Ms Tanya Coxon v Mining Pro Services Pty Ltd, National Mining Services Pty Ltd

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[2023] FWC 2620

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009

s.365 - Application to deal with contraventions involving dismissal

Ms Tanya Coxon
v

Mining Pro Services Pty Ltd, National Mining Services Pty Ltd

(C2023/4444)

DEPUTY PRESIDENT ROBERTS

SYDNEY, 10 OCTOBER 2023

Application to deal with contraventions involving dismissal

  1. This decision concerns what has been described[1] as the industrially contentious subject of ‘outer limit’ contracts. The Applicant, Ms. Tanya Coxon has applied under s.365 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the FW Act) for the Fair Work Commission (the Commission) to deal with a dispute relating to her alleged dismissal by Mining Pro Services Pty Ltd (the First Respondent). The application also named National Mining Services Pty Ltd as the Second Respondent to the proceeding, although that company did not take an active role in the determination of the matter dealt with in this decision.

  1. The Applicant claims that her alleged dismissal by the First Respondent was in contravention of Part 3-1General Protections, of the FW Act. The First Respondent has submitted that the Applicant was not dismissed but rather that the Applicant’s employment came to an end pursuant to the terms of the employment contract between themselves and the Applicant.

  1. Section 365 of the FW Act provides:

365 Application for the FWC to deal with a dismissal dispute

If:

(a) a person has been dismissed; and
(b) the person, or an industrial association that is entitled to represent the industrial interests of the person, alleges that the person was dismissed in contravention of this Part;

the person, or the industrial association, may apply to the FWC for the FWC to deal with the dispute.

  1. In order for the Commission to be able to deal with the dispute under s.368 of the FW Act it must determine that the Applicant has been dismissed within the meaning of s.365.[2] The Commission must conclude that the relevant dismissal has actually occurred as a matter of jurisdictional fact. It is not sufficient that the applicant merely alleges that they were dismissed. If there is a contest as to whether the alleged dismissal the subject of the application has occurred, this is an antecedent question which has to be determined before the powers to deal with the dispute conferred by s.368 can be exercised.[3]

  1. Section 386 of the FW Act defines the circumstances in which a person is taken to have been dismissed for the purposes of s.365.[4] Section 368 provides as follows:

386 Meaning of dismissed

(1)  A person has been dismissed if:

(a)  the person’s employment with his or her employer has been terminated on the employer’s initiative; or
(b)  the person has resigned from his or her employment, but was forced to do so because of conduct, or a course of conduct, engaged in by his or her employer.

(2)  However, a person has not been dismissed if:

(a)  the person was employed under a contract of employment for a specified period of time, for a specified task, or for…

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Details
Case
[2023] FWC 2620
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This decision of the Fair Work Commission concerns the applicant, Ms. Tanya Coxon, who applied under s.365 of the Fair Work Act 2009 for the Commission to deal with a dispute relating to her alleged dismissal by Mining Pro Services Pty Ltd. The applicant claims that her dismissal was in contravention of Part 3-1 General Protections of the FW Act. The First Respondent submitted that the applicant was not dismissed but rather that the applicant’s employment came to an end pursuant to the terms of the employment contract between themselves and the applicant. The Commission must conclude that the relevant dismissal has actually occurred as a matter of jurisdictional fact. If there is a contest as to whether the alleged dismissal the subject of the application has occurred, this is an antecedent question which has to be determined before the powers to deal with the dispute conferred by s.368 can be exercised.

The applicant contends that her employment was terminated on the First Respondent’s initiative and that s.386(1)(a) applies in the present circumstances. The First Respondent submitted that the applicant was engaged under the terms of a maximum term contract which was a form of employment contemplated by the Agreement. They submitted that the employment relationship was governed under the terms of the one employment contract and the applicable industrial instrument. The First Respondent said that the employment relationship with the applicant ended on the End Date as stated in the contract due to effluxion of time and in accordance with the parties’ genuine agreement reflected in that contract. As such, the First Respondent submitted that the applicant’s employment did not end “on the employer’s initiative.” The court found that the contract was to end when the company’s contract at Moolarben mine ended, rather than on the date specified as the end date, which was 12 July 2023. The applicant urged that on a proper construction of the terms of the employment contract, that contract was to end when the company’s contract at Moolarben mine ended, rather than on the date specified as the end date, which was 12 July 2023. The First Respondent submitted that the references to the maximum term of the employment contract as being based on the term of the employer’s contract was a case of “inelegant” expression but did not ultimately change the nature and effect of the contract as being a maximum term contract of twelve months duration. The court found that the contract referred to the employment end date, to the employment ending on the end date and to the offer not guaranteeing ongoing employment beyond the end date. In the court’s view each of those provisions, separately and in combination, reflected a common understanding that in the ordinary course, the employment relationship would come to an end on 12 July 2023. The applicant did not contend that there were in this case any other vitiating factors associated with the time-limited contract of the kind discussed by the majority in Navitas. Having regard to the evidence in this matter and taking into account the current state of the authorities as I am obliged to do, I am of the view that the employment relationship came to an end as a result of the agreement between the parties and that there was no termination on the employer’s initiative.

The application is dismissed. An order to that effect will accompany these reasons.

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