance.

Acting Detective Sergeant Richardson determined that the safest and most practical way to gain access to the premises was to cordon the premises off and call the occupants outside. This was because he considered the premises to be so heavily fortified with extensive security defences and reinforced entry points that it would be impractical to attempt a forced entry without causing extensive damage.
Having gained entry by calling the occupants outside, the police conducted a search of the premises. On the premises were the applicant, his partner (Ms Veccia) and their 6‑year‑old daughter. The child was removed from the premises by Ms Veccia's mother who was called to the house for that purpose. The applicant was placed under arrest.
During the search, police discovered that there was a removable wooden wall panel in the bar area on the first floor of the house. The panel was secured with Velcro tabs and concealed a hidden compartment between the cladding and a wall. Secreted inside the hidden compartment were:
1.two ballistic vests;
2.182 rounds of .45 calibre ammunition in a case and a box;
3.a double barrelled 12 gauge shot gun with sawn‑off barrel, modified stock and defaced serial numbers;
4.an unlicensed .22 calibre air rifle;
5.a Bentley 12 gauge pump action shotgun with sawn‑off barrel and defaced serial numbers;
6.a Colt .45 calibre semi-automatic handgun with defaced serial numbers;
7.a Colt .45 ammunition magazine;
8.a shoulder holster to carry a concealed handgun;
9.a handgun laser sight;
10.a military rifle sight;
11.a tin containing dozens of .177 calibre air rifle pellets and other air rifle ammunition;
12.five .22 calibre rim‑fire rifle rounds; and
13.five 12 gauge shotgun cartridges.
It will be seen that four firearms were recovered from that concealed compartment, being two shot guns, an air rifle and a handgun, together with ammunition and other accoutrements for the firearms.
When the police searched the rear games room, they found a homemade smoking implement with detectable traces of cannabis and a tin containing 3 g of cannabis plant material.
When they searched the master bedroom they found a hidden compartment behind a drawer in the walk-in wardrobe in which they located an electric shock weapon disguised as a mobile telephone. A knife disguised as credit card was found in a box on top of the bedside cabinet. A knife disguised as a belt buckle was located on a shelf opposite the bed.
On searching the gym area, police found, hidden behind two large mirrors, two purpose built hidden compartments consisting of voids within the walls. One void was surrounded by a wooden frame built into the brickwork with a hinged wooden door, behind which was an aluminium box fixed to the internal stud work. Two sides of the box had been removed and the stud work had been modified to increase the size of the void and allow access to the wall cavity beyond. The mirrors covering the compartments were secured to the wall by screws in the frames. They were removed by using a small 'rattle gun' with a socket, which was found in an adjacent tool storage room. The socket matched the size of the screws and the police were able to unscrew the mirror frames from the wall. From within the compartment with the aluminium box, the police recovered:
1.a Boito 410 double‑barrelled shotgun which was dismantled into its separate parts. The serial number was drilled out from the stock. The barrel contained a spent cartridge;
2.a .762 calibre semi‑automatic rifle;
3.a 12 gauge over-under shotgun;
4.a 12 gauge single barrel shotgun with defaced serial number;
5.an Enfield .303 calibre bolt repeater rifle.
So, five firearms were found in that compartment.
The other concealed compartment contained a safe mounted in the brickwork. It had a digital lock. Within the safe, which was not locked, police found a set of vehicle keys, a vehicle tracker, some money and a Coffin Cheaters enamel badge. I note that when the applicant's bedroom was searched a vest with a Coffin Cheaters patch was located slung over the back of a chair. Also photographs of the applicant, taken at the time of his arrest, show that he has a number of prominent tattoos indicating his affiliation with that club. In these proceedings, an admission was made on his behalf that he has been a member of that club, although his instructions are that he has retired from the club. I will return to that issue later.
On searching the kitchen, police found a hidden compartment behind a drawer under the oven. Inside were 28 12 gauge shotgun cartridges.
On searching the garage, they found a silencer with baffles in a toolbox.

The seriousness of the offences

It is apt to describe the collection of firearms, ammunition and accessories found concealed in the applicant's premises as an armoury, as the magistrate did. The weapons included high powered firearms, a number of them modified in ways in which they could not be licensed in any event. The number and nature of the firearms and ammunition, and the manner in which they were concealed is consistent only with an intended unlawful use. Senior counsel for the applicant conceded that it would not be reasonable to infer they were being kept as collector's items or intended for any legitimate purpose. The issue is whether they were in the applicant's possession.
The affidavit of Acting Detective Sergeant Richardson refers to intelligence suggesting that there was an impending club war between the Coffin Cheaters and another outlaw motorcycle club, and that this was the reason weapons were being stored at the applicant's premises. The applicant objects to that evidence as inadmissible hearsay, the source of which is unidentified and the reliability of which therefore cannot be assessed. Section 22 of the Bail Act permits a judicial officer considering a case for bail to take into account such information as he or she thinks fit, whether or not the same would be admissible in a court of law. Given the nature of the alleged offences, and the fact the intelligence appears to have provided some impetus for the search warrant in this case, it might be thought that some weight could properly be given to the information in the affidavit, at least to the extent that it raises a potential concern about the manner in which the weapons could have been used.
I have come to the view that it is not necessary to rule on the objection because of the concession made on behalf of the applicant that there could have been no lawful purpose for accumulating the firearms and ammunition. Putting to one side the information in Acting Detective Sergeant Richardson's affidavit, the inference is open that the arsenal was intended for violent conflict or at the very least for unlawful activity involving the threat of violence. The fact that bullet proof vests were found with the weapons tends to support that conclusion. There was potential for significant harm to be caused within the community.
If the applicant is found guilty of being in possession of the firearms and ammunition, whether as owner or custodian of them for others, the offending would properly be regarded as being a very serious case of its kind, because of the risk to the safety of others and to the community more generally.

The likely penalty

If the applicant were convicted of the offences, the penalty is likely to be a substantial period of imprisonment. If convicted of all the offences of possessing the firearms, it would involve a finding that he was in possession of three times the number of firearms that gives rise to the maximum penalty of 10 years under s 19(1ab). A sentence towards the upper end of the scale of seriousness could be expected.

Clause 3(d) ‑ The strength of the case against the applicant

A bail application is not an occasion for the court to make findings of credibility of witnesses who may give evidence at trial or to determine factual disputes that are to be litigated at trial and which may go fundamentally to the issue of whether the applicant is guilty of the offences charged. However, the strength of the prosecution case is a relevant factor under cl 3 and the court is required to make an assessment, if that is possible on the available information. It may readily be seen that it can affect the assessment of whether an accused is likely to answer his bail, there potentially being a disincentive if the case against him is strong, but it may also go to the question of whether the accused may commit an offence if not kept in custody. In this case, consideration of the strength of the case against the applicant does not depend at this stage on any assessment of credibility, as the search was captured on video, and the case is circumstantial.
The case against the applicant includes:
1.the recording of the search;
2.the evidence of the fortification of his home and the security measures he had taken;
3.the evidence of records from the relevant city council which show that he was responsible for the building of extensions to his home, including the theatre/bar area where one of the concealed areas was found;
4.evidence that he is a builder and has a building business, so he would have the means to build the concealed voids in which the firearms were found;
5.evidence of the manner in which the mirrors were affixed to the wall, suggestive of an attempt to make it difficult to remove them, and therefore an attempt to avoid detection of what was behind them, which would have been obvious to the applicant, a builder;
6.evidence that he is the registered proprietor of the property and has dominion over it;
7.evidence that the safe behind one of the mirrors in the bar area contained a Coffin Cheaters badge;
8.evidence of the applicant's affiliation with the Coffin Cheaters outlaw motorcycle club;
9.evidence that shotgun cartridges were also found in a section at the back of a kitchen drawer, which tends to strengthen the applicant's connection to the other concealed ammunition and the firearms; and
10.evidence that there was a safe behind a mirror that was held to the wall by temporary fasteners in the bathroom adjoining the applicant's bedroom, showing a similar approach to the concealed compartments in the other areas. Information put before the court on behalf of the applicant suggests that only he and Ms Veccia had access to the bedroom, which was secured by a pin lock on the door.
The State also intends to apply to the trial court in due course to adduce propensity evidence pursuant to s 31A of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA). I consider that it is appropriate for me to have regard to that proposed evidence, as it is potentially further evidence that would strengthen the case against the applicant, although its admissibility will be for another court to determine. The evidence concerns offences of which the applicant was convicted after trial in 2003. He was found guilty of possession of the drug MDMA with intent to sell or supply. The drug had been found by police in a wall safe hidden behind a false wall behind the cabinet in the ensuite bathroom in the applicant's home (which was a different place to his current home). Also in the safe was a large sum of money, a loaded .22 pistol and a stun gun. If that evidence were admitted, it would establish the applicant's propensity to use such concealed spaces to store items such as a firearm, albeit some 14 years or more earlier. It would tend to render unreasonable any hypothesis that items were stored in concealed compartments in his home without his knowledge.
The latter is essentially the applicant's defence, as outlined in instructions to his lawyer and adduced in her affidavit. I am not prepared to place any weight on the applicant's account adduced in that way, as hearsay. I indicated during the hearing that I did not consider evidence put in that form should be given any weight. The applicant is entitled to exercise his right to silence and is specifically not obliged to supply information on a bail hearing.[9] However, this is his application, and if he wishes to provide an account about any matter relevant to the proceedings with the view that the court should rely on it, he should do so on affidavit sworn or affirmed by him. Any information put before the court in that way cannot be used against him at trial.[10]
[9] Bail Act 1982 (WA) s 23.
[10] Bail Act 1982 (WA) s 25.
The affidavits of Ms Veccia and Steven Mule contain some direct evidence about people who visited or used the applicant's home from time to time and some hearsay or speculation about such matters. In general terms they tend to support the instructions given by the applicant to Ms Perling. Putting aside the hearsay and speculation, what remains is a picture of the applicant's sons living at the house and using it with friends, including when the applicant and Ms Veccia were overseas. However, there is no suggestion in either affidavit that any of the persons who may have come to the house brought any weapons, did any construction work, removed any mirrors or secreted large objects in the voids in the walls. In some respects, the picture painted on behalf of the applicant would suggest he had almost no control over his own home. That appears to be inconsistent with the objective evidence.
In order for the applicant to be found guilty of the offences, it would be sufficient for the prosecution to prove that he was exercising dominion over the firearms, ammunition and accessories (including the bulletproof jackets) as owner and occupier of the premises. It would not be necessary to prove he had exclusive ownership or possession. It may be that a tribunal of fact would consider it unlikely that he acted alone, but that would not detract from the conclusion that he had possession of the cache.
At face value, the implication that someone else may have constructed the concealed compartments lacks plausibility. So does the implication that others brought a very large number of firearms and ammunition to the applicant's home and concealed them in his walls without his knowledge. Of course, those matters will need to be determined ultimately by the tribunal of fact in any trial, but for present purposes I do not consider that the material put forward on behalf of the applicant detracts from the strength of the prosecution case.
Counsel for the State informed the court that the items that were seized from the applicant's home are being or will be forensically tested for fingerprints and trace evidence. There is no forensic evidence available at this time.
On the available information, I consider that the prosecution case against the applicant is relatively strong.

Clause 3(b) ‑ The character, antecedents, associations, etc of the accused

I am prepared to accept the information that has been put before the court by the applicant's lawyer about his personal circumstances, except in relation to his business, for reasons I will explain.
The applicant is 54 years old. He was born in Victoria and lived there until he was 16. He has one brother and one sister. He completed Year 10 of school and then worked as a bricklayer for his uncle in Melbourne. When he was 16, he moved with his family to Italy, where he completed a bricklaying apprenticeship. He returned to Australia and moved to Perth when he was 18. His chosen field of work has been in the building industry.
When he was 33, he started his own bricklaying business. He says that business is called 'Palm Home Builders'. He continues to operate that business. There is inconsistency in the evidence as to whether the business is run by a registered company or by the applicant as an individual. He claims to have between two and six subcontractors working for him ordinarily, depending upon the size of the project he is engaged in. No supporting material has been tendered in that regard.
The applicant's mother, brother and sister all live in Melbourne. His father has passed away.
The applicant has one child from his first marriage. He has a close relationship with him. He has six children from his second marriage. He says he has a good relationship with all six of those children. He has another daughter who was born in 2006. He has three grandchildren from the children of his second marriage.
The applicant has indicated that his sons from his second marriage visit him often at his residence. In fact, he has suggested that his sons Mark, Harley and Steven effectively had the run of his house at times, and they would have friends over. That suggestion was made in the context of the applicant implying that other people, perhaps associated with his sons, were responsible for secreting firearms and ammunition in his home. Should the applicant be released on bail, it would not be appropriate for his sons or their friends to live at or visit the applicant's home.
The applicant purchased the Landsdale property with his second wife around 2005. In 2014, following his separation from her, he acquired sole ownership. He estimates the value of the property to be $895,000 and that the mortgage on the property is $290,000, with repayments of $2,000 per month.
In 2008, the applicant commenced a relationship with Ms Veccia and she bore him their first child (the 6‑year‑old daughter I mentioned previously) in 2010. Ms Veccia is currently pregnant with the applicant's second child. Ms Veccia has said that she is concerned this child will be born prematurely, which occurred with their first child. She states that she is financially dependent upon the applicant, and he helps her pay her mortgage repayments of around $1,700 per month on her Bindoon property. The applicant is the guarantor for that mortgage. I note, however, that Ms Veccia has also said she conducted her own business from the premises, and she is prepared to offer security of $100,000 as a surety for the applicant.
In relation to his business, the applicant has instructed his lawyer that 'Palm Home Builders' is currently undertaking work on an extension at a property in Wanneroo. This work involves building a brick wall, a games room and a bathroom at the property. The letter tendered on his behalf from a contractor does not support the conclusion that work is already underway; rather it is proposed work. Having taken into account what has been said on behalf of the applicant in respect of his business, I do not consider that, if he were to remain in custody, it would be catastrophic for his business as he claimed. There is scant evidence of the business being a profitable concern that will be adversely affected if he is denied bail. There is information from surveillance conducted by the police that the applicant has not been visiting building sites as seemed to be suggested on his behalf.
I do not consider that the concerns raised on behalf of the applicant in respect of his business carry any significant weight when exercising the discretion in relation to bail after answering the mandatory questions in cl 1 and taking into account the mandatory considerations in cl 3.

History of offending

The applicant has a long criminal history that includes three separate periods of imprisonment. Those terms were for two separate instances of unlawful wounding and an offence of possession of a prohibited drug with intent to sell or supply, which I mentioned earlier. For the drug offence, the applicant was sentenced to 2 years and 9 months' imprisonment in May 2003. On 5 June 2003, he was convicted of three firearm, weapon and ammunition charges, relating to the other items found in the safe with the drugs. He received a cumulative sentence of 3 months' imprisonment and a small fine.

The applicant was released on parole after serving half of this term. He completed the term on parole successfully.
Since the 2003 weapons charges, the applicant has only two traffic offences on his record.
While it has been some 14 years since the convictions for offences that have some similarity to the allegations in the present case, the applicant's past possession of a handgun, in combination with the results of the search in this case, does give rise to the possibility that he may commit an offence involving firearms if not kept in custody.

Associations

The affidavit of Acting Detective Sergeant Richardson refers to a conversation he had with the applicant at the time of the search, during which the applicant made statements from which it can be inferred that he was a current member of the Coffin Cheaters Motorcycle Club.[11] There is other evidence in the affidavit and in the statement of Detective Sergeant Knight about practices of outlaw motorcycle clubs and the Coffin Cheaters in particular from which the conclusion may be drawn that the applicant's tattoos and his possession of a patched jacket are consistent with him continuing to be a member of the Coffin Cheaters, rather than a retired member.
[11] Affidavit of Benedict Patrick Richardson, sworn 8 May 2017 [27] and [28].
The applicant again has chosen not to attest to facts that may be relevant to this issue, but has sought to put his response through an affidavit sworn by his lawyer.[12] I am not prepared to rely on assertions made by the applicant to his lawyer on this issue. In her most recent affidavit, Ms Veccia expresses the belief that the applicant has retired from the club, but it is no more than a belief, the basis for which is not elaborated, although in context it would appear to be based on hearsay.
[12] Affidavit of Margot Sonja Perling, sworn 15 May 2017.
I accept for the purpose of these proceedings that the applicant was a member of the Coffin Cheaters outlaw motorcycle club at time of the alleged offences and remains a member of that club. This will be relevant to my consideration of the risk of the applicant committing an offence and what bail conditions may be necessary if bail is granted.

Home environment, place of residence

If the applicant is to be released on bail, his home environment and the nature of his residence will be of relevance. That is particularly so, if he is released on home detention. The fortification of his premises and the CCTV cameras may create some difficulty for monitoring of the applicant, I will return to that in the context of dealing with the bail assessment report.
Of course, there is an obvious concern in allowing the applicant to return to a residence in which a large cache of firearms and ammunition was found only recently. If he was responsible for it, there is a risk he will again seek to acquire firearms. If others were responsible, as he has suggested in instructions, he has failed to demonstrate an ability to safeguard his home against being used to store a dangerous cache of weapons and ammunition.

Clause 3(c) ‑ The history of any previous grants of bails

It was submitted on behalf of the applicant that I can conclude he has a good history on bail. That was on the basis that it can be assumed that he has always been on bail for the offences that appear on his record, and there is no conviction for a breach of bail. There was information that he did fail to appear on one occasion, but that was put down to a mistake on his part.
In my opinion, all that can be discerned from the absence of breaches of bail is that the applicant has answered bail as required in the past. However, the State does not submit that the applicant will be a flight risk, particularly if he surrenders any passport he may have. It is accepted he has ties to the jurisdiction that should prevent him from taking flight.
However, the fact that the applicant has answered bail in the past says nothing about his behaviour while on bail. There is simply no information about that, so I draw no conclusion

Clause 3 ‑ Any other matters the court considers relevant

Delay before trial

The applicant submits that the charges he is facing for the more serious indictable offences will likely be committed to the District Court. That will be inevitable if the aggravated unlicensed possession charges are amended to include the circumstance of aggravation under s 19(1ab)(b) of the Firearms Act. He submits that, if he is remanded in custody until trial, he will likely have been detained, while presumed innocent, for the custodial part of any sentence of imprisonment that may be imposed on him, or longer, and that this will result in injustice to him.
There is no evidence before me about how long the matter would take to get to trial in the District Court, but it is in its very early stages in the Magistrates Court, and it may be safely assumed that a period of 12 months or longer is a real possibility.
The issue of delay has been considered mostly in the context of cases in which the accused is required to demonstrate there are exceptional reasons why he should be released on bail, for instance where cl 3A of sch 1 pt C of the Bail Act applies.[13] However, it seems to me that the general principles are applicable where there may be a basis for refusing bail under cl 1, rather than because of a statutory presumption against bail. As has been noted in the cases that have dealt with the issue, and specifically referred to by Miller J in Oates v The Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions,[14] there will be occasions where it is necessary for an accused person to be detained in custody, pending his trial, no matter how long that may be, even though it might be perceived that a person who is presumed to be innocent ought to be at large while he awaits his trial, and that an injustice may result if that person is acquitted. In the end, as has been recognised in the authorities, the court must have regard to the particular circumstances of the case it is dealing with and weigh competing considerations.
[13] See, for instance, Saka v The State of Western Australia [2001] WASC 92; Outman v The Queen [2001] WASC 162; The State of Western Australia v Oates [2004] WASC 214; Firkins v The Director of Public Prosecutions [2002] WASC 203; (2002) 132 A Crim R 321; Oates v The Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions [2003] WASCA 329.
[14] Oates v The Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (2003) WASCA 329 [27] ‑ [31].
A relevant consideration, as the applicant has submitted, is the relationship that the delay may bear to the sentence that is likely to be imposed on the accused if he is convicted after trial.
It seems to me that the likely scenario, if the applicant is not released on bail, is that he will be committed in respect of all of the indictable charges to the District Court.
The applicant did not refer me to any authority that would suggest a range for offending of this kind. The size of the cache and the consequent number of charges in this case is unusual. I indicated earlier that one could reasonable expect a substantial term of imprisonment reflecting offending at the upper end of the scale of seriousness. That said, it is not possible for my assessment to identify a benchmark against which to assess whether the period that the applicant will have spent in custody will be of such an order as to result in an injustice, in particular because he will have served either the whole of or more than the sentence that would be imposed if he were convicted of the offences, or at least all of more than the non‑parole period of such a sentence. Of course, the greatest injustice would be if the applicant were acquitted, but it is fair to say that, even in the event of a conviction, if he were to have served longer than he might have been required to serve, that too would constitute an injustice. In any event, the applicant will be likely to have been in custody for a very significant period by the time of his trial.
Ultimately, the question must be approached on the basis that there are competing considerations that need to be taken into account.
If delay in getting to trial was the only matter the applicant was relying on, it would not have been a sufficient factor at this stage to weigh in favour of release on bail. However, when combined with the additional factor that Ms Veccia will soon be giving birth to a second child and her reliance on the applicant within the family structure, the fact the applicant would likely be in custody for a lengthy period takes on greater weight.

Clause 1(a)(i) ‑ Whether the accused may fail to appear

I have dealt with this above. The State does not submit that the applicant will be a flight risk. Apart from his ties to the jurisdiction and his family circumstances, if bail were otherwise appropriate, conditions could be imposed to remove any concern the court may have that the applicant would not appear when required under a bail undertaking.

Clause 1(a)(ii) ‑ Whether the accused may commit an offence

Having regard to the circumstances of the alleged offending, the strength of the case against the applicant and the applicant's criminal history, I consider that there is a real possibility the applicant will commit an offence. Without traversing the presumption of innocence, the court is entitled to consider the circumstances in which the applicant is likely to have acquired the cache of weapons and ammunition if he has committed the offences. The number and nature of the weapons, ammunition and accessories tends to suggest he would not have acted alone. The applicant's personal circumstances and associations give rise to a concern that the acquisition and storage of the cache at his premises was related to his membership of an outlaw motorcycle club.
The number and nature of weapons and ammunition also raise the concern that the applicant may continue to have access to a supplier or suppliers of such items. Further, the loss of the cache as a result of the police intervention gives rise to the concern that attempts may be made to replace the weapons and ammunition, particularly as it may be accepted that such a cache could only have been intended for unlawful purposes.
All of these factors militate against the grant of bail.

Clause 1(a)(iii) ‑ Whether the accused may endanger the safety, welfare, or property of any person

The matters discussed in the last section carry the potential consequence that the safety or welfare of other persons will be endangered. It is not necessary to identify intended targets of violence. It is sufficient to appreciate that the availability of such an armoury to persons who would use them for unlawful purposes creates the potential for members of the community to be put in danger.

Clause 1(c) ‑ Whether the prosecutor has put forward grounds for opposing the grant of bail

In refusing bail on 13 April 2017, the magistrate took into account, although not as the main factor, the risk that the applicant may interfere with witnesses. That was raised by the State at one stage in these proceedings, but was not given any prominence in final submissions.
At this stage, it is not known who the prosecution witnesses will be, other than Acting Detective Sergeant Richardson and perhaps Detective Sergeant Knight. However, all witnesses involved in the search were police officers.
It seems to me that the greater concern is the potential for influence to be exerted by the applicant over persons who have lived at or attended the applicant's home in the past and who have been implicated in his instructions to his lawyer as persons who may have been responsible for or have knowledge of others who were responsible for the cache.

Clause 1(e) ‑ Whether there is any condition which could reasonably be imposed

I have identified a number of concerns in answering the questions under cl 1(a) and (c) which militate against the grant of bail. In my opinion, because of the seriousness of the alleged offences, the strength of the case against the applicant and his criminal history, the concern about the possible commission of an offence and the endangering of others militate strongly against the grant of bail. The question is whether there are conditions that can be imposed on any grant of bail that would sufficiently remove those concerns. Because of the strength of the concerns, such conditions would have to be of the strictest kind. They would need to restrict the applicant's movements, his associations and his communications in order to give the court any confidence that the risks could be adequately managed, while ensuring also that the applicant would answer his bail.
It was in this context that I requested the bail assessment report in respect of Home Detention. Senior counsel for the applicant had argued that other conditions should be sufficient to satisfy the court that any concerns would be removed, but informed the court that his client was prepared to be subject to Home detention conditions and submitted the court should request such a report.

Home Detention Report

A Bail Assessment Report was subsequently prepared by a senior community corrections officer from the Northwest Metro Community Corrections Centre. It is dated 12 May 2017 and endorsed by the Team Leader from that centre.
The author of the report inspected the residence in Landsdale, where it is proposed the applicant would return if released on bail, and interviewed the applicant by telephone and Ms Veccia in person.
I mentioned earlier that the applicant has a 6‑year‑old daughter with Ms Veccia. The child was living at the house when the police search took place on 12 April 2017. On 11 May 2017, the Department of Child Protection and Family Support confirmed that there are ongoing investigations, but the subject and nature of those investigations is not explained. However, the Department also indicated that there was no concern for the welfare of the applicant's daughter if the applicant should return to reside at the home in Landsdale.
Both the applicant and his partner told the author of the report that the applicant is a retired member of the Coffin Cheaters Outlaw Motorcycle Club and had no obligation to associate with anyone associated with the group. However, the author of the report says that available information suggests otherwise. I understand that to mean that there is other information that contradicts either or both of the claim of retirement and the lack of obligation to associate. There is no elaboration. While I would not have been prepared to place weight on such a comment without elaboration, I now have before me the information I referred to above from Acting Detective Sergeant Richardson and Detective Sergeant Knight, and I have accepted for the purposes of these proceedings that the applicant remains a member of the club.
Ms Veccia confirmed with the author of the report that she is expecting to give birth in the next month or so and said she wants the applicant at home to support her through her pregnancy. She claimed to have no awareness of the firearms being hidden about the house before police located the items during the search. She also said that neither she nor the applicant engaged in illicit drug use. On the other hand, the applicant admitted during a conversation with the author of the report that he occasionally used cannabis. Ms Veccia also said that she was willing to provide the necessary transport if the applicant was released on bail.
The report confirms that home detention equipment could be installed at the applicant's home if he were released on bail. Home detention conditions and requirements were explained to the applicant and he indicated he would be willing to abide by those requirements.
However, the author of the report considered that, should a home visit be necessary, which I would expect to be the case from time to time, it would be difficult, because the property was fortified with high fences and gates. In addition, she noted that the two dogs on the premises needed to be locked away for the purposes of the assessment. She concluded that the nature of the property would make face to face contact problematic and was concerned that the dogs could pose a risk to staff who attended the premises.
The author of the report also noted that Ms Veccia did not present as a positive influence for the applicant, and that this was evident from her comments 'whereby she justified, minimised and denied [the applicant's] alleged offending and antisocial behaviour/s'.
The author concluded that home detention was not supported given the potential risk to staff, difficulties attending and accessing the property, as well as the perceived inability of Ms Veccia to influence the applicant to lead a law‑abiding lifestyle.
The applicant submits that I should ignore the author's assessment of Ms Veccia's capacity to positively influence the applicant, because it appears to be based on the fact that Ms Veccia denied the applicant was guilty of the offences charged. With respect, the author's description of Ms Veccia's remarks was broader than that. Further, it was evident to me from the search video, during which Ms Veccia was present for some of the time and was asked questions, that she was not prepared to co‑operate with the police. Almost all of her answers were 'no comment', even when the questions were about innocuous matters without risk that she might incriminate herself or the applicant. Her approach at that time does not augur well for cooperation with a community corrections officer or police for the purpose of administering the applicant's home detention conditions, if he were to be released on home detention.
However, the applicant appears to have been cooperative with the author of the report and frank about his use of cannabis. That is a positive sign that he would cooperate during visits and inspections pursuant to Home Detention conditions. One might expect also that, in light of these reasons and what I am about to say about necessary conditions if the applicant is to be released on bail, Ms Veccia would also be co‑operative to ensure the applicant is not in breach of such conditions, with the risk that he will be returned to custody.
I also accept the applicant's submission that the fortifications and security at the premises should not be an obstacle for inspection, as it would be a matter of being admitted by the applicant by unlocking the gates. Of course, citizens are entitled to put in place security measures around their homes for their own protection and the protection of their families. While the size of the cameras and the number of them around the applicant's home are unusual, I do not consider that they would be an obstacle to the monitoring of Home Detention. The dogs would not be a risk to Community Corrections staff if it was a condition of bail that they be kept secured away from such staff during visits.
Ultimately, although the author of the report says that 'home detention bail is not supported at this juncture', she goes on to stipulate the conditions that should be included if home detention bail is granted. It is accepted, in other words, that despite the reservations expressed by the author, home detention could be administered if the court were to release the applicant on that condition.

Other conditions

In my opinion, there are conditions that can be imposed to remove sufficiently the concerns that militate against the grant of bail. Home detention is the starting point. Conditions that prevent the applicant from having contact with persons associated with outlaw motorcycle gangs or other gangs, that limit his means of communication and limit the persons who come onto his property would go a substantial way to mitigate the risks. Of course, there must be prohibitions on his possession of firearms, ammunition or prohibited weapons, and on his capacity to gain access to such items, so that restrictions on his use of the internet to access information about such things would need to be put in place. I am also of the view that if the applicant wishes to be released on bail, then he must be prepared to give access to his property to the police as well as CCOs for inspection. This will enable a level of monitoring, which can occur randomly, that should mitigate the risk that he will come into possession of weapons or ammunition or that such items may be brought to his property. Requiring him to give a CCO and police access to any electronic devices on his premises would also enable monitoring of his use of such devices.

Other conditions, which are standard for home detention, such as prohibitions on the use of prohibited drugs and providing samples for urinalysis testing, should also mitigate the risk of the applicant engaging in antisocial activity, which potentially could be a factor affecting his risk of committing an offence.
Prior to giving these reasons, I indicated to the parties that I would be inclined to grant home detention bail on conditions of the kind I have outlined. I provided a draft proposal for bail conditions. The conditions which are annexed to these reasons are those that the parties agreed would adequately deal with the concerns I have discussed.

Conclusion

In circumstances in which the State has not argued that the applicant is a flight risk, and the real concern is about the possibility that he will commit an offence and endanger the safety of others if not kept in custody, the discretion in respect of bail will ultimately be informed by the question whether reasonable conditions can be put in place to remove the concern to an adequate extent, in the light of any factors that may favour the grant of bail. Those factors in this case are the likely delay in the charges proceeding to trial, and the amount of time the applicant is therefore likely to remain in custody as an accused person, in combination with the humanitarian consideration that his partner is shortly to have a baby and requires his support, in circumstances in which they also have a 6‑year‑old child.
Taking all of those matters into account, I am satisfied that the conditions I have outlined will provide sufficient protection against the applicant committing an offence and posing a danger to the community. Accordingly, I will grant bail on the conditions in the annexure (the accused's address and names of persons who may attend his premises have been redacted).

Order

Bail granted on the conditions annexed.

Annexure

Bail conditions

To provide a personal undertaking in the sum of $100,000;
To provide a surety in the sum of $100,000, of which the sum of $40,000 is to be a cash surety deposited with the court, such surety to be approved by an authorised person pursuant to the Bail Act 1982, s 36;
To be released on Home Detention conditions to reside at [ADDRESS SPECIFIED], Western Australia (the premises) and to abide by the Home Detention conditions, including but not limited to the obligations under Adult Community Corrections Rule 201;
Not to be released until Home Detention electronic monitoring equipment is installed at the premises and approved by a Community Corrections Officer (CCO);
To remain at [ADDRESS SPECIFIED] and not to leave there, except in accordance with directions given by a CCO, a police officer or the court;
Not to leave WA or approach within 1km of any point of departure from the State;
To surrender his passport to the police or the Judges Associate prior to release on bail and not to apply for any further passport;
To comply with all lawful directions of a CCO;
To permit a CCO to enter the premises for the purpose of administering the Home Detention conditions and do all necessary things to enable the CCO to enter the house at the premises at any time the CCO attends the premises;
To permit police officers to enter and inspect the premises and do all necessary things to enable such police officers to enter the house at the premises at any time they attend the premises for an inspection;
To ensure that any dogs at the premises are secured in a location where they will not be able to access those parts of the premises where a CCO or a police officer is in attendance;
To give a CCO or a police officer inspecting the premises access to any computer or other electronic device on the premises for inspection, including any account details necessary for the CCO or police officer to access data on such device;
Not to act in an aggressive, threatening, offensive or intimidatory manner towards any person who enters the property pursuant to these bail conditions;
Not to be in possession of any firearm, ammunition, prohibited weapon or a firearms licence or attempt to obtain a firearms licence;
Not to permit any other person to bring any firearm, ammunition or prohibited weapon onto the premises, and to require any such item that is brought onto the premises to be removed immediately;
If any firearm, ammunition or prohibited weapon is brought onto the premises, to report that fact to the supervising CCO and the police immediately;
Not to commit any offence;
Not to be in possession of or use any prohibited drug as defined in the Misuse of Drugs Act 1981;
To provide a valid urine sample for urinalysis testing at the request of a CCO;
Not to contact or attempt to contact any prosecution witnesses either directly or indirectly;
To surrender any mobile telephone device in his possession to the CCO when released;
Not to use any mobile telephone device;
To provide the CCO with any information required by the CCO in respect of any landline telephone at the premises;
Not to access any information on the internet concerning firearms or other weapons or ammunition;
Not to access any internet site connected with or concerning the Coffin Cheaters Motorcycle Club or any other outlaw motorcycle club, gang or outlaw organisation;
Not to have any contact with any member, former member, associate or nominee of the Coffin Cheaters Motorcycle Club or any other outlaw motorcycle club, gang or outlaw organisation;
Not to permit on the property any person other than [NAMES SPECIFIED], and any other person approved by a CCO, Police or the court;
All residents or guests at the premises must submit to a search if required to do so by a police officer attending the premises for an inspection;
In the event of any contact with any person not authorised by these conditions, contact and notify the CCO of the unauthorised contact immediately or as soon as practicable after the unauthorised contact.