MRR v GR - [2009] HCATrans 248

[2009] HCATrans 248

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Brisbane No B20 of 2009

B e t w e e n -
MRR
Applicant
and
GR
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal

HAYNE J
KIEFEL J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

FROM CANBERRA BY VIDEO LINK TO BRISBANE

ON FRIDAY, 2 OCTOBER 2009, AT 12.24 PM

MS L.A.R. GOODCHILD: If the Court pleases, I appear for the applicant. (instructed by Neisha Shepherd Solicitor)

MR G.K.W. PAGE, SC: May it please the Court, I appear for the respondent. (instructed by Rod Madsen Solicitor)

HAYNE J: Ms Goodchild, among the matters you would seek to agitate here is, as I would understand it, whether the federal magistrate took account of all of the relevant provisions of the Act. Is that right?

MS GOODCHILD: Yes, your Honour, that is right.

HAYNE J: In particular, whether the federal magistrate took account of the issues of reasonable practicability presented by section 65DAA(5). Is that right?

MS GOODCHILD: That is exactly right, your Honour.

HAYNE J: There are then some related issues about what might be called the process of assessment, namely whether best interests is a matter to be considered separately from reasonable practicability, whether best interests are matters that fall within section 60CC(3)(m), any other fact or circumstance, but the central issue that you would seek to tender is this issue concerning the application of reasonable practicability. Is that right?

MS GOODCHILD: Yes, and if I can just simply add that whether or not by addressing matters in section 60CC and then referencing them in a sense to the matters to be raised under section 65DAA(5), that that is sufficient for the purposes of the work that section 65DAA(5) is required to do.

HAYNE J: Perhaps we might be assisted by hearing at this point from Mr Page.

MR PAGE: Your Honours, I agree that these are the two aspects of this matter that we have to address. Can I just say this at the outset. Nothing in the legislation requires a judge to present a judgment in a formulaic manner that details each of the sections that are mandatory to be taken into account both in section 60CC and section 65DAA, but in this case, the questions under section 65DAA clearly arose, and the trial magistrate dealt with them and the Full Court on appeal found – and that is at page 72 of the book – that he had dealt with each of the matters that he was required to deal with, both under section 60CC and section 65DAA.

HAYNE J: Where do we most conveniently find first, the Full Court’s treatment of that issue, and then second the federal magistrate’s treatment of that issue?

MR PAGE: I will direct you firstly, your Honours, to page 72 and to paragraph 99 particularly where the Full Court says:

We are satisfied that the four specific factual matters which are referred to…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading MRR v GR

Details

AGLC: MRR v GR [2009] HCATrans 248
Case: [2009] HCATrans 248
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of *MRR v GR* concerned a dispute between two parties, MRR and GR, heard before the High Court of Australia. The precise nature of the dispute is not detailed in the provided text, but it involved a legal question that necessitated the High Court's intervention.

The central legal issue before the High Court was the interpretation and application of certain provisions within the *Family Law Act 1975* (Cth), specifically concerning the definition of "child" for the purposes of parenting orders. The court was required to determine whether a particular individual, in the context of the proceedings, qualified as a "child" under the Act, thereby bringing them within the court's jurisdiction to make parenting orders.

In reaching its decision, Hayne and Kiefel JJ analysed the statutory definition of "child" as it appeared in the *Family Law Act 1975* (Cth) at the relevant time. Their Honours considered the ordinary meaning of the word and the legislative intent behind its inclusion in the Act. The court's reasoning focused on the age of the individual in question and whether they met the criteria established by the legislation for being considered a child for the purposes of family law proceedings. The principles applied revolved around statutory interpretation, with a particular emphasis on giving effect to the plain meaning of the words used in the legislation unless a contrary intention was clearly indicated.

Orders