Ms May-Ring Chen v Woodside Energy Limited
[2022] FWC 3216
•12 DECEMBER 2022
| [2022] FWC 3216 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
| DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.394 - Application for unfair dismissal remedy
Ms May-Ring Chen
v
Woodside Energy Limited
(U2022/10458)
| DEPUTY PRESIDENT BINET | PERTH, 12 DECEMBER 2022 |
Application for an unfair dismissal remedy - Unfair dismissal application filed out of time –circumstances not exceptional – application dismissed
On 24 October 2022 Ms May-Ring Chen (Ms Chen) made an application to the Fair Work Commission (FWC) pursuant to s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) alleging she was unfairly dismissed from her employment with Woodside Energy Limited (Woodside) on 15 March 2022.
An unfair dismissal application must be lodged with the FWC within 21 days after the dismissal takes effect. The FWC may only allow a further period for lodgement in exceptional circumstances.
Ms Chen has made an application for an extension of time to file the Application. Woodside oppose the application.
The Application was listed for a hearing on 8 December 2022 to determine the application for an extension of time (Hearing).
Directions for the filing of materials were issued to the parties on 18 November 2022 (Directions).
The Directions required Ms Chen to file an outline of submissions, a witness statement for each witness upon whose evidence she relied and copies of any documents and authorities upon which she relied by 25 November 2022. Ms Chen filed her materials on 25 November 2022 and on 2 December 2022 Woodside filed their materials in response.
In accordance with the Directions, Ms Chen filed a witness statement setting out her evidence in chief.[1] Woodside chose not to file any witness statements relying solely on email correspondence between Ms Chen and the FWC.
A digital court book containing the evidence and submissions of the parties was prepared by Chambers and circulated to the parties on 6 December 2022 (DCB).
In her Form F2 – Unfair Dismissal Application (Form F2) Ms Chen indicated that she was represented by Mr Derek Balogh of Educate for Protection (Mr Balogh).
The Directions invited the parties to make submissions as to whether the FWC should grant permission to the parties to be represented by 2 December 2022. A determination of this issue is necessary to ensure that the manner in which any hearing is conducted is fair and just.[2]
Both parties sought permission to be represented at the Hearing.
Having considered the submissions of the parties, leave was granted to both parties to be represented, pursuant to section 596(2)(a) of the FW Act, on the grounds that it would enable the matter to be dealt with more efficiently taking into account the complexity of the matter.
At the Hearing, Ms Chen was represented Mr Balogh, a paid agent and Woodside was represented by Ms Olga Klimczak of Herbert Smith Freehills (Ms Klimczak).
At the outset of the Hearing Mr Balogh sought an adjournment of the Hearing on the grounds that he had not seen or read the contents of the DCB notwithstanding that:
a.Mr Balogh was named as Ms Chen’s representative on her Form F2.
b.Ms Chen first sought leave to be represented by Mr Balogh on 23 November 2022.
c.The Notice of Listing for the Hearing was issued on 25 November 2022.
d.Ms Chen filed her materials on 25 November 2022.
e.Woodside filed their materials on 2 December 2022.
f.The DCB was circulated to the parties on 6 December 2022. In the email circulating the DCB the parties were reminded to make sure that they and their witnesses had their own copy of the DCB at the Hearing.
g.Mr Balogh contacted Chambers on 7 December 2022 indicating that he was seeking leave to appear on behalf of Ms Chen and that he had appeared as a paid agent on numerous occasions before the FWC.
An adjournment of one hour was granted. When the proceedings recommenced it became apparent that Mr Balogh was unfamiliar with section 394(3) of the FW Act and the criteria that the FWC is required to consider when granting an extension of time. Similarly, it appeared that he did not understand other provisions of the FW Act upon which he sought to rely in relation to the merit of the Application. Fortunately, Ms Chen had addressed the criteria set out in section 394(3) of the FW Act in her outline of submissions and in her witness statement.
At the Hearing Ms Chen gave further oral evidence and was cross examined by Ms Klimczak. During that evidence it became apparent that it was on the advice of Mr Balogh that Ms Chen decided to file the Application.
The DCB admitted at the Hearing as an exhibit and marked Exhibit DCB1.
Notwithstanding the Directions requiring the parties to file their materials in advance of the Hearing, Mr Balogh sought leave at the outset of the Hearing to file copies of what he described as two authorities. He was granted leave to do so. What Mr Balogh ultimately filed, after the Hearing was completed, was over 1000 pages of materials filed in matters in other matters/jurisdictions.
Both parties were invited to make oral closing submissions. Both parties did so. After the Hearing was completed Mr Balogh asserted in an email to Chambers that he was denied what he described as a ‘right of reply’ to Woodside’s closing submissions. Woodside’s closing submissions, as they should, merely summarized the submissions and evidence previously filed or given at the Hearing, matters which Mr Balogh was expressly invited to address in his opening and closing submissions. He did not identify any basis upon which a ‘right of reply’ might arise or be necessary.
In reaching my decision, I have considered all the submissions made and the evidence tendered by the parties including these materials, even if not expressly referred to in these reasons for decision.
Background
Ms Chen commenced employment with Woodside on 5 June 2012.[3]
During the Covid Pandemic, Woodside introduced a COVID19 Vaccination Procedure (Procedure). The Procedure made vaccination with an approved covid vaccine or an exemption from doing so a condition of entry to Woodside’s Perth office.
Woodside say that it conducted extensive consultation with its workforce in relation to the introduction of the Procedure and that the Procedure was underpinned by a health and safety assessment. Woodside submit that direction to Ms Chen and its other employees that they must comply with the Procedure was a lawful and reasonable direction.
On 7 February 2022 Ms Chen was stood down without pay from her position as a Geology Subsurface Analyst due to her failure to comply with the Procedure.
On 9 March 2022 Ms Chen and her support person attended a ‘allegation’ meeting with her line manager and a member of Woodside’s human resources team. She was notified at that meeting that if she remained non-compliant with the Procedure that her employment would be terminated.[4]
A further ‘show cause’ meeting was held on 15 March 2022 at which she was advised that her employment would be terminated effective immediately.[5]
On 16 March 2022 Ms Chen made an application to the FWC pursuant to s.394 of FW Act alleging she was unfairly dismissed from her employment with Woodside (First Application).
Sometime between 16 March 2022 and 14 April 2022 Ms Chen met with a lawyer to obtain legal advice in relation to the Application.
The Application was subsequently listed for conciliation with a Staff Conciliator. On 14 April 2022 Ms Chen and Woodside participated in a telephone conference with a Staff Conciliator. The Staff Conciliator recorded that:
“After hearing the arguments of the Respondent and no offer of compensation the Applicant indicated at the end of the conciliation that she did not wish to proceed to a hearing given the potential time, stress and expense.”
The Staff Conciliator confirmed this in a letter sent by email to Ms Chen and Woodside the same day stating as follows:
“The Applicant has advised the Commission that they wish to discontinue their application. The case is now taken to have been discontinued in accordance with Rule 10 of the Fair Work Commission Rules 2013. The case is now closed. This means the case cannot be re-opened or further heard by the Commission.
On 30 September 2022 Ms Chen wrote to the Staff Conciliator requesting that the First Application be ‘reopened’ on the grounds that:
“The reasons for this request are:
1. It came to my attention that I was not properly informed of my rights and entitlements.
2. Exceptional circumstances have developed in the Northern Territory which directly affects you and you were not informed about this until two weeks ago.”
Commissioner Bisset considered Ms Chen’s request and on 3 October 2022 her Chambers sent Ms Chen an email informing her that:
“Commissioner Bissett notes that you notified the Commission at the conclusion of the conciliation on 14 April 2022 that you wished to withdraw your application. This was taken as a discontinuance pursuant to Rule 10(2)(b)(iii) of the Fair Work Commission Rules 2013 and the discontinuance confirmed with you by letter.
In AB v Tabcorp Holdings Limited [2015] FWCFB 523 a Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission held that a notice of discontinuance could only be set aside by making an application to a Court. The Commission is not a Court and therefore does not have the power to set aside your notice of discontinuance and therefore cannot re-open or hear your application.
If you consider that the Notice of Discontinuance was filed by mistake or under duress, you must make an application to a Court if you want it set aside. If you decide to file a new unfair dismissal application you will have to make an application for an extension of time for the late filing (as it will not have been filed within 21 days of the date of your dismissal) and address the reason for the delay.”
On 24 October 2022 Ms Chen filed this Application. In her Form F2 – Unfair Dismissal Application (Form F2) she acknowledged that the Application was being made out of time. She described the reasons for delay as follows:[6]
“I had a conciliation meeting in April 2022. Since then, I have learnt that I did not receive proper advice on my rights and entitlement. In addition to that Woodside has breached Article 7 of the ICCPR and section 10 of the Charter of Human Rights & Responsibilities Act 2006. In the meantime, exceptional circumstances have developed in the Northern Territory which directly affects the FairWork Commission and Woodside Energy Ltd.”
Consideration
Subsection 394(2) of the FW Act provides that an application for an unfair dismissal remedy must be made ‘within 21 days after the dismissal took effect’, or within such further period as the FWC allows pursuant to subsection 394(3) of the FW Act.
The 21 day period does not include the day on which the dismissal took effect.”[7]
If the final day of the 21 day period falls on a weekend or public holiday, the prescribed time will be extended until the next business day.”[8]
It is not in dispute, and I so find, that the dismissal took effect on 15 March 2022.
The date 21 days after the dismissal took effect was Tuesday 5 April 2022.
It is not in dispute, and I so find, that the Application was made on 24 October 2022.
The Application was therefore filed 206 days out of time when it was filed on 11 February 2022.
The FW Act allows the FWC to extend the period within which an unfair dismissal application must be made only if it is satisfied that there are ‘exceptional circumstances’. Exceptional circumstances are circumstances that are out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon, but the circumstances themselves do not need to be unique nor unprecedented, nor even very rare.[9] Exceptional circumstances may include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors, or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together can be considered exceptional.[10]
Section 394(3) of the FW Act requires that, in considering whether to grant an extension of time, the FWC must take into account the following:
- the reason for the delay;
- whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect;
- any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal;
- prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay);
- the merits of the Application; and
- fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position.
The requirement that these matters be taken into account means that each matter must be considered and given appropriate weight in assessing whether there are exceptional circumstances.[11]
The test of exceptional circumstances establishes a high hurdle for an applicant to overcome for an extension to be granted.[12]
Having taken into account the factors set out in sub-section 394(3) of the FW Act, ultimately, the power to grant an extension for the filing of an application which has been lodged out of time is a discretionary one.[13]
The requirement that there be exceptional circumstances before the time for the lodgement of an application can be extended under section 394(3) of the FW Act contrasts with the broad discretion conferred on the FWC under section 185(3), to extend the 14 day period within which an enterprise agreement must be lodged, which is exercisable simply if in all the circumstances the Commission considers that it is ‘fair’ to do so.
Were there reasons for the delay?
The onus is on Ms Chen to provide a credible reason for the delay.
While the delay to be considered is the period subsequent to the expiration of the 21 day period, the circumstances from the time of the dismissal may be relevant in determining whether the reason for the delay constitutes exceptional circumstances.[14]
In Diotti v Lenswood Cold Stores Co-op Society t/a Lenswood Organic,[15] the Full Bench explained the correct approach by reference to the following example:
“For example if an applicant is in hospital for the first 20 days of the 21 day period this would be a relevant consideration if the application was filed 2 days out of time as occurred in this matter.”
The reason for the delay is not in itself required to be an exceptional circumstance. It is one of the factors that must be weighed in assessing whether, overall, there are exceptional circumstances.[16]
The absence of any explanation for any part of the delay will usually weigh against an applicant in the assessment of whether there are exceptional circumstances, and a credible explanation for the entirety of the delay will usually weigh in the applicant’s favour, however all of the circumstances must be considered.[17]
The FW Act does not specify what reason for delay might tell in favour of granting an extension. However, decisions of the FWC have referred to an acceptable or reasonable explanation. Ignorance of the 21 day timeframe is not, of itself, an exceptional circumstance.[18]
The Ms Chen submitted that the delay occurred because:
“I had a conciliation meeting in April 2022 which was within the 21 days. As I learnt later, I was not informed of my rights.”
She expands on this further in her witness statement where she says:[19]
“After I was stood down without pay at the beginning of February 2022, I had two online meetings with my line manager (Gillian Harrowfield) and an HR person (Claire Swyny). In both meetings Gillian Harrowfield stated that the “vaccines” have been approved by the TGA (see attached document). This statement is false since these injections were only given provisional approval. Greg Hunt announced in April 2021 that the world, including Australia, is taking part in the largest clinical trial. I stand under section 7 of the ICCPR which says “ …….no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation”, so does The Charter of Human Rights & Responsibility Act 2006 Section 10. The introduce mandate to Woodside’s head quarter in Perth is not lawful. Section 732 of the Fair Work Act 2009 gives me protection from this mandate. I had a meeting with a lawyer for legal advice prior to the Conciliation Meeting on 14th April 2022. These laws mentioned above were not discussed during the meeting with the lawyer. I was not made aware of it until much later and sent a request to have my case reopened end of September 2022 but was advised to submit a new F2 form to Fair Work.”
Ms Chen submits in her materials filed in accordance with Directions that the delay occurred because she was not informed of her legal rights under section 10 of the Charter of Human Rights & Responsibilities Act 2006 (Charter) and section 7 of the International Covenant on the Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
Interestingly the Staff Conciliator recorded that Ms Chen decided not to proceed with the First Application because of the time and stress involved in a hearing rather than because she believed that her case had no prospect of success.
It remains unclear who Ms Chen asserts failed to inform her of what she says are her legal rights. It is not within the remit of the Staff Conciliator to provide legal advice to the parties. Presumably it is the lawyer she says she sought advice from prior to the conciliation conference in relation to the First Application. She does not identify the lawyer or the context in which they gave her advice.
Her assertion that she was incorrectly advised because the advice omitted to include what she describes as her legal rights under the Charter and ICCPR is misconceived. The Charter has no application in Western Australia given it is Victorian legislation.[20] The ICCPR has not been adopted into domestic law in Australia and therefore has no legal effect.[21] In any event a requirement to be vaccinated to attend the workplace does not constitute a breach of either the Charter or the ICCPR because it does not constitute an effective lack of choice or duress or coercion. Ms Chen had a choice, which she exercised, which was to choose not to be vaccinated.[22]
As stated by Beech-Jones CJ at [68] in Kassam v Hazzard[23], which was cited with approval by the Full Bench of the FWC in Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union, Mr Matthew Howard v Mt Arthur Coal Pty Ltd T/A Mt Arthur Coal at [218]:[24]
“It can be accepted that there is room for debate at the boundaries of what external factors might vitiate a consent to medical treatment so as to render the treatment a battery and a violation of a person’s right to bodily integrity. [...] People may choose to be vaccinated or undertake some other form of medical procedure in response to various forms of societal pressure including a law or a rule, an employment condition or to avoid familial or social resentment, even scorn. However, if they do so, that does not mean their consent is vitiated or make the doctor who performed the vaccination liable for assault. So far as this case is concerned, a consent to a vaccination is not vitiated and a person’s right to bodily integrity is not violated just because a person agrees to be vaccinated to avoid a general prohibition on movement or to obtain entry onto a construction site. Clauses 4.3 and 5.8 of [Public Health (COVID-19 Additional Restrictions for Delta Outbreak) Order (No. 2) 2021 (NSW)] do not violate any person’s right to bodily integrity any more than a provision requiring a person undergo a medical examination before commencing employment does.”
Ms Chen also submits that the delay occurred because she was not informed of her legal rights under section 732 of the FW Act.
Section 732 of the FW Act does not provide Ms Chen with any legal right. Section 732 is a provision which in conjunction with sections 725 to 731 prevent applicants making multiple applications in relation to a dismissal.
Section 725 of the FW Act provides that:
“s.725 General rule
A person who has been dismissed must not make an application or complaint of a kind referred to in any one of sections 726 to 732 in relation to the dismissal if any other of those sections applies.”
Section 732 provides that:
“732 Applications and complaints under other laws
(1) This section applies if:
(a)an application or complaint under another law has been made by, or on behalf of, the person in relation to the dismissal; and
(b) the application or complaint has not:
(i)been withdrawn by the person who made the application; or
(ii)failed for want of jurisdiction.
(2) An application or complaint under another law is an application or complaint made under:
(a)a law of the Commonwealth (other than this Act); or
(b)a law of a State or Territory.
(3) For the purposes of this Subdivision, if a complaint under the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 relates to a dismissal only as a result of an amendment of the complaint, the complaint is taken to be made when the complaint is amended.”
Furthermore, Ms Chen must have formed her view that she had been misinformed of her legal rights on or before 30 September 2022 when she contacted the staff conciliator to inform him that she wished to reopen her case. She was informed on 3 October 2022 by the Chambers of Commissioner Bissett, that if she wished to file a new unfair dismissal matter she would have to make an application for an extension of time as the 21 day period for filing had passed. However, she did not file the Application for a further 25 days. She has provided no explanation for this delay.
I consider the evidence before me does not provide a reasonable explanation for the delay. The absence of an acceptable explanation for the delay weighs against a conclusion that there are exceptional circumstances.
Did Ms Chen first become aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect?
Ms Chen admits that she was notified of her impending dismissal on 9 March 2022. Ms Chen was aware of her dismissal as soon it took effect and therefore had the full period of 21 days to lodge the Application. This factor weighs against Ms Chen being granted an extension.[25]
What action was taken by Ms Chen to dispute the dismissal?
Action taken by an applicant to contest the termination, other than by virtue of making the application will be relevant and may weight in favour of granting the extension of time.[26]
Ms Chen has provided no evidence that she took any steps to contest her dismissal after it took effect other than to file the First Application and to over 200 days later file this Application. Given that Ms Chen voluntarily withdrew the First Application Woodside was entitled to presume that she no longer disputed her dismissal.
This factor weighs against Ms Chen being granted an extension of time.
What is the prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay)?
Prejudice to the employer will go against the granting of an extension of time. The mere absence of prejudice to the employer is an insufficient basis to grant an extension of time.[27]
The employer must produce evidence to demonstrate prejudice. It is then up to the employee to show that the facts do not amount to prejudice.
Woodside submits that it would suffer prejudice if an extension of time were granted given the impact of duration of the delay on witness recollections.
A long delay gives rise “to a general presumption of prejudice”.[28]
There has been a period of more than seven months since Ms Chen’s dismissal. Witness recollections can be expected to fade over time. Furthermore, witness availability and the collection of relevant materials can become more problematic. This is particularly so in circumstances in which Woodside had no reason to believe that Ms Chen intended to reagitate her claim.
Even in the absence of prejudice I would attribute it little weight in consideration of whether there are exceptional circumstances. The mere absence of prejudice to the employer is an insufficient basis to grant an extension of time.
What are the merits of the application?
If a claim has merits, this will weight in favour of the grant of an extension of time.[29]
Ms Chen says that the Application if it were to proceed has merit because there was no valid reason for her dismissal because of the rights she says she has under the Charter and the ICCPR. The Charter and the ICCPR do not apply in Western Australia.
In considering the merits of an application for an extension of time, the FWC is not normally in a position to make findings of fact on contested issues because to do so would require the parties in effect to present their evidentiary cases twice.[30]
I note that non-compliance with an employer’s vaccination policy has been found to be a valid reason for dismissal.[31] Ms Chen was forewarned of this requirement and the consequences for her failure to comply with it. The disciplinary process adopted by Woodside was orthodox. Woodside invited her to show cause why she should not be dismissed. She was permitted to have a support person attend the meeting held to discuss her proposed dismissal.
Ms Chen’s circumstances are not dissimilar to many unfair dismissal applications heard by the FWC in recent months brought by applicants in similar circumstances to Ms Chen. On the material currently before me I am of the view that the Application has low likelihood of success. This weighs against the granting of an extension of time.
Fairness as between the Ms Chen and other persons in a similar position
The FWC may have consideration to fairness in matters of a similar kind that are currently before the FWC or have been decided in the past. This consideration is concerned with the importance of the application of consistent principles in cases of the same kind; however, cases of the same kind often turn on their own facts.[32]
In relation to this criteria Ms Chen submits that: “The dismissal was unfair”.
As Commissioner Bissett observed in Murray at [48]:
“In considering whether I should grant an extension of time, I need to have regard to whether it is fair to other unfair dismissal applicants whose applications are either currently before the Commission, or have been decided in the past. It would be unfair to other persons who have not been allowed a further period to make an unfair dismissal application in the absence of exceptional circumstances.”
The FWC has recently denied extension of time applications for claims commenced even if they are one day out of time.[33]
Taking into account the criteria set out in section 394(3) of the FW Act, there is no exceptional circumstance that differentiates Ms Chen’s circumstances from the circumstances of other individuals whose extension of time applications have recently been denied in a public health order context.[34]
These decisions weight against the granting of an extension of time.
Conclusion
Having regard to the matters I am required to take into account under section 394 of the FW Act, and all of the matters raised by Ms Chen, I am not satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances in this case, either when the various circumstances are considered individually or together.
As I am not satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, there is no basis for me to allow an extension of time. I therefore decline to grant an extension of time under section 394(3) of the FW Act.
Accordingly, Ms Chen’s Application for an unfair dismissal remedy must be dismissed. An Order[35] to this effect will be issued with this Decision.
DEPUTY PRESIDENT
Appearances:
Mr D Balogh, for the Applicant.
Ms Olga Klimczak, for the Respondent.
Hearing details:
2022
PERTH
8 December
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[1] Digital Court Book (DCB) 9-11.
[2] Warrell v Walton (2013) 233 IR 335, 341 [22].
[3] DCB (n 1) 3.
[4] Ibid 3, 15-18.
[5] Ibid 3,19-22.
[6] Ibid 3.
[7] Singh v Trimatic Management Services Pty Ltd [2020] FWCFB 553, [10]. See also Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 36(1) as in force on 25 June 2009; Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 40A.
[8] Ibid; Stedman v Transdev NSW Pty Ltd [2015] FWCFB 1877.
[9] Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd[2011] FWAFB 975, [13].
[10] Ibid.
[11] Stogiannidis v Victorian Frozen Foods Distributors Pty Ltd[2018] FWCFB 901, [39].
[12] Diotti v Lenswood Cold Stores Co-op Society t/a Lenswood Organic[2016] FWCFB 349 at [16].
[13] Kyvelos v Champion Socks Pty Ltd (unreported, AIRCFB, Giudice J, Acton SOP, Gay C, 10 November 2000) Print T2421 at [8].
[14] Diotti v Lenswood Cold Stores Co-op Society t/a Lenswood Organic[2016] FWCFB 349 at [31].
[15] [2016] FWCFB 349.
[16] Stogiannidis v Victorian Frozen Foods Distributors PtyLtd[2018] FWCFB 901, [39].
[17] Ibid.
[18] Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd (2011) 203 IR 1 at [14].
[19] DCB (n 1) 10.
[20] See Charter of Human Rights & Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) at s 6.
[21] Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292 at 305.
[22] CFMMEU & Ors v BHP Coal Pty Ltd T/A BHP Billiton Mitsubishi Alliance / BMA & Ors[2022] FWC 81.
[23] [2021] NSWSC 1320.
[24] [2021] FWCFB 6059.
[25] Meek v Baycorp Pty Ltd t/a Baycorp Pty Ltd[2016] FWC 1291 at [15].
[26] Brodie-Hanns v MTV Publishing Ltd (1995) 67 IR 298 at 300.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 at 556.
[29] Haining v Deputy President Drake (1998) 87 FCR 248, 250.
[30] Kyvelos v Champion Socks Pty Ltd (AIRCFB, Giudice J, Acton SOP, Gay C, 10 November 2000) Print T2421 at [14].
[31] Jovcic and Ors v Coopers Brewery Limited[2022] FWC 1931; Yardley v Rentokil Initial Pty Ltd[2022] FWC 2314; Kachwalla v ARA Security Services Pty Ltd[2022] FWC 1459; Pillifeant v Boeing Defence Australia Ltd[2022] FWC 2340.
[32] Andrew Green v Bilco Group Pty Ltd[2018] FWC 6818 at [31].
[33] See for example Battigelli v Respiratory West Pty Ltd[2022] FWC 25 and Murray v Ambulance Victoria (n 62).
[34] See for example: O’Dea v Grampians Health (n 62); Yates v Dahlsens Building Centres Pty Ltd (n 62), Ainslie v Groot Eylandt Mining Company Proprietary Limited (n 62); Fried v Travel Management Services Pty Ltd ( n 62); Massey v Centrecare (n 62), McIntosh v Barwon Health (n 62); Potapova v Alfred Health (n 62); Murray v Ambulance Victoria (n 62); Scanlan v Aged Care and Housing Group Inc (n 62); Ferrato v Virtus Diagnostics (n 62); Petherick v Estia Investments Pty Ltd (n 62).
[35] PR748836.
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