MSS Security Pty Ltd

[2015] FWC 2283

[2015] FWC 2283

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.185—Enterprise agreement

MSS Security Pty Ltd
(AG2014/10202)

COMMISSIONER GREGORY MELBOURNE, 31 MARCH 2015

Application for approval of the MSS Security QLD Enterprise Agreement 2014 - 2018.

[1] An application has been made for approval of an enterprise agreement known as the MSS Security QLD Enterprise Agreement 2014 - 2018 (the Agreement). The application was made pursuant to s.185 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act) by MSS Security Pty Ltd (“MSS”). It is a single-enterprise Agreement.

[2] The Form F18 – Statutory Declaration provided by United Voice raises four particular grounds of objection to approval of the proposed Agreement. I now turn to deal with each using the headings referred to by United Voice in the Form F18.

1. Pre-approval steps

[3] United Voice states in its Form F18 declaration that non-Union bargaining representatives were provided with the opportunity to address employees at the information sessions held during the “access” period. However, its representatives were not provided with the same opportunity. It submits as a consequence that MSS has not taken all reasonable steps to provide an appropriate explanation to all relevant employees about the terms and conditions contained in the proposed Agreement. It continues to submit the Union members employed by MSS constitute a particular group of relevant employees that require “some specific consideration.” 1 Accordingly, United Voice representatives should have been provided with the opportunity to specifically address members about the terms and conditions contained in the proposed Agreement during the access period.

[4] However, United Voice continued to indicate in its oral submissions that its objection was more of an “in principle” concern, than an actual one, in that the issue had not been raised by any of its members during the “access period.”

[5] MSS referred to three matters in response to the suggestion it did not take all reasonable steps to explain the terms of the proposed Agreement to all relevant employees. It, firstly, made reference to s.180(5) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and submits the obligation in the legislation to explain the terms of the proposed agreement is imposed on the employer, rather than on a bargaining representative or any other party.

[6] Secondly, it submits the Commission has not adopted a pedantic or prescriptive approach to this obligation in past decisions that have dealt with this issue. It also submits that the Commission has determined there is no requirement to conduct a “forensic investigation” into whether an Applicant provided an appropriate explanation to all relevant employees. It continues to submit the steps it took, as set out in its form F17 declaration, clearly represent “all reasonable steps.”

[7] MSS also submits it did not prevent any United Voice representative from speaking with employees, nor did it receive or reject any request from the Union to speak to employees about the terms of the proposed Agreement.

[8] In dealing with this objection it is noted, firstly, that United Voice is not pointing to particular evidence, or relying on a particular authority, to suggest any employee was disadvantaged by the steps taken by MSS in the process, or that Union members should be considered to be a class of “relevant employees” who require an explanation to be provided to them in a different way to that provided to employees generally.

[9] The relevant authorities confirm the scheme of the legislation intends that the obligation to take reasonable steps to provide an appropriate explanation to employees is borne by the employer. However, this doesn’t mean that bargaining representatives can’t be involved in these processes, and that they may be carried out in a collaborative way with the involvement of both the employer and bargaining representatives. Without going to it in detail the decision of the Full Bench in McDonald’s Australia v Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees’ Association 2 provides confirmation of this view.

[10] However, in dealing with this ground of objection I am not satisfied, in conclusion, that union members are to be considered to be a particular class of “relevant employees” who require an explanation about a proposed enterprise agreement to be provided in a manner that is different from that provided to employees generally.

2. Wages

[11] United Voice submits its concerns in relation to this particular ground of objection have been triggered by circumstances arising from the operation of the existing Enterprise Agreement, which has now passed its nominal expiry date but still covers the parties. It submits a situation has been created under the terms and conditions contained in that Agreement whereby the wage rates are less than the equivalent rates in the Security Services Industry Award 2010 3. It submits this situation has arisen because the wage increases in the Agreement took effect on 1 November each year, several months after the application of the increases granted by the Commission’s annual Minimum Wage Review decision.

[12] United Voice continues to submit that the potential for this situation to occur remains because the proposed Agreement also contains provisions for wage increases during the life of the Agreement to apply from 1 November in each year. In its submission this has the potential to result in employees not being “better off overall” when a comparison is made between the wage rates contained in the proposed Agreement and those contained in the underlying Award and further, “there remains the high likelihood of a further disputation and litigation over the course of the 4 years.” 4

[13] In response to a question from the Commission, which sought to clarify the nature of the Union’s objection, United Voice responded by indicating its concerns involve, in large part, the threat of future disputation between the parties, which it submits could have an impact or bearing on whether the employees are “better off overall” under the terms and conditions contained in the Agreement.

[14] MSS submitted in response that the Commission can only conduct the “better off overall” test assessment based on what is before it, and cannot be expected to predict what might occur at some point in the future. It also emphasised that the Act does not permit the operation of an enterprise agreement to apply wage rates that are less than those required to be provided under the terms of the underlying Award. It also submitted that if the Commission was concerned about this objection it was prepared to consider providing an undertaking to address any such concerns.

[15] In dealing with this ground of objection I am satisfied it does not act to prevent the proposed Agreement from being approved. I also note United Voice acknowledged in its oral submissions that while the “objection is maintained” it is pressed with “no great conviction.” 5 I will therefore deal briefly with the issue.

[16] Section 193 of the Act provides that the Commission is required to be satisfied an Agreement passes the “better off overall” test at the “test time.” It continues to indicate in s.193(6) that:

“The test time is the time the application for approval of the agreement by the FWC was made under section 185.” 6

[17] I also note the provisions contained in s.206, which apply in circumstances where both an Agreement and a Modern Award apply to an employee(s). It provides that the base rate of pay under the Agreement must not be less than the base rate of pay that would otherwise be applicable to the employee under the Modern Award. The section continues to provide that in any circumstance where the rate in an Agreement falls below the rates provided for in the underlying Award then the Agreement has effect as if the wage rates were equal to those contained in the Award. I am accordingly satisfied this provides an appropriate safeguard in any situation where the base wage rates in an Agreement fall below the comparable wage rates contained in the underlying Award.

[18] In addition, I am not persuaded that the prospect or possibility of industrial disputation at some point in time during the life of an enterprise agreement, for whatever reason, can constitute a matter that is required to be considered in the context of the “better off overall” test. The test is concerned instead with a comparison between the terms and conditions contained in a proposed Agreement and the terms and conditions contained in the underlying Award. It does not extend to speculative considerations about the possible consequences that might flow from the terms and conditions contained in the Agreement at some unspecified future time.

3. Overtime Allocation

[19] The objection by United Voice under this heading concerns the provisions contained in clause 4.3.5(a) of the proposed Agreement which states:

“(a) Overtime in a 12-hour rotating roster cycle will generally be allocated to hours that fall on a Sunday: at the end of the Saturday night shift and a Sunday day shift.” 7

[20] United Voice submits these provisions have the potential to act to deny employees the benefit of the overtime and penalty rate provisions in the Award. It refers, in particular, to clause 22.3 which provides that all ordinary hours worked during the Sunday span of hours receive a penalty rate of 100%, in addition to the ordinary time rates. It continues to submit this proposed arbitrary allocation of overtime is intended to defeat the entitlements provided for under the terms of the Award, and “impacts negatively in respect of the Better Off Overall Test.” 8

[21] United Voice provided an example of the disadvantage that might be incurred by referring to a situation where an employee is absent on sick leave on a day of rostered overtime, being the Sunday shift, meaning they would simply be paid at ordinary time rates for that rostered shift, rather than at the overtime rate.

[22] MSS submits in response the objection by United Voice in this case appears to be based on a view that under the Security Services Industry Award 2010 an employer cannot roster overtime on a Sunday if it results in employees not receiving overtime penalty rate entitlements on other days. It submits in response that no such restriction exists in the Award. It also submits the same issue was raised, unsuccessfully, by several employees in the matter of Douglas Harland; Ian Johnson; and Richard Hilleard v MSS Security Pty Ltd 9(“Harland”) and, “in light of this authority, the Union’s objection cannot be sustained.”10

[23] I have had regard to the decision in Harland. In that matter Commissioner Williams was dealing with various issues to do with the application of the Security Services Industry Award 2010. One of those issues concerned whether the employer was able to put in place a roster which resulted in 12 hours of overtime being worked on a Sunday. In his decision Commissioner Williams noted that these roster arrangements did operate to minimise the wage costs for the employer, and:

“If the roster was arranged differently the 12 hours of overtime which under the respondent’s roster falls on a Sunday would be spread across a number of different shifts and these overtime hours could be paid at double time and in addition the ordinary hours worked on the Sunday would also be paid at double time.” 11

[24] Commissioner Williams also made reference to a decision handed down as part of the Award Modernisation process 12, in this case dealing with the Security Services Industry Award 2010. It provided for 12 hour ordinary time shifts to be worked in certain circumstances. The Commissioner stated:

“[76] The Roster design in any workplace is at the discretion of the employer subject to the Award requirements.

[77] There is nothing inappropriate in the respondent designing its rosters to minimise its costs as the Full Bench has clearly recognised. In terms of the respondent’s approach to rostering ordinary hours and consequently where overtime hours fall in that roster, I am satisfied the respondent is entitled to operate under the roster it has designed in this case.

[78] The rostering approach of the respondent is consistent with the terms of the Award. There is nothing in the Award that prohibits Sunday shifts being 12 hours of overtime. I am satisfied that the respondent’s calculations, in terms of ordinary hours and overtime under their roster, meet the requirements of the Award.” 13

[25] It is acknowledged at the outset that the decision in Harland involved an application under s.739, and was concerned with the way in which the Security Services Industry Award 2010 was interpreted and applied. By contrast the present matter is concerned with an application under s.185 for approval of an Agreement.

[26] However, despite the different nature of the applications I am satisfied the conclusions reached by Commissioner Williams about the ability to roster Sunday shifts on the basis of 12 hours of overtime, without being in conflict with the provisions in the Award, are relevant to the determination of this matter. The concerns of United Voice about the consequences of these arrangements when an employee is unable to attend for work on a Sunday are also noted. However, I am not persuaded this acts to prohibit such arrangements being put in place under the Award, or under the terms of the proposed Agreement.

[27] In conclusion, having regard to both the decision in Harland and the submissions of the parties I am not persuaded that clause 4.3.5(a) in the proposed Agreement constitutes an arrangement that is “at odds” with what the Award enables. It follows that this is not a matter to be considered in the context of the “better off overall” test comparison between the provisions contained in the proposed Agreement and those contained in the underlying Award.

4. Exception to Payment of Overtime Penalties

[28] The objection of United Voice in this case centres on the provisions contained in sub clause 4.3.6(a) of the proposed Agreement which states:

“(a) Clauses 4.3.1 – 4.3.5 in respect to payment of overtime do not apply where a full time employee has entered into a written agreement as per Appendix B with MSS Security where he or she agrees to work hours in excess of the ordinary hours per fortnight to be paid at the rate prescribed for a casual employee as specified in Part 3 ‘Wages’”. 14

[29] United Voice submits the effect of this provision for employees who enter into such agreements is that instead of being entitled to payment at overtime rates, (those rates generally providing for time and a half for the first two hours and double time thereafter), the employees will instead only be entitled to payment at the applicable casual rate, being time and a quarter.

[30] United Voice raises several points in regard to this ground of objection. It, firstly, acknowledges in its oral submissions that a global assessment of the terms and conditions contained in the proposed Agreement is required by way of comparison with the terms and conditions contained in the underlying reference instrument, being the Security Services Industry Award 2010. Secondly, in objecting to the provisions contained in the sub clause it refers to various authorities which it submits have previously determined similar provisions contained in other agreements, which reduce overtime penalty rates below those contained in the comparable Award, have a consequential “significant detrimental impact on the BOOT.” 15

[31] United Voice continues to submit the provisions contained in the proposed Agreement should be viewed in the same way, and the proposal for such overtime work to only attract the casual penalty rate of 25 percent, means they are clearly disadvantageous for the employees involved.

[32] It continued to submit this disadvantage would not be offset by the proposed wage rates in the Agreement which it submits are not substantially different from those contained in the underlying Award.

[33] It also submits that similar provisions were contained in the Agreement that now covers the parties, however, in the course of the approval process MSS provided an undertaking that the provisions would not be relied upon. United Voice submits a similar undertaking should be provided in this case. It also indicated it does not support the sub clause operating in conjunction with an undertaking that provides for the auditing of employee entitlements to ensure they are, at all times, over and above those provided for in the underlying Award.

[34] MSS acknowledges in response that previous decisions of the Commission have established that enabling employees to have access to additional hours by volunteering to work at ordinary time rates, rather than overtime penalty rates, has not been considered by the Commission to be a benefit in the context of the “better off overall” test. However, it also submits such arrangements are not precluded from being part of an Agreement. Where they are included the Commission is simply required to consider them as part of the global assessment of the terms and conditions contained in the overall Agreement and those contained in the underlying Award.

[35] MSS also provided an assessment of the impact of employees performing overtime, but being paid at the casual rates of pay, within the context of what it described as the employees’ usual roster patterns. It submits these involve rosters involving 4 days of 12 hour shifts, followed by 4 days off, and then 4 nights of 12 hour shifts, followed by a further 4 days off, with the pattern then repeating. It continued to indicate in its oral submissions that employees at Level 1 and 2 could work 11 hours of overtime at the casual rate over the period of an 8 week roster and still be better off overall when compared with the underlying Award. It submits that the comparable hours that could be worked by a Level 3 employee are 12 hours and for a Level 4 employee, 16 hours.

[36] MSS continued to submit that any concerns about employees being “better off overall” under the terms and conditions contained in the proposed Agreement, including the overtime provision, could be dealt with by an undertaking which would require regular auditing of employees’ working arrangements to ensure that at all times their earnings under the terms and conditions contained in the proposed Agreement were in excess of what they would have been entitled to had they been employed under the terms and conditions contained in the Security Services Industry Award 2010.

[37] In dealing with the issues raised in the context of this objection it is noted at the outset that both parties acknowledge that the provision of voluntary overtime arrangements in an enterprise agreement have not been viewed by the Commission as a benefit in the context of the “better off overall” test assessment. However, it is also noted that both parties acknowledge this does not act to preclude such arrangements from being included in an Agreement approved by the Commission, provided a global assessment of the terms and conditions in the Agreement concludes the “better off overall” test has been satisfied.

[38] In the light of this acknowledgement it is not necessary to review the relevant authorities in detail. However, brief reference is made to the Award Modernisation decision 16 and the following passages from the Full Bench decision (references omitted):

“[134] While the BOOT is expressed in different terms to the NDT, each involves a global assessment. In Armacell Australia Pty Ltd a Full Bench of the Commission described the BOOT in these terms:

‘The BOOT, as the name implies, requires an overall assessment to be made. This requires identification of terms which are more beneficial to an employee, terms that are less beneficial and an overall assessment of whether an employee would be better off under the agreement.’

[135]While the Bupa decision involved the application of the NDT the same approach has been taken to the BOOT in a number of first instance decisions. For example, in Jellifish!! Pty Ltd where the Commission said:

‘An enterprise agreement that provides for hours that would otherwise be paid at overtime rates if the employee was covered by a modern award, to be paid at a base or ordinary rate that is less than the overtime rate under the modern award, contains a provision that is less beneficial than the modern award. In order for that agreement to pass the BOOT, it is necessary for the Tribunal to be satisfied, that at the test time, the Agreement contains provisions that are more beneficial than equivalent terms in the modern award or are not conferred by the modern award, that offset those provisions that are less beneficial, so that on balance, employees are better off overall if the agreement applied to them than they would be if the modern award applied.

Thus an agreement that provides for a loaded hourly rate payable for all hours worked, may result in employees being better off overall notwithstanding that they are working some hours that would be paid at overtime rates if they were covered by a modern award. This is because the loaded rate is payable for all hours worked and not just those payable at overtime rates. There may also be a cut off point where employees work so many hours that the loaded rate ceases to result in employees being better off overall than they would be if the award applied.’” 17

[39] In dealing with this issue it has already been made clear that the Commission needs to conduct a global assessment of the terms and conditions contained in the proposed Agreement and those contained in the underlying Security Services Industry Award 2010. The Agreement clearly contains some entitlements that are in advance of those contained in the Award. These include additional severance pay entitlements, paid training leave for union delegates, and some additional allowance entitlements. However, the key difference between the proposed Agreement and the Award, apart from the voluntary overtime clause, involves the respective wage rates.

[40] The proposed Agreement contains two wage rate arrangements. The first is set out in sub clause 3.1 and described as “non-aggregated rates.” It is understood these are intended to apply to a limited number of employees who are not engaged in working non-rotating rosters. At each Level these rates are approximately 25 cents per hour more than those provided for in the Award.

[41] The other form of wage rate arrangements are contained in sub clause 3.2 and are described as “aggregated rates.” The sub clause indicates these are intended to apply to full-time employees who work 12 hour shifts in a pattern of 2 days on/2 nights on, followed by 4 days off, over a period of at least eight consecutive weeks. These aggregated rates are approximately $7.50 more per hour at each Level compared to those in the underlying Award. However, they apply in lieu of the penalties that would otherwise apply for work at night, on weekends, and on public holidays.

[42] MSS submits that the overwhelming majority of its employees are rostered on the basis of these rotating roster arrangements. It also provided further examples in its written submissions indicating that up to 16 hours of overtime can be worked in an 8 week roster cycle, on the basis of the overtime being remunerated at the casual penalty rate, with the employees still being “better off overall” when compared with the entitlements that would otherwise apply under the terms and conditions contained in the Award.

[43] MSS also makes reference to the modelling it has done and submits an employee, for example, at Level 1 and 2 could work up to 11 hours of overtime on the basis of the proposed casual rate overtime arrangement and still be “better off overall” when compared with an employee working the same rosters under the terms and conditions contained in the Security Services Industry Award 2010. At Level 3 it submits the comparable figure is 12 hours and at Level 4 the number of hours would be 16 over the span of the eight week roster.

[44] The Commission has also made various comparisons between the rates contained in the proposed Agreement and those contained in the underlying Award. A range of different scenarios based on the Level 2 employee classification can be referred to by way of example. Firstly, a Level 2 employee working the “4 on 4 off” roster from Tuesday – Friday inclusive would earn 16% more than an employee working the same rosters under the terms and conditions contained in the underlying Award.

[45] Secondly, a Level 2 employee working a “4 on 4 off” roster from Wednesday to Saturday would earn approximately 10.5% more than that the same roster arrangements worked by an employee employed under the terms and conditions contained in the Security Services Industry Award 2010. In the third example a Level 2 employee working the “4 on 4 off” the roster from Thursday to Sunday inclusive would earn at least 4% more than an employee working the same roster under the terms and conditions contained in the Award.

[46] United Voice submits in response that the difference between the 25% penalty rate intended to apply to any voluntary overtime under the terms of the proposed Agreement, and the penalty rates that would otherwise apply under the Award is “quite stark.” It refers, in particular, to the non-aggregated wage rates in the proposed Agreement and the existing rates in the Award and submits they are not substantially different.

[47] United Voice also makes reference to the decision of SDP Harrison in Mondex Group Pty Ltd 18(Mondex), handed down on 17 February 2015, and submits it is relevant to the determination of this matter, although it did not elaborate in terms of its particular relevance.

[48] The decision in Mondex does deal with an application for approval of an Agreement that contained a so-called voluntary overtime clause, although it provided for additional hours to be worked at ordinary time rates of pay, rather than at the 25% penalty rate proposed in the Agreement in this matter. In referring to the agreement SDP Harrison also noted:

“As a general comment, I should indicate that it is not a document drafted in a manner that allows for ease of understanding. The meaning of a number of its clauses is unclear as is the manner in which certain clauses are to be read together with other seemingly inconsistent terms.” 19

[49] It is also noted that in Mondex the applicant employer acknowledged the proposed Agreement, as a whole, did not pass the “better off overall” test. However, it submitted there were exceptional circumstances to provide support for approval of the Agreement.

[50] In dealing with the voluntary hours provision SDP Harrison also made reference to the decision of the Full Bench in the 2013 Modern Awards Review decisions when she stated (references omitted):

“[55] I note that in the Full Bench decision in the Modern Awards Review 2012 - Award Flexibility, the issue of the application of the better off overall test to an agreement containing a voluntary hours provision was discussed. Although that Full Bench was considering the terms of a model flexibility clause for modern awards, it endorsed the approach that was taken by Deputy President Asbury and said that, to be approved, an enterprise agreement containing a preferred hours clause would need to contain a corresponding benefit/s that outweighed the detriment of the preferred hours arrangement in order to meet the requirements of the better off overall test.” 20

[51] The balance of SDP Harrison’s decision is then primarily concerned about whether “exceptional circumstances” exist to justify approval of the Agreement given her conclusion that, “It is not in issue that the Agreement does not pass the better off overall test.” 21 In this context she made further reference to the voluntary hours provision in terms of whether it would be contrary to the public interest to approve the agreement when she stated at [67]:

“Additionally, it is quite unclear what is meant by the reference in Appendix A to the voluntary hours provisions only being available to employees ‘who can establish a genuine need’” 22

[52] In dealing with the relevance of the decision in Mondex it is acknowledged at the outset that issues to do with the hourly rate to be paid for overtime work were an important part of the considerations before SDP Harrison. However, a number of aspects of that matter are also significantly different from those involved in the present matter. Three examples can be referred to, in particular, in this context – the acknowledgement by the Applicant employer in Mondex that the proposed Agreement did not satisfy the requirements of the “better off overall test”; secondly, the confusing nature of the provisions contained in the Agreement; and, finally, no additional penalty rate was proposed to be provided for work performed under the proposed voluntary overtime arrangement.

[53] The extract from the decision in Mondex, already referred to and contained at [55], also makes clear the decision cannot be relied on as authority for the view that an enterprise agreement containing a preferred hours clause cannot be approved by the Commission.

[54] The so-called “Overtime Agreement” in the proposed Agreement in this matter is intended to provide “written authorisation” for an employee who wishes to work in accordance with sub clause 4.3.6. It also indicates that an employee can withdraw from that arrangement by giving two weeks’ notice of their intention to do so. Section 2 in Appendix B accordingly also contains a pro forma for an employee to complete in circumstances where they wish to withdraw their consent.

[55] I am satisfied that the existence of sub clause 4.3.6 does not prevent the proposed Agreement from being approved. This conclusion is based on consideration of several factors.

• The provisions in the sub clause provide for a penalty rate of 25% to apply, which is different from the arrangements contained in other Agreements, including in the decision in Mondex, where no penalty rate was proposed to be applied at all.



• An employee who commits to work under sub clause 4.3.6 can withdraw from that commitment by giving 2 weeks’ notice.



• The Applicant’s submissions indicate the overwhelming majority of employees are engaged on the basis of the “4 on/4 off” roster system, which provide for rates of pay that are well in excess of those contained in the Award. The examples of modelling referred to in this decision also indicate that significant amounts of additional overtime can be worked under the arrangements in sub clause 4.3.6 while still continuing to satisfy the requirements of the “better off overall” test.



• Sub clause 4.3.6(d) provides that the maximum number of hours that can be worked under the sub clause are capped at a maximum of 24 per fortnight.



• Sub clause 4.3.6(e) also provides that any hours in any shift in excess of 12 will be paid at the normal overtime rates, rather than the 25% penalty rate provided for by the operation of sub clause 4.3.6.

[56] It is also noted that MSS has proposed separate undertakings in relation to employees who work overtime under the terms and conditions contained in sub clause 4.3.6 of the proposed Agreement. These draft undertakings were handed up during the proceedings, with copies subsequently provided to United Voice.

[57] In summary, the proposed undertakings intend that MSS will conduct quarterly audits in respect of employees who work overtime hours under clause 4.3.6. Separate audit processes are proposed for employees working under the aggregated wage arrangements, and those working under the non-aggregated wage arrangements. If any such audit indicates an employee(s) would have earned more under the terms and conditions contained in the Security Industry Services Award 2010, than under the Agreement, MSS will make up the difference for any past deficiency, and an amount to ensure the deficiency does not arise in the following quarter.

[58] I am satisfied that these undertakings will not disadvantage any employee, nor do they substantially change the terms and conditions contained in the proposed Agreement. In the event MSS provides these signed undertakings within 7 days of the date of this decision I am prepared to accept those undertakings in accordance with the provisions contained in s.190 of the Act. They will then operate as a term of the Agreement.

[59] I also note at this point that I am otherwise satisfied each of the requirements of ss.186, 187 and 188 as are relevant to this application for approval have been met. A further decision approving the Agreement will accordingly be issued subject to receipt of the undertakings referred to above.

COMMISSIONER

Appearances:

Margaret Stinson on behalf of the Applicant.

Simon Ong on behalf of United Voice.

Hearing details:

2015.

Melbourne and Brisbane by video:

18 February.

 1   Transcript at PN32

 2   [2010] FWAFB 4602

 3   MA000016

 4 F18 submitted by United Voice at para 18

 5   Above n.i at PN40

 6   Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) at s.193(6)

 7   MSS Security QLD Enterprise Agreement 2014 - 2018 at cl.4.3.5(a)

 8   Above n.iv at para 24

 9   [2013] FWC 8064

 10   Applicant’s submissions at para 18

 11   [2013] FWC 8064 at [74]

 12   [2008] AIRCFB 1000

 13   Ibid at [76]-[78]

 14   Above n.vi at cl.4.3.6(a)

 15   Above n.iv at para 30

 16   [2013] FWCFB 2170

 17   Ibid at [134]-[135]

 18   [2015] FWC 1148

 19   Ibid at [8]

 20   Ibid at [55]

 21   Ibid at [49]

 22   Ibid at [67]

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