Ms Tanya Coxon v Mining Pro Services Pty Ltd, National Mining Services Pty Ltd
[2023] FWC 2620
•10 OCTOBER 2023
| [2023] FWC 2620 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
| DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.365 - Application to deal with contraventions involving dismissal
Ms Tanya Coxon
v
Mining Pro Services Pty Ltd, National Mining Services Pty Ltd
(C2023/4444)
| DEPUTY PRESIDENT ROBERTS | SYDNEY, 10 OCTOBER 2023 |
Application to deal with contraventions involving dismissal
This decision concerns what has been described[1] as the industrially contentious subject of ‘outer limit’ contracts. The Applicant, Ms. Tanya Coxon has applied under s.365 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the FW Act) for the Fair Work Commission (the Commission) to deal with a dispute relating to her alleged dismissal by Mining Pro Services Pty Ltd (the First Respondent). The application also named National Mining Services Pty Ltd as the Second Respondent to the proceeding, although that company did not take an active role in the determination of the matter dealt with in this decision.
The Applicant claims that her alleged dismissal by the First Respondent was in contravention of Part 3-1General Protections, of the FW Act. The First Respondent has submitted that the Applicant was not dismissed but rather that the Applicant’s employment came to an end pursuant to the terms of the employment contract between themselves and the Applicant.
Section 365 of the FW Act provides:
365 Application for the FWC to deal with a dismissal dispute
If:
(a) a person has been dismissed; and
(b) the person, or an industrial association that is entitled to represent the industrial interests of the person, alleges that the person was dismissed in contravention of this Part;the person, or the industrial association, may apply to the FWC for the FWC to deal with the dispute.
In order for the Commission to be able to deal with the dispute under s.368 of the FW Act it must determine that the Applicant has been dismissed within the meaning of s.365.[2] The Commission must conclude that the relevant dismissal has actually occurred as a matter of jurisdictional fact. It is not sufficient that the applicant merely alleges that they were dismissed. If there is a contest as to whether the alleged dismissal the subject of the application has occurred, this is an antecedent question which has to be determined before the powers to deal with the dispute conferred by s.368 can be exercised.[3]
Section 386 of the FW Act defines the circumstances in which a person is taken to have been dismissed for the purposes of s.365.[4] Section 368 provides as follows:
386 Meaning of dismissed
(1) A person has been dismissed if:
(a) the person’s employment with his or her employer has been terminated on the employer’s initiative; or
(b) the person has resigned from his or her employment, but was forced to do so because of conduct, or a course of conduct, engaged in by his or her employer.
(2) However, a person has not been dismissed if:
(a) the person was employed under a contract of employment for a specified period of time, for a specified task, or for the duration of a specified season, and the employment has terminated at the end of the period, on completion of the task, or at the end of the season; or
(b) the person was an employee:(i) to whom a training arrangement applied; and
(ii) whose employment was for a specified period of time or was, for any reason, limited to the duration of the training arrangement;
(iii) and the employment has terminated at the end of the training arrangement; or
(c) the person was demoted in employment but:
(i) the demotion does not involve a significant reduction in his or her remuneration or duties; and
(ii) he or she remains employed with the employer that effected the demotion.
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply to a person employed under a contract of a kind referred to in paragraph (2)(a) if a substantial purpose of the employment of the person under a contract of that kind is, or was at the time of the person’s employment, to avoid the employer’s obligations under this Part.
The Applicant contends that her employment was terminated on the First Respondent’s initiative and that s.386(1)(a) applies in the present circumstances. For the reasons which follow, I have concluded that the Applicant was not dismissed within the meaning of s.365.
Background
Much of the basic factual background to the proceedings was uncontentious and can be briefly stated. The First Respondent provides labour services to the Second Respondent, who in turn is contracted to provide services to the mine operator at the Moolarben coal mine (Moolarben) in New South Wales.
On 5 July 2022 the First Respondent offered the Applicant a full-time position as a haul truck operator at Moolarben. The offer was set out in a document titled “Offer of employment for a maximum term with Mining Pro Services Pty Ltd” (contract).[5] The contract included details of the engagement, including a “start date” of 12 July 2022 and an “end date” of 12 July 2023. Consistent with that document, the Applicant commenced employment with the First Respondent on 12 July 2022. The Applicant had not previously been engaged by the First Respondent.
At all material times the Applicant and the First Respondent were bound by the terms of the Mining Pro Services Enterprise Agreement 2021 (Agreement).[6] The Agreement applies to the exclusion of any modern award or other industrial instrument that may have otherwise applied to employees.[7]
On or about 19 June 2023 the Applicant attended a performance review with Mr. Quentin O’Brien, her production supervisor, and received a document titled “Probationary Review 3/6 Month” signed by Mr. O’Brien. The document listed various performance measures and included examples and observations of the Applicant’s performance against those measures.
On or about 4 July 2023 the Applicant received correspondence from Ms Katja Romuss on behalf of the First Respondent. At that time Ms. Romuss was Business Services Lead for the First Respondent. The document provided, relevantly:
“Please be advised that your contract of employment is due to expire on 12th July 2023. Mining Pro Services Pty Ltd will not be renewing your contract of employment at this time.”
The Applicant did not perform any further work with the First Respondent after 12 July 2023.
After the Applicant ceased working for the First Respondent, the First Respondent offered new employment contracts to three other employees who the Applicant started with when she commenced work with the First Respondent. Those persons were to work as haul truck operators and their contracts were in almost identical terms to the contract of the Applicant, save for some minor details and the end date of each contract. The First Respondent also employed new employees at the mine as haul truck operators on 12-month contracts after the Applicant’s employment had ceased.[8]
Evidence and Submissions
The Agreement contemplates various types of employment arrangements. Clauses 10.1 to 10.4 refer to full-time, part-time and casual employment. Clauses 10.5 and 10.6 provide as follows:
10.5 Fixed term: an Employee employed for a specified period or periods of time, or for a specified task.
10.6 Maximum term: An Employee employed for a maximum period of time, or upon completion of a particular task, and whose employment may end on or before the completion of that maximum period or task.
The contract dated 5 July 2022 and signed by the Applicant includes the following:
I am pleased to offer you full time employment with Mining Pro Services Pty Limited (“we” “us” or “the Employer”) for a maximum term as set out in this agreement….
Employment details
The details of your employment are as follows:
Employer name Mining Pro Services Pty Limited
Employee name Tanya Coxon
Start date 12-07-2022
End date 12-07-2023……
Enterprise Agreement
Your employment is covered by the Mining Pro Services Enterprise Agreement 2021 (Enterprise Agreement) as varied or replaced from time to time. While the Enterprise Agreement is not incorporated into, and does not form part of this offer, while it is in operation it will prevail over the terms of this offer to the extent of any inconsistency…..
Term of employment
You are employed for a maximum term based upon the term of the Employer’s contract to perform services at the Moolarben Coal.
Your employment will start on the start date set out in the Employment Details and will end on the End Date set out in the Employment Details (which is when the Employer’s present contract at the mine is expected to end) without you or us having to give further notice of the termination of your employment.
Your employment may be terminated prior to the End Date in accordance with the terms of this agreement.
This offer does not guarantee you ongoing employment beyond the End Date.
Termination of your employment
Your employment will continue until the earlier of:
1. a) the End Date (upon which date your employment will automatically ceases, with no requirement for you or Mining Pro Services to provide any further notice); or
1. b) the date on which your employment is terminated prior to the End Date in accordance with the notice of termination provisions below.
At any time prior to the End Date, we may terminate your employment by giving the period of notice (or making an equivalent payment in lieu of notice) as outlined below:
Period of continuous service Notice period
Less than 3 years 2 weeks
More than 3 years but less than 5 years 3 weeks
More than 5 years 4 weeksIf you are over 45 and have completed at least 2 years of service at the time notice is given, an additional week of notice must be provided.
You must give one week’s notice to terminate your employment or forfeit 1 week’s pay instead of giving notice. If you fail to give the required notice, we may make a deduction from your pay for the pre-paid period not worked…..
Entire agreement
This agreement is the entire agreement between you and the Employer in relation to your employment, subject to the ongoing application of the Enterprise Agreement to you. It supersedes any prior understanding or agreement between us, as well as any representation or warranty made or given, in relation to your employment. You warrant that you have not relied on any representations in entering into this contract other than what is set out in this agreement.
Changes to your employment and this agreement
If your position, remuneration, duties, hours of work, classification, reporting arrangements or place of work change, this agreement will continue to apply with those changes unless we and you agree differently in writing. Otherwise, this agreement can only be changed if we and you agree to change it in writing….
I have read and understand the terms of employment set out above and accept this offer on those terms.
The Applicant’s evidence was provided in a witness statement. She was not required for cross-examination. Her statement included the following:
During the on boarding Katja and I had several conversations. One conversation included words to the effect of:
Me: “I am a bit confused. I am employed by Mining Pro but wearing a National Mining Service Uniform. Will be (sic) an opportunity to be a permanent employee. (sic)”
Katja: “After 12 months with Mining Pro you will get signed over to National Mining as a fulltime employee”.
Ms. Romuss gave evidence for the First Respondent and was cross-examined. At the time of the hearing, Ms. Romuss was employed by MWG Shared Services Pty Ltd which is a related entity of the First Respondent. Ms. Romuss was responsible for “onboarding” the Applicant when the Applicant commenced work with the First Respondent in 2022.
Ms. Romuss said that the work on the Moolarben project commenced in June 2022. She was unsure of the project’s expected duration although it may have been in the order of 2 or 3 years. Ms. Romuss confirmed that the project was still going at the time of the hearing and that the First Respondent had a similar number of employees working at the project as they did when the Applicant last worked there. She said that all the First Respondent’s mining operators at the project were employed on maximum term contracts which were all of twelve months duration. Ms. Romuss confirmed that some of the operators who had worked with the Applicant had had their contracts renewed and continued to work at the site. She said the decision to offer new contracts was based on the needs of the project and the skill set that the operators possessed. She confirmed that she was the person who had made the decision not to offer a further contract to the Applicant. She said that some new operators had also been employed since the Applicant finished working at the site and that this was due, at least in part, to unplanned resignations and the need to “backfill” those positions.
In its submissions, the Applicant relied on, in particular, the terms of the contract of 5 July 2022 that said the Applicant was to be employed for a maximum term based upon the term of the employer’s contract to perform services at the Moolarben mine. The Applicant submitted that the effect of the terms of the contract was that subject to the termination provisions of the employment contract, the employee’s employment was ongoing while the First Respondent continued to provide services at the mine.
The Applicant initially submitted that “her employment continued beyond the end date of the employment” but in final submissions accepted that the employment relationship and the employment contract both came to an end on 12 July 2023, albeit at the initiative of the employer. The Applicant also initially submitted that the contract was not a contract of employment for a specified period and the exclusion in s.386(2)(a) did not apply or if it was such a contract, s.386(3) would apply to exclude the operation of s.386(2)(a) because the substantial purpose of the employment of the Applicant under a contract of that kind was to avoid the employer’s obligations under Part 3-2 of the FW Act. The Respondent later submitted that it placed no reliance on s.386(2)(a) and it became unnecessary for the point to be argued.
The Applicant relied on the decision of the Full Bench in Khayam v. Navitas English Pty Ltd[9] (Navitas). The Applicant said the proper approach, as reflected in that decision, was to weigh up all the circumstances of the case and assess whether there was some act or intervention on the part of the employer that constituted a termination of the relationship on the employer’s initiative. The Applicant argued that the evidence here showed that there was a conscious and considered decision-making process undertaken by the First Respondent, through Ms. Romuss, to determine which of the operators were to have a further contract offered to them and which would not. That process was undertaken in advance of the expiry of the Applicant’s contract and the Applicant was notified of the outcome of the process prior to the expiry. In those circumstances the Applicant contended that there had been a termination of the relationship on the employer’s initiative. In final submissions the Applicant agreed that had the employer done nothing before 12 July and thereafter simply notified the Applicant that the contract had come to an end and would not be renewed, the employment relationship would have come to an end by agreement of the parties and through effluxion of time.
The First Respondent submitted that the Applicant was engaged under the terms of a maximum term contract which was a form of employment contemplated by the Agreement. They said the commencement and end dates of the contract were clear. They said the letter of 4 July 2023 showed that the Company did not dismiss Ms Coxon from her employment. Rather, the Company allowed her contract to expire on its agreed terms. The Respondent argued that the fact that Ms Coxon was notified is not evidence of the company’s unilateral action resulting in the termination of the employment relationship, but simply showed the company communicated the decision that employment would not continue after the agreed end date, 12 July 2023, and the Company would not offer further employment.
The First Respondent also relied on Navitas. However, they pointed out that this was not a case where the Applicant was engaged on successive maximum term or fixed term contracts, such that the employment relationship had continued past the end date of multiple contracts. This was the Applicant’s first engagement with the Company. The employment relationship was governed under the terms of the one employment contract and the applicable industrial instrument. Moreover, the First Respondent said there were no countervailing factors of the kind discussed by the majority in Navitas[10] which necessitated looking beyond the terms of the contract. It was said that the employment relationship with the Applicant ended on the End Date as stated in the contract due to effluxion of time and in accordance with the parties’ genuine agreement reflected in that contract. As such, the First Respondent submitted that the Applicant’s employment did not end “on the employer’s initiative.”
Consideration
There are various clauses in the employment contract that affirm its status as a maximum term contract with that maximum term being of twelve months duration. The document is titled “Offer of employment for a maximum term ...”. The opening sentence refers to “full-time employment … for a maximum term as set out in this agreement.” Under the heading "Employment details” there is a start date and an end date which are exactly 12 months apart. Under the heading “termination of employment”, it is stated that the Applicant’s employment is to continue until the earlier of the end date (specified in the contract as 12 July 2023) (upon which the Applicant’s employment automatically ceases without the need for further notice), or the date on which the employment is terminated prior to the end date in accordance with notice of termination provisions.
However, the situation is made less straightforward by the clauses appearing under the heading “Term of Employment” which are as follows:
You are employed for a maximum term based upon the term of the Employer’s contract to perform services at the Moolarben Coal.
Your employment will start on the start date set out in the Employment Details and will end on the End Date set out in the Employment Details (which is when the Employer’s present contract at the mine is expected to end) without you or us having to give further notice of the termination of your employment.
Your employment may be terminated prior to the End Date in accordance with the terms of this agreement.
This offer does not guarantee you ongoing employment beyond the End Date. (emphasis added)
The Applicant urged that on a proper construction of the terms of the employment contract, that contract was to end when the company’s contract at Moolarben mine ended, rather than on the date specified as the end date, which was 12 July 2023. On that view, there would be little room for doubt that the termination of the Applicant’s employment contract and the employment relationship on 12 July 2023 would have been a termination on the initiative of the employer. The First Respondent submitted that the references to the maximum term of the employment contract as being based on the term of the employer’s contract was a case of “inelegant” expression but did not ultimately change the nature and effect of the contract as being a maximum term contract of twelve months duration.
Unlike an enterprise agreement which draws its binding force from the operation of the FW Act, a contract of this nature is a private agreement between two parties. The rights and obligations of the parties to such a contract are to be determined objectively having regard to the text of the document, the context, that is the entire text of the document, and its purpose.[11] The process begins with a consideration of the ordinary meaning of the words. In the case of commercial contracts, the courts generally ask what a reasonable businessperson would have understood the terms in question to mean.[12] In an industrial context where the contract is between an employer and employee, although the instruments are of a different kind, this may be expressed by the formulation that has been adopted in relation to proper construction of enterprise agreements, namely, that the common intention of the parties is to be identified objectively, that is by reference to that which a reasonable person would understand by the language the parties have used to express their agreement, without regard to the subjective intentions or expectations of the parties.[13]
The starting point for the analysis of the contract’s provisions relating to the term of the Applicant’s employment is the reference to the dates specified as the start date (12 July 2022) and the end date (12 July 2023) under the heading “Employment details”. These are in clear and specific terms. The expression “End Date” is capitalised elsewhere in the contract, including under the “Term of employment” heading. In that case it is usual to treat the expression as a defined term within the contract. Where the expression “End Date” appears in the contract, unless a clear contrary intention can be discerned, I take it to mean 12 July 2023.
The references to the term of the First Respondent’s contract under the heading “Term of Employment” read in context and having regard to the ordinary meaning of the words do not give rise to a meaning which is inconsistent with the notion that the Applicant’s term of employment was to end on 12 July 2023. This is because the expression in brackets “(which is when the Employer’s present contract at the mine is expected to end)” and which appears after the reference to the End Date set out in the Employment Details can only be read as reflecting an expectation about the Employer’s contract as at the date the employment contract was entered into and not that the Applicant’s employment would end at some indeterminate alternative date. That is, the words do no more than indicate that the employer’s contract was at that time, expected to end on 12 July 2023. They do not qualify the End Date expressed elsewhere as 12 July 2023 by providing that if the Employer’s contract in fact continued beyond (or for that matter, ended before) that date, then the term of the Applicant’s employment contract would be extended (or reduced) accordingly.
The preceding sentence in the contract should be read in that context. The reference to “the term” in the expression “a maximum term based upon the term of the Employer’s contract to perform services at the Moolarben Coal” should be taken as meaning the same expected term as is referred to in the sentence which follows it. That is, in both cases the term of the employer’s contract was expected to end on 12 July 2023 and it is this date which sets the outer limit of the Applicant’s contract of employment. When the terms of the employment contract are understood in this way, the construction supplies a congruent operation to the various components of the whole.[14]
The clause of the contract headed “Termination of your employment” is consistent with the view that the contract is for a maximum term of twelve months. This is so because the clause makes reference to the “End Date” which is unencumbered by any mention of the employer’s contracted work at the mine. In this case the End Date clearly means the date set out in the clause “Employment details”, that is, 12 July 2023.
In my view, having regard to the text of the provisions, the overall context of the document in which those provisions appear and the objectives to which the contract are directed, the contract contains no ambiguity and the term of the employment contract of the Applicant was to come to an end by no later than 12 July 2023.
As was the case in Navitas, it was not ultimately contended that the employment relationship survived the termination of the maximum term (or outer limit) contract. The Applicant was told in advance that her contract was ending and that another contract would not be offered. It was also accepted by the Applicant that the contract and the employment relationship ended at the same time. In that event, applying the approach in Navitas, which both parties accepted as being the appropriate approach here, the issue for determination is whether the employment relationship was terminated on the employer’s initiative.[15] That is not to say that the terms of the contract are to be disregarded but rather that it is a part, and often a very significant part, of the overall question for determination. The Full Court of the former Industrial Relations Court in Fisher v. Edith Cown University[16] observed that a determination of that kind involved both a question of law and a question of fact. The majority in Navitas said that in some cases it would be necessary to go further than just examining the terms of any contract in which the parties have ostensibly agreed to terminate the employment relationship at a particular time.[17]
It is clear from the majority decision in Navitas that the ultimate answer may depend on the extent to which it can be said that the parties have reached a genuine agreement not only as to the term of a time-limited contract, but also as to whether there is agreement about the termination of the employment relationship itself. The majority said:[18]
In circumstances where the parties to a time-limited contract have agreed that their contract will expire on a specified date but have not agreed on the termination of their employment relationship, it may be the case that the termination of employment is effected by the expiry of the contract, but that does not exclude the possibility that the termination of employment relationship occurred at the initiative of the employer - that is, as a result of some decision or act on the part of the employer that brought about that outcome.
Although it seems that at the end of the employment contract the Applicant wanted to continue with her employment and the First Respondent did not want that to happen, there is little to be gleaned from the terms of the contract or the surrounding circumstances to support the view that it was never intended that the employment relationship would end on 12 July, if not earlier. The contract refers to the employment end date, to the employment ending on the end date and to the offer not guaranteeing ongoing employment beyond the end date. It says that the Applicant’s employment will continue until the earlier of the end date (upon which (the) employment will automatically cease) or some date prior to the end date. In my view each of those provisions, separately and in combination, reflect a common understanding that in the ordinary course, the employment relationship would come to an end on 12 July 2023. Ultimately, as is noted earlier in these reasons, the Applicant agreed in submissions that the employment relationship would have come to an end in any event had the First Respondent done nothing prior to that date.
It was not in issue that some operators who had worked with the Applicant were offered a renewal of their 12-month contracts. But there was no succession of contracts for the Applicant, as there was in the case of D’Lima,[19] which the Applicant could point to as suggesting an ongoing and continuous employment relationship in her case.
There was some very limited evidence as to representations made by the First Respondent “during the on-boarding” about employment after the 12-month period had expired.[20] There are at least two difficulties for the Applicant in this respect. The first is that on her own evidence, the representation was not that the employment relationship would continue with the First Respondent, but that the Applicant would become a full-time employee of the Second Respondent. Whatever else might be said about this statement it was not a representation that the Applicant’s employment relationship with the First Respondent would or could be expected to extend beyond 12 July 2023. The other is that the contract includes an “Entire agreement” clause which said that the contract represented the totality of the terms of the employment relationship. It provided:
This agreement is the entire agreement between you and the Employer in relation to your employment, subject to the ongoing application of the Enterprise Agreement to you. It supersedes any prior understanding or agreement between us, as well as any representation or warranty made or given, in relation to your employment. You warrant that you have not relied on any representations in entering into this contract other than what is set out in this agreement.
The Applicant did not contend that there were in this case any other vitiating factors associated with the time-limited contract of the kind discussed by the majority in Navitas.[21]
Having regard to the evidence in this matter and taking into account the current state of the authorities as I am obliged to do, I am of the view that the employment relationship came to an end as a result of the agreement between the parties and that there was no termination on the employer’s initiative. I am reinforced in that view by the following extract from the reasons of the majority in Navitas:
Where the terms of an operative time-limited contract reflect a genuine agreement on the part of the employer and employee that the employment relationship will not continue after a specified date and the employment relationship comes to an end on the specified date, then, absent a vitiating or other factor of the type to which we refer in (5) below, the employment relationship will have been terminated by reason of the agreement between the parties and there will be no termination at the initiative of the employer. Further, in those circumstances a decision by the employer not to offer any further contract of employment will not be relevant to the question of whether there was a termination of employment at the initiative of the employment. The decision not to offer further employment is separate and distinct from the earlier agreement between the parties to end the employment relationship on a particular date (Griffin/Fisher).[22]
As was observed in Fisher, the conclusion reached in matters of this kind will follow from the available evidence and the particular facts of the case. Madgwick J noted in that case that there may be instances where it can be shown that fixed term contracts were not appropriate in the relevant field of employment, which may in turn have a bearing on whether the employment can be regarded as having been brought to an end at the employer’s initiative. The majority in Navitas referred to time-limited contracts that may be contrary to public policy and whether the use of such contracts in a particular field might be relevant to an examination of an employer’s purpose for entering into those contracts. Where for example, the practice of reliance on outer-limit contracts had been developed and applied to avoid the unfair dismissal jurisdiction or the protections afforded by the General Protections provisions of Part 3-1, this may yield a different result. These were not, however, arguments that were had in this matter.
The application is dismissed. An order to that effect will accompany these reasons.
DEPUTY PRESIDENT
Appearances:
Mr. Jacka for the Applicant.
Ms. Hillier for the First Respondent.
Hearing details:
In-person in Sydney on Wednesday, 6 September 2023 at 9:00am AEST.
[1] Department of Justice v Lunn [2006] 158 IR 410 at [42].
[2] Coles Supply Chain Pty Ltd v. Milford (2020) 279 FCR 591 and see Lipa Pharmaceuticals v Jarouche[2023] FWCFB 101.
[3] Lipa op cit at paragraph [4].
[4] See s.12 FW Act.
[5] Exhibit A1 Statement Coxon Annexure A.
[6] Exhibit A1 Statement Coxon paragraph 2.
[7] Exhibit A1 Statement Coxon Annexure TC2 Clause 5.
[8] Ibid, paragraph 10.
[9] [2017] FWCFB 5162.
[10] At paragraph [75](5).
[11] Mount Bruce Mining Pty Limited v Wright Prospecting Pty Limited (2015) 256 CLR 104 at [46].
[12] Ibid at [47].
[13] AMWU v. Berri Pty Ltd[2017] FWCFB 3005 at [114].
[14] Wilkie v. Gordian Runoff Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 522 at [16].
[15] cf NSW Trains v. James [2022] FWCFB where a Full Bench concluded that the expression ‘employment … has been terminated’ in s.386(1)(a) means termination of the employment relationship and/or termination of the contract of employment at [45].
[16] (1997) 72 IR 464 at 473.
[17] Op cit at [75](5).
[18] Ibid at [75](3).
[19] D’Lima v. Board of Management, Princess Margaret Hospital for Children (1996) 64 IR 19.
[20] Exhibit A1 Statement of Coxon paragraph 5.
[21] At [75](5).
[22] At [75](4).
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
<PR767055>
0
6
0