SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
MSD Securities Pty Ltd & ors v MFB Properties (NQ) Pty Ltd & ors (No 2) [2017] QSC 168
PARTIES:
MSD SECURITIES PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE FOR THE BRUNSWICK STREET TRUST
ACN 160 362 345(first applicant)
PK’S RESORT PTY LTD
ACN 168 348 730(second applicant)
MARK LEONARD SEABROOK
(third applicant)
DAVID BRUCESMITH
(fourth applicant)
v
MFB PROPERTIES (NQ) PTY LTD
ACN 101 980 303(first respondent)
THE JUNGLE VILLAGE PTY LTD
ACN 098 067 077(second respondent)
ASHLEE JANE PIPER
(third respondent)
MARK FREDERICK DAVID BIANCOTTI
(fourth respondent)
FILE NO/S:
SC No 13256 of 2016
DIVISION:
Trial Division
PROCEEDING:
Application
DELIVERED ON:
18 August 2017
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
6 and 7 March 2017
JUDGE:
Bond J
ORDER:
The orders of the Court are:
[1] Orders 2 – 4 of the judgment of Flanagan J dated 28 November 2016 are vacated.
[2] It is declared that:
(a) by its notice to the First Respondent dated 13 December 2016, the First Applicant validly terminated the contract of sale between MFB Properties (NQ) Pty Ltd and MSD Securities Pty Ltd dated 13 March 2014 for Lots 1, 2 and 4 on SP219085 pursuant to s. 73 of the Property Law Act 1974;
(b) the contract of sale of land between Ashlee Jane Piper and MSD Securities Pty Ltd dated 17 March 2014 for Lot 3 on SP219085 was at an end as at 13 December 2016;
(c) the contract of sale of a business between Jungle Village Pty Ltd and PK's Resort Pty Ltd dated 13 March 2014 was at an end as at 13 December 2016;
(d) the Applicants are entitled to be repaid by the Respondents the sum of $2,000,000 paid by the Applicants pursuant to the contracts referred to in sub-paragraphs 1(a) to 1(c) hereof and the transaction deed between MFB Properties (NQ) Pty Ltd, Jungle Village Pty Ltd, Ashlee Jane Piper, Mark Frederick David Biancotti, MSD Securities Pty Ltd as trustee for the Brunswick Street Trust, PK's Resort Pty Ltd, Mark Leonard Seabrook and David Bruce Smith;
(e) the First Applicant has the benefit of an equitable lien over the estate in fee simple in respect of lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 on SP210985 to secure payment of all money referred to in this judgment.
[3] The matter be referred to the Registrar to inquire and determine or assess:
(a) the amount payable by the First Applicant and the Second Applicant as a reasonable occupational rental during the period they were in possession of the land and business the subject of the Contracts; and
(b) the amount paid by the First Applicant and the Second Applicant in respect of the registered mortgage over the Resort Land being Lot 4 on SP219085.
[4] The Registrar determine the amount that is owed by the Respondents, or any of them, to the Applicants, or any of them, or by the Applicants to the Respondents as a result of such inquiry.
[5] The…
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- Case
- [2017] QSC 168
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether the Applicants were entitled to avoid the contract, whether the Applicants were entitled to restitutionary relief for the part payment made, and whether the order for specific performance rendered ineffective the Applicants' exercise of their right to avoid the contract. The court found that the Applicants were not entitled to avoid the contract, because they had consented to the mortgage. The Applicants were not entitled to restitutionary relief for the part payment made because the contract called for performance by the Applicants of their contractual obligations from the very commencement of the contract and continuously thereafter, and the advance payment should be regarded as the provision of consideration for each and every substantial benefit expected under the contract. The order for specific performance did not render ineffective the Applicants' exercise of their right to avoid the contract, because the order for specific performance was obtained before the Applicants exercised their right to avoid the contract.
The court made orders vacating certain orders of an earlier judgment, and made orders for repayment of the part payment made by the Applicants, and orders for an inquiry into occupational rental and mortgage payments. The court also made orders for liberty to apply.
Orders
Orders of the court
The orders of the Court are:
[1] Orders 2 – 4 of the judgment of Flanagan J dated 28 November 2016 are vacated.
[2] It is declared that:
(a) by its notice to the First Respondent dated 13 December 2016, the First Applicant validly terminated the contract of sale between MFB Properties (NQ) Pty Ltd and MSD Securities Pty Ltd dated 13 March 2014 for Lots 1, 2 and 4 on SP219085 pursuant to s. 73 of the Property Law Act 1974;
(b) the contract of sale of land between Ashlee Jane Piper and MSD Securities Pty Ltd dated 17 March 2014 for Lot 3 on SP219085 was at an end as at 13 December 2016;
(c) the contract of sale of a business between Jungle Village Pty Ltd and PK's Resort Pty Ltd dated 13 March 2014 was at an end as at 13 December 2016;
(d) the Applicants are entitled to be repaid by the Respondents the sum of $2,000,000 paid by the Applicants pursuant to the contracts referred to in sub-paragraphs 1(a) to 1(c) hereof and the transaction deed between MFB Properties (NQ) Pty Ltd, Jungle Village Pty Ltd, Ashlee Jane Piper, Mark Frederick David Biancotti, MSD Securities Pty Ltd as trustee for the Brunswick Street Trust, PK's Resort Pty Ltd, Mark Leonard Seabrook and David Bruce Smith;
(e) the First Applicant has the benefit of an equitable lien over the estate in fee simple in respect of lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 on SP210985 to secure payment of all money referred to in this judgment.
[3] The matter be referred to the Registrar to inquire and determine or assess:
(a) the amount payable by the First Applicant and the Second Applicant as a reasonable occupational rental during the period they were in possession of the land and business the subject of the Contracts; and
(b) the amount paid by the First Applicant and the Second Applicant in respect of the registered mortgage over the Resort Land being Lot 4 on SP219085.
[4] The Registrar determine the amount that is owed by the Respondents, or any of them, to the Applicants, or any of them, or by the Applicants to the Respondents as a result of such inquiry.
[5] The balance so found be paid by the Respondents to the Applicants, or by the Applicants to the Respondents, as the case may be.
[6] There will be liberty to apply.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Mason CJ found that the passenger was not entitled to recover the advance payment on the basis discussed because the payee had been required to perform obligations under the contract before completing. His Honour observed (at 353, emphasis added):Nor is there any acceptable foundation for holding that the advance payment of the cruise fare created in the appellant no more than a right to retain the payment conditional upon its complete performance of its entire obligations under the contract. As the contract called for performance by the appellant of its contractual obligations from the very commencement of the voyage and continuously thereafter, the advance payment should be regarded as the provision of consideration for each and every substantial benefit expected under the contract. It would not be reasonable to treat the appellant's right to retain the fare as conditional upon complete performance when the appellant is under a liability to provide substantial benefits to the respondent during the course of the voyage. Gaudron J spoke in similar terms (at 385-386, emphasis added):Quite apart from entire contracts, the parties may provide, expressly or impliedly, that the obligation to pay or the right to retain moneys paid in advance is conditional upon completion of the contract. Thus, in McDonald v. Dennys Lascelles Ltd., Dixon J. explained that under a contract for sale of land involving prepayment of some part of the purchase price, the vendor's "title to retain the money has been considered not to be absolute but conditional upon the subsequent completion of the contract"[62]. And the contract considered in Dies v. British and International Mining and Finance Corporation Ltd.[63] seems to have involved a condition of a similar kind[64].[62] (1933) 48 C.L.R. 457, at p. 477.[63] [1939] 1 K.B. 724.[64] See the analysis by Beatson, The Use and Abuse of Unjust Enrichment (1991), pp 54-55. Her Honour expressed agreement with the approach of Mason CJ on the question whether the contract should be regarded as containing a term that the fare would be refunded in the event that the cruise ended prematurely. McHugh J acknowledged the possibility of a relief based on a failure of contractual condition. His Honour observed (at 389, emphasis added):When a contractual payment is made conditionally upon the performance of a promise by the payee, the right to retain the moneys after discharge of the contract is dependent upon whether the promise has been performed. If the promise has not been performed, there has been a total failure of consideration by reason of the nonfulfilment of the condition, and the money is recoverable as money had and received to the use of the payer[65]. In this context, consideration is not necessarily the same concept as the consideration which supported the formation of the contract. In a case where a promise and not an act or forbearance is the consideration for the contract, it is the performance of the promise which constitutes the consideration for the purpose of the law of restitution[66]. As Birks[67] says:"Failure of the consideration for a payment ... means that the state of affairs contemplated as the basis or reason for the payment has failed to materialize or, if it did exist, has failed to sustain itself."Furthermore, where the condition upon which the money was paid has failed, the payer is entitled to the return of the money advanced, even though that person has obtained some benefit from the contract.[65] Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd., [1943] AC 32, at p. 65.[66] ibid., at p. 48; Rover International Ltd. v. Cannon Film Ltd., [1989] 1 W.L.R. 912, at pp. 923-924; [1989] 3 All E.R 423, at pp. 433-434.[67] An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, (1985), p. 223.