Mr Jason Rolender v Spotless Management Services Pty Ltd T/A Spotless
[2021] FWC 2624
•4 JUNE 2021
| [2021] FWC 2624 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.394 - Application for unfair dismissal remedy
Mr Jason Rolender
v
Spotless Management Services Pty Ltd T/A Spotless
(U2021/2912)
COMMISSIONER HUNT | BRISBANE, 4 JUNE 2021 |
Application for an unfair dismissal remedy – application made outside of 21-day time limit – no exceptional circumstances present – unfair dismissal application dismissed.
[1] On 7 April 2021, Mr Jason Rolender filed an application for unfair dismissal remedy under s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act) alleging that his employer, Spotless Management Services Pty Ltd T/A Spotless (Spotless Management/the Respondent), unfairly dismissed him.
[2] In the application Mr Rolender nominated the date the dismissal took effect to be 18 March 2021, being the day he received his termination payment.
Legislation
[3] Section 394 of the Act provides when the Commission may allow a further period for an unfair dismissal application to be made:
“394 Application for unfair dismissal remedy
(1) A person who has been dismissed may apply to the FWC for an order under Division 4 granting a remedy.
Note 1: Division 4 sets out when the FWC may order a remedy for unfair dismissal.
Note 2: For application fees, see section 395.
Note 3: Part 6 1 may prevent an application being made under this Part in relation to a dismissal if an application or complaint has been made in relation to the dismissal other than under this Part.
(2) The application must be made:
(a) within 21 days after the dismissal took effect; or
(b) within such further period as the FWC allows under subsection (3).
(3) The FWC may allow a further period for the application to be made by a person under subsection (1) if the FWC is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, taking into account:
(a) the reason for the delay; and
(b) whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect; and
(c) any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal; and
(d) prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay); and
(e) the merits of the application; and
(f) fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position.”
[4] Pursuant to s.394 of the Act, an application for unfair dismissal must be made within 21 days after the dismissal took effect. A dismissal takes effect when the employment relationship is ended. 1 For example, when termination occurs with pay in lieu of notice, the dismissal takes effect immediately, not at the end of the notice period, or when final payment is made or received following dismissal.
[5] Mr Rolender’s termination letter dated 15 March 2021 provides:
“The termination of your employment will take effect on 15 March 2021. You will be paid your notice period in lieu and will not be required to attend work.”
[6] I am satisfied that Mr Rolender was dismissed on 15 March 2021 and not 18 March 2021. The 21-day time limit would then fall on Monday, 5 April 2021, which happened to be Easter Monday and a public holiday in all states and territories of Australia, but most importantly in Queensland where Mr Rolender resides. Therefore, the 21-day period ended on a public holiday.
[7] If the final day of the 21-day period falls on a weekend or on a public holiday (where the Commission is closed), the timeframe will be extended until the next business day. 2 Accordingly, in order for Mr Rolender’s application to have been made in time, it was required to be filed by 6 April 2021. The application was made on 7 April 2021, and therefore is one day out of time.
[8] The Respondent objects to the application on two jurisdictional grounds:
• the application is out of time; and
• the dismissal was a case of genuine redundancy within the meaning of s.389 of the Act.
[9] This is my decision determining only whether the time limit allowing Mr Rolender to make his application is extended in accordance with s.394(3) of the Act.
Decision to determine application ‘on the papers’
[10] The matter was listed for jurisdiction hearing on 12 May 2021 to hear the out of time issue. On 12 May 2021, shortly prior to the scheduled hearing, Mr Rolender filed a medical certificate providing he was unfit to participate in a hearing from 12 May to 14 May 2021. I adjourned the hearing, allowing Mr Rolender time to liaise with his doctor.
[11] On 17 May 2021, Mr Rolender filed a further medical certificate providing he was unfit to participate in a hearing from 17 May to 23 May 2021.
[12] On 21 May 2021, I corresponded with the parties, asking Mr Rolender to confirm whether he seeks a hearing on the extension of time issue when he is medically fit to participate, or in the alternative, is he content for the Commission to make a decision whether an extension of time should be granted on the information currently before it? On 31 May 2021, Mr Rolender advised my chambers he was content for the matter to be determined without a hearing. He attached to his correspondence a document and stated, “I have provided a written version of what I would have said if I was able to participate in the hearing for your information and consideration.”
[13] The Respondent also advised it is content for the decision to be dealt with by the Commission on the written material and correspondence before it.
[14] Having reviewed the evidence and submissions of the parties, on 31 May 2021 my Associate informed the parties in writing that my decision was now reserved and would be determined ‘on the papers’; that is, with the information I have before me. I satisfied myself that pursuant to s.397 of the Act there were no contested facts on the first jurisdictional issue relevant to the application having been made out of time. If there had been contested facts it would have been necessary to conduct a conference or a hearing.
Background
[15] Mr Rolender commenced employment as a Project Coordinator with Spotless Management on 1 May 2019. He had been employed with a related entity since 28 June 2017 and accordingly his service was recognised from this time.
[16] Between November 2020 and February 2021, Spotless Management undertook a restructure of reporting lines across its Sunshine Coast University Hospital contract, identifying the role of Project Coordinator in the Asset and Lifecyle Team as surplus to the current and future operational needs.
[17] On 15 March 2021, Mr Rolender received a letter terminating his employment, as produced in part below:
“…
This letter is written notice that your employment with Spotless Management Services Pty Ltd (“the Company”) will terminate on 15th March 2021 (End Date).
Reason for termination
As you are aware from my letter dated 1 March 2021 and meeting that day, a recent review of operational requirements by the Company identified that the structure of the Asset Lifecycle team was not aligned with the current and future operational needs. As a result, there is a need for a different mix of skills and unfortunately your position as Project Coordinator is no longer required and is now redundant.
Notice
The termination of your employment will take effect on 15 March 2021. You will be paid your notice period in lieu and will not be required to attend work.
Potential redeployment opportunities
As you are aware from the letter dated 1 March 2021 and subsequent discussions with you, the Company has been seeking to work with you to identify alternative employment opportunities within the Spotless Group. Unfortunately, you have expressed no interest in any of roles that have been brought to your attention during the consultation period.
…”
Mr Rolender’s evidence and submissions
[18] In his initiating application, Mr Rolender said the reason for the delay in making the application was for the following reasons:
“I spent some time, processing and deciding if this was the path I wanted to take and trying to look after myself. I suffer with mental health issues and anxiety issues and this dismissal affected me greatly, it has also affecting my marriage which is now causing me additional stresses and time management issues. I did not received my final payment until 18 March 2021. During this time I was offered and accepted a casual assignment working away from home, assisting with the COVID Vaccination role out, which required me to spend considerable amount of time onboarding, undertaking inductions and on line training. This has also taken it's toll on me mentally, however I have to work. I flew out to this post on 28 March 2021 and have had limited time and access to internet and emails. I am travelling to and from North Queensland and working 6 days a week, 12 hours per day approx.” (original text)
[19] On 27 April 2021, Mr Rolender was invited by Vice President Catanzariti’s chambers to file written materials and supporting evidence explaining why he considers his circumstances are exceptional to allow a further period for the application to be made. Mr Rolender filed a medical certificate dated 30 April 2021, stating:
“I saw Jason several times around late Feb and early March 2021 and can confirm that he was suffering some anxiety around this time. This may have impacted his judgement during this period. Thanks for consideration of this.
Dr Daniel Van Dijk”
[20] Mr Rolender submitted:
“There was some confusion around the actual end date of my employment as the letter advised 15 March and my final payment wasn’t made until 18 March, If you take the date from the letter, then my application is 24hours late, if you take it from payment date, I lodged within timeframe.” (original text)
[21] Following allocation to my chambers, I issued a direction inviting Mr Rolender to file any further evidence or submissions. Mr Rolender filed the below statement on 31 May 2021:
“I am requesting an extension of time to be considered as I was mismanaged by Spotless during this process.
In April 2020 I had a break down and required 3 weeks off work to recover. During this time, my employer was kept informed of my condition at all times. They were fully aware of my mental health concerns. The break down came as a result of work pressures due to COVID and the demands from the client SCUH, increased substantially. I attempted a gradual return to work situation at this time, however the Spotless process was unable to accommodate. My doctor was unable to complete the questions that were asked
Ie – Will Jason be able to perform his duties in accordance with Spotless policies. As he doesn’t know Spotless policy, he was unable to provide insight into this. As a result of this, I retuned to full duties under duress.
The HR Manager, Contract Manager and my immediate line manager were fully aware of my circumstances on my return to work.
The following 12 months was challenging in the workplace as there were many uncertainties in relation to structural changes and dynamic changes to my role regularly. This not only became confusing and stifling it also created further and ongoing anxiety. I expressed this regularly to my line manager. The Contract Manager, David Griffin, did check in with me on several occasion regarding my mental health and I would always express to him that I was on the journey but there were also massive challenges that were not being dealt with causing me additional and ongoing anxiety. At no time did Spotless offer training, mentoring or any alternative solutions to assist me.
The email that Spotless has tabled from Alex Byrne includes 2 recipients that were fully aware of my mental stress – David Griffin and Suzy Hudson and Alex was also aware as I had had discussion with her previously.
On the 5th February 2021, the day I was going on 3 weeks leave, I tabled my concerns to Alex Byrne regarding the restructure and during this conversation I explained to her that I was going on leave as I was changing medications for my mental health and would not be able to cope with that and work at the same time as med changes cause me to become unstable in my thinking. During this conversation Alex reassured me that this conversation need to be escalated to her manager and that it would be managed in an appropriate manner and kept confidential. I was concerned after this conversation regarding the outcomes of this for myself on my return to work.
I was then addressed on my return to work on 1 March and advised of my pending redundancy.
Based on their prior knowledge of my mental health issues, Spotless were negligent as they did not exercise additional care when dealing with me, making me redundant. Not only did they know about my mental health issues they also penalised me for expressing my concerns about the business and Terry McGuinness, by making me redundant the day I returned from leave. This shows intent by my employer. This has caused me additional mental anguish and additional stresses in my person life. It has also had a substantial effect on my mental health progression.
In addition to this, late in the following week after my redundancy, I was successful in obtaining a casual position assisting in the COVID vaccination roll out in rural & remote QLD. The onboarding process for this role was significant and I was on time restraints to have it completed in time to commence on 28 March.
During this time, I was flying in and out of central and north queensland, working 6 days/week upto 12 hours per day and having trouble accessing internet during this time. I did not have access to a computer and I also experienced phone troubles. My phone did not allow me to make phone calls. I got it fixed and then on my way to another location, it stopped working altogether again which I had repaired when I came home for a weekend.
Based on this, I would like the Commissioner to take into account my responses for consideration for extension of time that Spotless have mismanaged me, my mental health & my redundancy process as their standard process are insufficient as they did not take additional care in my circumstances, together with my new role and technical issues that I experienced as explained.” (original text)
Respondent’s submissions
[22] Spotless Management submitted there are no exceptional circumstances, taking into account the criteria set out in s.394(3) of the Act, to which the Commission can be satisfied in order to exercise its discretion to extend the 21-day time period.
[23] Addressing s.394(3)(a) of the Act, the reason for the delay, Spotless Management said the date of dismissal was abundantly clear from the letter of termination issued to Mr Rolender by email on 15 March 2021. It submitted that various means were open to him to ensure the application was made on time. The Commission’s website states how an unfair dismissal application may be lodged. The Respondent submitted that Mr Rolender could have obtained guidance over the telephone from the Commission regarding the time frame for lodgement.
[24] Spotless Management submitted Mr Rolender had notice from 1 March 2021 that his role would be made redundant and he was not required to perform his role. It accepted the medical opinion at [19], but said there was a significant time between from when Mr Rolender was made aware that his role would be made redundant on 1 March 2021 referring to:
(a) the time the dismissal was effective on 15 March 2021 (14 days), a period where Mr Rolender was not required to attend for work;
(b) the time between the dismissal and the date on which Mr Rolender commenced his new role (13 days);
(c) the time between the dismissal and the date on which the application was lodged with the Commission.
[25] It submitted the considerations at s.394(3)(a) should weigh against any decision to grant an extension of time.
[26] Addressing s.394(3)(b) of the Act, whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect, it was submitted Mr Rolender was aware of the dismissal two weeks’ prior to the termination taking effect as part of the Respondent’s consultation process. Mr Rolender was not required to attend work during this period. Spotless Management said in circumstances where Mr Rolender was aware of the dismissal prior to it taking effect and not required to attend for work, he had ample opportunity prior to the dismissal taking effect and within the 21-day time period to seek guidance on his legal rights and file an application if that was his intended course. It submitted this should weigh against any decision to grant an extension of time.
[27] Addressing s.394(3)(c) of the Act, any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal, Spotless Management submitted that Mr Rolender took no steps to dispute the dismissal. Mr Rolender was consulted with and involved in discussions regarding the termination of his employment and attendant entitlements prior to the dismissal taking effect. Prior to the termination date, Mr Rolender did not raise any substantive questions about the redundancy and in the days following asked one question about whether he would receive an additional one week of notice for being over 45 as per the NES. It submitted this should weigh against any decision to grant an extension of time.
[28] Relevant to s.394(3)(d) of the Act, prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay), Spotless Management has not suffered any material prejudice by the delay but says that the mere absence of prejudice to the employer is an insufficient basis to grant an extension of time. 3
[29] It submitted this matter does not involve any other employee in a similar position. As such, s.394(3)(f) of the Act, fairness as between Mr Rolender and other persons in a similar position, is a neutral factor.
[30] Addressing s.394(3)(e) of the Act, the merits of the application, Spotless Management submitted that the substantive application lacks merit on the grounds that the employment was brought to an end by way of genuine redundancy.
[31] In addressing the criteria in s.389 of the Act, it set out:
(a) as of 15 March 2021, Mr Rolender’s job was not required to be performed by anyone;
(b) no industrial instrument applied to the employment as to enliven an obligation to consult. However, on 1 March 2021 Spotless Management commenced a consultation process with Mr Rolender; and
(c) there were no roles to which he could be reasonably redeployed. Between 1 March 2021 and 15 March 2021, on two occasions Ms Byrne provided Mr Rolender with a list of vacancies across the Respondent’s business.
[32] It submitted that the merits of the substantive application should weigh against any decision to grant an extension of time.
Applicable Case Law
[33] The meaning of “exceptional circumstances” was considered in Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd4where the Full Bench said:
“[10]It is convenient to deal first with the meaning of the expression “exceptional circumstances” in s.366(2). In Cheval Properties Pty Ltd v Smithers a Full Bench of FWA considered the meaning of the expression “exceptional circumstances” in s.394(3) and held:
“[5] The word “exceptional” is relevantly defined in The Macquarie Dictionary as “forming an exception or unusual instance; unusual; extraordinary.” We can apprehend no reason for giving the word a meaning other than its ordinary meaning for the purposes of s.394(3) of the FW Act.’
[11] Given that s.366(2) is in relevantly identical terms to s.394(3), this statement of principle is equally applicable to s.366(2).
[12] The ordinary meaning of the expression “exceptional circumstances” was considered by Rares J in Ho v Professional Services Review Committee No 295 a case involving in s.106KA of the Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth). His Honour observed:
“23. I am of opinion that the expression ‘exceptional circumstances’ requires consideration of all the circumstances. In Griffiths v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 372 at 379 Brennan and Dawson JJ considered a statutory provision which entitled either a parole board or a court to specify a shorter non-parole period than that required under another section only if it determined that the circumstances justified that course. They said of the appellant’s circumstances:
‘Although no one of these factors was exceptional, in combination they may reasonably be regarded as amounting to exceptional circumstances.’
24. Brennan and Dawson JJ held that the failure in that case to evaluate the relevant circumstances in combination was a failure to consider matters which were relevant to the exercise of the discretion under the section (167 CLR at 379). Deane J, (with whom Gaudron and McHugh JJ expressed their concurrence on this point, albeit that they were dissenting) explained that the power under consideration allowed departure from the norm only in the exceptional or special case where the circumstances justified it (167 CLR at 383, 397).
25. And, in Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513 at 573 [173] Callinan J referred with approval to what Lord Bingham of Cornhill CJ had said in R v Kelly (Edward) [2000] QB 198 at 208, namely:
‘We must construe “exceptional” as an ordinary, familiar English adjective, and not as a term of art. It describes a circumstance which is such as to form an exception, which is out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon. To be exceptional a circumstance need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare; but it cannot be one that is regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered.’
26. Exceptional circumstances within the meaning of s 106KA(2) can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional. Thus, the sun and moon appear in the sky everyday and there is nothing exceptional about seeing them both simultaneously during day time. But an eclipse, whether lunar or solar, is exceptional, even though it can be predicted, because it is outside the usual course of events.
27. It is not correct to construe ‘exceptional circumstances’ as being only some unexpected occurrence, although frequently it will be. Nor is it correct to construe the plural ‘circumstances’ as if it were only a singular occurrence, even though it can be a one off situation. The ordinary and natural meaning of ‘exceptional circumstances’ in s 106KA(2) includes a combination of factors which, when viewed together, may reasonably be seen as producing a situation which is out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon. And, the section is directed to the circumstances of the actual practitioner, not a hypothetical being, when he or she initiates or renders the services.”
[13] In summary, the expression “exceptional circumstances” has its ordinary meaning and requires consideration of all the circumstances. To be exceptional, circumstances must be out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon but need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare. Circumstances will not be exceptional if they are regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered. Exceptional circumstances can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional. It is not correct to construe “exceptional circumstances” as being only some unexpected occurrence, although frequently it will be. Nor is it correct to construe the plural “circumstances” as if it were only a singular occurrence, even though it can be a one off situation. The ordinary and natural meaning of “exceptional circumstances” includes a combination of factors which, when viewed together, may reasonably be seen as producing a situation which is out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon.” [Endnotes not reproduced]
[34] In Stogiannidis v Victorian Frozen Foods Distributors Pty Ltd t/as Richmond Oysters,5 a Full Bench of the Commission rejected the finding at first instance that that the decision in Cheval Properties Pty Ltd (t/as Penrith Hotel Motel) v Smithers6 stood for a decision rule that, absent a credible explanation for the entirety of the delay, there could be no finding of exceptional circumstances. The Full Bench reaffirmed the test for exceptional circumstances as follows:7
“As we have mentioned, the assessment of whether exceptional circumstances exist requires a consideration of all the relevant circumstances. No one factor (such as the reason for the delay) need be found to be exceptional in order to enliven the discretion to extend time. This is so because even though no one factor may be exceptional, in combination with other factors the circumstances may be such as to be regarded as exceptional.” (original emphasis)
Consideration
Section 394(3)(a) - The reason for the delay
[35] Following the dismissal, approximately one week later, Mr Rolender secured a casual position requiring significant onboarding/training, travel and he attests to working six days per week up to 12 hours per day from 28 March 2021. He stated that he had trouble accessing internet during this time and had phone troubles.
[36] Applying for and securing a new job so quickly following a dismissal takes some effort. Mr Rolender was capable of doing so. There would, no doubt, have been forms for him to complete to secure the new employment, particularly the kind of employment he did secure.
[37] I have taken into consideration he was capable of travelling by air during the period in which he could have made his application to the Commission. Further, he was fit and able to work long days at work for his new employer.
[38] Where Mr Rolender has stated that he had trouble accessing the internet or had phone issues, I consider he could have, if he had wanted to, requested and been granted access to a colleague’s phone during a meal break or outside of work hours in his new employment. A short call to the Commission to make an unfair dismissal application is all that is required to commence proceedings.
[39] Mr Rolender has been experiencing mental health issues since April 2020. He has provided evidence from his doctor that he was experiencing anxiety in late February and early March 2021.
[40] I have had regard to the evidence before me and I note, in particular, a decision of Deputy President Sams in Micallef v Garfield Child Care Pty Ltd. 8 The Commission has held on numerous occasions that if an individual is suffering from depression and anxiety, this may not constitute a sufficient reason to justify a delay in lodging an application under s.394 of the Act. I note in particular the decisions in Custo v Norstar Recycling Pty Ltd,9 Muir McMeeken v Action Industrial Catering Pty Ltd10 and Rose v BMD Constructions Pty Ltd.11 As such, I am not satisfied that Mr Rolender’s medical condition itself qualifies as an ‘exceptional circumstance’ warranting an extension of time.
[41] Taking into account all of the circumstances resulting in the delay in lodging the application, I am not satisfied that Mr Rolender has demonstrated exceptional circumstances for the reason for the delay. The reasons for the delay weigh against the exercise of the discretion to grant an extension of time.
Section 394(3)(b) – Whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect
[42] Mr Rolender became aware of the dismissal on 15 March 2021. I do not accept the Respondent’s submissions that he had a further period between 1 March and 15 March 2021 to properly prepare himself, as it is the case that the termination may not have taken effect if a suitable role could be found for him.
[43] This criterion is not a matter in dispute. I find this a neutral consideration.
Section 394(3)(c)- Any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal
[44] Mr Rolender did not take any action to dispute the dismissal. Mr Rolender did take the time to query an additional entitlement on account of his age.
Section 394(3)(d) - Prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay)
[45] I consider that the one-day delay would cause very minimal prejudice to the Respondent given its size and its resources. This is a neutral factor when considering whether to exercise the discretion to grant an extension.
Section 394(3)(e) – The merits of the application
[46] In the matter of Kornicki v Telstra-Network Technology Group12 the Commission considered the principles applicable to the exercise of the discretion to extend time under s.170CE(8) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth). In that case the Commission said:13
“If the application has no merit then it would not be unfair to refuse to extend the time period for lodgment. However we wish to emphasise that a consideration of the merits of the substantive application for relief in the context of an extension of time application does not require a detailed analysis of the substantive merits. It would be sufficient for the applicant to establish that the substantive application was not without merit.”
[47] I am not satisfied that the application is without merit so that this factor weighs against the grant of an extension. Neither am I satisfied that there is such apparent merit that it weighs in favour of an extension. I consider merit to be a neutral factor in this case.
Section 394(3)(f) – Fairness as between the person and other person in a similar position
[48] A relevant principle in consideration of this criterion was articulated by the Full Bench in Perry v Rio Tinto Shipping Pty Ltd:14
“Cases of this kind will generally turn on their own facts. However, this consideration is concerned with the importance of the application of consistent principles in cases of this kind, thus ensuring fairness as between the Appellant and other persons in a similar position. This consideration may relate to matters currently before the Commission or matters previously decided by the Commission.”
[49] Similar cases, in which there is no clear account of the delay or demonstration of the exceptional circumstances, have not favoured the exercise of the discretion to extend time.15 Granting the extension would cause unfairness to other parties in a similar position whose applications to extend time had been refused.
[50] I am not satisfied that the issue of fairness as between Mr Rolender and other persons in a similar position is a relevant consideration in this matter. Because it is not a relevant factor it is a neutral factor when considering the discretion to grant an extension.
Conclusion
[51] Having taken into account each of the factors referred to in s.394(3)(a) to (f) of the Act, I am not persuaded that there are exceptional circumstances warranting consideration of whether I should exercise my discretion to allow a further period within which an application for an unfair dismissal remedy may be lodged by Mr Rolender.
[52] Although I have sympathy for the range of matters Mr Rolender dealt with in the period following his dismissal, the circumstances were not, in my evaluative assessment, out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon.
[53] Accordingly, the application for an extension of time is refused. The jurisdictional objection is upheld and the substantive application for an unfair dismissal remedy is dismissed.
[54] I order that the application be dismissed.
COMMISSIONER
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1 Siagian v Sanel Pty Ltd [1994] IRCA 2 (Wilcox CJ).
2 Hemi v BMD Constructions Pty Ltd[2013] FWC 3593;
3 Brodie-Hanns v MTV Publishing Ltd (1995) 67 IR 298.
4 [2011] FWAFB 975.
5 [2018] FWCFB 901.
6 (2010) 197 IR 403 at [16]-[18].
7 [2018] FWCFB 901 at [38].
8 [2013] FWC 5447.
9 [2012] FWA 8278.
10 [2012] FWAFB 5933.
11 [2011] FWA 673.
12 Print P3168, 22 July 1997 per Ross VP, Watson SDP and Gay C.
13 Ibid.
14 [2016] FWCFB 6963 at [41].
15 See for example: Burke v Mamre Association Inc T/A Mamre [2017] FWC 5922; Pellew v Samuel O’Connor T/A Hair Republic [2017] FWC 6382; Hoger v Bondall Pty Ltd [2017 FWC 6067.
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