Mrs Alicja Swiecinska v Spotless Services Australia Ltd
[2024] FWC 1941
•24 JULY 2024
| [2024] FWC 1941 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
| DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.365 - Application to deal with contraventions involving dismissal
Mrs Alicja Swiecinska
v
Spotless Services Australia Ltd
(C2024/3427)
| DEPUTY PRESIDENT ANDERSON | ADELAIDE, 24 JULY 2024 |
Application to deal with contraventions involving dismissal – late lodgement – application prepared by solicitor – English second language – lack of computer literacy – applicant assisted by a friend – application erroneously sent to solicitor and not filed in Commission as advised – whether confusion or poor English a reasonable explanation – exceptional circumstances – time for late lodgement extended – application to be conciliated
On 24 May 2024 Ms Alicja Swiecinska (Ms Swiecinska or the applicant) made a general protections application under s 365 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) alleging contraventions associated with her dismissal.
Ms Swiecinska’s application is against her former employer, Spotless Services Australia Ltd (Spotless, the respondent or the employer), which she alleges committed the contraventions. The respondent opposes the application.
It is not in dispute that the application is eight days out of time. Ms Swiecinska seeks an extension. This is opposed.
The decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in Coles Supply Chain Pty Ltd v Milford[1] requires applications under s 365 to be within jurisdiction before the Commission can exercise powers conferred by s 368. It is thus necessary to determine the out of time issue if Ms Swiecinska’s application is to proceed further.
I issued directions on 17 June 2024. I conducted a hearing on 16 July 2024.
On 18 July 2024 and following the hearing, chambers drew my attention to a document in Commission records indicating that Ms Swiecinska had, on 30 April 2024, applied for pro bono legal assistance from the Commission’s Workplace Advice Service. My chambers provided the parties with that document and an opportunity to make a submission on a provisional finding “that Ms Swiecinska came to receive pro bono legal advice from Dentons via a referral from the Commission’s Workplace Advice Service based on her request of 30 April 2024”.
Spotless made a further submission,[2] accepting that the provisional finding was open to be made but contending that the referral weighed against an extension.
I received evidence from:
Ms Alicja Swiecinska (applicant); and
Mr Ajay Shelke (Manager, Patient Support and Services).
Facts
The facts are not in dispute.
Spotless has a contract with SA Health to administer non-clinical services to patients at certain public hospitals including the Royal Adelaide Hospital.
Ms Swiecinska migrated to Australia from Poland approximately thirty years ago. She is currently sixty years of age.
In approximately 2008, Ms Swiecinska commenced employment with Spotless as a Patient Support Services Assistant providing non-clinical services. She was a part-time employee, working approximately 28 hours per week.
In approximately 2015, Mr Shelke became her manager.
During 2021, at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, SA Health implemented mandatory vaccination policies for persons working in public hospitals, including those employed by Spotless.
Ms Swiecinska considered the vaccines experimental, a risk to her health and the direction to be vaccinated unreasonable. She refused to be vaccinated. Spotless approved Ms Swiecinska’s request to use accrued annual and then long service leave. When those leave forms were exhausted and Ms Swiecinska continued to refuse vaccination, she was stood down without pay. She remained employed with leave credits accruing.
After two years, on 24 November 2023 Spotless wrote to Ms Swiecinska advising that it was “unable to sustain your continued absence from work, and based on the information presently available to it, Spotless’ preliminary view is that it should terminate your employment”.[3] Ms Swiecinska was given until 8 December 2023 to provide a response.
Ms Swiecinska continued to refuse vaccination.
On 15 January 2024, Spotless wrote to Ms Swiecinska advising that it would “provide you with a final seven days to comply with the Policy” and if not compliant by 22 January 2024 Spotless “will review the status of your employment and may determine that you are unable to perform the inherent requirements of your role which could result in the cessation of your employment”. Spotless also advised Ms Swiecinska of seven roles to which she could be redeployed outside the SA Health sector if she wanted to pursue those options.[4]
Ms Swiecinska continued to decline to be vaccinated and did not pursue the redeployment options.
On 21 March 2024, Spotless (under the hand of Mr Shelke) wrote to Ms Swiecinska advising that it had “made the decision to terminate your employment” with the last day of employment being 25 April 2024.[5] Mr Shelke’s evidence was that he provided this four-week period to enable Ms Swiecinska to advise of any belated change to her vaccination status in which case, according to the termination letter, “the Company will consider whether you can return to your role”.
Ms Swiecinska’s vaccination status did not change during the notice period.
However, on 15 April 2024, Ms Swiecinska, with assistance from her son and believing that SA Health were reviewing its vaccination policies for public hospitals and that they may be varied (eased) from mid-May 2024, wrote to Spotless (Mr Shelke) as follows:[6]
“Not sure if you are aware but SA Health is set to remove mandatory Covid vaccinations for employees from next month. Staff will be exempted just by signing a Covid Vaccination refusal form. I am happy to sign this form and return to work!
Thanks Alicia”
Mr Shelke was on leave at this time (not returning until around 30 April). Ms Swiecinska received an automated email reply advising that Mr Shelke was absent and with alternate contact details.
Spotless did not action or reply to Ms Swiecinska’s email of 15 April 2024.
The termination date came and went. Ms Swiecinska’s dismissal took effect on 25 April 2024 as had been advised by the letter of termination of 21 March 2024.
Ms Swiecinska considered her dismissal unfair.
On 30 April 2024 Ms Swiecinska sought assistance from the Commission’s Workplace Advice Service (WAS), which contracts with the private sector legal profession to provide pro bono advice to eligible persons on certain matters (including dismissals).
Ms Swiecinska received legal advice from a solicitor Mr Edmund Burke, a partner at national law firm Dentons, via a referral from the WAS based on her request of 30 April 2024.
On 15 May 2024, the twentieth day after dismissal took effect, Ms Swiecinska received a telephone call from Mr Burke and then a follow-up email from Dentons which, to assist her, attached a near fully completed General Protections application (including the form F8 cover sheet and application fee details).
The cover sheet informed Ms Swiecinska that her application needed to be lodged within twenty-one days of the dismissal taking effect. The covering email from Dentons read:[7]
“Hi Alicja
As discussed, I’ve attached the form you should lodge today. There are some details you will need to add and I have highlighted those sections for you.
I’ve also included the attachments you should send in with the application.
The fee is $83.30 and I’ve ticked the box that allows you to pay that by credit card.
The section of the act I’ve said they have breached is s340 (below)
Section 340 – Protection
(1) A person must not take adverse action against another person:
(a) because the other person:
(i) has a workplace right; or
(ii) has, or has not, exercised a workplace right; or
(iii) proposes or proposes not to, or has at any time proposed or proposed
not to, exercise a workplace right; or
(b) to prevent the exercise of a workplace right by the other person.
(2) A person must not take adverse action against another person (the second person)
because a third person has exercised, or proposes or has at any time proposed to exercise, a
workplace right for the second person’s benefit, or for the benefit of a class of persons to
which the second person belongs.
We say your workplace right was the fact you intended to use the new policy to return to work without being vaccinated.
Once you filled in the missing details, you can lodge everything by emailing it to [email protected]
Good luck!
Edmund Burke
Partner”
(emphasis in original)
The next day (16 May 2024) Ms Swiecinska took the email and application form to a friend’s house because she required assistance to complete and send her application. Ms Swiecinska considered her friend more computer literate than she was.
With the assistance of her friend, Ms Swiecinska signed the application form and asked her friend to send it electronically.
In error, on 16 May 2024 (the twenty-first day after dismissal), Ms Swiecinska and her friend sent the signed form back to Mr Burke of Dentons and not to the Commission’s email address which he had advised. When sending the form, Ms Swiecinska sent a covering email (drafted by her friend):[8]
“Dear Edmund Burke,
Please find attached the relevant form signed.
If you have any more questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.
Thank you
Alicja”
On 24 May 2024, eight days later, Ms Swiecinska received a telephone call from Mr Burke of Dentons. During the call she was informed that the 16 May 2024 email to Dentons was not lodgement with the Commission, and that if the application had not been separately lodged with the Commission, then it needed to have been done so, as had been advised.
Realising that an error had been made, at 2.02pm that day (24 May 2024) Ms Swiecinska (again assisted by her friend) sent the same application to the Commission’s email address with a covering email that read:[9]
“Dear FWC,
Today I was informed by my lawyer that he had not sent on my signed form, but was expecting that I would do it. Attached is my email to him dated 16th May.
My English is poor and so it’s possible I had miss understood him. Would you please accept my form with this delay.
Thank you
Alicja Swiecinska”
Not owning a credit card, Ms Swiecinska provided her friend the filing fee amount and her friend’s credit card was used to pay the fee.
The application as lodged did not attach the documents to which it referenced, and which Dentons had advised should be attached. Following service on the respondent, and inquiries by the respondent of the Commission, Ms Swiecinska provided these documents, and they were subsequently included as attachments to her application.
On 26 May 2024, two days after the late lodgement, Ms Swiecinska travelled overseas to visit an elderly parent. She returned to Australia on 28 June 2024.[10]
Submissions
Ms Swiecinska
Ms Swiecinska submits that time should be extended because the delay was caused by an innocent error by herself and her friend.
The error was caused by her needing to obtain support and lodgement assistance from her friend because she (Ms Swiecinska) was not computer literate in sending forms on-line, and had a poor command of English.
Ms Swiecinska submits that she has a strong case on merit because Spotless could have and should have kept her employed for a few more weeks (having already done so for more than two years) when SA Health’s mandatory vaccination policy would have then changed, allowing her to resume work unvaccinated.
Ms Swiecinska submits that the combination of having to take legal advice, obtaining that advice late (on the twentieth day after dismissal), not being computer literate, having a poor command of English, rectifying the error on the day it became apparent, the merits of her application and the absence of prejudice to Spotless constitute exceptional circumstances warranting an extension of time.
Spotless
Spotless submit that time should not be extended because applicant error is not exceptional. This is not a case of error by a legal representative.
Spotless submit that the error was made simply by Ms Swiecinska being inattentive to the simple instructions of her legal adviser who set out what she needed to do in plain and simple language, including making it clear that she (not the lawyer) had to file the application to the email address specifically advised (and not back to the lawyer).
Spotless submit that the WAS referral did not explain the delay and weighs against an extension as it establishes that Ms Swiecinska had access to legal advice including about the statutory time limit.
Spotless submit that the error cannot be attributable to a poor command of English because, after thirty years in Australia, Ms Swiecinska spoke English each workday to patients, fellow employees and managers, and she was able to read and understand training materials and other instructions in the workplace which were written in English.
Spotless submit that Ms Swiecinska knew at least a month prior to 25 April 2024 that her employment would terminate on that day if her vaccination status did not alter. To the extent Ms Swiecinska felt pressured by time on 15 and 16 May 2024, this was a matter within her control as she could have sought and obtained legal advice and assistance earlier, including prior to termination.
Spotless submit that the case on merit is weak because no workplace right existed to perform work unvaccinated in the SA public health sector at the time of the dismissal. It is simply speculation for which there is no evidence, whether SA Health’s policy on vaccination would or did change following dismissal.
Spotless submit it would be unfair to other persons who have not had time extended due to errors caused by their inattentiveness or for failing to be vaccinated for this application to be allowed to proceed.
Finally, Spotless submit they will incur prejudice in having to expend time and cost in defending a late and spurious application.
Consideration
Section 366 provides:
“366 Time for application
(1)An application under section 365 must be made:
(a)within 21 days after the dismissal took effect; or
(b)within such further period as the FWC allows under subsection (2).
(2)The FWC may allow a further period if the FWC is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, taking into account:
(a)the reason for the delay; and
(b)any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal; and
(c)prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay); and
(d)the merits of the application; and
(e)fairness as between the person and other persons in a like position.”
I now consider whether an extension of time should be granted for the late lodgement.
An applicant for an extension of time has an onus to adduce evidence in support of matters which they assert constitute exceptional circumstances.[11]
The test of “exceptional circumstances” establishes a “high hurdle” for an applicant.[12] A decision whether to extend time under s 366(2) involves the exercise of a discretion.[13]
I apply s 366(2) in the context of the Full Bench decision in Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd:
“[13] In summary, the expression “exceptional circumstances” has its ordinary meaning and requires consideration of all the circumstances. To be exceptional, circumstances must be out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon but need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare. Circumstances will not be exceptional if they are regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered. Exceptional circumstances can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional. It is not correct to construe “exceptional circumstances” as being only some unexpected occurrence, although frequently it will be. Nor is it correct to construe the plural “circumstances” as if it were only a singular occurrence, even though it can be a one-off situation. The ordinary and natural meaning of “exceptional circumstances” includes a combination of factors which, when viewed together, may reasonably be seen as producing a situation which is out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon.”[14]
The principles of Nulty have been cited with approval by subsequent full benches of the Commission.[15]
I now consider each of the factors in s 366(2).
Reason for delay (s 366(2)(a))
The reason for the delay in lodging an application is a factor that must be considered. The FW Act does not specify what reason or reasons for delay might favour granting an extension, although decisions of the Commission have referred to an acceptable or reasonable explanation.[16] The absence of an explanation for any part of the delay will usually weigh against an applicant in such an assessment. Similarly, a credible explanation for the entirety of the delay will usually weigh in an applicant’s favour, though it is ultimately a question of degree and insight.[17]
However, a reasonable explanation for the delay is not needed for the whole of the period of delay or may in fact not be required at all if the circumstances are otherwise exceptional.[18] The period of the delay requiring explanation is the period commencing immediately after the time for lodging an application has expired, ending on the day on which an application is ultimately lodged. That said, regard may be had to any circumstances from the date the dismissal took effect when assessing whether an explanation for the delay is acceptable or credible.[19]
In this matter, the delay period is eight days, 17 to 24 May 2024 inclusive.
In that period:
Ms Swiecinska initially believed, erroneously, that she had filed the application on the twenty-first day following dismissal (16 May) and in-time;
Only learnt that she had not done so when contacted by the WAS solicitor a week later (on 24 May 2024); and
Immediately thereafter (on 24 May) lodged the application with the assistance of a friend.
Counting in favour of Ms Swiecinska is that she intended to file an application within time, believed in good faith that she (with the assistance of her friend) had done so on-line on the twenty-first day, and that she moved to correctly file the application immediately after being made aware that her application had been sent to her legal adviser and not lodged with the Commission.
In assessing the reasonableness of the explanations for the delay I take these matters fully into account.
However, some of the other factors said to have caused the delay are not so weighty.
Weighing against is that Ms Swiecinska had access (via the WAS) to legal advice, received that advice inside the 21-day period and ought reasonably to have been aware of the 21-day rule because it is clearly stated in the F8 application cover sheet and the WAS request form.
Nor do I find that a poor command of English, of itself, explains the delay. The evidence of Mr Shelke was that Ms Swiecinska used English in the workplace without apparent difficulty. Training and other materials were communicated to, and responded to by, her in English.
It was apparent from the hearing that whilst English is not Ms Swiecinska’s primary language, and whilst she had some limitations (and in that respect used the aid of an interpreter when required), Ms Swiecinska was able to communicate in and understand at least basic English.
Materially, the email by Dentons to Ms Swiecinska on 15 May 2024 was written in a non-legalistic manner and contained simple and repeated instructions. Ms Swiecinska’s evidence was that she read the email and generally understood it. The email instruction that Ms Swiecinska personally (and not Dentons) file the application was made clear and repeated by Mr Burke five times:
“you should lodge today”;
“you will need to add”;
“you should send”;
“you to pay”; and
“you can lodge everything by emailing”.
It was not unreasonable that Ms Swiecinska discussed the email with her son and her friend, but the fact that English is not her primary language provides only a limited explanation for the error in filing.
That Ms Swiecinska is not computer literate is a somewhat weightier explanation. It was apparent from the hearing that Ms Swiecinska is easily confused with and by technology. Signing an application electronically or sending an application online, as requested by Dentons, would clearly have been a challenge. In this respect it was entirely reasonable that Ms Swiecinska sought assistance from a more computer literate friend.
In considering this aspect of the explanation, it must however be recognised that Ms Swiecinska did in fact obtain that assistance. It wasn’t the fact that her signature couldn’t be electronically appended (with her friend’s assistance) to the application or that the application could not be electronically attached to an email (with her friend’s assistance) that caused the delay, because both steps were successfully taken on 16 May 2024. Rather, the delay was caused by sending the application to the wrong person (Mr Burke of Dentons).
In this respect, this is a case of joint error by the applicant and her friend who was assisting her. The delay was caused by human error. That human error was joint inattentiveness by Ms Swiecinska and her friend to the clear direction by Dentons in its email of 15 May 2024 that:
“Once you filled in the missing details, you can lodge everything by emailing it to [email protected]”.
I observe that in no sense was there error by Dentons. Dentons provided clear and specific advice and instructions inside the twenty-one-day period. Dentons populated an application form with all but a small amount of information that was readily able to be completed by Ms Swiecinska. Dentons spoon-fed instructions including the email address to which the application needed to be sent for lodging once completed and signed. Acting in a pro bono capacity only and without Ms Swiecinska as a fee-paying client, it was not unreasonable that Dentons required Ms Swiecinska to lodge the application personally. Indeed, the assistance given by Mr Burke in preparing a draft application exceeded the mere provision of pro bono advice.
Whilst Ms Swiecinska did not receive information from Dentons until day twenty after dismissal, the task of completing the near-complete application, signing and emailing it was achievable inside the remaining one day, even for a person of limited English and computer skills. As noted, this was in fact done and an application was sent in this time frame, but to the wrong entity.
Error caused by inattentiveness to clear instructions given to a dismissed employee by a professional adviser is applicant error. The human error was avoidable if more care had been taken to follow the instructions which had been given. The error was not wholly Ms Swiecinska’s fault. It is open to find that it was also in part an innocent error by her friend, as Ms Swiecinska was relying on her friend to assist in the lodgement task which needed to be done on 16 May. This mitigates, but only somewhat, the blameworthiness of Ms Swiecinska. Avoidance of the error remained within her control because she had read and generally understood Denton’s email of 15 May and was with her friend when they jointly undertook the task.
Considered overall, the explanation for the delay weighs somewhat in favour of a finding of exceptional circumstances.
Action taken to dispute dismissal (s 366(2)(b))
Ms Swiecinska, via an email drafted by her son, informed Spotless on 15 April 2024 that she considered that the requirement by SA Health mandating vaccination in public hospitals was in a state of flux and liable to change. In this respect, it ought to have been readily apparent to Spotless that Ms Swiecinska not only considered the direction unreasonable but that it was open to Spotless to ascertain whether the direction was subject to review and possible easing.
In this respect I find that Ms Swiecinska had taken some action to dispute the reasonableness of the dismissal.
This consideration weighs somewhat in favour of a finding of exceptional circumstances.
Prejudice to the employer (s 366(2)(c))
As a general principle, an employer is entitled to arrange its affairs and organise its resources on the basis that claims can no longer be made beyond the lodgement period, except in exceptional circumstances.[20]
If time is extended, a claim would have to be further responded to by the employer, involving time and cost. However, that prejudice, whilst real, is not unique.
This notwithstanding, the absence of prejudice would not of itself be a reason to grant an extension.[21]
This is a neutral consideration.
Merits of the application (s 366(2)(d))
A court hearing would concern whether the employer dismissed Ms Swiecinska for an unlawful reason.
Spotless have made it clear that proceedings will be contested.
Were this an unfair dismissal case, I would consider it reasonably arguable that the dismissal was unfair should it be established that Spotless was on notice that a change in SA Health policy was imminent such that non-clinical hospital support employees (such as Ms Swiecinska) would be permitted to work unvaccinated upon making an appropriate declaration. However, this is not such an application.
Being a general protections application, it will need to be established that Ms Swiecinska was dismissed for exercising a workplace right. The workplace right said to have existed was her intention to use a new SA Health policy to return to work without being vaccinated.
It is difficult to see, at first blush, how such a contention could be made out given that at the time dismissal was notified (21 March) no such varied policy existed. Nor does it appear that such varied policy was in place at the time dismissal took effect (25 April). A speculative or future workplace right may not be a proper basis for grounding a general protections application.
This matter has not been fully ventilated before me. At best, it is only a provisional view that this consideration will present some challenges for Ms Swiecinska. It may, but also may not, be insurmountable.
The merits are not strong but at this stage are largely a neutral consideration.
Fairness between persons in similar position (s 366(2)(e))
Whilst extensions of time have been granted in some matters before the Commission because an employee has made an error, most cases of error concern representative error – which this is not.[22] In cases of error (whether representative or otherwise) the guiding principle is a consideration of the conduct of the applicant employee, and the extent (if any) to which they contributed to or sought to mitigate the effect of the error.
Each case turns on its own facts. No other general rule can be reasonably gleaned from past cases or applied to this matter.
This is a neutral consideration.
Conclusion
The period of delay, being eight days, is not lengthy but, in the context of a 21-day time limit, is not immaterial. In any event, the circumstances must be exceptional for time to be extended, even by this amount.
The explanation for the delay weighs somewhat in favour of a finding of exceptional circumstances. Given Ms Swiecinska’s lack of computer literacy, that English was not her primary language and that she was seeking to take a legal step on 16 May, it was not unreasonable that she sought assistance from her friend. That she completed the application and it was sent (albeit to the incorrect entity) on the twenty-first day (the day following the advice) is in her favour. Ms Swiecinska was active, not passive, to her interests to file within time. The error in sending the application was not hers alone, but a joint error shared by the friend on which she was relying.
Further, that Ms Swiecinska promptly sought legal advice inside the 21-day period (within five days of dismissal), acted quickly once the error was known, and the fact that Spotless was, in a general sense, on notice that she disagreed with her dismissal, also weigh in her favour. The merits are not strong but largely a neutral consideration.
Considered overall, this combination of factors outweighs the factors against. They lead me to conclude that the circumstances are exceptional. Whilst human error is not unusual, Ms Swiecinska’s prompt attentiveness to her interests at each stage, coupled with the other considerations in s 366(2), warrants an extension of time.
There are no discretionary reasons not to grant an extension. It is appropriate to do so.
Disposition
Time for late lodgement is extended such that application C2024/3427 can proceed further. It will be listed for conciliation under s 368 of the FW Act.
An order giving effect to this decision will be issued in conjunction with its publication.[23]
DEPUTY PRESIDENT
Appearances:
A. Swiecinska on her own behalf.
N. Smith of and on behalf of Spotless Services Australia Ltd with C. Mason assisting.
Hearing details:
2024.
Adelaide;
16 July.
Final written submissions:
Spotless Services Australia Ltd: 22 July 2024.
[1] [2020] FCAFC 152
[2] Email to chambers 22.7.2024 11.03am
[3] R2
[4] R3
[5] A5 and R4
[6] A6
[7] A3
[8] A3
[9] A1
[10] A6
[11] Smith v Canning Division of General Practice[2009] AIRC 959
[12] Lombardo v Commonwealth of Australia as represented by the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations[2014] FWCFB 2288 at [21]
[13] Halls v AR & MA McCardle & Sons Pty Ltd and Ors [2014] FCCA 316
[14] [2011] FWAFB 975 “Nulty” at [13]. See also Cheval Properties Pty Ltd t/as Penrith Hotel Motel v Smithers[2010] FWAFB 7251 at [5]
[15] John Mamur v Coles Group Supply Chain Pty Ltd[2020] FWCFB 4954 at [7] and [19]; Dennis Obel v Central Desert Regional Council[2021] FWCFB 167 at [6]
[16] Manoj Ellikuttige v Moonee Valley Racing Club Inc[2018] FWCFB 4988 at [30] and [36]
[17] Stogiannidis v Victorian Frozen Foods Distributors Pty Ltd t/as Richmond Oysters[2018] FWCFB 901 at [35]-[45]
[18] Stogiannidis (Ibid); Elliott v LEAP Legal Software Pty Ltd t/a LEAP Legal Software[2018] FWCFB 3288
[19] Shaw v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited[2015] FWCFB 287 at [12]; Ozsoy v Monstamac Industries Pty Ltd[2014] FWCFB 2149 at [31] – [33]; Perry v Rio Tinto Shipping Pty Ltd T/A Rio Tinto Marine[2016] FWCFB 6963; Czoy v Monstamac Industries Pty Ltd [2014] FWCFB 2149
[20] Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor [1996] HCA 25
[21] Brodie-Hanns v MTV Publishing Ltd (1995) 67 IR 298 at 299-300
[22] See for example Brahmbhatt v Sydney Tools Pty Ltd[2023] FWC 1874; Palmer v The Trustee for T & P Removals Unit Trust t/as Allied Business Relocations Adelaide[2024] FWC 707; Wei v Open Universities Australia Pty Ltd[2023] FWC 3402
[23] PR777439
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
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