Mudiy v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Mudiy v Minister for Home Affairs [2023] FCA 1402  

Appeal from: Mudiy v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 346
File number(s): VID 331 of 2022
Judgment of: O'BRYAN J
Date of judgment: 16 November 2023
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Div 2) – where Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) dismissed application for review of decision refusing to grant appellant’s partner visa application – appellant’s marriage had ceased and sponsorship was withdrawn – appellant made a non-judicially determined claim of family violence – appellant failed to provide evidence in support of claim as required under reg 1.24(b) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) and legislative instrument IMMI 12/116 – at hearing before the Tribunal, appellant requested adjournment to enable him to remedy deficiencies in his application – Tribunal refused to grant an adjournment – decision not legally unreasonable in the circumstances – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), Pt 5, Div 5, ss 360, 363

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Div 1.5, regs 1.21, 1.22, 1.23, 1.24, Sch 2, cl 801.221

Cases cited:

Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 139 ALD 50

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 264 CLR 541

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs v Lieu, by her Litigation Representative Nguyen (2023) 297 FCR 162

Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) 278 ALD 536

Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 85
Date of hearing: 18 August 2023 
Counsel for the Appellant: Dr A McBeth
Solicitor for the Appellant: Clothier Anderson Immigration Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms J Lucas
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting appearance save as to costs

ORDERS

VID 331 of 2022
BETWEEN:

PRADEEP NISHANTHA MAHAKUMBURA HERATH MUDIY

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

O'BRYAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

16 NOVEMBER 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The Appellant pay the First Respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

O’BRYAN J

Introduction

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court (Division 2) made on 13 May 2022, dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal).  On 10 January 2018, the Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs (the Minister) refusing to grant the appellant a Partner (Residence) Visa.  

  2. By his notice of appeal dated 9 June 2022, the appellant relies on a single ground of appeal:

    The primary judge erred in failing to find that the…

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Details
Case
[2023] FCA 1402
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Mudiy v Minister for Home Affairs involves an appeal against the dismissal of an application for review of a decision refusing to grant the appellant's partner visa application. The appellant's marriage had ceased, and sponsorship was withdrawn. The appellant made a non-judicially determined claim of family violence but failed to provide evidence in support of the claim as required under the relevant regulations and legislative instrument. The appellant requested an adjournment at the hearing before the Tribunal to enable him to remedy deficiencies in his application, but the Tribunal refused to grant an adjournment. The court was required to determine whether the Tribunal's decision was legally unreasonable.

The court found that the Tribunal's decision not to adjourn the hearing was not legally unreasonable. The appellant was made aware on two occasions by the Minister’s delegate of the deficiency in his application before the Minister refused the application. The appellant then sought review before the Tribunal of the delegate’s decision. The appellant did not obtain a statutory declaration from a registered psychologist in support of his claim that he was the victim of family violence, despite having some 18 months to do so. The appellant's representative acknowledged this failure at the Tribunal hearing, and further stated that she had explained to the appellant the importance of having the necessary documents. However, no satisfactory explanation for the failure was offered by the appellant or his representative. The court found that the Tribunal's decision not to adjourn the hearing was not legally unreasonable.

In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed with costs. The court found that the Tribunal's decision to affirm the delegate’s decision was not affected by jurisdictional error. The appellant had been made aware of the deficiency in his application, and despite having some 18 months to remedy it, he did not provide the necessary evidence. The court found that the Tribunal's decision not to adjourn the hearing was not legally unreasonable. The court found that the appeal was without merit and dismissed it with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The Appellant pay the First Respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The relevant instrument for the purpose of regs 1.23(9)(c) and 1.24(b) was IMMI 12/116. That instrument stipulated that two pieces of evidence were required of a type, and containing the details, specified in Sch 1, with no more than one of each type of evidence. Relevantly, the instrument specifies (among others) the following types of evidence for the purpose of regs 1.23(9)(c) and 1.24:(a)a medical report prepared by a registered medical practitioner performing the duties of a registered medical practitioner, which identifies the alleged victim and details the physical injuries or treatment for mental health that is consistent with the claimed family violence; and (b)a statutory declaration made by a registered psychologist in a State or Territory who has treated the alleged victim while performing the duties of a psychologist, which states in their opinion that the alleged victim was subject to family violence, details the reasons for the opinion, and identifies the alleged perpetrator. Background The appellant married his wife, an Australian citizen, in Victoria on 23 March 2013. On 6 June 2013, the appellant applied for a Partner (Temporary) Visa, together with a Partner (Residence) Visa, which application was sponsored by his wife. On 11 June 2013, the appellant was granted a Partner (Temporary) Visa for the period until a decision on the appellant’s permanent partner visa application was made. The appellant’s relationship with his wife broke down in September 2015. On 5 October 2015, the Department informed the appellant that the sponsorship for his visa application had been withdrawn, and invited the appellant to provide further information regarding his current circumstances and the reasons for the breakdown in his relationship. By letter from his then lawyer dated 23 October 2015, the appellant confirmed to the Department that his relationship had broken down and further stated that he had suffered family violence perpetrated by his wife and former sponsor. Pursuant to the Regulations in force at the relevant time, which are set out above, a partner visa may be granted even where the relationship has ceased if the appellant has suffered family violence committed by the sponsoring partner, and other visa criteria would otherwise be satisfied. The letter relevantly stated:Mr. Mudiy has been subjected to domestic family violence as his wife has abused him throughout the relationship with the support of his mother-in-law who has also encouraged his wife. … Additionally due to the abuse he has suffered, he has suffered severe anxiety and depression as outlined by Dr. Mendis in the attached report. A report from Dr Roshan Mendis was attached to the letter of 23 October 2016. The report took the form of a letter dated 15 October 2015 in which Dr Mendis referred to the appellant as a “regular patient” and stated that, as a result of his separation from his wife, the appellant was suffering severe anxiety and depression, as well as insomnia, and had been referred for psychological assessment. The report of Dr Mendis does not refer to any allegation, or the occurrence, of family violence as between the appellant and his former wife.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The foregoing conclusion is not altered by the fact that, at the very end of the hearing, the Tribunal member indicated that he would not be making a decision for two days and that, if the appellant had anything else that he wanted the Tribunal member to consider, he could provide it to the Tribunal in that time. For the reasons given earlier, that indication was not a two day adjournment. The Tribunal merely afforded the appellant with liberty to provide any additional relevant material before the Tribunal made its decision, which the Tribunal estimated would be in two days’ time. The practical effect remained that the Tribunal refused the request for an adjournment. The Tribunal’s decision not to adjourn the hearing was not legally unreasonable.Conclusion In conclusion, the primary judge was correct to find that the Tribunal’s decision to affirm the delegate’s decision was not affected by jurisdictional error. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As the Full Court emphasised in Singh (at [42]), the assessment of whether there has been a legally unreasonable exercise of a discretionary power requires the application of the principles stated in Li and the earlier authorities discussed in it; it is erroneous to engage in a process of factual comparison, identifying factual similarities or differences in some kind of checklist manner. Legal unreasonableness is invariably fact dependent, so that in any given case determining whether an exercise of power crosses the line into legal unreasonableness will require careful evaluation of the evidence before the court.Consideration of the present case In the present case, the Minister’s delegate refused the appellant’s visa application because the appellant had not provided evidence in the form required to make a non-judicially determined claim of family violence, such that the appellant did not satisfy the criteria for the grant of a permanent partner visa. Specifically, the appellant was informed that the letter written by Ms Bartlett could only be accepted and taken into account if it was in the form of a statutory declaration. The appellant was made aware on two occasions by the Minister’s delegate of this deficiency in his application (in January and May 2016), before the Minister refused the application (in June 2016). The appellant then sought review before the Tribunal of the delegate’s decision. On the basis of the communications between the Minister’s delegate and the appellant, and the Minister’s decision, I infer that the appellant and/or his migration agent was aware that the appellant was required to submit a statutory declaration from a registered psychologist in support of his claim that he was the victim of family violence. The appellant did not obtain such a statutory declaration, despite having some 18 months to do so (being the period between when he applied for review of the delegate’s decision and the date of the Tribunal hearing on 2 January 2018). The appellant’s representative acknowledged this failure at the Tribunal hearing, and further stated that she had explained to the appellant the importance of having the necessary documents. However, no satisfactory explanation for the failure was offered by the appellant or his representative. The appellant’s representative stated in submissions that she had made a couple of telephone calls to Ms Bartlett, had spoken to her once explaining the further documentation required, and had not since been able to speak to or contact Ms Bartlett. The attempts made to contact Ms Bartlett were not the subject of evidence. Nor was there any evidence of any attempts made by or on behalf of the appellant to consult a different psychologist. Moreover, the appellant’s representative expressly indicated in her correspondence with the Tribunal some months before the hearing that all documentation in support of the appellant’s case would be provided to the Tribunal ahead of the hearing.