Mr Shannon Mcpherson v Blask Pty Ltd T/A Blask Engineering
[2019] FWC 2301
•27 MAY 2019
| [2019] FWC 2301 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.394 - Application for unfair dismissal remedy
Mr Shannon Mcpherson
v
BLASK Pty Ltd T/A BLASK Engineering
(U2019/677)
DEPUTY PRESIDENT ASBURY | BRISBANE, 27 MAY 2019 |
Application for an unfair dismissal remedy.
[1] This Decision concerns an application for an unfair dismissal remedy under s. 394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act) by Mr Shannon McPherson (the Applicant) with respect to his dismissal by BLASK Pty Ltd t/a BLASK Engineering (the Respondent). In his Form F2 Application filed on 23 January 2019 the Applicant states that he was dismissed on 20 November 2018 and that his dismissal took effect on that date.
[2] By virtue of s. 394(2) of the Act an application under s. 394 of the Act must be made within 21 days after the dismissal took effect, or within such further period as the Commission allows under s. 394(3). The application was made 43 days outside the required time and it is therefore necessary to determine whether a further period should be allowed under s. 394(3) of the Act. The Respondent indicated that it did not wish to participate in a conciliation conference before a Fair Work Commission Conciliator prior to the determination of whether a further period would be allowed for the application to be made. Accordingly the file was allocated to me for the purposes of determining that matter.
[3] Directions were issued requiring the Applicant to file a statement attaching any supporting documentation by 28 February 2019, setting out the basis for the submission that he should be granted a further period to make his unfair dismissal application taking into account the matters is s. 394(3) of the Act. Those matters were also set out in the Directions. The Respondent was required to file any material it wished to rely on in opposition to the grant of a further period, by 7 March 2019.
[4] The matter was listed for Jurisdiction Hearing on Wednesday 20 March 2019. The Applicant represented himself and the Respondent sought permission to be represented by Focus HR, a paid agent which conducts its human resource management function. In circumstances where the Respondent did not seek to call any witnesses or cross-examine the Applicant and relied only on oral submissions in support of written submissions it had already filed, I allowed the Respondent to be represented for the present proceedings on the basis that I was satisfied that it would enable the matter to be dealt with more efficiently and no issue of fairness arose.
EVIDENCE
[5] The evidence and submissions relevant to the matter for determination can be summarised as follows. In his Form F2 Application for an unfair dismissal remedy lodged on 23 January 2019, the Applicant stated that he was not aware of a 21 day time limit in which he was required to file such an application and that he thought he had a three month period to decide whether he wanted to make an unfair dismissal application. In his statement filed on 28 February 2019 the Applicant said that two weeks prior to his dismissal he was assaulted in the car park at the Respondent’s workshop. The Applicant said that during this assault he was kicked in the back of the head with steel capped boots a number of times and that he could include a Police Statement/Report “if required”. The Applicant states that while his physical wounds had subsided, his mental state was anxious and distressed after the assault. The Applicant asserts he was in no state to make any decision, let alone complete a claim.
[6] At the hearing on 20 March 2019, the Applicant stated in oral evidence to the Commission that he did not know there was a 21 day period in which he was required to make his application, and that due to the extent of the injuries he suffered as a result of the assault he was not able to make the application until 23 January 2019. The Applicant also stated that during the assault on 6 November 2018 he sustained a suspected fracture to his skull, and had a period of sick leave up until 13 November 2108 for which he provided the employer with a medical certificate. The Applicant stated that he could produce the certificate if required and that either his partner or his mother had a copy of the certificate.
[7] I put to the Applicant during the hearing that he had provided no medical evidence to support the assertion that any injury he sustained during the assault on 6 November 2018 was relevant to the consideration of whether there were exceptional circumstances. I also informed the Applicant that the relevant period extended to the date on which the application was actually made – 23 January 2019 – and that a medical certificate covering only the period from 6 to 13 November 2018 may not support a finding of exceptional circumstances.
[8] The Applicant stated that he could provide a copy of the relevant medical certificate by 21 March 2019. The Applicant was unable to meet the initial timeframe, and on the basis that the Applicant stated that he had made an appointment with a medical practitioner to obtain documentation and had experienced delays because of this, I allowed the Applicant until 4.00pm on 28 March 2019 to provide any additional material including the medical certificate he had referred to for the period from 6 to 13 November 2018. On 28 March 2019 the Applicant sent an email to my Chambers advising that he continued to have difficulty obtaining relevant medical documentation and asserting that this may be because a female person involved in the assault against him worked at the Practice at which he was seen in relation to his injuries. The email stated that the Applicant had made a further appointment for Friday 29 June at 4.00 pm and went on to say that:
“I have been through my own lot of exceptional circumstances in the past few months.
The Respondent knows well of it all.
The biggest kick in the gut was being terminated from my job after so many years.
Everyone has their troubles, i'm no different to anyone.
Call it bad timing or call it bad luck
Call me stubborn or to proud for not seeking help to admit any disorder i may have.
Call me lazy for at that time i should have been seeking paperwork to prove so.
Call me stupid for not having the knowledge to know what was wrong.
I never intended or wanted to go down this road it was only until I had gone through my own combination of exceptional circumstances that i can now get up and realise that I was without a doubt unfairly dismissed and the merits of this application can speak for themselves.
- A mutual agreement was never made - As stated i signed that document to release my money. If i did not sign i was not getting paid!
- An ex gratis payment was made - I had been employed continuously for over 7 years.
- Employed up to 20 employees at the time of termination. Yet the Respondent states only 12.
- 19/11/2018 i was asked to start early at 6 am . Met with Brad then was told "i cost him too much money"
this was actually my last day of work. NOT 23/11/2018”
[9] Appended to the email of 28 March 2019 was documentation relating to an application for a Domestic Violence Protection Order completed by Queensland Police on behalf of the Applicant including a report of an incident on 6 November 2018 involving an altercation between the Applicant and his partner and the Applicant’s brother and his partner. The report of the incident evidences that Police attended at the premises of the Respondent to deal with that altercation. The report confirms that after the incident the Applicant was interviewed at the Inglewood Hospital and had a grazed knee consistent with being pulled from his vehicle, and injuries described as a swollen and blackened left eye, scratches around his right ear and a “large egg swelling” on the back of his head. The Applicant’s partner who witnessed the incident is recorded as having stated to police that the Applicant was on the ground during the altercation while the perpetrator “layed into him”. The report also states that the Applicant and his brother had been involved “in a long family dispute” regarding property left to them by their deceased father and that Police sought a protection order.
[10] On 29 March 2019 at 3.28 pm the Applicant sent a further email to my chambers stating that he had received a medical certificate from the Inglewood Medical Centre and was awaiting paperwork from a psychologist. The attached WorkCover Medical Certificate states that the Applicant was seen by a General Practitioner on 29 March 2019 that date and that the Applicant “is/was” suffering from “Assault at the gate of work, sustating (sic) occipital haematoma L zygoma and abrasion R cheek and L eye”. The certificate dated 29 March 2019 states that the Applicant was first seen at the practice for the injuries on 6 November 2018. The certificate further states that the Applicant had no capacity for any type of work from 6 November 2018 to 12 November 2018 and that he had capacity to undertake suitable duties from 13 November 2018 to 26 November 2018. The certificate goes on to state that the Applicant would require treatment from 6 November 2018 to 12 November 2018 and would be reviewed on 29 March 2019.
[11] On 1 April 2019 the Applicant filed an additional WorkCover medical certificate, which states that on 29 March 2019 the Applicant “is/was” suffering from “PTSD following assault at the gate of work” and that the Applicant was first seen at the practice on 6 November 2018 in relation to this injury. A box on the certificate is checked to indicate that it is a provisional diagnosis and that the treatment plan is “psychologist”. The certificate also states that the Applicant has been referred to a specialist but instead of inserting the name of the specialist as the certificate requires the term “psychologist” has been inserted.The certificate further states that the Applicant has no capability for work from 13 November 2018 to 12 April 2019, and that the Applicant requires treatment until from 29 March to 29 April 2019. The certificate is signed by the same General Practitioner who issued the earlier certificate. The second certificate is dated with a typed date of 29 March 2019 (as is the first certificate) except that this date has been struck through and the date 1/4/19 has been handwritten onto the certificate. Both certificates have boxes checked to indicate that the Applicant can undertake various physical activities including using “injured hand/arm” frequently in circumstances where no injury to his hand or arm is evidenced in the medical certificate, the Police Report or the Applicant’s statement to the Commission.
[12] It is also the case that there is no reference in the Form F2 also note that in his Form F2 Unfair dismissal application to the assault or its ongoing effects. Further, in his evidence to the Commission at the hearing the Applicant reiterated that he was not aware of the time limit for making his application and erroneously believed that he had a three month period in which to file an unfair dismissal application.
[13] The Respondent opposed the grant of a further period for the application to be made asserting that the Applicant had not provided any medical certificates prior to the date of his dismissal and that he had returned to normal duties on 13 November 2018. The Respondent also took issue with the medical certificates tendered by the Applicant being worker’s compensation Certificates when the injury did not occur at work and was not work related and pointed to the following inconsistencies:
• One certificate states that the Applicant was seen on 6 November 2018 but is dated 29 March 2019;
• The other certificate also indicates that the Applicant was seen on 6 November 2018 and the date the certificate was signed (29 March 2019) is crossed out and 1 April 2019 is handwritten on the certificate;
• The certificate dated 29 March 2019 states that the Applicant can return to work on suitable duties from 13 November 2018 until 26 November 2018 and the second certificate dated 1 April 2019 states that the Applicant cannot return to work between the dates of 13 November 2019 and 12 April 2019 but that treatment is only required from 29 March 2019 to 29 April 2019;
• The certificate dated 29 March 2019 is signed by the Doctor and contains a stamp setting out his details and the second certificate dated 1 April 2019 is signed and not stamped;
• There is no evidence of a suspected skull fracture; and
• Both certificates are backdated.
[14] The Respondent submits the material tendered by the Applicant does not support an extension of time. Further the Applicant has not produced evidence stating that his injuries were serious, and did not communicate anything to the Respondent at the time about any injury to his head or skull other than that he had sustained superficial wounds. The Respondent submits the Applicant also attended a meeting on 23 November 2018 where the mutual cessation of his employment was agreed and tendered a document that was said to evidence the agreement. That document is a letter to the Applicant dated 5th December 2018 advising that he would be paid entitlements comprising four weeks’ pay in lieu of notice, holiday pay and leave loading and an additional amount of long service leave. This additional amount is said to be paid notwithstanding that long service leave is not an entitlement until the Applicant has seven years’ service. The letter concludes by stating:
“If you are in agreeance with this proposal, please sign the bottom of this letter and your entitlements will be processed to your account.”
[15] At the hearing on 20 March 2019 I pointed out to the Respondent that it was not clear from the letter that the Applicant accepted these payments on the basis that he released the Respondent from any claim arising out of the cessation of his employment and that it appeared that the Applicant had just agreed to accept payments to which he was already entitled. The Respondent indicated that there was a covering letter that set out these matters and sought a further opportunity to tender it, which was granted on the basis that it may be relevant to the merit of the application which is a matter I am required to take into account in deciding whether there are exceptional circumstances. The Respondent did not file an additional document or covering letter in relation to this matter.
[16] It is also the case that the Respondent asserted that the Applicant had not completed seven years’ service so that the payment of long service leave was an ex gratia payment. The Applicant maintained that he had completed the required service and that he signed the letter simply so that he could receive the payments to which he was entitled. Neither party put evidence before me sufficient for me to reach a conclusion in relation to whether or not the Applicant was entitled to long service leave.
CONSIDERATION
The approach to determining whether a further period should be granted to the Applicant to make his unfair dismissal application
[17] As previously noted, s. 394(2) of the Act requires that an unfair dismissal application under s. 394 must be made within 21 days after the dismissal took effect or within such further period as the Commission allows under s. 394(3) of the Act. Section 394(3) sets out the circumstances in which the Commission may allow a further period for an unfair dismissal application to be made as follows:
“(3) The FWC may allow a further period for the application to be made by a person under subsection (1) if the FWC is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, taking into account:
(a) the reason for the delay; and
(b) whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect; and
(c) any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal; and
(d) prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay); and
(e) the merits of the application; and
(f) fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position.”
[18] The approach to deciding whether there are “exceptional circumstances” in a particular case is that the term is given its ordinary meaning, and encompasses circumstances:
• out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon, but not necessarily unique unprecedented or rare; or
• involving a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a combination of ordinary factors that taken together are exceptional.1
[19] Exceptional circumstances can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional. It is not correct to construe “exceptional circumstances” as being only some unexpected occurrence, although frequently it will be. Nor is it correct to construe the plural “circumstances” as if it were only a singular occurrence, even though it can be a one off situation. The ordinary and natural meaning of “exceptional circumstances” includes a combination of factors which, when viewed together, may reasonably be seen as producing a situation which is out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon.2
[20] The assessment of whether “exceptional circumstances” exist requires a consideration of all of the relevant circumstances. No one factor, such as the reason for the delay need be found to be exceptional in order to enliven the discretion to extend time although an absence of any explanation for any part of the delay will usually weigh against an extension while an acceptable explanation for all of the delay will usually weigh in favour of an extension. However it is necessary to take each factor into account by considering and giving appropriate weight to it. 3
[21] The Applicant must provide a credible reason for the delay in making an application and the reason is considered along with the other matters set out in s. 393.4 The delay required to be considered is the period beyond the prescribed 21 day period for lodging an application and does not include the period from the date of the dismissal to the end of the 21 day period. 5 Even when exceptional circumstances are established, discretion as to whether time should be extended remains, which should be exercised having regard to all the circumstances, including whether an extension is fair and equitable.6 The circumstances from the time of the dismissal must also be considered and ultimately whether the reason for the delay or part of it constitutes exceptional circumstances.7 I turn now to consider each of the matters in s.394(3) of the Act.
Reasons for the delay – s.394(3)(a)
[22] The 21 day period for making the application in the present expired on 11 December 2018. The period of the delay from that date until the application was made on 23 January 2019, is 43 days. The reasons for the delay in making the application as advanced by the Applicant are firstly, that he was unaware of the time limit for making his application and secondly, the effect of the injuries he sustained on 6 November 2018. It is well established that ignorance of the time limit is not of itself an explanation for a delay in making an application that weighs in favour of a finding that there are exceptional circumstances justifying the grant of a further period.
[23] The Applicant stated in his Form F2 application and at the hearing that he wrongly believed that he had three months from the date of dismissal to make his application. The Applicant also stated that he became aware of the 21 day time limit a few weeks after he was dismissed and later stated that he became aware of the 21 day time limit at some point in January 2019. The Applicant also said that at some point in January 2019 he formed the view that he should have been paid more on termination of his employment and decided that he would make a claim for unfair dismissal. Considered in isolation, the Applicant’s ignorance of the time limit in which to make his unfair dismissal application would be a consideration weighing against a finding that there were exceptional circumstances.
[24] I accept that an assault of the kind sustained by the Applicant on 6 November 2018 could provide a credible and reasonable explanation for a delay in making an unfair dismissal application. Generally family members do not behave in the manner described by the Applicant and in the Police report. The evidence establishes that the Applicant was assaulted by his brother on 6 November 2018 and that he sustained injuries to his face and head as a result of the assault. There was also evidence of an injury to the Applicant’s knee consistent with being dragged from his vehicle. I accept that the Applicant would have been distressed by the assault and that his distress would have been exacerbated by the fact that the assault occurred in full view of his co-workers.
[25] However, I do not accept that the assault sustained by the Applicant provides a reasonable explanation for the delay in filing his unfair dismissal application. The assault occurred on 6 November 2019. The Applicant had a week off work as a consequence and then returned to work on 13 November 2018. The Applicant worked for a week with no apparent issue before he was dismissed on 20 November 2018. The Respondent maintains that the Applicant did not provide a medical certificate at the time of his absence and the Applicant did not produce a certificate for this period during the hearing of this matter despite being given numerous opportunities to do so.
[26] I do not accept that the medical certificates provided by the Applicant provide a reasonable explanation for the delay in filing his unfair dismissal application. Neither of the medical certificates tendered by the Application is contemporaneous with the injury and both were generated following proceedings in the Commission during which the Applicant was made aware that his medical condition was relevant to his extension of time application. Both certificates state that the Applicant was first seen on 6 November 2018 and that the date of the injury was 6 November 2019. However, the certificates were issued on 29 March 2019 and 1 April 2019 respectively and there is no evidence of a certificate being issued on or around 6 November 2018 when the injury the Applicant now relies on to explain the delay in filing his application occurred. In addition to the inconsistencies in the information set out in the certificates identified by the Respondent, I note that the medical practitioner who issued the certificate has ticked a box to indicate that the Applicant can use his injured hand/arm frequently in circumstances where no injury to his hand or arm is evidenced in the medical certificate or the Police Report.
[27] The first certificate dated 29 March 2019 states that the Applicant has no capacity for any type of work from 6 November 2018 to 12 November 2018 and is then able to undertake suitable duties. As previously noted the Applicant returned to work on 13 November 2018 and does not contest the Respondent’s assertion that he performed his usual duties. The certificate further states that the Applicant will require treatment from 6 to 12 November 2018. The prescribed treatment is stated to be “cold packs” and the prescribed medication is Ibuprofen and Panadol. There is no indication that the effects of the injury which occurred on 6 November 2018, as identified in the medical certificate issued on 29 March 2019, subsisted past 12 November 2018 – before the Applicant was dismissed on 20 November 2018.
[28] The second medical certificate dated 1 April 2019 states that the Applicant is suffering from “PTSD” which I take to be post traumatic stress disorder. The certificate also indicates that this is a provisional diagnosis. The indicated treatment is a referral to a psychologist. That certificate states that the Applicant has no capacity for any type of work from 13 November 2018 to 12 April 2019 and that he will require treatment from 29 March 2019 to 29 April 2019. I do not accept that the certificate establishes that the Applicant was suffering from PTSD in the period from 13 November to 11 December 2018 the date by which the application was required to be filed or the period from 11 December 2018 to 23 January 2019, when it was filed. First, the Applicant made no mention of any medical condition, much less PTSD, in his Form F2 Application in response to questions in the Form about why he had not filed his application in the required time. As previously noted the Applicant stated in his Form F2 Application that he was not aware of the time limit to make an unfair dismissal application and thought he had three months from the date of his dismissal to do so. While the Applicant described his distress at being dismissed and the fact that he had to cancel a holiday cruise, this does not explain the delay in filing an unfair dismissal application.
[29] Second, the Applicant made no mention of PTSD or any other medical condition in his statement filed in the Commission in accordance with Directions. Third, the Applicant made no mention of PTSD in his oral evidence to the Commission and the medical certificate stating that he was suffering from PTSD was only provided after the hearing at which I made it clear to the Applicant that he needed to provide an explanation for the delay in filing his application. Fourth, the medical certificate does not establish that the Applicant was suffering from this disorder at the relevant time. It is a provisional diagnosis made on 29 March 2019 and evidences only that the Applicant was not capable of undertaking any kind of work from 13 November 2018 to 12 April 2019. That statement contradicts the earlier certificate which indicates that the Applicant was able to undertake suitable duties from 13 November until 26 November 2018 and which placed no restrictions on the Applicant after that date. Further, if the Applicant was suffering from PTSD at some point following his dismissal the evidence does not establish that this was during the period of the delay or that it impacted in any way on his ability to file an unfair dismissal application so as to provide an explanation for his delay in doing so.
[30] The assault sustained by the Applicant on 6 November 2018, while causing him distress, is not a reasonable explanation for the delay in filing his unfair dismissal application. The evidence establishes that the real reason for the delay is that the Applicant thought that he had three months to consider whether he would take any action in relation to the termination of his employment and that by mid-January 2019 the Applicant formed a view that he had not been paid enough on termination of his employment and decided to make an application for an unfair dismissal remedy. On balance, the evidence establishes that the most probable explanation for the delay is that the Applicant wrongly believed that he had three months in which to make an unfair dismissal application and simply did not comply with the time limit prescribed in s. 394(2) of the Act.
[31] Accordingly, the lack of a reasonable explanation for the delay in filing the application is a factor that weighs against a finding that there are exceptional circumstances such that a further period should be granted.
Whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect – s.394(3)(b)
[32] There is no dispute that the Applicant was aware of his dismissal on the date that it took effect. This is a neutral consideration in deciding whether there are exceptional circumstances justifying the granting of a further period for the application to be made.
Any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal – s.394(3)(c)
[33] Other than making an unfair dismissal application some 64 days after he was dismissed, the Applicant did not take any steps to dispute his dismissal. To the contrary, the Applicant signed a document setting out what was described as a “severance agreement”. While the document signed by the Applicant is not a release and discharge, it was signed some two weeks after his dismissal took effect. Notwithstanding that the document is poorly drafted, it is arguable that it evidences that the Applicant accepted his dismissal and that he did not intend to contest it.
[34] However, in circumstances where there is insufficient evidence for me to make a finding as to whether the Applicant had the required continuous service to be entitled to long service leave, and where the Applicant maintains that he signed the document simply to ensure that he was paid his minimum entitlements and that this included long service leave, I have concluded that this factor is neutral rather than that it weighs against a further period in which to make the application being granted.
Prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay) – s.394(3)(d)
[35] There is no evidence that the employer will suffer any prejudice from the delay in the application being made, other than the usual prejudice of having to defend an unfair dismissal application. This is a factor that weighs in favour of a further period being granted.
The merits of the application – s.394(3)(e)
[36] In the matter of Kornicki v Telstra-Network Technology Group 8 the Commission considered the principles applicable to the exercise of the discretion to extend time under s.170CE(8) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth). In that case the Commission said:
“If the application has no merit then it would not be unfair to refuse to extend the time period for lodgement. However we wish to emphasise that a consideration of the merits of the substantive application for relief in the context of an extension of time application does not require a detailed analysis of the substantive merits. It would be sufficient for the applicant to establish that the substantive application was not without merit.” 9
[37] In the present case, the Respondent contends that there were issues with the Applicant’s work performance and that the dismissal was consistent with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code (the Code). The Applicant contends that he was told he was dismissed because his wages were too much of a cost. The Applicant also disputes that the Respondent is a small business and maintains that it employed 20 employees at the time of his dismissal.
[38] These are disputed facts which could only be resolved by evidence. In these circumstances the Applicant’s case is not without merit and this is a factor weighing in favour of an extension of time albeit at the lower end of the spectrum given that the Applicant’s case does not have obvious merit.
Fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position – s.394(3)(f)
[39] There are no other employees in a similar position to that of the Applicant and this is a neutral factor. If this consideration requires fairness to be considered on a broader scale, then a refusal to grant a further period in the circumstances of this case will not be inconsistent with other cases where employees have been refused a further period when the reason for the delay has been lack of knowledge of the time limit for making an application.
CONCLUSION
[40] After weighing all of the factors, in s. 394(2) I am not satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances justifying the grant of a further period for the application to be made. I decline to exercise the discretion in s. 394(2) to grant a further period for the application to be made and the application must therefore be dismissed. An Order to that effect will issue with this Decision.
DEPUTY PRESIDENT
Appearances:
Mr S Mcpherson on his own behalf.
Mr A Green of Focus HR on behalf of the Respondent.
Hearing details:
2019.
21 March.
Brisbane.
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
<PR706613>
1 Nulty v Blue Star Group [2011] FWAFB 975 at [13] and see also Parker v Department of Human Services [2009] FWA 1638; Johnson v Joy Manufacturing Co Pty Ltd t/as Joy Mining Machinery [2010] FWA 1394.
2 Nulty v Blue Star Group [2011] FWAFB 975.
3 Stogiannidis v Victorian Frozen Foods Distributors Pty Ltd t/as Richmond Oysters [2018] FWCFB 901 at [38] – [39].
4 Cheval Properties Pty Ltd v Smithers (2010) 197 IR 403.
5 Stoginniadis op. cit. at [22].
6 Ibid at [15].
7 Shaw v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited T/A ANZ Bank [2015] FWCFB 287.
8 Print P3168, 22 July 1997 per Ross VP, Watson SDP and Gay C.
9 Ibid
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