Mr Gary Dufall v Greyhound Australia Pty Ltd

[2015] FWC 2684

[2015] FWC 2684

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.394 - Application for unfair dismissal remedy

Mr Gary Dufall
v
Greyhound Australia Pty Ltd
(U2014/12638)

COMMISSIONER CLOGHAN PERTH, 31 JULY 2015

Application for relief from unfair dismissal.

[1] This is an application by Mr Gary Dufall (Mr Dufall or Applicant) seeking a remedy for alleged unfair dismissal from his former employer, Greyhound Australia Pty Ltd (Greyhound or Employer).

[2] The application was made pursuant to s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (FW Act).

[3] At the hearing, Mr Dufall was represented by Mr Glenn Ferguson, Senior Projects Officer, Transport Workers’ Union of Australia, Western Australia Branch (TWU). Mr Dufall gave evidence on his own behalf. Mr P Ogden and Mr R Thomson gave evidence on behalf of the Applicant.

[4] Greyhound, with the leave of the Commission ([2015] FWC 2105), was represented by Mr Andrew Pollock of Herbert Smith Freehills. Ms S Guild, Mr M Teasdale and Mr J Dowsett gave evidence on behalf of the Employer.

[5] This is my decision and reasons for decision on Mr Dufall’s application.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

[6] Greyhound has a contract with Bechtel Oil and Gas Chemicals (Bechtel) for the provision of bus services on the Wheatstone LNG Project (Wheatstone Project).

[7] Bechtel is the Wheatstone Project’s Engineering, Procurement, Construction and Management provider. Put shortly, Bechtel is the head contractor and is responsible for the management of other contractors on the Wheatstone Project.

[8] The Wheatstone Project is located 12 kilometres west of Onslow, which is 1,392 kilometres north of Perth in Western Australia.

[9] Greyhound provides transportation services for approximately 3,500 construction workers on the Wheatstone Project.

[10] On 26 July 2014, Mr Dufall was stood down on pay regarding an incident which occurred on 25 July 2014.

[11] The Employer reduced to writing the allegations resulting from the incident and put those to the Applicant on 28 July 2014. Included in the correspondence is the requirement that he is to treat the allegations and investigation on a strictly confidential basis. A meeting into the allegations incident occurred on 30 July 2014.

[12] Notes of the meeting were provided in evidence 1. The Applicant did not take issue with their content. The notes reveal that Ms Guild read from a prepared document. The script included the following:

“We again remind you that this investigation is strictly confidential. Other than for the purposes of seeking legal advice or accessing your support person, you must not discuss the matters under investigation with anyone.” 2

[13] On 30 July 2014, Mr Dufall emailed Mr Andre Fox, PSB Coordinator, on two (2) occasions. Mr Fox is employed by Bechtel. The subject heading of the emails is “GHA Allegations”. The emails are not copied to any other person. On 6 August 2014, Mr Dufall again emailed Mr Fox. On this occasion, the subject heading of the email is “Greyhound intimidation and bullying” 3 and it was copied to two officers at the TWU.

[14] On 13 August 2014, Mr Dufall was emailed to say that the investigation into the incident on 25 July 2014, had now been broadened to include the allegation that he failed to comply with an express direction that the investigation be kept strictly confidential.

[15] On 22 August 2014, the Employer communicated formally to Mr Dufall of the continuing investigation and that its scope now included:

• breach of directions to treat the investigation as confidential and not to discuss with another person except for the purposes of seeking legal or accessing a support person; and



• breaching his contractual duty to perform his work (driving) with reasonable care and skill in accordance with the Employer’s direction both in training and at toolbox meetings.

[16] On 10 September 2014, Mr Dufall was informed of the outcome of the investigation. The Employer concluded that the allegations in relation to the substantive incidents on 25 July 2014 were not proven to the required standard.

[17] With respect to the allegations of not complying with a direction to keep the matter strictly confidential and driving breaches, the Employer found that these had been substantiated. The Employer informed Mr Dufall that as a result of these findings “a decision regarding any appropriate disciplinary outcome may result in termination of your employment” 4.

[18] Mr Dufall was invited to a further meeting (11 September 2014) and provided with an opportunity to “show cause” why his employment should not be terminated 5.

[19] Following the meeting on 11 September 2014, the Employer advised Mr Dufall that his employment had been terminated effective from 11 September 2014.

RELEVANT LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK

[20] There is no dispute between the parties that Mr Dufall has properly made the application in accordance with s.382 of the FW Act. Accordingly, the relevant statutory framework for consideration is ss.385 and 387 of the FW Act.

[21] Section 385 of the FW Act sets out the meaning of unfair dismissal as follows:

“385 What is an unfair dismissal

A person has been unfairly dismissed if the FWC is satisfied that:

(a) the person has been dismissed; and
(b) the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable; and
(c) ...
(d) ...”

[22] The criteria for whether a dismissal is harsh, unjust or unreasonable can be found in s.387 of the FW Act and is as follows:

“387 Criteria for considering harshness etc.

In considering whether it is satisfied that a dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable, the FWC must take into account:

(a) whether there was a valid reason for the dismissal related to the person’s capacity or conduct (including its effect on the safety and welfare of other employees); and

(b) whether the person was notified of that reason; and

(c) whether the person was given an opportunity to respond to any reason related to the capacity or conduct of the person; and

(d) any unreasonable refusal by the employer to allow the person to have a support person present to assist at any discussions relating to dismissal; and

(e) if the dismissal related to unsatisfactory performance by the person—whether the person had been warned about that unsatisfactory performance before the dismissal; and

(f) the degree to which the size of the employer’s enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal; and

(g) the degree to which the absence of dedicated human resource management specialists or expertise in the enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal; and

(h) any other matters that the FWC considers relevant.”

CONSIDERATION

[23] Section 387 of the FW Act sets out the matters which the Commission must take into account in determining whether a dismissal was “harsh, unjust or unreasonable”. In seriatim, they are as follows.

s.387 (a) - was there a valid reason for the Applicant’s dismissal?

[24] A valid reason for dismissal is one that is “sound, defensible or well founded and not capricious, fanciful or spiteful”. The authority for this approach is found in the often cited case of Selvachandran v Peterson Plastics Pty Ltd (1995) 62 IR 371 at page 373 which reads as follows:

“In its context in s.170DE(1), the adjective “valid” should be given the meaning of sound, defensible or well founded. A reason which is capricious, fanciful, spiteful or prejudiced could never be a valid reason for the purposes of s.170DE(1). At the same time the reasons must be valid in the context of the employee’s capacity or conduct or based upon the operational requirements of the employer’s business. Further, in considering whether a reason is valid, it must be remembered that the requirement applies in the practical sphere of the relationship between an employer and an employee where each has rights and privileges and duties and obligations conferred and imposed on them. The provisions must ‘be applied in a practical, commonsense way to ensure that the employer and employee are treated fairly’.”

[25] A valid reason for dismissal attempts to balance, in a practical way, the needs of employees and employers.

[26] When the reason for the dismissal relates to the employee’s conduct, it is necessary for the Commission to determine, on the balance of probabilities, whether the alleged conduct occurred, and if so, whether it was a sufficient reason for termination 6.

[27] In his offer of employment, the Employer relevantly informs Mr Dufall:

“Whilst working for Greyhound you are required to comply with any company policy or procedure…You are required to familiarise yourself with these and if you have any questions about your obligations in complying with the policies and procedures, you should speak to your manager Further, you are required to comply with any reasonable direction given to you by your manager or another person in authority within the company”.

[28] In return for performing his duties as a Driver, and complying with the above requirements, the offer of employment sets out his current hourly rate and advised Mr Dufall that, while employed, the Greyhound Australia Pty Ltd Enterprise Agreement 2010, would provide the minimum terms and conditions of his employment.

[29] In simple straightforward language, Mr Dufall was informed before starting his employment that, in return for the performance of his duties as a Driver and complying with Greyhound policies, procedures and directions, it would provide him with certain wages and conditions. It is no more complex than that.

[30] Greyhound dismissed Mr Dufall for three reasons; they are:

• he failed to comply with the Employer’s direction of 28 July 2014 to treat allegations against him, and the consequent disciplinary investigation, on a strictly confidential basis;



• Contrary to a Safe Work Practice reversing his vehicle without a spotter on five (5) occasions; and



• Reading his run sheet while driving his coach.

[31] I will begin with the assertion that Mr Dufall was to treat a disciplinary investigation into allegations, on a strictly confidential basis, and not disclose any information into the matter to other persons, save for certain instances.

Direction to keep allegations against Mr Dufall and investigation on a strictly confidential basis

[32] Mr Dufall was informed by written correspondence on 28 July 2014 of an investigation into alleged serious misconduct. It is not necessary to set out the allegations, except to say that Mr Dufall was stood down on pay and demobilised from the Wheatstone site for the duration of the investigation.

[33] As part of the 28 July 2014 correspondence advising Mr Dufall of the investigation, the Employer states:

“We take this opportunity to remind you of two other important ongoing obligations:

- …
- You must treat the allegations and investigation on a strictly confidential basis (other than for the purposes of seeking legal advice or accessing your support person). In particular, you must not disclose information about these matters to any Greyhound employee, or otherwise attempt to contact any Greyhound employee in relation to the allegations and investigation. Greyhound will take any breach of this direction extremely seriously.”

[34] Between 30 July and 6 August 2014, Mr Dufall emailed Mr Fox, a Bechtel employee setting out his views regarding the allegations and the investigation into those allegations.

[35] The subject heading of the first two emails is “GHA Allegations”. The third email to Mr Fox is entitled, “Greyhound intimidation and bullying”.

[36] It is not necessary to set out the detail of the emails, except to say that Mr Dufall revealed to Mr Fox, not only actions taken by Greyhound regarding himself but other employees. Prior to the first email, it would appear that Mr Dufall and Mr Fox had been involved in a conversation on the previous day as the Applicant commences his first email, “I realise that Bechtel can not get involved in the political workings of GHA but I am compelled to at least give you some insight as to what is going on at our work place” (my emphasis). Finally, in relation to the emails, Mr Dufall seeks, in my view, to undermine the relationship between his Employer and its client, Bechtel, when he states to Mr Fox, “this is the sort of tactics GHA revel in when dealing with their drivers and I find it hard to believe that this is the sort of company that Bechtel and indeed Chevron would want to be associated with”.

[37] It was also alleged that on 7 August 2014, Mr Dufall telephoned Ms A Preston, Bechtel, Occupational Health Coordinator, Aspen Medical Centre, and advised her that he had been “stood down”, that the allegations against him were “fabricated”, and other drivers were “manufacturing” evidence to support the Employer’s allegations.

[38] In response to the allegations, Mr Dufall submits that the Employer’s instruction was not to contact or disclose information about the investigation to any Greyhound employee. Alternatively, the Applicant contacted Mr Fox and Ms Preston in his capacity as a TWU delegate.

[39] Mr Dufall’s written evidence regarding this allegations is as follows:

“17. As to the allegations of breach of confidentiality, in the initial stand down letter, it stated that I was not to contact GHA employees which I didn’t. I took it as it was written. Also I don’t believe that GHA or anybody else has the right to stop free speech, secondly my emails and phone calls I believed were of a private matter between individuals and should not have been released to GHA without my written consent. Further to this when I made these phone calls and wrote the emails, I was acting for and behalf of my fellow co-workers in my capacity as the union representative which I had been duly elected by the membership at the Greyhound Wheatstone project and I felt it was my duty to help them as much as I could.”

[40] The direction to Mr Dufall of 28 July 2014 is in two parts. Firstly, that the Applicant “must treat the allegations on a strictly confidential basis”. Even Mr Dufall agreed that such a direction is “very clear” 7.

[41] The direction restrains Mr Dufall from discussing the allegations with any other person except for the purposes of seeking legal advice or accessing a support person. There is no confusion or contradiction in the direction. The whole point of conveying to Mr Dufall not to disclose the allegations or investigation, is to maintain the integrity of the disciplinary process. The two exceptions, regarding legal advice and support person, are for the purposes of fairness.

[42] The words “in particular” move from the general direction (save the exceptions), to the particular. The Employer is conveying, in addition to the general direction, a very specific direction not to discuss the allegations and investigation with Greyhound employees.

[43] Mr Dufall’s evidence that he “understood” 8, “took it”9 or “the way it came across”,10 as there being only one direction, and that was not to discuss the matter with Greyhound employees. On a plain meaning of the Employer’s direction, I am not prepared to reach such a conclusion.

[44] Mr Dufall’s alternative argument is that he contacted Mr Fox as a TWU delegate is complete nonsense.

[45] Being a TWU delegate is no shield for Mr Dufall to ignore a lawful and reasonable direction from the Employer regarding matters which relate to him as an employee, not as a TWU site delegate. A union delegate is not immune from an employer’s instruction which relates to that person as an employee.

[46] Mr Dufall’s evidence, that he was exercising his belief in free speech when communicating with Mr Fox, does an injustice to the concept of free speech. The assertion of “free speech” is the last refuge of applicants, when their chain of reasoning fails, for all other arguments. Mr Dufall may have a belief in free speech, but that belief does not absolve him from not complying with the Employer’s direction in relation to a disciplinary investigation.

[47] In Greyhound’s correspondence of 28 July 2014, Mr Dufall was put on notice that non-compliance with the Employer’s direction to treat the allegations and investigation on a “strictly confidential basis”, would be taken as “extremely serious”.

[48] It is trite, but employees are employed to carry out lawful and reasonable directions of their employer. In this case, Mr Dufall was given a lawful and reasonable direction on 28 July 2014. However, unlike the hundreds of thousands of directions given every day in the workplace, this direction came with the specific warning that, if it was breached, such a breach would be considered by the Employer, as “extremely serious”. Put simply, if Mr Dufall failed to comply with the direction, it would have serious consequences.

[49] The Employer did not give to Mr Dufall any sense, other than a breach of the direction, would be treated seriously.

[50] Mr Dufall’s actions are not one of those borderline situations of whether he did or did not comply with the Employer’s direction – it is clear he did not.

[51] The question is whether such a non-compliance is, of itself or with the other allegations of misconduct, a valid reason for dismissal. I consider this question should be considered in the following context.

[52] The Employer’s direction is dated 28 July 2014. Mr Dufall appears to have discussed the matter on the following day (29 July 2014) with Mr Fox. On the following day, 30 July 2014, Mr Dufall sent two emails to Mr Fox. A further email was sent on 6 August 2014. Mr Dufall had a discussion with Ms Preston on 7 August 2014.

[53] In terms of Mr Dufall’s breach of the Employer’s directions, they were almost immediate. This is not a case of an employee, with the passage of some time, not complying with the direction – non-compliance occurred with haste.

[54] Secondly, Mr Dufall’s non-compliance with the Employer’s directions was not a one-off event, it was on four (4) occasions.

[55] Thirdly, I turn to the content of the communications which breached the Employer’s direction. The content of communication lays out in details the Employer’s allegation, claims by Mr Dufall that they were a complete fabrication and “has been levelled at me purely because I am the union delegate and because I am continually bringing up safety reasons”. Mr Dufall asserts that his Employer is more intent on bullying and intimidating its staff, than creating a safe working environment. In another email, Mr Dufall described his demobilisation from site as if he was a criminal, terrorist or killer. On 30 July 2014, Mr Dufall proceeds, in an email to Mr Fox, from his own disciplinary investigation, to clearly undermine the relationship between Bechtel, Chevron and his Employer.

[56] The final email to Mr Fox is the least harmful in terms of Mr Dufall’s specific breach of the directions relating to allegations against him and the investigation. However, Mr Dufall refers to himself being “stood down” and that the allegations are at the “kindergarten level”.

[57] Mr Dufall’s discussion with Ms Preston reveals that he had been “stood down”, the allegations were “fabricated” and evidence was being “manufactured” against him 11. What I find extraordinary is the circumstances which led to Mr Dufall making contact with Ms Preston. In examination-in-chief his evidences is that his partner thought she was having a heart attack and went to the Aspen Medical Centre. Ms Preston is the ‘liaison officer’ and Mr Dufall telephoned her12. Mr Dufall’s evidence is that:

“Yes?---So then I just called her and had a conversation with her.  I told her I was the union delegate and I'd been stood down, and I was trying to find out what was going on.  She suggested that I ring her superior, which I did try to do.

So when you had that conversation with her, you explained that you were the union delegate?---I did.

That you had been stood down?---Yes.

But you were concerned about the situation - - -?---Well, that's it.  As I said to her, I was in Perth and I'm only getting, you know, information from other employees that are ringing me and telling me what's going on up there and - - -

So you were in Perth at the time that your wife was on site?---My partner.  She's not my wife.

Your partner was - - -?---Was still on site, yes.

- - - seeking assistance for a possible heart - - -?---That's right.

That's what led to that telephone conversation?---Yes”.

[58] Ms Preston’s recollection of the telephone conversation with Mr Dufall is that, at no stage did he make enquiries about his partner. Mr Dufall’s own evidence appears to confirm the circumstances. One interpretation of this set of circumstances is that Mr Dufall did telephone Ms Preston as the TWU delegate, as insensitive as it may be. However, as I have already observed, being a union delegate does not excuse him from obeying a lawful direction as a employee.

[59] Mr Dufall’s breaches are not some innocent unwitting or inadvertent revelation to a third party, but: specific presentation of the facts as he sees them, his defence of the allegations and how Greyhound is conducting it’s case against him.

[60] The revelation of Mr Dufall’s allegations and investigation are also a “platform” in which he makes some damning allegations against his own employer.

Contrary to a Safe Work Practice, reversing a vehicle without a spotter on five (5) occasions

[61] On 5 July 2014, The Employer carried out a “Reversing a Coach” training programme as part of a Tool Box Talk (TBT) of one hour. Mr Dufall confirmed, by signature, that he attended the training programme and would comply with its requirements 13.

[62] The Employer alleges that Mr Dufall did not comply with its Safe Work practice when reversing a coach policy on:

• two occasions on 7 July 2014;



• one occasion on 8 July 2014;



• one occasion on 10 July 2014; and



• one occasion on 11 July 2014.

[63] A video recording of each occasion was played to Mr Dufall on 26 August 2014 as part of the disciplinary investigation. Prior to viewing the video recording, Mr Dufall stated, and it was not contested that, “how can I say yes I did or not do that” 14. However, he does state as part of the disciplinary meeting, that supervisors had informed him that drivers could reverse the length of a bus without a spotter. Mr Dufall was reminded, at the disciplinary meeting, that this changed on 7 July 2014, which presumably was meant to be 5 July 2014 at the TBT.

[64] As I apprehend Mr Dufall’s submission and evidence, his response to the allegation can be divided into five categories.

[65] Firstly, what I will describe as the “depot” argument. That is, the Safe Work Practice concerning reversing with a spotter only applies to the depot and not outside the depot. The allegations regarding Mr Dufall reversing without a spotter, were in a location outside the depot. The Safe Work Practice clearly states that it applies at “all times”- “all times” is in the Practice note, is in bold. I reject Mr Dufall’s “depot” argument 15.

[66] Secondly, Mr Dufall puts the position that, at the TBT, it was conveyed to him that the Safe Work Practice was a “guide” and that it did not apply to the overflow yard 16. I am satisfied, on Mr Teasdale’s evidence, that there was no distinction between the depot and the overflow yard17. The only distinction related to an area described as LMG, in which the Employer has no control over18. Further, the notes of the TBT do not record that the Safe Work Practice is a “guide” or any notes to convey that it did not apply to the overflow yard19. Consequently, I reject Mr Dufall’s submission regarding any impression he may have gained at the meeting, that it did not apply to the overflow area.

[67] Thirdly, Mr Dufall puts what can be described as the “no choice” argument 20. Simply, “there are times on the site where you had to --- all over the site where you had to reverse a bus and sometimes you do not have a spotter and you’ve got no choice but to reverse21. The Safe Work Practice sets out what is to be carried out if no spotter is available. In any event, such circumstances are not relevant to the location in which Mr Dufall reversed his coach without a spotter; this will become apparent when another “defence” raised by Mr Dufall is discussed below.

[68] Fourthly, Mr Dufall states that he did not reverse the coach without a spotter or going to get a spotter because, “there was people there standing as I came in and they gave me the all clear to back up 22. Mr Dufall gave evidence that those persons said, “well, just watch it as you’re going back. Just hand signal, that’s all” and “they were implying that they were all going to watch while I reversed”23.

[69] Mr Dufall agreed that he did not raise this matter as part of the disciplinary investigation 24.

[70] Mr Dufall also conceded from the video footage, there is no recognition or communication on his part, with the alleged persons who were present and two (2) to three (3) metres from the coach 25. It also happens to be the case that the persons who allegedly acted as spotters for Mr Dufall, are all “off camera”26 on each of the five occasions. On the evidence, I am not persuaded by Mr Dufall’s evidence. At most, I conclude that the alleged spotters said to Mr Dufall as he drove in, “how are you going” – and any “hand gesture” was a wave to greet him and no more27.

[71] I now turn to what I consider the essence of what really happened, and that is, in his own words, “I probably actually didn’t really need anybody’s assistance” 28 and “I know where I’m going, I’m driving in, so you can see that you’re going in”29.

[72] Put shortly and simply, Mr Dufall “knows best” when it came to reversing the coach and the Employer’s Safe Work Practice, was to be complied with at his discretion.

[73] Similar to the allegation relating to confidentiality, Mr Dufall’s actions in not complying with the Employer’s revised Safe Work Practice were recent and frequent. Further, when confronted with such breaches, Mr Dufall mounted defences which were spurious.

Driving while reading a run sheet

[74] The Employer’s allegation is that on 7 July 2014, Mr Dufall “abandoned control of [his] vehicle in order to read your run sheet”. At the time, the vehicle was travelling at approximately 70 kilometres per hour. 30

[75] Mr Dufall admits that he did look at his run sheet on several occasions and advised the Employer that he considered it to be normal practice 31.

[76] Mr Dufall compares his actions to looking at his rear vision mirror, speedometer 32 or changing radio channels which are knee high33 in the vehicle.

[77] Mr Dufall states in his evidence that he had not abandoned control of his vehicle.

[78] I note that the Employer’s Statement of Facts re-characterises the allegation as, “the Applicant abandoned the proper control of his vehicle”. While this may be splitting hairs, I am, on the evidence, not satisfied that Mr Dufall abandoned control of his vehicle. Mr Dufall may have, on a number of occasions, driven the coach without having his eyes on the road.

[79] Mr Dowsett asserts in this evidence that Mr Dufall’s “hands are not on the steering wheel”. Unless Mr Dufall’s palms are not part of his hands, I am not able to come to the same conclusion.

[80] If Mr Dowsett is not aware that other drivers are reading run sheets while they are driving, it is contrary to the evidence I have in these proceedings and in another. I suggest he heed what evidence that has been given in these proceedings, rather than give advice to Mr Dufall, that he should have reported such behaviour to his supervisor.

[81] While the circumstances of Mr Dufall’s alleged breach of safety driving is not on “all fours” with the matter in [2015] FWC 2570, I am satisfied for the reasons set out in that Decision that Mr Dufall’s conduct, of itself, was not a valid reason to terminate his employment. However, this was only one category of conduct which led to Mr Dufall’s dismissal.

CONCLUSION

[82] In conclusion, for the reasons set out above, I am satisfied that Mr Dufall’s dismissal from his employment in relation to not complying with a lawful and reasonable direction and a Safe Work Practice, was not unfair pursuant to s.387 of the FW Act. Accordingly, the application must be dismissed. An order to this effect is issued jointly with this Decision.

COMMISSIONER

Appearances:

G Ferguson, of the TWU, on behalf of the Applicant.

A Pollock, of counsel, on behalf of the Employer.

Hearing details:

2015:

Perth,

17 April.

 1   Exhibit R7 (16)

 2   R8

 3   Exhibit R7 (17)

 4   Exhibit R7 (21)

 5   Exhibit R7 (21)

 6   Brink v TWU PR922612 at paragraph [7]

 7   Transcript PN349

 8   Transcript PN346

 9   Transcript PN350

 10   Transcript PN345

 11   Exhibit R4 (10)

 12   Transcript PN170

 13   Exhibit R7 (12)

 14   Exhibit R4 (9)

 15   Transcript PN409

 16   Transcript PN410

 17   Transcript PN831

 18   Transcript PN841

 19   Exhibit R7 (13)

 20   Transcript PN411

 21   Transcript PN410

 22   Transcript PN432

 23   Transcript PN435

 24   Transcript PN474

 25   Transcript PN441

 26   Transcript PN448

 27   Transcript PN468

 28   Transcript PN466

 29   Transcript PN478

 30   Exhibit R7 (10)

 31   Exhibit A3

 32   Exhibit A4 (20)

 33   Transcript PN491

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