Mrs Leanne Cooper v Ingenia Communities Pty Limited T/A Ingenia
[2017] FWC 4106
•4 AUGUST 2017
| [2017] FWC 4106 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
| DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.394 - Application for unfair dismissal remedy
Mrs Leanne Cooper
v
Ingenia Communities Pty Limited T/A Ingenia
(U2017/4493)
| Commissioner Spencer | BRISBANE, 4 AUGUST 2017 |
Application for relief from unfair dismissal – jurisdictional objections – minimum employment period and filed out of time – extension of time sought – application dismissed.
INTRODUCTION
An application pursuant to s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act) was made by Mrs Leanne Cooper (the Applicant), alleging that the termination of her employment from Ingenia Communities Pty Limited T/A Ingenia (the Respondent) on 3 April 2017 was harsh, unjust and or unreasonable.
The Respondent raised two jurisdictional objections to the application; that the application was not filed within the 21 day statutory time limit and that the Applicant did not meet the relevant “minimum employment period” at the time of the dismissal.
The Applicant made an application with the Fair Work Commission (the Commission) for an extension of time. The Application was filed on 26 April 2017, two days out of time. This Decision relates to the extension of time issue, and whether the Applicant met the minimum employment period. The Respondent stated the Applicant had not met the six month minimum employment period. Directions were set in relation to the jurisdictional objections.
The Full Bench of the Commission in Lewis v Altus Traffic Pty Ltd,[1] dealt with the issue of procedural fairness, where a matter involved contested facts. Section 397 of the Act states:
“397 Matters involving contested facts
The FWC must conduct a conference or hold a hearing in relation to a matter arising under this Part if, and to the extent that, the matter involves facts the existence of which is in dispute.”
Accordingly, after consideration of the written submissions and the above Full Bench authority, by consent a Hearing conducted by telephone (given the geographical location of the parties) was held on 25 July 2017. The Hearing was recorded and the parties agreed that any additional information offered by the Applicant and the Respondent could be taken into consideration.
At the Hearing, the Applicant was represented by Mr Bernie Barrett, and the Respondent was represented by Ms Dianne Onn, National Human Resources Manager of the Respondent. Mr Barrett did not appear as a lawyer or paid agent in the matter. Accordingly, neither party required permission to appear pursuant to s.596 of the Act.
Whilst not all of the materials and evidence have been referred to in this decision, all of such have been taken into account.
RELEVANT LEGISLATION
Pursuant to s.394 of the Act:
“394 Application for unfair dismissal remedy
(1) A person who has been dismissed may apply to the FWC for an order under Division 4 granting a remedy.
Note 1: Division 4 sets out when the FWC may order a remedy for unfair dismissal.
Note 2: For application fees, see section 395.
Note 3: Part 6 1 may prevent an application being made under this Part in relation to a dismissal if an application or complaint has been made in relation to the dismissal other than under this Part.
(2) The application must be made:
(a) within 21 days after the dismissal took effect; or
(b) within such further period as the FWC allows under subsection (3).
(3) The FWC may allow a further period for the application to be made by a person under subsection (1) if the FWC is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, taking into account:
(a) the reason for the delay; and
(b) whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect; and
(c) any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal; and
(d) prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay); and
(e) the merits of the application; and
(f) fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position.”
Further, ss.382 and 383 of the Act relevantly provide:
“382 When a person is protected from unfair dismissal
A person is protected from unfair dismissal at a time if, at that time:
(a) the person is an employee who has completed a period of employment with his or her employer of at least the minimum employment period; and
(b) one or more of the following apply:
(i) a modern award covers the person;
(ii) an enterprise agreement applies to the person in relation to the employment;
(iii) the sum of the person’s annual rate of earnings, and such other amounts (if any) worked out in relation to the person in accordance with the regulations, is less than the high income threshold.
383 Meaning of minimum employment period
The minimum employment period is:
(a) if the employer is not a small business employer--6 months ending at the earlier of the following times:
(i) the time when the person is given notice of the dismissal;
(ii) immediately before the dismissal; or
(b) if the employer is a small business employer--one year ending at that time.”
Section 23 of the Act provides:
“23 Meaning of small business employer
(1) A national system employer is a small business employer at a particular time if the employer employs fewer than 15 employees at that time.
(2) For the purpose of calculating the number of employees employed by the employer at a particular time:
(a) subject to paragraph (b), all employees employed by the employer at that time are to be counted; and
(b) a casual employee is not to be counted unless, at that time, he or she has been employed by the employer on a regular and systematic basis.
(3) For the purpose of calculating the number of employees employed by the employer at a particular time, associated entities are taken to be one entity.
(4) To avoid doubt, in determining whether a national system employer is a small business employer at a particular time in relation to the dismissal of an employee, or termination of an employee's employment, the employees that are to be counted include (subject to paragraph (2)(b)):
(a) the employee who is being dismissed or whose employment is being terminated; and
(b) any other employee of the employer who is also being dismissed or whose employment is also being terminated.”
Finally, pursuant to s.311 of the Act:
“311 When does a transfer of business occur
Meanings of transfer of business, old employer, new employer and transferring work
(1) There is a transfer of business from an employer (the old employer) to another employer (the new employer) if the following requirements are satisfied:
(a) the employment of an employee of the old employer has terminated;
(b) within 3 months after the termination, the employee becomes employed by the new employer;
(c) the work (the transferring work ) the employee performs for the new employer is the same, or substantially the same, as the work the employee performed for the old employer;
(d) there is a connection between the old employer and the new employer as described in any of subsections (3) to (6).
Meaning of transferring employee
(2) An employee in relation to whom the requirements in paragraphs (1)(a), (b) and (c) are satisfied is a transferring employee in relation to the transfer of business.
Transfer of assets from old employer to new employer
(3) There is a connection between the old employer and the new employer if, in accordance with an arrangement between:
(a) the old employer or an associated entity of the old employer; and
(b) the new employer or an associated entity of the new employer;
the new employer, or the associated entity of the new employer, owns or has the beneficial use of some or all of the assets (whether tangible or intangible):
(c) that the old employer, or the associated entity of the old employer, owned or had the beneficial use of; and
(d) that relate to, or are used in connection with, the transferring work.
Old employer outsources work to new employer
(4) There is a connection between the old employer and the new employer if the transferring work is performed by one or more transferring employees, as employees of the new employer, because the old employer, or an associated entity of the old employer, has outsourced the transferring work to the new employer or an associated entity of the new employer.
New employer ceases to outsource work to old employer
(5) There is a connection between the old employer and the new employer if:
(a) the transferring work had been performed by one or more transferring employees, as employees of the old employer, because the new employer, or an associated entity of the new employer, had outsourced the transferring work to the old employer or an associated entity of the old employer; and
(b) the transferring work is performed by those transferring employees, as employees of the new employer, because the new employer, or the associated entity of the new employer, has ceased to outsource the work to the old employer or the associated entity of the old employer.
New employer is associated entity of old employer
(6) There is a connection between the old employer and the new employer if the new employer is an associated entity of the old employer when the transferring employee becomes employed by the new employer.”
SUMMARY OF SUBMISSIONS AND EVIDENCE
The Applicant resided in Wondunna, Hervey Bay. She stated that primarily the delay in lodging the application, was the result of a combination of receiving misleading information and advice, on the “minimum employment period” and the intervening Easter and Anzac Day public holidays, during the 21 day filing period.
With regard to the minimum employment period, the Applicant stated that contrary to the termination notice, she had already served a 12 month minimum employment period from 8 March 2016 to 3 April 2017. The Applicant stated she was initially employed as a casual Receptionist at the Happy Wanderer Village Caravan Park. The Respondent purchased this site on 10 October 2016. The Applicant stated her employment continued when she received an offer of employment from the Respondent and she was provided with an employment agreement titled, “Receptionist Front Office Administrator.”
On 23 January 2017, the Applicant then became a full-time Park Manager with the Respondent until her employment was terminated on 3 April 2017. The Respondent stated that the Applicant’s dismissal was due to not meeting the inherent requirements of the position of Park Manager, based on her performance not being at the required level to meet and comply with the operational needs of the business.
The Applicant contended the termination was unfair and that she had not received appropriate warnings with regard to the alleged performance deficiencies.
The Respondent stated the Applicant commenced employment on 10 October 2016. This is in contrast with the commence date provided by the Applicant of 8 March 2016, whereby the Applicant counted the service she had initially with the Happy Wanderer Village Caravan Park, which was purchased by the current Respondent on 10 October 2016. On these dates, the Applicant submitted that she had met the minimum period of employment of 6 months. The Applicant also denied that she was on a “probationary period”, as referred to or allegedly relied on by the Respondent. The Applicant stated that neither of the two employment agreements, under which she was employed, stipulated or referenced a probationary period.
The Respondent stated the Applicant was terminated during a discussion on Monday, 3 April 2017. The Applicant’s manager, Mr Christopher Stokoe, stated and outlined in a letter provided to the Applicant on the same day:
“Due to the continued concerns with not meeting the inherent requirements of your position as Park Manager, the Company has made the decision to terminate your employment during your minimum employment period.”
The Respondent stated the letter further states that employees may seek information about minimum terms and conditions of employment from the Fair Work Ombudsman, and provides the telephone and website contact details for the Fair Work Commission as well.
The Respondent stated that on Thursday, 6 April 2017, the Applicant phoned the Respondent’s National Human Resources Manager, Ms Dianne Onn, to further discuss the reasons of the termination. The Respondent stated that the Applicant had verbally advised during this phone call, that three days after the termination of her employment, the Applicant had already sought legal advice in relation to the termination and had also contacted the Fair Work Ombudsman, to seek further advice.
On Tuesday, 11 April 2017, the Applicant undertook a further phone conversation with Ms Chelsey Hammond, HR Advisor of the Respondent, regarding further questions in relation to her termination. The Respondent stated that no reference was made to the probationary period, during this phone call. Reference was made to the termination letter and the Applicant was again advised to contact the Fair Work Commission.
The Respondent referred to the Applicant’s stated meetings with the lawyer and the office of the Fair Work Ombudsman that occurred during the 21 day lodgement period. The Applicant set out on her Form F2 – Application at section 1.4, that she had received advice from her advocate, Mr Barrett given on 24 April 2017, and she commenced to prepare the paperwork for this claim.
The Respondent stated that the Applicant, at the early stage during her employment, was provided with Fair Work Information Statements on two occasions; once with the initial offer of casual employment, and again on her acceptance of the full-time position as Park Manager. In addition, the Respondent stated that on the day of termination and in subsequent phone calls, the Respondent advised the Applicant to contact the Fair Work Commission to seek further information. The Applicant later acknowledged that she had sought legal advice and contacted “Fair Work” for advice within the 21 day period. The Applicant had a meeting with a lawyer three days after her dismissal.
The Applicant’s representative submitted that there was a direct relationship between the two objections as follows:
“1. Reason for delay in lodgment
1.1 The termination notice states;
“the Company has made the decision to terminate your employment during your minimum employment period”.
1.2 In a phone call to Ms. Chelsea Hammond, Human Resources Advisor, following termination Ms. Hammond advised Mrs. Cooper that her employment was “probationary”.
1.3 Following termination, legal advice was sought, but given acceptance of the premise that Mrs Cooper had not completed the MEP AND the suggestion of her employment status as being “probationary” she was told she had no access to Fair Work unfair dismissal processes.
1.4 Further advice was sought in a phone call from Mrs Cooper to the office of the Fair Work Ombudsman who based on the same presumptions of Ms Cooper not having met the MEP requirement concluded that Mrs Cooper would have no right to Fair Work unfair dismissal processes.
NOTE: In deliberations by both the lawyer and the office of the Fair Work Ombudsman no regard was had to an examination of Mrs. Cooper’s employment status in terms of whether her previous service with the former Happy Wanderer Village (Corafee Pty Ltd) might count as service towards her minimum employment period. It was simply assumed, based upon the documented information provided by Ingenia that she had not met the MEP requirements of the Fair Work Act 2009.
1.5 Upon seeking yet further advice from Mr. Barrett who determined that an examination of Mrs Cooper’s employment status, and particularly that area of previous employment with the Happy Wanderer Village in terms of its relevance to the MEP was required, Mrs Cooper awaited the outcome of that rather complex task and upon Mr Barrett’s interpretation of the Fair Work Act, 2009 in which he concluded that Mrs Cooper “appeared” to meet ALL of the requirements for having completed her MEP, the application for unfair dismissal was prepared and lodged with the Fair Work Commission on 26 April, 2017, two days beyond the requirement of the 21 days for lodgment. An investigation was also undertaken in respect to the matter of claims by Ingenia of “probationary” employment and found to be false.
1.6 We also respectfully request the Commission to consider that both the Easter and Anzac public holidays impacted upon the 21 day period following Mrs Cooper’s termination on 3 April, 2017 (Anzac day falling on the day immediately after the 21 day period) and then the application being submitted the next day, Wednesday 26 April 2017.”[2]
In relation to the minimum employment period, the Applicant argued:
“In accordance with the relevant sections of the Fair Work Act 2009 Mrs Cooper’s employment circumstances, prior to, during and beyond the transfer of business from the old to the new owner’s, we contend satisfies comprehensively ALL such requirements as defined by requirements a,b,c,and d at Section 311 for her service with the former employer Corafee Pty Ltd to be counted towards her minimum employment period with her new employer Ingenia Communities.
We submit the above for consideration and determination by the Fair Work Commission as to the matter of whether, or not, Mrs Cooper is to be regarded as having completed the statutory 12 month minimum employment period commencing on 8 March, 2016 and having been completed on 7 March, 2017.”[3]
The Respondent stated the Applicant had time over the course of the 21 days and ample means by which to lodge the application. The Respondent set out:
“Despite the jurisdictional concerns raised with the minimum employment period, at the time the Applicant decided to proceed with such submission to Fair Work, the Applicant had multiple methods to lodge her application, including email, online or express post, to ensure her application was lodged and received within the 21 day timeframe. The Applicant was aware of Fair Work and the Fair Work website which contains valuable step by step information in an easy to understand language.
Once the Applicant had been terminated from Ingenia Communities, she commenced seeking further support and advice from a number of avenues internally, including the Applicants previous Manager, Human Resources Advisor and National Human Resources Manager, as well as external advice from the Fair Work Ombudsman, legal representatives and advocates.
On receiving advice within the 21 days lodgment timeframe, the Applicant still failed to meet the Fair Work deadline for submission.
With the above reasons considered, the Applicants inability to submit the Unfair Dismissal Application to the Fair Work Commission within the designated timelines, would not be considered exceptional circumstances.”[4]
CONSIDERATION
The Applicant maintained that there was some complexity to the matter, as she stated she had been advised after consulting a lawyer, three days after the termination, that she was unable to file the application given she had not met the minimum period of employment. The Applicant also stated she consulted the Fair Work Ombudsman and received advice from them in regards to the matter. Neither the lawyer’s details nor the written advice from the FWO were provided.
On the Applicant’s employment dates, whereby she stated she commenced work on 8 March 2016 with Happy Wanderer Village (which was later purchased by the Respondent) she stated she included the prior period of employment, based on s.311 of the Act. She stated a transfer of business had occurred, and this provided continuity of service and employment, that was more than six months of employment. She stated as a casual, she had worked a regular and systematic pattern with an expectation of continuing work. The Applicant’s representative stepped through the criteria in s.311 of the Act, and stated that the Applicant had satisfied the tests. He stated there was a similarity to the work and a connection between the businesses given the purchase.
The Respondent confirmed that it was not a small business employer as per s.23 of the Act, and the relevant minimum period of employment to be served was six months of employment. The Respondent (in contrast to the Applicant), stated that the Applicant’s service with the prior employer at the caravan park, did not form part of the employment period.
On the dates of the Applicant’s employment with the Respondent from 10 October 2016 to 3 April 2017, the Applicant had not worked the requisite six month minimum employment period.
In accordance with ss.23 and 383 of the Act, the relevant minimum period of employment was six months. The caravan park business referred to, was not an associated entity, nor on the material provided had a transmission of business or a transfer of employment occurred.
The Applicant had also argued, with regard to the extension of time, that the public holidays that fell during the 21 day period had contributed to the delay in filing the application. During this period, public holidays were observed for Good Friday on 14 April 2017, Easter Monday on 17 April 2017 and Anzac Day on 25 April 2017. The Commission was closed on these dates. The application was lodged 23 days after the termination date.
In circumstances where the final day of the 21 day period falls on a weekend or a public holiday and the Commission is closed, the 21 day period will be extended until the next business day.[5] However, public holidays and weekends that fall during the 21 day period will not extend the period for filing. Therefore, in taking into consideration the current 21 day period, additional days are not added for Good Friday, Easter Monday or Anzac Day that fell during the period, but did not form the final date for lodgement and therefore, did not justify an extension of time.
The Act requires the Commission to be satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, in order to extend the period of time for a person to make an application to deal with contraventions involving dismissal, taking into account the following criteria:
s.394(3)(a) - the reason for the delay
The dismissal of the Applicant took effect on 3 April 2017. The application under s.394 was made on 26 April 2017, two days out of time. In her application, the Applicant refers to confusion about her employment status, receiving related misleading information, poor advice and holiday delays as contributors to the delay.
During the period leading up to the lodgment of her application, the Applicant says she sought legal advice and advice from the Fair Work Ombudsman. The Applicant stated there was reference to her serving a probationary employment period, and was advised that a remedy under s.394, was not available to probationary employees. The Respondent argued that the Applicant’s reference to the probationary period, was evidence that she was aware she was serving a new (rather than a continuous), employment contract.
s.394(3)(b) - whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect
There is no contest that the Applicant first became aware of the dismissal on the day it took effect, being 3 April 2017.
s.394(3)(c) - any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal
The Applicant had contacted the employer during the 21 day period, indicating that she disputed the termination and sought confirmation of the facts about the contract of employment, and whether a prior period of employment at the caravan park (that the Respondent had purchased), was included in her period of service. She endeavoured to ascertain whether she was able to make an unfair dismissal application to the Fair Work Commission. The Respondent advised her to seek legal advice soon after the dismissal, or to contact the Fair Work Ombudsman or the Commission. The Applicant did seek legal advice and contacted the Fair Work Ombudsman. Further capable assistance and representation was provided by Mr Barrett, a retired advocate. His assistance was only sought some 3 days prior to the end of the period for filing.
s.394(3)(d) - prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay)
No significant prejudice was set out by the Respondent generally, or by virtue of the delay.
s.394(3)(e) - the merits of the application
The merits of the substantive application were unable to be assessed on the limited material provided, in relation to whether the Applicant had general performance deficiencies in terms of the inherent requirements of the position. Accordingly, this matter has been assessed as a neutral criterion in determining the matter.
s.394(3)(f) - fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position
On the material presented, there were no other persons in a similar position to examine the comparative fairness between the parties.
CONCLUSION
Whether the minimum employment period and the 21 day time limit have been met, have been considered in this matter.
The Applicant has the onus of proof to establish that “exceptional circumstances” exist, by proving “credible reasons” for the entire 21 day period, not just the period that the application was delayed.[6]
The test for assessing the Applicant’s conduct and activity during the 21 day period, was established in the Full Bench Decision of Diotti v Lenswood Cold Stores Co-op Society t/a Lenswood Organic:[7]
“[29] The appellant relies upon the Full Bench decision in Mitchell Shaw v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited T/A ANZ Bank[2015] FWCFB 287 (Shaw and ANZ), at paragraph [12] the majority decision states:
‘[12] This decision makes an important point which we consider deserves re-emphasising. The delay required to be considered is the period beyond the prescribed 21 day period for lodging an application. It does not include the period from the date of the dismissal to the end of the 21 day period. …’
[30] This extract must be read in its entirety. The decision goes on to state:
‘[12] … The circumstances from the time of the dismissal must be considered in order to determine whether there is a reason for the delay beyond the 21 day period and ultimately whether that reason constitutes exceptional circumstances.’
[31] Hence, the decision emphasised that while the delay to be considered is the period subsequent to the expiration of 21 days, the circumstances from the time of the dismissal must be considered in determining whether the reason for the delay constitutes exceptional circumstances. For example if an applicant is in hospital for the first 20 days of the 21 day period this would be a relevant consideration if the application was filed 2 days out of time as occurred in this matter. The reason for the delay by reference to the circumstances from the date the dismissal took effect is as expressed in Shaw and ANZ the correct approach.”[8]
The events and activities that occurred across the 21 day period, have been considered. It was clear that there was a dispute between the parties regarding the length of employment served, and that this was a matter to be determined by the Commission. The Applicant was aware of this contested issue, from legal advice received, early in the 21 day period, and further advice from her advocate. It is a regular matter, that other jurisdictional issues may exist, and the consideration of such does not form an exceptional circumstance.
The Applicant in arguing that the prior employment should be counted, stated that she had been employed with her partner, at the caravan park on a, “couples agreement”, working, as a casual, eight days per month. The Applicant stated she was undertaking similar duties in both jobs, and provided correspondence from her previous employer confirming this. There was no conclusive evidence that the separate contract formed with the current Respondent, recognised the prior employment or that it could be interpreted as a transfer of employment or transmission of business, where the prior employment was required to be recognised.
On the material in relation to the prior period of employment at the caravan park, it cannot be determined that this period of employment can be taken in conjunction with the Applicant’s period of employment with the current Respondent, in order that the Applicant would have met the minimum employment period of six months. The contract with the Respondent makes no reference to this prior engagement, and it should be noted that the Applicant was a casual employee.
The term “exceptional circumstances” has been dealt with in s.394 extension of time applications. I adopt the approach taken by Whelan C in Parker v Department of Human Services,[9] as preferred by Lawler VP in Johnson v Joy Manufacturing Co Pty Ltd t/as Joy Mining Machinery,[10] is set out below:
“[30] Branson J, in a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court (Hewlett Packard Australia Pty Ltd v GE Capital Finance Pty Ltd [2003] FCAFC 256) described exceptional circumstances as simply circumstances sufficient to render it just and equitable to grant relief.
[31] Dealing with the expression ‘exceptional circumstances’ as used in regulations dealing with the cancellation of visas, the Full Court of the Federal Court, in a recent decision, also noted that the expression had been considered by the courts on numerous occasions:
Although the expression “exceptional circumstances” is not defined in the Regulations, it has been the subject of consideration in numerous cases. Assistance in interpreting the expression can be found in comments of Lord Bingham of Cornwell CJ in R v Kelly (Edward) [2000] 1 QB 198 at 208 as follows:
We must construe “exceptional” as an ordinary, familiar English adjective, and not as a term of art. It describes a circumstance which is such as to form an exception, which is out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon. To be exceptional a circumstance need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare; but it cannot be one that is regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered.” (Footnotes omitted).
In addition, the Full Bench in Cheval Properties Pty Ltd trading as Penrith Hotel Motel v Janette Smithers characterised exceptional circumstances as:[11]
“[5] The word “exceptional” is relevantly defined in The Macquarie Dictionary as “forming an exception or unusual instance; unusual; extraordinary.” We can apprehend no reason for giving the word a meaning other than its ordinary meaning for the purposes of s.394(3) of the FW Act.”
If in circumstances where the determination on the interpretation of the minimum employment period is in error, in relation to the second jurisdictional objection, (that the application was filed out of time by 2 days, the delay being in regards to the Applicant receiving misleading information on what was referred to as a complicated matter, and that public holidays fell during the period,) I do not consider these equate to exceptional circumstances.
It is recognised that there was some complexity to the jurisdictional objections, however the Applicant had sought independent legal advice at an early stage after the termination, had also pursued the matter with the Fair Work Ombudsman, and had further sought the assistance of Mr Barrett, some three days prior to the end of the filing period. The circumstances of the additional jurisdictional objection, did not need to be confirmed prior to filing the application, and are not commensurate with “exceptional circumstances.”
The application, on the chronology of events that occurred (as set out above), could have been filed within the 21 day time frame, taking into account the dispute over the length of the period of employment. These were always jurisdictional matters that had to be determined by the Commission. The application could have been filed within the time limit to advance the progress of the matter.
Accordingly, pursuant to s.394(3) of the Act, the circumstances of the delay, were not circumstances considered to be “exceptional”. The discretion to extend the time limit is, therefore not exercised to grant a further period to accept the application.
The application made pursuant to section 394 is, therefore dismissed.
I Order accordingly.
COMMISSIONER
Appearances:
Mr. B. Barrett for the Applicant.
Ms. D. Onn for the Respondent.
Hearing details:
25 July 2017.
Brisbane.
[1] [2015] FWCFB 259.
[2] Applicant’s Statement in Response to Objections to Unfair Dismissal dated 30 May 2017 at page 1.
[3] Ibid at page 4.
[4] Respondent’s Response to Applicant – Final dated 13 June 2017 at page 3.
[5] Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s.36(2); Hemi v BMD Constructions Pty Ltd[2013] FWC 3593.
[6] Francis v Holmesglen Institute [2017] FWC 3910; Cheval Properties Pty Ltd (t/as Penrith Hotel Motel) v Smithers [2010]197 IR 403.
[7] [2016] FWCFB 349.
[8] Ibid at [29] – [31].
[9] [2009] FWA 1638.
[10] [2010] FWA 1394.
[11] [2010] FWAFB 7251.
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