Mro v Commissioner of Police

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

MRO v Commissioner of Police [2023] QDC 205

PARTIES:

MRO

(appellant)

v
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE

(respondent)

and

ME
(aggrieved)

FILE NO/S:

BD 1245/22

DIVISION:

Appellate

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Brisbane Magistrates Court

DELIVERED ON:

16 November 2023

DELIVERED AT:

Townsville

HEARING DATE:

3 March 2023

JUDGES:

Richards DCJ

ORDER:

The appeal is dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE LAW – APPEAL – INTERVENTION ORDER – where the appellant was the respondent to an application for a protection order - where the learned Magistrate made an intervention order at a hearing – where the appellant – whether the intervention order can be subject to an appeal under section 164 of the Domestic Violence and Family Protection Act 2012

DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE LAW - APPEAL – ADMISSION OF FURTHER EVIDENCE – where the appellant’s son was a named person on the protection order – where the son initially made a complaint of a sexual nature against the aggrieved – where two weeks later the son withdrew his statement – where the learned Magistrate found on the balance of probabilities that the appellant influenced his son to make the complaint – where the appellant makes an application to adduce fresh evidence from his son – whether the appellant can adduce further evidence

DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE LAW – APPEAL – PROTECTION ORDER – where the appellant was the respondent to an application for a protection order – where the appellant and the aggrieved were married and have four children from the marriage – where the appellant was previously the respondent to a protection order that was made by consent without admissions – whether the learned Magistrate displayed actual or apprehended bias - whether the protection order made was necessary or desirable – whether the learned Magistrate erred in including the children of the aggrieved and associates of the aggrieved in the protection order

LEGISLATION:

Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 s 23(2), s 45, s 69, s 70, s 164, Division 6.

CASES:

Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488

Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568

GKE v EUT [2014] QDC 248

ACP v McAulliffe [2017] QDC 294

Arte v Nugent & Anor [2020] QDC 268

EKL v Commissioner of Police and PEL [2020] QDC 194

COUNSEL:

MRO for the appellant (self-represented)

M C O’Brien for the first respondent

SOLICITORS:

Appellant is self-represented
Queensland Police Service Legal Unit for the first respondent

Introduction

  1. On 13 May 2022 a protection order was made naming the appellant as the respondent and his ex-partner ME as the aggrieved.  Also named in the order as associates of the aggrieved were her partner SH, his children and the children of the aggrieved [who are also the children of the appellant].  There were non-contact provisions attached to the order with a rider that the Family Court or Federal Circuit Court could make orders allowing contact.  The appellant has appealed this order.

  2. The appellant appears on his own behalf and has filed…

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Details
Case
[2023] QDC 205
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in the matter of Mro v Commissioner of Police concerned an intervention order made under the Domestic Violence and Family Protection Act 2012. The appellant, a father, sought to appeal the intervention order made against him by the Magistrate. The appellant argued that the intervention order was not subject to appeal and that the Magistrate erred in allowing fresh evidence from his son. The Magistrate had found that the appellant influenced his son to make a false complaint against the aggrieved party, and the son subsequently retracted his statement.

The legal issues before the court were whether the intervention order was appealable under section 164 of the Domestic Violence and Family Protection Act 2012, and whether the appellant could adduce further evidence from his son. The court considered whether the Magistrate displayed actual or apprehended bias and whether the protection order made was necessary or desirable. The court also examined the Magistrate's decision to include the aggrieved party's children and associates in the protection order.

The court found that the intervention order was appealable under section 164 of the Domestic Violence and Family Protection Act 2012. However, the court dismissed the appellant's application to adduce further evidence from his son. The court found that the affidavit submitted by the appellant's son was gratuitous and irrelevant to the issue being litigated. The court also found that the Magistrate did not display actual or apprehended bias and that the protection order made was necessary or desirable. The court found that the Magistrate did not err in including the aggrieved party's children and associates in the protection order.

The appeal was dismissed, and the intervention order made against the appellant was upheld. The court found that the Magistrate had correctly considered the evidence and made the appropriate orders. The court found that the appellant's arguments were without merit and that the intervention order was necessary to protect the aggrieved party and her children.

Orders

Orders of the court

The appeal is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

On the hearing of the appeal, the appellant sought to lead fresh evidence in relation to allegations made by his son which were considered by the Magistrate at the hearing.Background The aggrieved and the appellant began a relationship in 1994 and married in 1997. They have four children from the marriage: SE born on 17 June 2003, OP born on 19 January 2005, FA born on 12 January 2009 and RA born on 24 May 2011. They separated in 2015 however, initially lived under the same roof. On 3 March 2016, a domestic violence order was taken out by ME in Brisbane Magistrates Court. The appellant was the respondent and the order was made by consent without admissions. In relation to this matter, events appear to have escalated from around 25 March 2018. On that day OP made a disclosure to ME in relation to a sexual incident occurring between herself and her older brother SE. The incident occurred without the knowledge of either parent. ME took the child to the police and an investigation commenced. As a result of those allegations, ME decided that she no longer wanted the younger children going to the respondent’s home where SE currently resided. She sought help from the police and was told that as there was no Family Court Order in place they couldn’t help her but she then consulted a solicitor and decided to withhold the children from a scheduled visit. Worried about the appellant’s reaction to this stance, ME decided to stay at her partner’s place over the Easter break largely because she believed that the appellant did not know where her partner lived. However, on 1 April 2018, the appellant took SE to her partner’s house, hid in the bushes for two hours and when FA came out of the house to hunt for Easter Eggs, the appellant grabbed him. The appellant went into the house attempting to take RA but was unsuccessful. The appellant and SE left taking FA with them. The police investigated this incident and the appellant was charged with stalking and wilful damage as a result of this behaviour, however, those charges were discontinued and he entered a plea of guilty to trespass. He was fined $700. The police issued a police protection notice and which then resulted in this application for a domestic and family violence protection order. Fresh evidence On 4 April 2018 SE was driven to a police station by his father, the appellant and made a complaint of a sexual nature against his mother. On 17 April 2018 he retracted his statement alleging that his father had told him to make the complaint and told him what he should say. In April 2018 he also made the complaint that his father had shown him indecent photographs on his phone. The police investigated that allegation and there were no such photographs found on the appellant’s phone. The applicant has submitted an affidavit from SE affirmed on 8 December 2022, which now says that he was made to withdraw his complaint against ME, was made to allege that the appellant instructed him to make the complaint against her, and that his mother was the one who was mistreating him, not his father.[1][1] Affidavit under the hand of SE affirmed 8 December 2022 at [35], [39], [40], [41]-[71].

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The police investigated this incident and the appellant was charged with stalking and wilful damage as a result of this behaviour, however, those charges were discontinued and he entered a plea of guilty to trespass. He was fined $700. The police issued a police protection notice and which then resulted in this application for a domestic and family violence protection order. Fresh evidence On 4 April 2018 SE was driven to a police station by his father, the appellant and made a complaint of a sexual nature against his mother. On 17 April 2018 he retracted his statement alleging that his father had told him to make the complaint and told him what he should say. In April 2018 he also made the complaint that his father had shown him indecent photographs on his phone. The police investigated that allegation and there were no such photographs found on the appellant’s phone. The applicant has submitted an affidavit from SE affirmed on 8 December 2022, which now says that he was made to withdraw his complaint against ME, was made to allege that the appellant instructed him to make the complaint against her, and that his mother was the one who was mistreating him, not his father.[1][1] Affidavit under the hand of SE affirmed 8 December 2022 at [35], [39], [40], [41]-[71]. I have read the affidavit submitted on behalf of the appellant and signed by SE. It concerns me very much that this young man is being used in this way. It is clear from the evidence that SE was a troubled youth. He was charged with indecent treatment of his sister. He became homeless for a while and was using drugs. He has been attacked during that time. He has had three haemorrhages on his brain while living rough on the streets.[2] I have watched the interview between the police and SE where he withdrew his complaint. His distress and concern about being forced to make the complaint appeared to be quite genuine and believable. His vulnerability is evident. [2] Affidavit under the hand of SE affirmed 8 December 2022 at [51]. In relation to the issue of whether the appellant can adduce this further evidence and whether SE can give further evidence on oath, I accept the submissions of Mr O’Brien for the respondent that much of the affidavit is simply gratuitous and irrelevant to the issue being litigated. It appears to be designed to be hurtful to the ME and in fact is suggestive of further domestic abuse by the appellant who would have been aware that the affidavit would be read by ME. At the very least it lacks insight. The appellant is a solicitor and it can therefore be assumed he has some grasp on the relevance and weight of evidentiary material. This young man who, as I have already noted, is clearly troubled, has given, on his own version, two false complaints: one against his mother and one against his father. He has withdrawn the complaint against his mother saying his father coerced him to make it and now he is saying that was a lie. He is saying he made up the complaint against his father. He is saying the allegations he made to the police that his father was controlling was a lie. It is impossible now for the court to be able to consider him a witness of credit and giving evidence in court against one of his parents would likely be a traumatic experience for him. I do not propose to put a young person in that position, particularly when it is unlikely to make any difference to the outcome of this appeal.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established