Mrs Sandra Woolford v Super Retail Group Limited
[2024] FWC 1543
•14 JUNE 2024
| [2024] FWC 1543 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
| DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.394 - Application for unfair dismissal remedy
Mrs Sandra Woolford
v
Super Retail Group Limited
(U2024/4983)
| DEPUTY PRESIDENT ANDERSON | ADELAIDE, 14 JUNE 2024 |
Application for an unfair dismissal remedy – extension of time – dismissal – conduct allegations – mental health impacts – whether exceptional circumstances – extension refused – application dismissed
On 2 May 2024 Sandra Woolford (Mrs Woolford or the applicant) applied to the Commission under s 394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the FW Act) for an unfair dismissal remedy. The application related to a dismissal by SRG Leisure Retail Pty Ltd T/A BCF (BCF, the respondent or the employer) which took effect on 5 April 2024.
The application is six days outside the statutory 21-day period for making unfair dismissal claims. Mrs Woolford seeks an extension of time. BCF oppose an extension.
This decision determines whether an extension of time should be granted. Aspects of this published decision have been redacted as they concern evidence of health matters of a private nature. The parties have received the decision in unredacted form.
I issued directions on 20 May 2024.
I heard the extension of time issue (by video) on 5 June 2024.
Mrs Woolford was self-represented. BCF were represented by a paid agent (Citation HR), with permission and by consent. I heard evidence from Mrs Woolford[1] and Mr Timothy Daniel.[2] Relevantly, Mrs Woolford’s general practitioner Dr Aurati Kumar was not called to give evidence on a letter she wrote in support of Mrs Woolford’s application.
Facts
The facts are largely not in dispute. I make the following findings.
BCF is a retail business operating nationwide selling boating, camping and fishing products.
Mrs Woolford was employed as Store Manager at Whyalla in regional South Australia. Until dismissed, she was employed in this role for approximately two and a half years.
Mrs Woolford was, at all relevant times, a member of the Australian Workers Union (AWU).
On 5 April 2024 Mrs Woolford was summarily dismissed.
The dismissal followed a conduct complaint (13 March), a letter of allegations and stand down (26 March), an investigation meeting (28 March), a show cause letter (3 April) and a show cause meeting (4 April).
Dismissal was communicated verbally during an in-person meeting of 5 April 2024 with Mr Daniel, the then acting Area Manager.
Later that day, Mr Daniel and Mrs Woolford exchanged emails.[3] Mr Daniel had sent an email attaching a letter confirming dismissal and its reasons (5.04pm).[4] Mrs Woolford then sought assurance that her final pay would include penalty rates for public holidays worked over Easter (5.09pm). Mr Daniel provided that assurance (7.04pm).
During the immediately following weekend (6 and 7 April) Mrs Woolford formed the view that she had been set-up and that her dismissal was unfair. She knew that rights existed for dismissed employees to make unfair dismissal claims. However, she decided to initially seek an internal review of the decision.
On 8 April 2024 (1.27pm) Mrs Woolford sent a lengthy email to the General Manager of Operations Mr McConnell, for whom she had regard. The email stated:[5]
“Hi Ben
I would like to bring something to your attention. I feel I have been stitched up. I am sorry, you probably have more important things to deal with but I am contacting you as I feel you are the only one I can trust as you have always been approachable to me.
Not a fair go.
I have been a dedicated manager, always there for my team in any capacity, from store opening, I have worked my butt off…
The allegations were all fictitious lies…I feel very betrayed and bullied…Now I have been terminated for these lies and feel like the last 2.5 years have just been wasted. When I thought I was doing a good job.
I am sorry if this is inappropriate but I had to speak up to someone.
Thanks for listening
Sandra Woolford”
Mr McConnell responded by email the following day (9 April):[6]
“Hi Sandra
Thank you for your email and I appreciate you contacting me directly.
I hope you can understand that I’ll need some time to look into your concerns and I will aim to come back to you by Friday of this week as I would like to be fully informed before I make comment.
I take this seriously and will review with appropriate diligence.
Kind regards
Ben McConnell”
On the evening of 9 April, Mrs Woolford acknowledged by email the holding response from Mr McConnell and thanked him for looking into the matter.[7]
On 12 April (Friday 4.30pm) Mr McConnell responded substantively to Mrs Woolford. He stated:[8]
“Hi Sandra
Firstly, thanks again for your email.
I do appreciate you taking the time to step me through your concerns and the investigation process from your perspective. I have consulted with the WR team who oversaw your case with Tim and Lisa. I acknowledge the matters you have raised...
Having reviewed the information provided to me, I’m satisfied with the process that was run, the evidence obtained, and the decisions made. I understand this means you are no longer employed, and I appreciate this is not the outcome you were hoping for, however the decision remains upheld.
I understand this is impacting you and would encourage you to seek support through the Employee Assistance Program which you will have access to for a further 4 weeks…
I wish you well in your future endeavours.
Kind regards,
Ben McConnell
General Manager – Operations”
Mr Woolford replied (at 6.42pm):[9]
“Hi Ben
Thanks for your time and efforts regarding this matter…
I would also like to thank you for always listening to my concerns. I am disappointed that I am no longer employed in the company, but I am also concerned about my future employment and the reference they would receive if they enquired. I have never felt so stitched up, betrayed, and embarrassed by this latest incident and would appreciate this being kept confidential to future employers.
I would also like to bring to your attention the fact that several SA BCF stores including Whyalla, were told…to keep filling gas without the current gas licences…I refused…
Thanks
Sandra Woolford”
Having received advice on 12 April 2024 of Mr McConnell’s decision upholding the dismissal, Mrs Woolford felt stressed, anxious and depressed. Her evidence was that she had difficulty sleeping [Medical Details Omitted].
Mrs Woolford had earlier (prior to dismissal, on about 27 March) made an appointment to see her local general practitioner Dr Kumar. That appointment had been scheduled for 18 April. Despite her feelings post-dismissal, Mrs Woolford did not escalate or bring forward this medical appointment.
On 18 April Mrs Woolford was seen by Dr Kumar. According to Mrs Woolford’s evidence, Dr Kumar diagnosed severe anxiety and depression, and prescribed an anti-depressant.
On 30 April 2024 Mrs Woolford decided to take her dissatisfaction with the dismissal further. She telephoned the AWU and spoke to an officer. She was asked to send through all of the documents related to her dismissal, which she did.
The following day (1 May) Mrs Woolford had a further discussion with the AWU at which time, according to Mrs Woolford’s evidence, they provided the following advice:
that unfair dismissal claims had to be filed within 21 days and that Mrs Woolford was already out of time;
that extensions of time can be sought;
that to improve the chance of an extension being granted on health grounds Mrs Woolford should obtain a letter from her doctor and include that in her application; and
that the AWU could help prepare Mrs Woolford’s application but could not file it on her behalf or represent her as they did not have coverage of the retail sector.
Mrs Woolford already had a follow-up appointment with Dr Kumar scheduled for 2 May. She decided to hold off filing the application until the following day (2 May) when she would seek a letter of support from the doctor.
On 2 May 2024 Mrs Woolford was seen by Dr Kumar. Mrs Woolford asked the doctor for a letter supporting the late lodgement of her claim on medical grounds. Dr Kumar provided a letter during that consultation. It is in evidence. It read:[10]
“Thursday 2 May 2024
Dear Sir/Madam
This letter is to bring to your kind attention that Mrs Sandra Woolford is currently facing issues regarding her mental health. This has led to her missing the last date for application for review of wrongful termination from work. I would be grateful if you could kindly enable her to apply for the same. This letter was written with Ms Woolford’s consent regarding mentioning her health condition.
Should any of the above need clarification please feel free to contact me on [phone number].
Thank you for your care and assistance. I look forward to hearing the outcome of Sandra’s attendance.
Yours sincerely
Dr Armati Kumar”
Mrs Woolford went home and advised the AWU of the letter. The AWU prepared the application and the letter was attached to it.
At 4.18pm that day (2 May) Mrs Wolford filed the application online under her hand.
Submissions
Mrs Woolford
Mrs Woolford submits that the reason for the delay was severe anxiety and depression experienced after she was terminated. She submits that this was caused by two factors:
the shock and upset at being terminated, including being accused of conduct she denies and the challenges which the loss of her job presented to her financial security and capacity to obtain future employment; and
that the termination occurred at a time when she was grieving the one and two year anniversaries of the passing of her father and mother respectively.
Mrs Wolford submits that she put BCF on immediate notice following the dismissal that she considered it unfair as she had sought an internal review.
Mrs Wolford submits that she saw her treating doctor twice before filing the application, and that the doctor has written a letter of support which provides independent medical verification that “her mental health…had led to her missing the last date for application”.
Mrs Woolford submits that she took advice from the AWU to obtain the doctor’s letter, did not know that a 21 day rule applied until 30 April, and filed the application on 2 May immediately after receiving the doctors letter.
Mrs Woolford submits that there is no prejudice to the employer because a delay of six days is short.
Mrs Woolford submits that her case on merit is strong and this should favour extending time.
In combination, Mrs Woolford submits that the circumstances are exceptional and time should be extended.
BCF
BCF submit that the circumstances for the late lodgement are not exceptional, individually or collectively.
BCF submit that the medical evidence presented by Mrs Woolford is insufficient to make a finding that reasonably explains the delay. BCF point out that Dr Kumar was not called to give evidence about the diagnosed health condition and submit that accordingly her opinion has not been subject to testing.
BCF submit that in the immediate wake of the dismissal Mrs Woolford had the capacity to communicate with BCF on her final payment, had the capacity to write a lengthy request for an informal internal review of the dismissal, and had the capacity both on 8 and 12 April to inform BCF of a range of concerns and complaints she had about others in the business. BCF submit that this is evidence of capacity by Mrs Woolford to advance her interests, notwithstanding her distress at being dismissed.
BCF submit that Mrs Woolford knew of the right to take unfair dismissal claims at the time she was dismissed, and that she was a trade union member, but did not take active steps to inform herself of her rights, how to exercise such rights or the time frames to in which to do so until twenty five days after being dismissed (when she contacted the AWU), at which point she was already out of time.
BCF submit that the internal review was conducted immediately following it being requested by Mrs Woolford, was handled in a responsible manner, and that the result was communicated within four days and in the time frame promised by Mr McConnell.
BCF submit that by 12 April Mrs Woolford knew that the employer would not reverse the dismissal, and from that date at least she knew that any challenge to her dismissal would have to be taken by external action. Despite having two further weeks from 12 April to file within time, Mrs Woolford did not do so.
BCF submit that it will be prejudiced by having to defend a late claim including being put to the cost and expense in doing so.
BCF submit that it would not be fair to extend time in circumstances where other persons who have made applications for an extension based on stress and depression have been denied extensions on the ground of insufficient medical evidence.
BCF submit that the application is weak on merit and that this should weigh against extending time.
Consideration
Unfair dismissal applications are required to be filed within twenty-one days of a dismissal taking effect. However, s 394(3) of the FW Act provides:
“394 Application for unfair dismissal remedy
…
(3)The FWC may allow a further period for the application to be made by a person under subsection (1) if the FWC is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, taking into account:
(a)the reason for the delay; and
(b)whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect; and
(c)any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal; and
(d)prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay); and
(e)the merits of the application; and
(f)fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position.”
The application can only proceed if the applicant can establish that “exceptional circumstances” exist within the meaning of s 394(3).
An applicant for an extension of time has an onus to adduce evidence in support of matters which that applicant asserts constitute exceptional circumstances.[11]
The test of “exceptional circumstances” establishes a “high hurdle” for an applicant.[12] A decision whether to extend time under s 394(3) involves the exercise of a discretion.[13]
I apply s 394(3) in the context of the Full Bench decision in Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd:
“[13] In summary, the expression “exceptional circumstances” has its ordinary meaning and requires consideration of all the circumstances. To be exceptional, circumstances must be out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon but need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare. Circumstances will not be exceptional if they are regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered. Exceptional circumstances can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional. It is not correct to construe “exceptional circumstances” as being only some unexpected occurrence, although frequently it will be. Nor is it correct to construe the plural “circumstances” as if it were only a singular occurrence, even though it can be a one off situation. The ordinary and natural meaning of “exceptional circumstances” includes a combination of factors which, when viewed together, may reasonably be seen as producing a situation which is out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon.”[14]
The principles of Nulty have been cited with approval by subsequent full benches of the Commission.[15]
It is not in dispute that Ms Woolford’s application is six days out of time.
I now consider each of the factors in s 394(3).
Reason for the delay (s 394(3)(a))
The reason for delay in lodging an application is a factor that must be considered. The FW Act does not specify what reason or reasons for delay might fall in favour of granting an extension although decisions of the Commission have referred to an acceptable or reasonable explanation.[16] The absence of an explanation for any part of the delay will usually weigh against an applicant. Similarly, a credible explanation for the entirety of the delay will usually weigh in an applicant’s favour, though it is ultimately a question of degree and insight.[17]
However, a reasonable explanation for the delay is not needed for the whole of the period of delay or may in fact not be required at all if the circumstances are otherwise exceptional.[18]
The period of delay that requires explanation is the period commencing immediately after the time for lodging an application has expired, ending on the day on which an application is ultimately lodged. That said, regard may be had to any circumstances from the date the dismissal took effect when assessing whether the explanation for delay is acceptable or credible.[19]
In this matter, the delay period commenced after 26 April 2024 until the day the application was filed (2 May). In this six day period Mrs Woolford was at home. In the final three days of this period (30 April, 1 May and 2 May) Mrs Woolford commenced steps to advance her unfair dismissal rights by contacting her union, obtaining a letter from her doctor and then making an application.
Prior to this Mrs Woolford had taken no steps to advance her unfair dismissal rights other than to seek an internal review by BCF of the decision (on 8 April). This was completed and the result advised to her four days later (12 April).
Mrs Woolford submits that the reason for the delay was severe anxiety and depression experienced after she was dismissed, caused by two factors:
the shock and upset at being terminated, including being accused of conduct she denies and the challenges which the loss of her job presented to her financial security and capacity to obtain future employment; and
that the termination occurred at a time when she was grieving the one and two year anniversaries of the passing of her father and mother.
It is well established that an applicant seeking an extension of time and relying on a health or medical condition to explain the delay needs, in practice, to adduce evidence establishing the nature of the health condition, and that it materially impacted their capacity to make an in-time application. The Commission’s approach was summarised by Deputy President Easton in Bianca Mamo v ICLED Australia Pty Limited T/A Signs National Group:[20]
“[24] It is not a requirement per se to provide medical evidence of exceptional circumstances arising from mental illness. However, the practical reality is that without proper and specific medical evidence it is very difficult for the Commission to make informed findings about an applicant’s capacity to complete and file their application within the statutory time limit.
[25] In summary the following principles apply:
(i)stress, shock, confusion and similar conditions are not exceptional circumstances in and of themselves (per Shaw);
(ii)a depressive illness might point towards exceptional circumstance if the illness had a material impact upon the applicant’s capacity to lodge the application within the statutory time limit (per Roberts and Underwood);
(iii)the evidence should positively demonstrate that the applicant’s depressive illness had an impact on their mental capacity so as to prevent the lodging of the application within the 21 day time frame (per Underwood and Merhi); and
(iv)an applicant’s self-assessment of their alleged psychological incapacity is unlikely to be sufficient (per Underwood).”
Two issues arise. Firstly, was Mrs Woolford in fact suffering a mental health condition; and secondly, was Mrs Woolford’s condition such that she could not reasonably take advice on her rights or make an application within time or earlier than when she did.
The evidence of the health condition relied upon by Mrs Woolford is her oral evidence of how she felt in the post-dismissal period, and the letter of support from Dr Kumar.
Mrs Wolford’s evidence of feeling anxious and depressed following the dismissal, and in particular following the email from Mr McConnell on 12 April upholding the dismissal, is plausible. It is not uncommon that a dismissed employee, concerned about the dismissal itself and the consequent economic insecurity, will feel this way. That Mrs Woolford saw Dr Kumar twice in the post-dismissal period, discussed her feelings [Medical Details Omitted]. and was prescribed an anti-depressant, broadly supports that she was feeling this way, notwithstanding that the first appointment was made prior to dismissal for unrelated health issues.
Dr Kumar’s letter of 2 May 2024 refers to “issues regarding her mental health”. It supports a finding that Mrs Woolford was experiencing depression following the dismissal.
However, was Mrs Woolford’s health condition such that she could not reasonably take advice on her rights or make an application within time or earlier than when she did?
On this, the evidence relied upon by Mrs Wolford is the letter of Dr Kumar of 2 May. The letter was requested of the doctor by Mrs Woolford for the specific purpose of supporting the application and because the AWU appropriately advised her to obtain such a letter.
Whilst obtained in this context, and whilst very brief, the letter draws a connection between the health condition and the late filing. It states:
“Mrs Sandra Woolford is currently facing issues regarding her mental health. This had led to her missing the last date for application for review of wrongful termination from work.”
I give weight to this letter because it is an opinion expressed by a treating doctor who was familiar with Mrs Woolford as a client and had prescribed an anti-depressant two weeks earlier.
However, the fact that Dr Kumar was not called to give evidence diminishes somewhat the weight that can been attached to the letter because the doctor’s opinion that the medical condition “led to” the late filing is untested. It is unclear what the doctor knew or understood to be involved in filing a claim, how doing so might align to any impairments caused by the medical condition, how severe the condition was, whether the doctor was aware that Mrs Woolford had support from the AWU to draft the application, and whether the doctor knew that Mrs Woolford had, in the wake of the dismissal, already competently corresponded with the employer and sought an internal review.
I take into account the letter of Dr Kumar and consider that it generally supports the reason for delay advanced by Mrs Woolford. However, it does not do so compellingly or with a level of weight that might otherwise be attached to it had Dr Kumar given evidence on the aforementioned matters.
In doing so, and whilst noting that each matter has its particular facts, I broadly adopt a similar approach to other decided applications where medical evidence has not been called or tested.[21] This contrasts with matters where medical evidence is presented, health professionals called and their evidence tested.[22]
Two other factors also mitigate somewhat the contention by Mrs Woolford that feelings of stress and depression had a material impact on her capacity to lodge the application within the statutory time limit.
Firstly, that Mrs Woolford had twice (8 and 12 April) communicated effectively with BCF in the wake of the dismissal when seeking an internal review. In doing so, Mrs Woolford not only advanced the reasons why she believed her dismissal unfair, but also provided a narrative concerning the conduct of other employees and alerted the employer to what she considered certain dangerous or unsafe practices by others. This was in addition to email communication on 5 April concerning her final pay. I take into account that it may have been, as Mrs Woolford suggested, that her depression became severe once the decision on the internal review became known, but as noted her level of capacity or incapacity between 12 April and 26 April (the twenty-first day) has not been the subject to testing by a health professional.
Secondly, Mrs Woolford had access to advice and support from her union at all times, including prior to the expiry of the twenty-one days and following. That support was capable of materially simplifying the burden of making an application, and in the final analysis did so. Mrs Woolford did not seek that support before the twenty-one day period expired. That Mrs Woolford was unaware of the time limit does not weigh in favour of the delay being reasonable. She knew of the right to take unfair dismissal claims and could have, but did not, investigate that option immediately after being dismissed.
I acknowledge the distress of bereavement but give little weight to the fact that the period of dismissal coincided with a period of remembrance and sadness at the loss (in March 2023 and March 2022 respectively) of Mrs Wolford’s parents, one and two years earlier. Anniversaries of bereavements that fall within or near a statutory time limit may understandably worsen an employee’s emotional state. However, these are known periods of remembrance common to the human condition. Sadness arising from anniversaries of the passing of loved ones is not unusual. Of itself, this is not a reasonable explanation for the delay nor materially weighs in that direction.
Considered overall, the explanation for the delay somewhat, but only somewhat, supports a finding of exceptional circumstances and the granting of an extension.
Awareness of the dismissal taking effect (s 394(3)(b))
Mrs Woolford was aware that she was dismissed with immediate effect on 5 April 2024, and the reasons.
This is a neutral factor.
Action taken to dispute dismissal (s 394(3)(c))
I have found that Mrs Wolford put BCF on immediate notice following the dismissal that she considered it unfair, provided reasons for her contention and sought an internal review. This was done by Mrs Woolford on 8 April, the next business day after the dismissal.
Whilst the employer responded substantively and promptly four days later, and doing so does not reasonably explain the delay after 12 April, the employer remained on notice until the application was filed that Mrs Woolford was dissatisfied with the dismissal. In her words to Mr McConnell on 12 April, Mrs Woolford was appreciative of his effort but remained “disappointed” with the outcome of the review.
That Mrs Woolford put the employer on notice weighs materially in favour of a finding of exceptional circumstances.
Prejudice to the employer (s 394(3)(d))
BCF would incur time and effort in responding to an unfair dismissal claim. It submits that it would sustain prejudice given the delay.
I do not agree. The prejudice sustained has no unique element given that the delay period is relatively short.
However, the absence of prejudice would not of itself be a reason to grant an extension.[23]
In the circumstances, this is a neutral consideration.
Merits (s 394(3)(e))
Each party submits that the merits support their position for and against an extension.
I disagree with both submissions. It cannot be said that Mrs Woolford’s claim is so clearly merited that it would be an injustice to not extend time. Nor can it be said that the claim is so manifestly groundless that granting an extension and allowing the application to be determined would be a waste of time and resources.
The reason is clear. The dismissal concerns alleged conduct issues. Mrs Woolford claims the conduct as alleged did not occur and that those making the allegations against her are lying and have agendas. BCF submit that the conduct was objectively established to its satisfaction and that evidence supports the decision it made.
Given disputed conduct and the obvious issues of credit that arise it is not possible to form any view, even provisionally, as to the strength or weakness of the application, let alone whether clearly merited or unmerited.
This is a neutral consideration.
Fairness between persons in similar position (s 394(f))
BCF submit that it would not be fair to extend time in circumstances where other persons who have made applications for an extension based on stress and depression have been denied extensions on the ground of insufficient medical evidence.
I reject this submission.
Whilst general principles concerning extensions of time and matters where a health condition is said to support the case for an extension can be gleaned from previous cases, each case ultimately turns on its own facts.
I do not consider that granting an extension to Mrs Woolford would in any sense create unfairness to employees past or present who may be seeking extensions based on medical grounds. This is because Mrs Woolford’s application is decided by the application of the law to the evidence presented in this matter alone. The same would apply in other matters. There is no inconsistent application of law or principle. Each applicant filing late runs the same gauntlet.
This issue does not arise in this matter.
Conclusion
The six day period of delay is not lengthy but is material in the context of a twenty-one day statutory time limit.
That Mrs Woolford put the employer on immediate notice that she considered the dismissal unfair weighs materially in her favour, but whilst it was reasonable for Mrs Woolford to wait for the result of the internal review once sought , she knew that outcome one week after dismissal and did nothing more for a further eighteen days (12 to 30 April). Her conduct in the final three days (30 April to 2 May) was attentive to her interests and reasonable.
Ultimately this matter turns on Mrs Woolford’s circumstances after 12 April and the materiality of the impairment said to have arisen from the anxiety and depression experienced in this period.
Whilst I accept that the evidence somewhat supports a finding that Mrs Woolford’s anxiety and depression went beyond a level of upset and stress commonly experienced by a dismissed employee, the medical evidence relied upon supports somewhat, but does not positively demonstrate to the required level of satisfaction, that Mrs Woolford’s condition impacted her capacity such that it impaired the lodging of the application within time.
Had Dr Kumar’s letter of support been tested by oral evidence, and had such testing positively demonstrated this to have been so on the balance of probabilities, then the decision in this matter may have been different.
Taking all factors into account, I do not find that exceptional circumstances exist warranting an extension of the time for late lodgement.
Disposition
There being no exceptional circumstances, the time for lodgement of application U2024/4983 cannot be extended.
Being out of time, the unfair dismissal application must be dismissed.
An order[24] giving effect to this decision is issued in conjunction with its publication.
DEPUTY PRESIDENT
Appearances:
S. Woolford, on her own behalf.
N. Visedo, on behalf of SRG Leisure Retail Pty Ltd, with C. Zinner assisting.
Hearing details:
2024.
Adelaide;
5 June.
<PR775999>
[1] A1 Statement 24 May 2024
[2] R1 Statement 3 June 2024
[3] R1 TD10
[4] A1 SW2; R1 TD9
[5] A1 SW3
[6] ibid
[7] ibid
[8] ibid
[9] ibid
[10] A1 SW4
[11] Smith v Canning Division of General Practice[2009] AIRC 959
[12] Lombardo v Commonwealth of Australia as represented by the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations[2014] FWCFB 2288, [21]
[13] Halls v AR & MA McCardle & Sons Pty Ltd and Ors [2014] FCCA 316
[14] [2011] FWAFB 975, [13]. See also Cheval Properties Pty Ltd t/as Penrith Hotel Motel v Smithers[2010] FWAFB 7251, [5]
[15] John Mamur v Coles Group Supply Chain Pty Ltd[2020] FWCFB 4954, [7] and [19]; Dennis Obel v Central Desert Regional Council[2021] FWCFB 167, [6]
[16] Manoj Ellikuttige v Moonee Valley Racing Club Inc[2018] FWCFB 4988, [30] and [36]
[17] Stogiannidis v Victorian Frozen Foods Distributors Pty Ltd t/as Richmond Oysters[2019] FWCFB 3288, [35] - [45]
[18] Stogiannidis (Ibid); Elliott v LEAP Legal Software Pty Ltd t/a LEAP Legal Software[2018] FWCFB 3288
[19] Shaw v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited[2015] FWCFB 287, [12]; Ozsoy v Monstamac Industries Pty Ltd[2014] FWCFB 2149 at [31] – [33]; Perry v Rio Tinto Shipping Pty Ltd T/A Rio Tinto Marine[2016] FWCFB 6963; Czoy v Monstamac Industries Pty Ltd [2014] FWCFB 2149
[20] [2021] FWC 3903
[21] Bianca Mamo v ICLED Australia Pty Limited T/A Signs National Group [2021] FWC 3903, [24] – [25]; Hawkins v Todd Transport Pty Ltd[2024] FWC 1271, [68] – [74]
[22] Reeve v PKF (Gold Coast) HR Services Pty Ltd [2023] FWC 488, [65] – [75]
[23] Brodie-Hanns v MTV Publishing Ltd (1995) 67 IR 298, 299-300
[24] PR776000
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