Mr Mark Francis v Moxon and Co Pty Ltd T/A Moxon Timbers

[2015] FWC 2211

[2015] FWC 2211

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

REASONS FOR DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.394 - Application for unfair dismissal remedy

Mr Mark Francis
v
Moxon and Co Pty Ltd T/A Moxon Timbers
(U2015/3195)

SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT DRAKE SYDNEY, 30 MARCH 2015

Application for relief from unfair dismissal.

[1] This decision arises from an application for an extension of time for lodgement of an application for an unfair dismissal remedy pursuant to section 394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act).

[2] In his application Mr Francis indicated that his dismissal took effect on 5 December 2014 but that he was notified of his dismissal on 8 January 2015. Mr Francis lodged his application on 19 February 2015. His application was lodged 23 days outside the statutory time if measured from 8 January 2015.

[3] When determining this application I had before me the application for unfair dismissal lodged by Mr Francis. I wrote to him on 3 March 2015 outlining the matters I was required to consider by the Act and asked him to provide a statement addressing these matters within 14 days. Mr Francis provided a comprehensive statement on 9 March 2015. I issued an Order refusing his application for an extension of time and dismissed his application on 17 March 2015. Mr Francis requested reasons for my Order. His request is set out below.

“Can you please explain your reason for my dismissal . I applied on the grounds of unfair dismissal , Why? I am in Queensland you are in Sydney , Why ? Haven,t they got any one in this state.The Respondent/ solicitor is also in Sydney . I applied for unfair dismissal against Moxon Timbers , Not Hurford wholesales PTY LTD , Both with same ABN . Your responce (sic) today is back stating Moxon timbers . Why? Are you trying to give me the run around. Please Explain ,  or is this fake.      Who do you think you are, I gave  you the respect to respond to  your requests on the grounds of unfair dismissal, You have made me state to the respondent my reasons & now they may have the heads up if i have to bring negelence (sic) charges against against them due to my injury . As stated above I gave you the respect, give me some respect back in return, As to the grounds as for your dismissal. Or do I have to contact the law reform  commision (sic), & or federal / state members of parliment (sic) etc           Mark Francis”

[4] The relevant legislative framework for the exercise of the Fair Work Commission’s discretion in relation to applications of this kind is set out below:

394 Application for unfair dismissal remedy
...
(3) The FWC may allow a further period for the application to be made by a person under subsection (1) if the FWC is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, taking into account:

(a) the reason for the delay; and

(b) whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect; and

(c) any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal; and

(d) prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay); and

(e) the merits of the application; and

(f) fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position.

[5] The meaning of “exceptional circumstances” was considered in Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd[2011] FWAFB 975 where the Full Bench said:

“[10]It is convenient to deal first with the meaning of the expression “exceptional circumstances” in s.366(2). In Cheval Properties Pty Ltd v Smithers a Full Bench of FWA considered the meaning of the expression “exceptional circumstances” in s.394(3) and held:

“[5] The word “exceptional” is relevantly defined in The Macquarie Dictionary as “forming an exception or unusual instance; unusual; extraordinary.” We can apprehend no reason for giving the word a meaning other than its ordinary meaning for the purposes of s.394(3) of the FW Act.”

[11] Given that s.366(2) is in relevantly identical terms to s.394(3), this statement of principle is equally applicable to s.366(2).

[12] The ordinary meaning of the expression “exceptional circumstances” was considered by Rares J in Ho v Professional Services Review Committee No 295 a case involving in s.106KA of the Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth). His Honour observed:


“23. I am of opinion that the expression ‘exceptional circumstances’ requires consideration of all the circumstances. In Griffiths v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 372 at 379 Brennan and Dawson JJ considered a statutory provision which entitled either a parole board or a court to specify a shorter non-parole period than that required under another section only if it determined that the circumstances justified that course. They said of the appellant’s circumstances:

‘Although no one of these factors was exceptional, in combination they may reasonably be regarded as amounting to exceptional circumstances.’

24. Brennan and Dawson JJ held that the failure in that case to evaluate the relevant circumstances in combination was a failure to consider matters which were relevant to the exercise of the discretion under the section (167 CLR at 379). Deane J, (with whom Gaudron and McHugh JJ expressed their concurrence on this point, albeit that they were dissenting) explained that the power under consideration allowed departure from the norm only in the exceptional or special case where the circumstances justified it (167 CLR at 383, 397).

25. And, in Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513 at 573 [173] Callinan J referred with approval to what Lord Bingham of Cornhill CJ had said in R v Kelly (Edward) [2000] QB 198 at 208, namely:

‘We must construe "exceptional" as an ordinary, familiar English adjective, and not as a term of art. It describes a circumstance which is such as to form an exception, which is out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon. To be exceptional a circumstance need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare; but it cannot be one that is regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered.’

26. Exceptional circumstances within the meaning of s 106KA(2) can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional. Thus, the sun and moon appear in the sky everyday and there is nothing exceptional about seeing them both simultaneously during day time. But an eclipse, whether lunar or solar, is exceptional, even though it can be predicted, because it is outside the usual course of events.

27. It is not correct to construe ‘exceptional circumstances’ as being only some unexpected occurrence, although frequently it will be. Nor is it correct to construe the plural ‘circumstances’ as if it were only a singular occurrence, even though it can be a one off situation. The ordinary and natural meaning of ‘exceptional circumstances’ in s 106KA(2) includes a combination of factors which, when viewed together, may reasonably be seen as producing a situation which is out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon. And, the section is directed to the circumstances of the actual practitioner, not a hypothetical being, when he or she initiates or renders the services.”

[13] In summary, the expression “exceptional circumstances” has its ordinary meaning and requires consideration of all the circumstances. To be exceptional, circumstances must be out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon but need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare. Circumstances will not be exceptional if they are regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered. Exceptional circumstances can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional. It is not correct to construe “exceptional circumstances” as being only some unexpected occurrence, although frequently it will be. Nor is it correct to construe the plural “circumstances” as if it were only a singular occurrence, even though it can be a one off situation. The ordinary and natural meaning of “exceptional circumstances” includes a combination of factors which, when viewed together, may reasonably be seen as producing a situation which is out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon.” [Endnotes not reproduced]

[6] For exceptional circumstances to arise as contemplated by s.394 of the Act, it is not necessary that the applicant for that extension of time be overtaken by a catastrophic event. Reasons for delay in the category of extreme events are not necessary to meet the test. All of the factors outlined in s.394(3) must be considered and weighed when deciding whether or not exceptional circumstances, circumstances sufficient to support an exception, exist.

[7] I considered the various criteria to which my attention is directed by s.394(3) of the Act.

reason for the delay-s.394(3)(a)

[8] Mr Francis’s response of 9 March 2015 is set out below.

[9] The most beneficial reason Mr Francis provided for his delay in lodgement was that he had noticed over time that he was the only person who had been stood down due to lack of work and he therefore wondered why. However, there is a considerable delay even from the day provided by Mr Francis for the termination of his employment and the history he provided in his statement was very confused.

whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect-s.394(3)(b)

[10] Mr Francis became aware of the end of his relationship with the respondent on 8 January 2015.

any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal-s.394(3)(c)

[11] Mr Francis disputed his dismissal by lodging this application.

prejudice to the employer-s.394(3)(d)

[12] I was satisfied that there would be no greater prejudice to the respondent caused by this application being listed now than there would have been had it been lodged in time. Prejudice to the respondent was a neutral consideration.

the merits of the application-s.394(3)(e)

[13] Merit was a neutral issue in my consideration of this application.

fairness as between Mr Francis and other persons in a similar position-S.394(3)(f)

[14] There was no issue of fairness in relation to any other person in a similar position.

[15] While sympathetic to Mr Francis’s circumstances I was not persuaded that Mr Francis’s difficulties were out of the ordinary, unusual or uncommon.

[16] Having considered all of the matters to which my attention is directed by the Act I was not satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances which would warrant my granting an exception to the statutory time limit and on that basis dismissed the application. Mr Francis’s circumstances were not out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon.

SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT

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