Mrs Petra Sargent v Braemar College Limited

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[2022] FWC 885

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009

s.394 - Application for unfair dismissal remedy

Mrs Petra Sargent

v

Braemar College Limited

(U2022/3259)

DEPUTY PRESIDENT YOUNG

MELBOURNE, 14 APRIL 2022

Application for an unfair dismissal remedy - circumstances not exceptional - application dismissed

  1. This decision concerns an application by Mrs Petra Sargent (Applicant) for an unfair dismissal remedy pursuant to section 394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Act).

  1. Mrs Sargent’s employment with Braemar College Limited (Respondent) was terminated with effect from 22 February 2022. Mrs Sargent lodged her unfair dismissal application (Application) on 17 March 2022.

  1. Section 394(2) of the Act states that an application for an unfair dismissal remedy must be made ‘within 21 days after the dismissal took effect’, or within such further period as the Commission allows pursuant to section 394(3). The period of 21 days ended at midnight on 15 March 2022. The application was therefore filed 2 days outside the 21 day period. The Applicant asks the Commission to grant a further period for the application to be made under section 394(3). The Respondent opposes the grant of an extension of time.

  1. Mrs Sargent’s application was the subject of an extension of time telephone hearing before me at 10.00 am on 14 April 2022. Mrs Sargent appeared on her own behalf. Pursuant to permission granted under section 596(2)(a) of the Act, Mr Ben Tallboys, Russell Kennedy Lawyers, appeared on behalf of the Respondent. Ms Sargent and Mr Douglas Sargent filed witness statements on behalf of the Applicant. Neither were required for cross examination. In addition, it was agreed that Ms Sargent’s Outline of Argument would also comprise her evidence in this matter. Ms Robyn Baddeley, Human Resource Manager for the Respondent, gave evidence on behalf of the Respondent.

Consideration

  1. The Act allows the Commission to extend the period within which an unfair dismissal application must be made if it is satisfied that ‘exceptional circumstances’ exist. This establishes a high hurdle for an applicant.[1]

  1. The meaning of exceptional circumstances was considered by the Full Bench of what was then Fair Work Australia in Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd,[2] where it was noted that, in order to be exceptional, circumstances must be out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon, although they need not be unique or unprecedented. The Full Bench also noted that exceptional circumstances can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors, or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together can be considered exceptional.[3]

  1. Section 394(3) requires that, in considering whether to grant an extension of time, the Commission must take into account the following:

(a)   the reason for the delay;

(b)   whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect;

(c)   any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal;

(d)   prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay);

(e)   the merits of the application;…

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Details
Case
[2022] FWC 885
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Mrs Petra Sargent applied to the Fair Work Commission for an unfair dismissal remedy, pursuant to section 394 of the Fair Work Act 2009. Her application was made two days outside the 21-day statutory period. The Respondent opposed the grant of an extension of time. The matter was heard on 14 April 2022. Mrs Sargent sought an extension of time on the basis of an error in understanding the manner in which the 21-day period for lodgement was calculated, her stress and anxiety following her dismissal, and her asserted lack of knowledge of her ability to make a claim. The Deputy President found that these did not constitute exceptional circumstances. The Deputy President concluded that the application did not have merit and that the Respondent would not suffer prejudice if an extension of time were granted. The application for an extension of time was dismissed.