MSP v The Queen

Case [2019] SASCFC 120


Supreme Court of South Australia

(Court of Criminal Appeal)

MSP v THE QUEEN

[2019] SASCFC 120

Judgment of The Court of Criminal Appeal

(The Honourable Justice Kelly, The Honourable Justice Parker and The Honourable Auxiliary Justice David)

4 October 2019

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PARTICULAR GROUNDS OF APPEAL - MISDIRECTION AND NON-DIRECTION - PRESENTATION OF CROWN CASE

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PARTICULAR GROUNDS OF APPEAL - MISDIRECTION AND NON-DIRECTION - REVIEW OF EVIDENCE

CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - OPINION EVIDENCE

Appeal against conviction.

Appellant submitted that trial Judge:

1. Erred in failing to direct jury that the delay in the complainant reporting the matter could not be taken into account as something that was capable of supporting the complainant’s credibility which was referred to in the Prosecution address;

2. Erred in failing to direct the jury to ignore inadmissible opinion evidence;

3. Erred in directing the jury in relation to evidence of the complaint;

4. Erred in failing to direct the jury that statements made by the complainant to a third party were not evidence of the truth of those statements;

5. Erred in failing to direct the jury that a statement by the complainant’s mother to a third party was not evidence as to the truth of that statement.

Held by David AJ (Kelly and Parker JJ agreeing) allowing the appeal and ordering a re-trial:

1. That the trial judge should have corrected the statements in the Prosecution address in her summing up;

2. That the opinion evidence was of no real consequence and there was no need to direct the jury on it;

3. That the directions in relation to evidence of the complaint did not amount to a miscarriage of justice;

4. That the trial Judge’s failure to direct the jury in respect of statements made by the complainant to a third party about what the appellant had stated were not evidence of the truth of those statements was an error which was so highly prejudicial to the appellant and has led to a miscarriage of justice.

Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34M, referred to.

MSP v THE QUEEN
[2019] SASCFC 120

Court of Criminal Appeal:   Kelly and Parker JJ, David AJ

  1. KELLY J:             I agree that the appeal should be allowed and that the matter should be remitted for re-trial.  I agree generally with the reasons of David AJ. 

  2. PARKER J:          I would allow the appeal.  I agree with the reasons of David AJ.

    DAVID AJ.

    Introduction

  3. This is an appeal against conviction.  The appellant was convicted by verdicts of a jury of seven counts of unlawful sexual intercourse with a person above the age of 12 years and under the age of 17 years.  The offending all occurred between October 1999 and June 2002, against one female complainant, whom I will refer to as “C”.  The appellant appeals against all seven convictions. 

  4. At the time of the offending, C was aged between 13 and 16 years. The…

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MSP v The Queen [2019] SASCFC 120
Case
[2019] SASCFC 120
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned MSP, the appellant, and The Queen, the respondent, before the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia. The dispute arose from the appellant's conviction for a sexual offence. The central issue on appeal was whether the trial judge had misdirected the jury regarding the admissibility and use of evidence relating to a complaint made by the complainant.

The legal issues before the Court were whether the trial judge had erred in her directions to the jury concerning the evidence of the complainant's complaint, specifically in relation to the application of section 34M of the *Evidence Act 1929* (SA). This section governs the admissibility and use of complaint evidence in sexual offence trials, abolishing the common law rule and providing specific directions that must be given to the jury. The Court was required to determine if the judge's directions adequately informed the jury of the limited purpose for which complaint evidence could be considered, and whether the evidence itself was properly characterised and presented.

The Court allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's directions regarding the complaint evidence were insufficient. The judge had referred to several instances of disclosure by the complainant, including to a half-sister, her mother, a social worker, and Families SA. While section 34M(3) permits evidence of an initial complaint and its elaboration, subsection (4) mandates specific directions to the jury. These directions must clarify that the evidence is admitted to inform how the allegation came to light and as evidence of the complainant's consistency of conduct, but not as evidence of the truth of the allegations. The Court concluded that the judge's directions did not adequately convey these limitations, potentially leading the jury to misuse the complaint evidence.

Consequently, the Full Court ordered a re-trial.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

It is important to set out in full s 34M of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA).34M—Evidence relating to complaint in sexual cases(1) This section abolishes the common law relating to recent complaint in sexual cases.Note—See Kilby v The Queen (1973) 129 CLR 460; Crofts v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 427(2)In a trial of a charge of a sexual offence, no suggestion or statement may be made to the jury that a failure to make, or a delay in making, a complaint of a sexual offence is of itself of probative value in relation to the alleged victim's credibility or consistency of conduct.(3)Despite any other rule of law or practice, evidence related to the making of an initial complaint of an alleged sexual offence is admissible in a trial of a charge of the sexual offence.Examples—Evidence may be given by any person about—• when the complaint was made and to whom;• the content of the complaint;• how the complaint was solicited;• why the complaint was made to a particular person at a particular time;• why the alleged victim did not make the complaint at an earlier time.(4)If evidence referred to in subsection (3) is admitted in a trial, the judge must direct the jury that—(a) it is admitted—(i) to inform the jury as to how the allegation first came to light; and(ii) as evidence of the degree of consistency of conduct of the alleged victim; and(b) it is not admitted as evidence of the truth of what was alleged; and(c) there may be varied reasons why the alleged victim of a sexual offence has made a complaint of the offence at a particular time or to a particular person,but that, otherwise, it is a matter for the jury to determine the significance (if any) of the evidence in the circumstances of the particular case.(5)It is not necessary that a particular form of words be used in giving the direction under subsection (4).(6) In this section—complaint, in relation to a sexual offence, includes a report or any other disclosure (whether to a police officer or otherwise);initial complaint, in relation to a sexual offence, includes information provided by way of elaboration of the initial complaint (whether provided at the time of the initial complaint or at a later time). In her summing up, the following evidence was referred to by the trial Judge as being capable of being used as evidence of complaint: 1C’s evidence that she made a disclosure to her half-sister J. 2The evidence of C’s mother that the complainant told her that she had a sexual relationship with the appellant. This was lead as an elaboration to the first complaint made to J. 3C’s evidence that she told a social worker, Ms B, at some stage. No details were given. This was elicited in cross-examination.4DB’s evidence that she reported the sexual relationship to Families SA. That was also elicited from DB in cross-examination. 5An agreed fact that C made a disclosure of sexual abuse to Mr C of Families SA.6It was an agreed fact that on 26 February 2007 the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) of the Department of Families and Communities received a sexual abuse notification about C while in the care of the appellant’s family. These allegations were referred to SAPOL.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It is unnecessary to decide the final ground of appeal. Conclusion For the reasons given I would allow the appeal and order a re-trial.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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