Mt Isa City Council v Desmond; Desmond v McIntyre
[1990] HCATrans 297
m .1,, AUSTRALIA I!' --.>).)~~~~/....~
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Brisbane No B39 of 1990 B e t w e e n -
MT ISA CITY COUNCIL
Applicant
and
WAYNE JOSEPH DESMOND
Respondent
Office of the Registry
Brisbane No B40 of 1990 B e t w e e n -
WAYNE JOSEPH DESMOND
Applicant
and
JOHN McGILLIVRAY McINTYRE,
ANTHONY O'BRIEN LOUGHNAN,
RICHARD GRENVILLE BARRETT,
DAVID HARRY JAMES, JOHN
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WILLIAMS, HARRY MIKELSONS
and LEONARD ERIC MOORE
Respondents
Applications for special leave
to appeal
MASON CJ
TOOHEY J
McHUGH J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
FROM BRISBANE BY VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA ON FRIDAY, 7 DECEMBER 1990, AT 11.04 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR R.R. DOUGLAS, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my
learned friend, MR P.C. STEPHENS, for the applicant
in the first matter. (instructed by Quinlan,
Miller & Treston)
MR C.J.L. BRABAZON, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with
my learned friend, MR D.J. McGILL, for the
respondent in the first matter and for the
applicant in the second matter.
(instructed by Barry & Nilson)
| MR J. GRIFFIN, QC: | May it please the Court, I appear with |
my learned friend, MR M.W. FORDE, for the
respondent in the second matter.
(instructed by Murrell Stephenson)
| MASON CJ: | The Registrar has been informed by the |
solicitors for the third defendant in the action
that they are not a party to the application, but
that they have been served with the joint
application book by the applicant. They have further informed the Registrar they do not wish to
be heard on the substantive issue. They have a
costs order in their favour and that if the
applicant's application is successful, they wish to
reserve their rights to appear at any appeal.
MR DOUGLAS: Yes, Your Honour.
| MASON CJ: Yes. | |
| MR DOUGLAS: | Your Honours, this application arises out of a |
case which concerns a motor cyclist, who came to
grief on an intersection in Mt Isa, where - - -
| MASON CJ: | We are familiar with the facts and with the |
history of the matter on its way through the court.
| MR DOUGLAS: | Thank you, Your Honours. Might I just make one |
point so that it is clear to you, that the
subdivision was one which was done, if you like, in
the bush, in the sense that there was no connecting
roadway between it at one end and Marian Street,
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which is the main road, and that there was an
unformed road between the completed subdivision and
the main road, which was subsequently, as part of
the overall development, covered with a thinbitumen strip leaving, as were described in the
papers, "the gravel shoulders to either side".
Your Honours, in our submission, put shortly,
the Full Court has misapplied the test in
Buckle v Bayswater Road (1936) 57 CLR 259. The way
Mr Justice Connolly in the Full Court expressed the
test was put by him succinctly at page 93 of the
record, where he said:
This is not a simple case of a highway
authority failing to form a road. It is, on
the contrary, a case in which a local
authority has permitted subdivision on the
basis of a road layout which inevitably had
the dangerous features which materialised in
this case unless it either sealed, curbed and
channelled the eastern part of Park Avenue or
took appropriate steps by warning the public
and cleaning the road as early as practicable
to guard against the hazard.
The eastern part of Park Avenue, to which
His Honour is referring, is the part which was
always going to be left unsealed. It was not part
of the subdivision. It was not part of the
roadworks, the subject of the design by the
engineers and a construction by the constructing
authority. It was, however, given the treatment of
a twelve foot strip of bitumen between the
subdivision and the main road.
Your Honours, the Chief Justice did not
express himself as succinctly as
Mr Justice Connolly, but his reasons are to the
same effect, beginning at page 71 of the record and
particularly pages 75 to 78. I will not deal with those. In essence they reach the same conclusion
as His Honour Mr Justice Connolly.
Mr Justice Kelly, in his judgment, dealt only with the question of the liability of the engineers to
the plaintiff.
In our submission, the correct approach was
that of the trial judge, and might we take you to
pages 52 and 53 of the record where His Honour
Mr Justice Ryan expressed the test, we say
correctly, this way, having found the facts with
which Your Honours are familiar. At the bottom of page 52: The question which must be asked in my
opinion is whether it was negligent for the
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was constructed. In the language used by
Dixon J. it is the "improper nature of the
original act of the road authority" which is
the foundation of the complaint against it.Council to build a road in the way in which it the road in the way it did it seems to me that
it would not be liable for any injuries attributable to a failure to remove gravel
from the road. I have given my reasons for
concluding that it was not negligent. The case therefore is one where there was a failure to maintain a road surface which -
| McHUGH J: | Just stopping there, Justice Ryan was of the |
view that there was no negligence in design because
there would be supplementary clearing and
maintenance continually carried out.
| MR DOUGLAS: | I can hardly hear Your Honour actually. |
| McHUGH J: | I am sorry. | Mr Justice Ryan found that there was |
no negligence in the design of the road because he
was of the opinion that there would be a subsequent
or supplementary clearing and maintenance
continually carried out.
| MR DOUGLAS: | That is so. That was done, Your Honour. It |
was done, on the evidence, by two gangs who were
permanently employed on that task. One of the gangs did other tasks during different times of the
year but what happened after rain, and what must be
borne in mind, is the storm which produced the
amount of gravel on this intersection was what is
called "a one in 50 storm", that is one which you
would expect only every 50 years. So you would expect there to be a lot of gravel and the evidence
was that it took as long as it took to get around
Mt Isa with many hundreds of intersections all with the same problem and that this intersection had not
been reached by the time that the accident
occurred.
| McHUGH J: That only means that there was foreseeable risk |
of injury arising from the design as it operated
which could have been avoided either by a clean-up
gang, or by a better design.
MR DOUGLAS: Well, Your Honour, with respect, there is
nothing new in that, if one goes to the older
cases, and particularly if one goes to Buckle
itself. The graphic illustration of a similar case is that of Moul v Croydon Corporation,
119 Law Times 318, which is in our list of
authorities. In that case, a highway was built
using wood paving which after heavy rain swelled
and bulged causing an obstruction which resulted in
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a bus colliding with an electric standard and
injuries being suffered by the plaintiff.
The fact that the wooden blocks would swell
and bulge was known to the corporation, the
constructing authority, at the time they were put
in and notwithstanding the case the Court of Appeal
held that in such circumstances it was mere
nonfeasance and not actionable. There are many similar cases. One could take a case of a road authority
which constructs a highway through a rainforest
knowing that trees may from time to time in a
cyclone fall on the roadway. One may take other examples where such a thing could occur. In this case our submission is the council did not bring
anything artificial on to the surface of the
roadway. What came on to it was something which occurred naturally during rainfall. Indeed, a
great majority of the gravel itself came from the
roadway on the eastern side of Park Avenue between
Marian Street and the subdivision.
MASON CJ: That does not meet the point of negligent design
and construction.
| MR DOUGLAS: | We submit it does, with respect, because if one |
goes back again to Mills' case that, on the same
test, must have been negligent design and
construction. The constructing authority there knew that. The material which they were using for the road would swell in certain circumstances and
would cause an obstruction. They did nothing about
it. The Court of Appeal there thought that was mere nonfeasance.
McHUGH J: Well, what do you say about the proposition that
Buckle's case only applies the
misfeasance/nonfeasance dichotomy in relation to
the exercise of highway powers and not in relation
to drainage powers, and this was a case of
drainage?
| MR DOUGLAS: Well, Your Honour, to answer the question, it |
is the debate, and always has been the debate
whether it applies only to highway authorities and
not to drainage authorities. The judges themselves in that case reached different conclusions.
In any event, Your Honour, this case can be
truly said to be where the drainage was merely
ancillary to the construction of the roadway. It
was, in truth then, I think, Your Honours,
throughout the case dealt with as being a highway
construction where the drainage was incidental.
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| McHUGH J: | I thought Mr Justice Macrossan tended to the view |
that this case was not within Buckle.
| MR DOUGLAS: | Your Honour, he expressed that view, though we |
would take what he said as not being central to his
decision. In any event, Your Honour, what Buckle
means in respect of that is not clear, we submit.
The leading judgment in Buckle was that of
Mr Justice Dixon, as he then was.
With respect to Buckle, might we say there has
been some debate in recent times in Australia as to whether that decision has been impinged upon by the decision of this Court in Heyman's case, and might
we perhaps turn to that and submit that it has beendealt with on at least three occasions recently so
far as we know.
The Full Court of the Federal Court in
McDonough, 73 ALR 148, determined that Heyman's
case -
has not expressly or impliedly abrogated the
defence of non-feasance.
Mr Justice Ryan took the same view in this case.
It has also been discussed in Hill v The
Commissioner for Main Roads in the New South Wales
Supreme Court - and these references are all at
page 110 of the record - and in French v District
Council of Ridley, in the South Australian Supreme
Court, where the debate has been whether Heyman's
case, as I said, has had the effect of abrogating
the defence of nonfeasance.
| MASON CJ: | Has anyone held that it has? |
| MR DOUGLAS: | No, nobody has held that it has so far as we |
can find out. No one has yet suggested - I expect because of the strength of Buckle's case,
Your Honours, that the general duty of care which
is imposed by Heyman's case - no judge has -
applies to, if you like, impliedly overrule
Buckle's case.
MASON CJ: It is possible that Heyman may provide a
development which in due course could undermine
Buckle, but at the moment there is no decision of
this Court or of any other court that I know of
that actually undermines Buckle as a decision.
| MR DOUGLAS: | No, Your Honour, that is so. | But we would |
submit this may be, of course, the case which is
the proper vehicle to determine whether, in fact,
Heyman's case has impinged upon or undermined - - -
MASON CJ: Well, you are not asking us to do, are you?
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| MR DOUGLAS: | No, Your Honour. | It would not be fruitful for |
our exercise. Your Honours, in our submission, put as best we can, the Full Court has misapplied the
test in Buckle - - -
McHUGH J: That is not a special leave ground, is it?
MR DOUGLAS: Well, it is in the sense that if they had
misconstrued the law and if that case gets some
notoriety in the country, Your Honour, it is a
special leave point; if, in fact, they have
misapplied the test and that misapplication gets
some strength behind it elsewhere, it makes it a
special leave point.
Your Honours will be keen to see, with
respect, that Buckle's case is maintained as
authority for the propositions it put, the effect
of the Full Court's decision is to undermine it tosome extent if the test has been applied incorrectly. They are our submissions,
Your Honour.
| MASON CJ: | Thank you, Mr Douglas. | We need not trouble you, |
Mr Brabazon. In this application, the Court is of
opinion that the decision of the Full Court of the
Supreme Court is not attended with sufficient doubt
to justify the grant of special leave to appeal. The application is therefore refused. I take it
you apply for costs, Mr Brabazon?
| MR BRABAZON: | Yes, Your Honour. |
| MASON CJ: | I take it that is not opposed, Mr Douglas, so the |
application is refused with costs.
Now, Mr Brabazon, in the circumstances, you do
not proceed with your application.
| MR BRABAZON: | That is so. We have no further interest, |
Your Honour. All we would wish to say on the
assumption that our learned friends for the
engineers might ask for costs against us, which I
suppose we cannot oppose, we simply wish a sort of Bullock order to recover all our costs because it
was a step we had to take to protect the plaintiff in the event that the Council may have got special
leave.
MASON CJ: Yes.
| MR BRABAZON: | So we do not pursue the application, and our |
only concern is with costs.
MASON CJ: Yes, well we had better hear what your opponent,
Mr Griffin, has to say. Mr Griffin, you do not
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oppose the refusal of the application? What do you
say about costs?
| MR GRIFFIN: | We ask for costs, if the Court pleases. |
MASON CJ: very well.
| MR DOUGLAS: | Could I be heard on the order for costs, |
please, Your Honours, in that application?
MASON CJ: Yes.
| MR DOUGLAS: | We were not parties to it and we would submit |
that it was purely an application based upon a
finding of fact put before the trial judge and the facts to find that the engineers were negligent.
That sort of application, before this Court, was always doomed to failure and whether we succeeded
on ours or not would not affect that result. It had to be done, I expect, in the outcome that if we
got special leave and succeeded in the High Court,
Mr Brabazon, to protect his interest, had to pursue
the engineer on the off chance that the High Court
might overturn a finding of fact. But it otherwise
did not concern us and a Bullock order or similarorder should not be made which would compel us to
pay those costs.
| MASON CJ: | Yes. | The Court will refuse each application and |
in each application the applicant will pay the
respondent's costs.
AT 11.20 THE MATTER WAS ADJOURNED SINE DIE
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Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
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Negligence & Tort
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Administrative Law
Legal Concepts
-
Duty of Care
-
Negligence
-
Appeal
-
Judicial Review
-
Standing
-
Causation
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