MTI v SUL (No 3)
[2012] WASCA 145
•6 AUGUST 2012
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: MTI -v- SUL [No 3] [2012] WASCA 145
CORAM: PULLIN JA
MURPHY JA
HEARD: 19 JUNE 2012
DELIVERED : 6 AUGUST 2012
FILE NO/S: CACV 36 of 2011
BETWEEN: MTI
Appellant
AND
SUL
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : FAMILY COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram :MONCRIEFF J
File No :PT 1025 of 2004
Catchwords:
Practice and procedure - Application by respondent to dismiss the appeal - Whether any grounds of appeal have any reasonable prospect of succeeding
Legislation:
Supreme Court (Court of Appeal) Rules 2005 (WA)
Result:
Respondent's application to dismiss the appeal upheld
Appellant's application for extension of time in which to appeal dismissed
Appeal dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Appellant: In person
Respondent: Ms M M Wadsworth
Solicitors:
Appellant: In person
Respondent: Bannerman Solicitors
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Bloch v Bloch (1981) 180 CLR 390
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337
Gerlach v Clifton Bricks Pty Ltd [2002] HCA 22; (2002) 209 CLR 478
Maxwell v Keun [1928] 1 KB 645
Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls [2011] HCA 48; (2011) 244 CLR 427
MTI v SUL [2007] WASCA 57
MTI v SUL [2008] WASCA 116
MTI v SUL [2008] WASCA 261
MTI v SUL [2009] WASCA 70
MTI v SUL [2011] WASCA 267
MTI v SUL [No 2] [2007] WASCA 240
MTI v SUL [No 2] [2010] WASCA 58
MTI v SUL [No 2] [2012] WASCA 87
MTI v SUL [No 3] [2008] WASCA 19
REASONS OF THE COURT: This is an application by the respondent for an order under r 43(2)(g) of the Supreme Court (Court of Appeal) Rules 2005 (WA) dismissing the appeal on the basis that none of the grounds of appeal have any reasonable prospect of succeeding, are scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, do not disclose any error in fact or law and are an abuse of process. The appellant also requires an extension of time in which to appeal. None of the grounds have any reasonable prospect of succeeding and some are scandalous with the result that an extension of time in which to appeal should be refused and the appeal should be dismissed. The reasons follow.
According to the appellant's appeal notice, the appeal is against orders made by Moncrieff J on 16 March 2011. The orders made on that day were:
1That the proceedings are to be adjourned part heard before the Honourable Justice Moncrieff.
2That within 14 days the applicant father, [MTI], file and serve a Form 1 Application.
3That before the resumption of the hearing the father either pay, or have waived, hearing fees for a four day trial.
4That within 14 days of service of the father's Form 1 the respondent mother, [SUL], file and serve a Form 1A Response.
5That during adjournment parties are to attend on Professor George Lipton in compliance with the orders appointing Professor Lipton as a single expert and in accordance with the terms of reference as ordered on 13 May 2008.
6That prior to resumption of the trial the mother is to facilitate the child, [SJI], attending upon Dr Kay Johnston, Paediatrician, for the purpose of her updating the reports that she has provided at the request of the father.
7The proceedings stand adjourned to the callover of cases on 15 July 2011 at 9.00 am.
8The parties be at liberty to apply for such further directions as may be necessary.
9That a copy of the transcript of proceedings of 15 March 2011 and 16 March 2011 be prepared and distributed to the parties without cost.
10.That the application for leave to file an application for contempt filed on 8 March 2011 is dismissed.
To deal with the appellant's appeal, it is necessary to rake over some old history which is as follows. The lead-up to this hearing goes back to 2006.
The 20 December 2006 orders
On 20 December 2006, Martin J discharged all previous parenting orders which were in place in relation to the child and made a number of orders concerning custody and access. In substance, her Honour ordered that the child live with the respondent who was to have sole responsibility for the child's care, welfare and development and that the appellant have access according to a regime which her Honour set out.
The order restraining the appellant from commencing proceedings without leave
Martin J further ordered, pursuant to s 242(1) of the Family Court Act, that the appellant be restrained by injunction from instituting further proceedings without leave of the court: see I v L [2006] FCWA 141.
The appellant's application for leave to file an application to vary the 20 December 2006 orders
On 4 January 2008, the appellant filed an application for leave to file an application to vary the orders made by Martin J on 20 December 2006 ('application for leave'). The application for leave was amended several times after it was filed.
The events which then followed are set out in Newnes JA's judgment in MTI v SUL [No 2] [2010] WASCA 58. In short, there were various adjournments for various reasons including the failure of both parties to attend on appointed hearing dates. On 21 April 2008, the appellant voiced a number of concerns he had about the circumstances of the child which caused Martin J to adjourn the hearing to 13 May 2008, so that a child expert could be appointed to report on the family dynamics.
On 13 May 2008 Martin J ordered that Professor Lipton be appointed as a single expert to inquire into and report (inter alia) on the personality, including any psychiatric or other personality disorder or mental health problem, of the appellant and the respondent. The order stated that if the single expert was of the view that either party suffered from any psychiatric or other personality disorder or mental health problem, he was to advise on the nature and diagnosis of such condition, what if any treatment or medication may eliminate or improve such condition and his views as to the party's prognosis. Both parties were ordered to cooperate with all reasonable requests made by the single expert regarding the making of interview appointments and the attendance on all appointments as directed by the single expert. The case was then adjourned to 30 July 2008.
Following the adjournment, the appellant applied to the court for an order that the hearing of his application for leave 'be put on hold until [Martin J] disqualify herself'. The application for leave was listed before Martin J on 30 July 2008. On 29 July 2008, the appellant wrote saying that he might not be able to attend on 30 July 2008. On 30 July 2008, the appellant did not attend. On that day, the independent children's lawyer informed Martin J that the appellant was not prepared to cooperate with Professor Lipton. Exactly what else occurred at that hearing is set out in MTI [No 2] [2010] WASCA 58. The end result was that the appellant's application for leave was dismissed by Martin J.
That decision was appealed against by the appellant and that appeal was upheld in MTI [No 2] [2010] WASCA 58. The dismissal of the appellant's application for leave was set aside and the matter was sent back to the Family Court for it to consider the application for leave.
The application for leave is listed before Moncrieff J
The application for leave then came on for hearing before Moncrieff J on 17 November 2010. There was no appearance for the appellant. It was listed again on 23 November 2010. The appellant was then in attendance. This was a directions hearing. After appearances were taken his Honour said:
I have called this matter on for several reasons because there appears to be some misunderstanding or miscommunication about what application it is that is actually before the court and in fact the application that was returned to the court for consideration after the matter was dealt with by the Court of Appeal ... but effectively what's being sought is leave to file an application to effect changes to the orders made by Martin J on 20 December 2006. So what the court is being asked to consider then is effectively an application for leave to issue proceedings.
It is not necessary to set out all which took place at that hearing, but in the end, Moncrieff J directed that there be another directions hearing at which a fixed date was to be set for hearing the appellant's application for leave. After Moncrieff J had indicated that he was going to make those orders, the transcript then reads:
MR I: ... If the case is not being heard today ... I want an interstate judge. I don't want any judicial of this court. I don't trust any of the judicial in this court any more to handle my case. I want a judge from Victoria or from New South Wales to handle my case and I want them ‑ ‑ ‑
HIS HONOUR: Well, you can bring an application if you wish to have me disqualified and you have leave ‑ ‑ ‑
MR I: Not you.
HIS HONOUR: I will give you leave to file that application and that can be listed before me when you file it.
In due course, 15 and 16 March 2011 were set aside for a trial of the appellant's application to amend the orders of 20 December 2006, apparently on the basis that the appellant would likely be granted leave to bring the application. The respondent's solicitors agreed with that course.
The appellant's application that Moncrieff J recuse himself
Subsequently, on 20 December 2010, the appellant filed an application which read:
The applicant is seeking an interstate judicial [sic] to run the trial for this matter in March.
That application was dealt with by Moncrieff J on 20 January 2011. The application was dismissed. His Honour referred to Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337 and concluded that there were no factual issues raised which would found an allegation of bias or apprehended bias and, as a result, the application was dismissed.
Appellant's application for leave to have the respondent and her solicitor dealt with for contempt
On 8 March 2011, a week before the hearing of the appellant's application for leave was due to commence, the appellant filed another application for leave, this time seeking leave to apply to have the respondent and the respondent's solicitor dealt with for contempt of court. The application read:
(1)'I the applicant apply for leave from the court to charge the respondent in this case with contempt of court for interfering during and in the service of a court document to some on [sic] else';
(2)'I the applicant apply for leave from the court to charge [the respondent's solicitor] of misleading the court and contempt of court for trying to influence and help some one to avoid service of a court document and hinder the service of a court document'.
This was supported by an affidavit sworn by the appellant on 8 March 2011. In it the appellant deposed that on 7 March 2011 he went to an address where SL (the 'someone else' referred to in proposed order 1) 'lives to try again serving the subpoena on him. I was looking first for the person who agreed to help me with the serves [sic] last week. I could not see or find that person so I tried to find some one else in the street to help me'. He said he pushed the telecommunication button in the lobby and asked to speak to SL. He deposed that the respondent answered and hung up on him.
The appellant then deposed that he said that 'if [SL] does not make himself available to receive the subpoena the court might arrest him' and that the respondent said 'we were told a third person should be present' and the appellant deposed that he said 'there is'. He then deposed that he went to a young man who was sitting in a 'silver greyish 4‑wheel drive car ... in the street outside the building'. The appellant deposed that this person whose name was 'Tim' agreed to 'make the service for some money'
The appellant then deposed 'I remembered the conduct money. I went to the car to get it from the glove box but I did not find it'. He said that he went back towards the lobby and saw the respondent and SL and the child on the other side of the lobby opening the security door to get into the lobby. He said that the respondent opened the outer door and asked 'Tim' to come inside. The appellant deposed that he saw SL receive the subpoena from 'Tim'. He then deposed that 'Tim' left the lobby after that. The respondent kept trying to invite him inside 'but he wanted to go back to his car'. The appellant deposed that he said he would leave the conduct money in the letterbox. His affidavit continued:
I did not have a change to give Tim his money and the conduct money so I went to the nearby shopping centre ... I bought something and got the change. I returned ... I gave Tim his money and dropped in the letterbox ... $7 ... as conduct money. I am uncertain how much conduct money I needed to leave to him but that was the change I have in my pocket at the time.
The only reference to the respondent's solicitor was in par 11 of the affidavit which read:
[The respondent's solicitor] apparently passed the massage [sic] first that I would try to issue subpoena for [SL] that is why he hide then passed the issue of the court arrest that is why he made himself available this time. The expression 'we were told' reveals that some one gave [SL] and his sister legal advice.
The affidavit concluded:
I wish the court to charge the respondent and her solicitor with contempt of court and interfering in and trying to influence the service of a court document on another person. Their deceptive rude manner is part of this case and I frankly had enough.
The hearing on 15 and 16 March 2011
On 15 March 2011 the matter came on for hearing before Moncrieff J. The appellant gave evidence and at some point during the day, another witness the appellant wished to call was interposed. This was the respondent's brother. He gave evidence through an interpreter and after his evidence was given, the appellant continued his evidence and then the court adjourned for the day. On 16 March 2011, the appellant completed his evidence and his Honour then adjourned the proceedings.
Moncrieff J's reasons for adjourning the hearing
His Honour gave reasons for his decision to order an adjournment. They reveal that the main reason for adjourning was because orders made on 13 May 2008 by Justice Martin concerning the appointment of Professor George Lipton as a single expert in the proceedings had not been complied with. The appellant had failed or refused to participate in an interview with Professor Lipton.
The appellant offered as his reasons for not attending on Professor Lipton that Professor Lipton may be 'somehow tarnished, or his evidence corrupted by virtue of the fact that he was appointed by Mr Pacy, who at the time was the independent children's lawyer'. Moncrieff J in his reasons, pointed out that the order for appointment was not made by Mr Pacy but by Martin J. Moncrieff J also recorded the fact that the appellant's other objection to the appointment of Professor Lipton was that Professor Lipton's curriculum vitae was 'messy'. Insofar as the appellant had any doubt about Professor Lipton's professional skills, Moncrieff J observed that the appellant would have the opportunity to cross‑examine him about any conclusions that he drew. As a result, his Honour said that he required the parties to attend on Professor Lipton.
In the course of his reasons, Moncrieff J mentioned also that a paediatrician, Dr Kay Johnson, was unavailable to give evidence about some drawings done by the child for Dr Johnson and which the appellant regarded as having some relevance.
Moncrieff J noted that the appellant had been restrained from instituting proceedings without the leave of the court. His Honour stated that the appellant's application for leave should formally be granted. The reference to the filing and serving of a form 1 application in the orders set out above was a form 1 application to vary the existing parenting orders as a result of the grant of leave. The form 1 application would then formalise the subsequent proceedings as an application to vary the orders which had been made on 20 December 2006.
The disposal of the appellant's application for leave to have the respondent dealt with for contempt
Immediately after Moncrieff J indicated that he would adjourn the proceedings, the appellant raised the issue of his application for leave to file an application to have the respondent and the respondent's solicitors dealt with for contempt.
Moncrieff J refused to grant leave to the appellant to bring the contempt application. His Honour said that he was not satisfied that the appellant had demonstrated that it could be established beyond reasonable doubt, that any contempt had been committed.
The appeal to this court
The appellant filed his appeal notice in this appeal on 22 March 2011. The appeal notice specified the decisions appealed against as follows:
The court decision to appoint an unavailable child expert and adjourn the case to the next call over because of this. The judge biased and corrupt attitude during the hearing and in the last 9 months. The judge dismissal of the appellant application to charge the respondent with contempt of court. All other court orders made one the day [sic].
The appellant failed to serve the appeal notice on the respondent. This made it necessary for the appellant to apply for leave to appeal out of time. The appellant did not file the appellant's case within time and the time for filing the appellant's case was extended with an order for costs made against the appellant. The appellant then sought a review of the decision to order costs against him.
The appellant filed the appellant's case on 19 August 2011. On 15 September 2011 the respondent applied for orders striking out the grounds of appeal. The grounds were struck out by this court on 13 December 2011: MTI v SUL [2011] WASCA 267. The appellant was granted leave to file and serve an amended appellant's case.
The appellant filed an amended appellant's case on 2 February 2012. The respondent has again applied to strike out the grounds of appeal on the basis that they have no reasonable prospects of success, are scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, do not disclose any error in fact or law and are otherwise an abuse of process of the court.
The amended grounds of appeal shorn of scandalous allegations, contend:
(1)that Moncrieff J was biased because of the fact that his Honour:
(a)listed the matter on 17 November 2010;
(b)illustrated an imbalanced approach towards the parties when he listed the appellant's application (after 23 November 2010) 'few weeks after its filing and deferred listing the Trail [sic] for few months twice [sic]';
(c)adjourned the trial on 23 November 2010 'for no legal grounds';
(d)disregarded evidence presented before him on 23 November 2010 stating the court was 'unsympathetic' to the 'masses of mould contained in child school water bottle which reveals the neglect the child lives in [sic]';
(e)refused to disqualify himself as 'case judge and appoint an interstate judge';
(f)insisted on appointing Professor Lipton;
(g)insisted on listing the case in September 'to fit the unavailable child expert time table although I was not available to attend the court [sic]';
(h)'utterly ignored ... what the respondent was doing in the court in giving the witness [SL] signs with her hand to how to answer questions';
(i)'directed the respondent to visit a beforehand subpoenaed witness (whom is the witness of the child drawings of [SL] as a sexual origan) in the case privately before the witness due to give evidences [sic] so according to his wording the witness become familiar with the respondent [sic]';
(j)allowed the respondent's solicitor to ask questions unrelated to the case;
(k)indorsed the respondent's solicitor taking a document out of the court file out of the courtroom unsupervised;
(l)-(m)interrupted the appellant during questioning of the witness SL; and
(n)interrupted the appellant's presentation of his case;
(2)that he did not receive a fair hearing (on 23 November 2010);
(3)that Moncrieff J 'did not allow me to represent my case unreservedly which denied me natural justice';
(4)that Moncrieff J erred by adjourning the case on 16 March 2011 because of the unavailability of Professor Lipton;
(5)(this is a repeat of one of the particulars to ground 1);
(6)that at a hearing in June 2010, Moncrieff J promised 'prompt listing of the case for trial, which he failed to convey [sic];
(7)that Moncrieff J 'listed application, adjourned a trial and allowed other conducts in his decisions against the court rules and act in defiance of any court ethics [sic]';
(8)that Moncrieff J followed the same pattern as Martin J and 'disadvantaged my cause' therefore asking for his dismissal from the case and appointment of an interstate judge;
(9)that Moncrieff J caused a miscarriage of justice.
Disposition
The grounds of appeal raise four main points. The first is the allegation that Moncrieff J erred in refusing to recuse himself on 20 January 2011. If there was any such error, then the orders made on 16 March 2011 would be challengeable for that reason: see Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls [2011] HCA 48; (2011) 244 CLR 427 [78] ‑ [81]. Secondly, if Moncrieff J did not err in refusing to recuse himself, then it is necessary to consider whether Moncrieff J erred in adjourning the proceedings on 16 March 2011. Thirdly, it is necessary to consider the appellant's allegations that Moncrieff J was biased. The fourth point is the allegation that Moncrieff J erred in dismissing the appellant's application for leave to have the respondent and the respondent's solicitor dealt with for contempt.
The decision of Moncrieff J dismissing the application that he recuse
A decision by a judge dismissing an application to recuse may in some circumstances be challenged in an appeal against the judgment of the proceedings: Gerlach v Clifton Bricks Pty Ltd [2002] HCA 22; (2002) 209 CLR 478 [8]; Michael Wilson [78]. However, if the application to recuse is not made promptly, the delay may constitute a waiver of the right to object: Michael Wilson [76] and there may be circumstances where a failure to seek leave to appeal against a judge's decision refusing to recuse may lead to the conclusion that the appellant has given up the point: Michael Wilson [79] and [84]. The appellant has not given up the point.
However, no error is identified by the appellant. Ground 1(e) alleges a miscarriage of justice because the appellant applied for his Honour to disqualify himself 'as the case judge and appoint an interstate judge'. The appellant's written submissions state:
I applied in an interim hearing for an interstate judge to be appointed but [Moncrieff J] rejected the application unreasonably claiming there were no evidence of corruption before him in his part even after I mentioned to him the above, the same arrogance and denying the truth attitude from a judicial.
The reference to the 'above' appears to be a reference to par 34 of his written submissions which stated that he showed Moncrieff J a water bottle his daughter used in her school, which he alleged had mould inside it.
This allegation was raised inappropriately during the directions hearing. The place for his allegations to be examined was in the full hearing which was to take place if he was granted his application for leave. In effect, the appellant alleges bias (and makes other scandalous allegations) merely because decisions were made with which he did not agree. Nothing in the transcript of the hearings to date reveals any conduct by Moncrieff J which indicated bias and nothing gives rise to any reasonable apprehension of bias. Indeed, his Honour has gone to great lengths to explain to the appellant what was happening in the proceedings. Ground 1(e) has no reasonable prospect of succeeding.
The decision to adjourn on 16 March 2011
A decision whether to grant or refuse an adjournment lies in the discretion of the trial judge and it is seldom that an appellate court will review such a decision. Usually, it is necessary to show that the refusal of an adjournment defeats the rights of the parties or a party: Maxwell v Keun [1928] 1 KB 645, 653; Bloch v Bloch (1981) 180 CLR 390, 395.
Ground 4 asserts that Moncrieff J erred in adjourning 'the case for 'the child expert unavailability' reason which delaying the case further because he should deal with cases in the prompt time in accordance with the FCR and Act with any available child expert as any other child expert would have just carried the task as the nominated child expert was never involved in the past' [sic]. This ground is almost incomprehensible, but insofar as it alleges that it was an error to adjourn the case because a paediatrician, Dr Kay Johnson, was unavailable, it has no merit. The reason for adjourning was because the appellant had not complied with the order concerning Professor Lipton. The case would have been adjourned even if Dr Johnson had been available. The adjournment did not defeat the rights of the parties. No error was made by Moncrieff J. In any event, the appeal against the adjournment order is futile. There is no order this court could make to undo the adjournment order. Ground 4 has no reasonable prospect of succeeding.
The application for leave to commit the respondent and the respondent's solicitor for contempt
The affidavit of 8 March 2010 set out above is what the appellant relied on in trying to obtain leave to commit the respondent and her solicitor for contempt. The mere recital of this material reveals that Moncrieff J was entirely justified in refusing to grant leave to file his application for contempt and reveals the good sense in the order which had earlier been made by Martin J restraining the appellant from instituting proceedings without the leave of the court. Contrary to the rules of court, there is no ground of appeal alleging error in the dismissal of the application for leave. However, the notice of appeal alleges the decision was in error. Insofar as the appeal is against the refusal of leave it must be dismissed.
The allegation of bias
All grounds of appeal other than ground 1(e) and 4 appear to relate to the allegation of bias or apprehended bias. The allegations of bias or apprehended bias are completely devoid of merit. The appellant is a querulous litigant who frequently brings meritless appeals against decisions which are not to his liking, disobeys orders of the court he does not agree with, alleges bias when a decision is not made in his favour and makes scandalous allegations against judicial officers who deal with his applications. Often he uses all of these techniques. The time of the courts is wasted in dealing with many meritless applications and appeals and he vexes the respondent by such applications and appeals.
The fact that the appellant brings meritless applications and appeals means that there are many orders made dismissing such applications and appeals which the appellant then relies on to assert bias. Allegations of bias or corruption have been made in this court against two Family Court judges and two members of this court merely because decisions have not been made in his favour. The mere fact that decisions are made against the appellant does not justify a claim of bias or apprehended bias, and it certainly does not justify other scandalous allegations made against Moncrieff J.
None of the grounds have any reasonable prospect of succeeding.
The appellant's opportunity to make submissions
The appellant was advised by Registrar's Notice that the respondent's application to have the appeal dismissed was listed to be heard on 19 June 2012. The appellant appeared on 19 June 2012. He claimed at the beginning of the hearing that he had not been sent a copy of the respondent's application and submissions. He claimed that he had received an email copy of the documents from the respondent's solicitors, but only half of each page of these documents could be downloaded by him on his computer. He admitted that he had not contacted the respondent's solicitors to advise them of this and to ask for another copy of the documents. In court, counsel for the respondent proffered a copy of the application and submissions which the appellant refused to accept. Notwithstanding this, the court adjourned to give the appellant the opportunity to read the documents. During the adjournment, the appellant left the court and did not reappear. The court reserved its decision.
Notwithstanding that the appellant had been given the opportunity to hear the respondent's oral submissions and to read the documents and had rejected the opportunity, the court subsequently ordered that the appellant be given until Friday 6 July 2012 to file and serve any written submissions concerning the application. He did not file any submissions.
Instead, he chose to file an application that 'Newness J [sic] and Pullin J be disqualified from dealing with my appeals or cases and interstate judges to be appointed'. The appellant apparently failed to observe that Newnes JA was not sitting on this appeal. He was not given leave to file any application after the court reserved its decision. The appellant asserts that Pullin JA should not sit on the appeal because Pullin JA presided 'on just about each, and every hearing until the current appeal'. In fact, apart from the Chief Justice and the President, all but one of the current judges of the Court of Appeal have sat on appeals brought by the appellant. The appellant has brought so many appeals that it was inevitable that he would encounter judges of this court on more than one occasion. The application has no merit and is dismissed.
Disposition of the respondent's application to dismiss the appeal
The respondent's application should be upheld. None of the grounds of appeal have any reasonable prospect of succeeding. As a result, an extension of time in which to appeal should be refused with the result that the appeal is dismissed.
Reference of papers to the Attorney General
This is the third occasion on which the appellant has appealed against an adjournment order in circumstances where the appeal could serve no practical purpose: see MTI v SUL [2009] WASCA 70 and MTI v SUL [2008] WASCA 261. It is the ninth appeal against orders of three different judges in the Family Court in proceedings concerning the child: see MTI v SUL [2007] WASCA 57; MTI v SUL [No 2] [2007] WASCA 240 (application for review dismissed in MTI v SUL [2008] WASCA 19); MTI v SUL [No 3] [2008] WASCA 19 (two appeals); MTI v SUL [2008] WASCA 116; MTI v SUL [2008] WASCA 261; MTI v SUL [2009] WASCA 70 and MTI v SUL [No 2] [2010] WASCA 58.
Of the eight other appeals, six were dismissed without a full hearing. They were dismissed because of failure to comply with a springing order, or noncompliance with the rules or because they were based on grounds which had no reasonable prospect of succeeding.
These reasons for decision will be referred to the Attorney General with a request that the Attorney consider making an application to a judge in the General Division for an order under s 4 of the Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 2002 (WA).
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