Mt Thorley Operations Pty Limited v Burgess & Ors

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Mt Thorley Operations Pty Ltd v Burgess [2001] FCA 117

INDUSTRIAL LAW - inconsistency between state and federal law – whether orders sought under s 106 of Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW) inconsistent with a certified agreement made pursuant to Commonwealth legislation– whether s 152 of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) has application to an industrial agreement certified under the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) – whether s 152 of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) has application to orders not yet made

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – declaratory orders – whether question of inconsistency hypothetical - where inconsistency arises from orders sought rather than orders issued

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B(1A)(c)
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ss 152, 153, 170LZ and 412
Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW) s 106

Burgess v Mount Thorley Operations Pty Ltd(No 2) (1999) 100 IR 260 referred to
Gordonstone Coal Management Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (1999) 93 FCR 153 referred to
Telstra Corporation Limited v MacBean (2000) 98 IR 10 referred to
Australian Education Union v Department of Trainingand Employment (1999) 94 IR 386 referred to
University of New South Wales v Moorhouse (1975) 131 CLR 1 referred to
Commissioner of Taxation v De Vonk (1995) 61 FCR 564 referred to
Telstra Corporation Ltd v Worthing (1999) 197 CLR 61 referred to
Australian Broadcasting Commission v Industrial Court of South Australia (1998) 138 CLR 399 referred to
Bass v Permanent Trustees Co Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334 referred to

MT THORLEY OPERATIONS PTY LTD (ACN 000 013 249) v MICHAEL JOHN BURGESS, RAYMOND GORDON WILLS, MARVYN SMITH, RODNEY WILLIAM JONES, GEOFFREY IAN BRIGHT, CHARLES ANTHONY MITCHELL, BARRY FONG, LESLIE JAMES IRVINE, WILLIAM ROBERT HOYE, FREDERICK GEORGE VEIGEL, MICHAEL BRUCE SAMPSON, ROSS ALLEN BROWN,MICHAEL MATTHEW PHILLIPS, JOHN DOUGLAS CUDDIGAN

N 777 OF 2000

MOORE J
23 FEBRUARY 2001
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 777 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

MT THORLEY OPERATIONS PTY LIMITED
ACN 000 013 249
APPLICANT

AND:

MICHAEL JOHN BURGESS, RAYMOND GORDON WILLS,
MARVYN SMITH, RODNEY WILLIAM JONES, GEOFFREY IAN BRIGHT, CHARLES ANTHONY MITCHELL, BARRY FONG, LESLIE JAMES IRVINE, WILLIAM ROBERT HOYE,
FREDERICK GEORGE VEIGEL, MICHAEL BRUCE SAMPSON, ROSS ALLEN BROWN,MICHAEL MATTHEW PHILLIPS, JOHN DOUGLAS CUDDIGAN
RESPONDENTS

JUDGE:

MOORE J

DATE OF ORDER:

23 FEBRUARY 2001

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS AND DIRECTS THAT:

1.The application of Mt Thorley Operations Pty Ltd, matter No N 777 of 2000, be stayed until further order of the Court.

2.Mt Thorley notify the associate of Moore J in writing, within 7 days of the making of the orders, that final orders have been made in matters 3614 to 3627 of 1998 in the Industrial Commission of New South Wales.

3.Liberty to apply on 7 days notice.

4.The hearing date of 16 March 2001 is vacated.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 117
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Mt Thorley Operations Pty Limited v Burgess & Ors, Mt Thorley Operations Pty Ltd applied to the Federal Court for declaratory relief concerning orders sought by fourteen former employees in proceedings brought under s 106 of the Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW). Mt Thorley argued that the sought orders in the 106 proceedings would be inconsistent with the terms of a certified agreement, rendering them invalid. The Federal Court was required to determine whether it had jurisdiction to hear Mt Thorley's application and, if so, whether the orders sought by the former employees in the 106 proceedings were inconsistent with the certified agreement.

The court found that it had jurisdiction to hear the application under s 153 of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) and s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). The court held that issues of inconsistency could be determined by reference to the proposed orders in the 106 proceedings and the certified agreement. The court concluded that there was no intention in the certified agreement to exclude any inconsistent terms and conditions of a contract of employment regulated by the agreement. Therefore, the court could make the declaratory orders sought by Mt Thorley.

The Federal Court granted the declaratory relief sought by Mt Thorley, declaring that the orders sought by the former employees in the 106 proceedings would be invalid if they were inconsistent with the certified agreement. The court also restrained the former employees from pursuing their claims for the sought orders in the 106 proceedings. The court further ordered that the proceedings should be heard and determined before the trial of the 106 proceedings commenced to avoid unnecessary inconvenience and expense.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

On 19 July 2000 Mt Thorley Operations Pty Ltd (“Mount Thorley”) filed an application seeking relief under s 39B(1A)(c) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), ss 152, 153 and 412 of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (“WR Act”) and ss 21, 22 and 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (“FC Act”). Mount Thorley seeks declaratory relief concerning orders sought in proceedings brought by fourteen former employees (“the applicants”). Those proceedings have been brought under s 106 of the Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW) (“the State Act”) seeking relief under that section (“the 106 proceedings”). The gravamen of the application by Mount Thorley in these proceedings is that the orders sought in the 106 proceedings will, if made, be inconsistent with the terms of a certified agreement which presently has legal effect by operation of the WR Act. If that is so, then because of this inconsistency, the orders will be invalid. Declaratory relief to that effect is sought. The background On 29 September 1996 the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (“the Federal Commission”) certified an agreement under what was then entitled the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) (“the IR Act”) called the Mount Thorley Operations Enterprise Agreement 1996 (“the Agreement”). The Agreement contained provisions dealing with termination of employment, introduction of change, redundancy, severance and retrenchment and security of employment. On 28 November 1997 Mount Thorley terminated the employment of each of the applicants. On 3 July 1998 the applicants commenced the 106 proceedings in the New South Wales Industrial Relations Commission (“the State Commission”). The orders then sought are conveniently set out in a judgment of Marks J given on 24 May 1999: Burgess v Mount Thorley Operations Pty Ltd(No 2) (1999) 100 IR 260 at 262-263. Somewhat simplified, the orders sought were orders declaring the contract of employment of each applicant void, and/or unfair, harsh and unconscionable and contrary to the public interest and consequential orders varying the contract of employment requiring the payment of specified sums on termination, giving specified notice on termination and procedures to be followed prior to termination. The judgment of Marks J concerned an application by Mount Thorley for orders striking out the 106 proceedings. The grounds were summarised by his Honour at 261:“The first is that this Court lacks jurisdiction by reason of the operation of s 109 of the Australian Constitution and either s 152 or s 170LZ of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth). The second reason advanced is that each applicant seeks that this Court exercise powers under a State law which is inconsistent with and/or in conflict and/or which would impair or detract from the operation of an industrial agreement certified under the Workplace Relations Act 1996. The third reason advanced is that upon a proper interpretation the provisions of Ch 2 Pt 6 of the Act within which s 106 is contained do not and were not intended to extend to employees whose terms and conditions of employment are governed by a certified agreement of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission made pursuant to the Workplace Relations Act 1996 or its predecessor.”His Honour dismissed the application and published lengthy reasons explaining why. Marks J canvassed the legal principles concerning inconsistency and, in relation to the alleged inconsistency between the relief sought in the State Commission and the Agreement, said at 282:“I conclude therefore that although the nature and effect of any orders that this Court may make may be affected by the provisions of the industrial agreement, I am unable in the circumstances to discern any intention from the provisions of the industrial agreement itself that the jurisdiction of this Court should ipso facto be excluded.On this basis it is not necessary that I consider the other arguments advanced by Mr Kenzie, namely that some of the provisions of the industrial agreement provide for minimum entitlements only and do not prevent the payment of enhanced benefits whether pursuant to the agreement itself or by any order of this Court. Such arguments may, however, fall to be considered on any occasion when this Court is called upon to make orders.There is another aspect of this argument. Whilst it is true that the industrial agreement does deal exhaustively with the circumstances of the termination of employment and in particular redundancy it does not purport to deal with the underlying contract of employment. I do not detect from the provisions of the industrial agreement any intention to exclude any inconsistent terms and conditions of a contract of employment which is concurrently regulated by the industrial agreement. It is clear that a contract of employment can subsist concurrently with an industrial agreement even though there may, prima facie, be some tension.”His Honour then dealt with an argument concerning inconsistency between Division 3 of Part VIA of the WR Act though that matter is not presently relevant in these proceedings. His Honour went on to deal with submissions concerning the scope and operation of s 106 in so far as it might apply to employees or former employees employed under an award or agreement made or certified under the WR Act. His Honour, in substance, rejected the submission that proceedings under s 106 could not be instituted by employees whose employment had been regulated by a federal industrial instrument and/or heard and determined by the State Commission.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

MOORE J

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MOORE J

Telstra Corporation Ltd v MacBean raised a different question. In issue was the status of a certified agreement which had been certified by the Federal Commission on 27 April 1993 pursuant to the statutory regime embodied in the IR Act as originally enacted. At that time, “award” was defined in the IR Act as including a certified agreement. One issue was whether the certified agreement was an award for the purposes of provisions in Sch 5 of the WROLA Act requiring the removal from awards, by their variation, of provisions so the awards only dealt with what was elsewhere prescribed as “allowable award matters”. The Full Court concluded that the certified agreement in question was not an award though the members of the Court published separate reasons for so concluding. For reasons which will be apparent shortly, it is unnecessary to descend into greater detail about the approach of each member of the Full Court nor discuss in much greater detail the amendments (including transitional provisions) that may impact upon the issue raised in these proceedings.The issues and their consideration The applicants submitted in this matter that the proceedings should be stayed pending the determination of the 106 proceedings or, alternatively, dismissed because this Court lacks jurisdiction to determine them. Ultimately counsel for the applicants submitted that the jurisdictional issue was a factor to be considered in the application for an order staying the proceedings and, in substance, invited the Court not to determine the jurisdictional issue at this stage. Counsel for Mount Thorley submitted that it had properly invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under s 153 of the WR Act (perhaps when read with s 39B of the Judiciary Act) or s 39B of the Judiciary Act when read with s 170LZ of the WR Act. It was further submitted that the declaratory orders sought could be made notwithstanding that no orders had yet been made in the State Commission. That was because the applicants have identified what orders were sought in the 106 proceedings, and issues of inconsistency could be determined by reference to those proposed orders (or perhaps, additionally, as those orders have been amended) and the Agreement. It is convenient to set out the orders sought by Mount Thorley in these proceedings. They were:“1.A declaration that the orders sought by the respondents in summonses numbered 3614 to 3627 of 1998 filed in the Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales on 3 July 1998 against the applicant are invalid.2.An order that the respondents and each of them be restrained from pursuing or otherwise advancing their claims for the orders sought in summonses numbered 3614 to 3627 of 1998 in the Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales against the applicant.3.Such other relief as the Court sees fit.” The trial in the 106 proceedings is scheduled to commence in the State Commission in May 2001. Since its application was filed in this Court, Mount Thorley has submitted that the proceedings in this Court should be heard and determined before the trial commences. Indeed a principle reason advanced by Mount Thorley for this Court to hear and determine its application before then, is to avoid the inconvenience and expense of a trial seeking orders, it is submitted, that will have no legal effect.