Mr Ben Pritchard v Glencore T/A Newlands Pty Ltd
[2019] FWC 7956
•21 NOVEMBER 2019
| [2019] FWC 7956 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.394 - Application for unfair dismissal remedy
Mr Ben Pritchard
v
Glencore T/A Newlands Pty Ltd
(U2019/9465)
COMMISSIONER SPENCER | BRISBANE, 21 NOVEMBER 2019 |
Application for unfair dismissal remedy – jurisdictional objection – application filed out of time – s.394(3) extension of time sought – application dismissed. .
[1] An Application pursuant to s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act) was made by Mr Ben Pritchard (the Applicant) alleging that his dismissal from Glencore T/A Newlands Pty Ltd (the Respondent) was harsh, unjust or unreasonable. The Respondent raised a jurisdictional objection pursuant to s.394(2)(a) of the Act, arguing that the Application was not filed within the 21 day statutory time limit. This decision concerns whether the Commission exercises the discretion, to extend the time limit pursuant to s.394(3) of the Act.
[2] The termination of the Applicant’s employment, in summary terms, was based on a sequence of events that occurred outside work hours, on the night of 19 June 2019. The dismissal letter stated:
“The Company remains satisfied that your behaviour does not meet the required expectations of the Company. Your behaviour was destructive of harmonious working relationships and amounted to a disturbance of the peace in the residential town of Glenden which is populated by coal mine workers employed by the Company. In the Company’s view your conduct constitutes serious misconduct as defined in the Performance and Conduct Policy.”
[3] In terms of the relevant background, the Applicant, a coalminer, stated that after drinking alcohol he attended (as a pillion passenger on a motorbike) at his supervisor’s company house at 1:00am and ‘as a practical joke’ kicked the door of his house in. The supervisor, soon after, attended the Applicant’s house in a shirtless, angry state. After an exchange of words, the Applicant stated he was pushed from behind and connected with the supervisor’s car and sustained a ‘significant spiral fracture of his leg and ruptured, ankle ligament’.
[4] The Applicant’s employment was terminated on 29 July 2019. The Application was filed on 28 August 2019, four days out of time. Directions were set in relation to this jurisdictional objection and the matter was listed by phone to confirm the parties’ submissions. After that proceeding the Applicant later that day sent further correspondence in relation to the reasons for the delay and why he considered them to be ‘exceptional circumstances’. The Respondent was given an opportunity to respond to the additional material and provided further submissions. All of this material has been considered.
[5] The Applicant was represented by Mr Mitchell Jamieson, of Everyday Lawyers and the Respondent was represented by Ms Ellen Mayr, of Ashurst. Both representatives were granted permission to appear pursuant to s.596(2) of the Act.
[6] The Applicant submitted that there were, “exceptional circumstances,” to warrant the Commission granting an extension of time. In particular, the Applicant stated he was suffering, (after and at the time of dismissal), from the significant leg injury that required surgery and the associated effects of pain relief medication, which exacerbated his pre-existing depression and caused insomnia.
[7] Whilst not all of the material and evidence has been referred to in this decision, all of such has been taken into account.
RELEVANT LEGISLATION
[8] Pursuant to s.394 of the Act:
“394 Application for unfair dismissal remedy
(1) A person who has been dismissed may apply to the FWC for an order under Division 4 granting a remedy.
Note 1: Division 4 sets out when the FWC may order a remedy for unfair dismissal.
Note 2: For application fees, see section 395.
Note 3: Part 6 1 may prevent an application being made under this Part in relation to a dismissal if an application or complaint has been made in relation to the dismissal other than under this Part.
(2) The application must be made:
(a) within 21 days after the dismissal took effect; or
(b) within such further period as the FWC allows under subsection (3).
(3) The FWC may allow a further period for the application to be made by a person under subsection (1) if the FWC is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, taking into account:
(a) the reason for the delay; and
(b) whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect; and
(c) any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal; and
(d) prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay); and
(e) the merits of the application; and
(f) fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position.”
SUMMARY OF THE APPLICANT’S SUBMISSIONS AND EVIDENCE
[9] The Applicant submitted that the reasons for his delay in lodging his Application amounted to exceptional circumstances pursuant to s.394(3) of the Act. He primarily submitted that the reason for the delay in lodging his Application was due to mental and physical health issues he was experiencing.
[10] The Applicant stated that he was assaulted several weeks prior to his termination and sustained serious injuries to his lower right leg, suffering a broken fibula, dislocated ankle and ruptured tendons. The Applicant was required to undergo surgery to insert metal pins to support the bone and stated that he was in extreme pain, following his first operation which occurred on 19 June 2019. Following this surgery the Applicant was required to attend regular doctor’s appointments, requiring two hours travel time each way, to attend the specialist.
[11] The Applicant stated that the severity of the injuries, he sustained and the uncertainty of the healing and recovery options, in addition to the dismissal, substantially impacted on his pre-existing depression.
[12] The Applicant stated that the significant amount of pain and discomfort and the associated medication resulted in side effects including a “blurring effect” that affected the Applicant’s ability to perform everyday tasks such as showering or getting out of bed. The Applicant contended that due to his injury and its overall management, additional surgery was required on 6 September 2019, (after the Application had been filed).
[13] The Applicant provided a medical certificate dated 12 September 2019, and a further medical letter from his treating doctor, dated 1 November 2019, detailing the impact of the injury and the effect of the treatment, on his state of mind, at the time of his dismissal. The letter of 1 November requested that consideration be given, to the fact that the Applicant was experiencing issues with concentration, insomnia, depression and was prescribed strong medication, which may have affected his ability to think clearly and complete the Application as set out below.
[14] The Applicant provided medical evidence, in the form of two letters from separate doctors from the local medical practice to support his claims in relation to the impact of his physical and mental injuries. One doctor noted:
“Benjamin was unable to submit Form F2 to the Fair Work Commission and meet the deadline of submitting it 3 weeks from the date of his termination (29th of July 2019). Benjamin reports this is because the termination and its process and the injury that he went through has a negative impact at the time on his depression that he is known to have. Please do take this into consideration. Thank you.”
[15] The other doctor noted:
“Ben Pritchard has requested that I provide some more information regarding the impact of his injury and treatment on his state of mind and well being at the time of his termination of employment 29th July 2019.
On 19th June 2019 Ben sustained a significant spiral fracture of his R fibula and ruptured syndesmosis. He was treated by open fixation and cast and was restricted to bed rest and non-weight bearing for approximately 8 weeks. He required strong analgesia including endone and panadeine forte.
Ben has had a past history of depression and has been treated with an SSRI (fluoxetine). The impact of his injury and the medication, followed by his termination of employment on 29th July has had a negative impact on his depression. This caused a deterioration in his mental health causing problems with sleep and concentration. This is supported in his medical records as he attended Dr Wilke at the practice in early August due to a problem with insomnia.
Ben has submitted documentation to the Fair Work Commission but failed to do so before the deadline of 3 weeks post his termination date.
It is requested that consideration be given to the fact that Ben has issues with concentration, insomnia and depression and was on strong medication which may have impacted on his ability to think clearly and complete the necessary paperwork…”
[16] The Applicant set out that he was required to attend "regular" doctor's appointments. The dates of such appointments were not provided.
[17] The Applicant asserted that he was required to travel 2 hours each way to see his specialist. The Respondent noted that it was not apparent why the Applicant could not have filed his claim during the statutory period stating it is likely it would have taken less time than his travel to the alleged specialist appointments. To that end, the Respondent noted that the Application filed is extremely short, consisting of no more than 6 paragraphs.
[18] The Applicant stated ‘he lost days’ due to the ‘blur’ of the pain and analgesics and that he was considerably anxious due to the severity of the injury, the magnitude of the impact of the surgery, the possibility of facing a potential below knee amputation and the consequences of the dismissal on he and his family.
[19] The Applicant stated he attributed the risk of losing his employment, the possibility of his family having to leave Glenden, (where he had grown up), the pain of his existing leg injury, the concern that his leg would not return to a functional state, the extensive use of pain medications and his inability to drive a vehicle or to be self-reliant again in caring for himself, as contributing factors to his state of mind at the time of dismissal. He stated this resulted in a reduced capacity to cope with the situation at the time. It is noted that the period in question relating to the filing of the Application is that, after the dismissal.
[20] The Applicant conceded that he owned and had access to a home computer, although maintained that he did not have a printer, and had to use the town library facilities in order to print documents.
[21] The Applicant ultimately submitted that it was this sequence of events and circumstances that substantially reduced his ability to consider his options and avenues for recourse and that he was physically unable to undertake the process of completing the Application and proceeding with the lodgement, within the required time as he was substantially incoherent at the time due to his level of pain. The Applicant drew reference to the Decision of Nulity v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd where it was found that the ordinary and natural meaning of ‘exceptional circumstances’ includes a combination of factors which, when viewed together, may reasonably be seen as producing a situation, which is out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon. He stated that when viewed ‘holistically’, his set of circumstances constituted ‘exceptional circumstances’ for the purposes of s.394(3) of the Act.
SUMMARY OF THE RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS AND EVIDENCE
[22] The Respondent submitted that there were no exceptional circumstances or relevant factors that would satisfy the granting of an extension of time, in terms of the criteria in s.394(3) of the Act.
[23] The Respondent refuted the Applicant’s claim that he had a reduced ability to consider his options and avenues of recourse. The Respondent stated that during the termination meeting of 29 July 2019, the Applicant was explicitly advised that he was at liberty to lodge an Application for unfair dismissal with the Fair Work Commission, and additionally advised of the 21 day time frame for lodgement and that an Application could be lodged online.
[24] The Respondent did not dispute that the Applicant sustained injuries to his leg on 19 June 2019. However, the Applicant, in his submissions, referred to two surgeries that occurred on 19 June 2019 and 6 September 2019. Relevantly, the Respondent stated that the Applicant's first surgery occurred prior to his termination and the Applicant's second surgery occurred well after the Applicant filed his unfair dismissal Application. Accordingly, the Respondent stated that they do not provide any explanation for the Applicant's failure to file his unfair dismissal claim within the statutory timeframe.
Reasons for delay (section 394(3)(a))
[25] The Applicant placed significant weight on his "physical and mental injuries" which he alleged caused the delay in filing his Application. The Respondent rejected that the Applicant's assertions would constitute "exceptional circumstances" of the kind, required by section 394(3) for the following reasons:
• The Applicant conceded that he had a home computer. The Applicant had already been informed that he could lodge an unfair dismissal Application online. Importantly, it was not necessary for the Applicant to walk or drive to another location or to access a computer for the purpose of filing his unfair dismissal Application.
• The Applicant has recently contended that he was "assaulted" prior to the termination of his employment, but at no time did he make that allegation prior to his employment ceasing.
• The Respondent noted there was no information regarding any changed circumstances that enabled the Applicant to file on the 25th day.
• The Respondent contends the merits of the substantive matter weigh against the Applicant.
• At no time during his employment did the Applicant declare to the Respondent any medical condition.
[26] While the Applicant made reference to being diagnosed with depression and 'long term medication requirements for several years', the Respondent noted that this was not disclosed to the Employer pursuant to clause 7.3 of MOP 0041 Drug and Alcohol Policy, which provides that coal mine workers 'who are using medication which may impair their work performance are required to complete FRM Medication Declaration to declare their use of legally prescribed and/or some “over the counter” medication'.
[27] Further, it was submitted that the Applicant’s condition in itself does not constitute an exceptional circumstance. In David Grogan v Forgacs Engineering Pty Ltd T/A Forgacs, 1 while the facts are not precisely analogous, that Applicant submitted that the complications that followed from an injury he suffered at work in 2011 left him in a position where he has been unable to respond rationally and in a timely manner to the termination of his employment. It was concluded in that matter that:
“Clearly, Mr Kimpton’s injury and what followed from it are a most unfortunate set of circumstances and have been a significant upset in his life. The complications that apparently followed from the injury are also something that is not normally encountered…
Despite his unfortunate medical condition I am not satisfied it can be concluded that “exceptional circumstances” prevented him from making an unfair dismissal application within the requisite time period.”
[28] The Respondent emphasised that the Applicant was expressly notified at the termination meeting, of the 21 day time limit in which to file an unfair dismissal Application in the Commission, and that the Application could be made online. The Respondent submitted that the Application should have been made without delay after the conclusion of the termination meeting. The Respondent noted that the Applicant had ample opportunity during the 21 day period in which to prepare his unfair dismissal Application. The Respondent advanced that the Applicant did not demonstrate adequate reasons for the delay which would warrant a finding of ‘exceptional circumstances’ or the granting of an extension of time.
Whether the Applicant first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect (section 394(3)(b)) and any action taken by the Applicant to dispute the dismissal (section 394(3)(c))
[29] The Applicant became aware of the dismissal in a face to face meeting on 29 July 2019. During this meeting the Applicant's support person indicated that the dismissal was disputed. In response, the Applicant was advised that he could file an unfair dismissal Application, and could obtain relevant information from the Fair Work Commission website and that he was able to lodge an unfair dismissal Application online. The Respondent submitted that this factor weighed against the granting of an extension of time.
Prejudice to the employer (section 394(3)(d))
[30] The Respondent stated it did not suffer any particular prejudice except the ordinary prejudice of making this jurisdictional objection to the Application and being required to respond to the Application, despite the time period having expired.
[31] The Respondent submitted that a Respondent should be able to rely on compliance with statutory timeframes as noted in McLennan v Northern Territory Stolen Generations Aboriginal Corporation. 2 The Respondent confirmed that a "lack of prejudice is a positive factor but not a major factor in considering exceptional circumstances" (as found in Raoul Caire v Imscan Technologies3) and respectfully submitted that this factor should be treated as neutral.
Merits of the Application (section 394(3)(e))
[32] The Respondent submitted that they had a valid reason to terminate the Applicant's employment and that the dismissal was not otherwise harsh, unjust or unreasonable.
[33] The Respondent also stated that the Applicant's misconduct, in leading to the dismissal, is not in dispute and, when viewed objectively, was serious conduct.
Fairness as between the Applicant and other persons in a similar position (section 394(3)(f))
[34] The Respondent argued that there were no parties in a similar position. The Respondent submitted that to allow an extension of time in the present circumstances would be unfair to other employees, who have not made an out of time Application or have been denied an extension of time, in similar circumstances and to those who, in a similar position, complied with the legislative deadline.
CONSIDERATION OF WHETHER A FURTHER PERIOD SHOULD BE GRANTED
[35] As previously set out, s.394(2) of the Act requires that an unfair dismissal Application under s.394 must be made within 21 days after the dismissal took effect or within such further period as the Commission allows under s.394(3) of the Act. S.394(3) sets out the circumstances in which the Commission if satisfied there are ‘exceptional circumstances’ and may allow a further period for the filing of the Application. The Full Bench decision of Periklis Stogiannidis v Victorian Frozen Foods Distributors Pty Ltd t/as Richmond Oysters (‘Stogiannidis’) 4 rejected an earlier Full Bench decision in Cheval Properties Pty Ltd v Smithers5 which had concluded that in order for ‘exceptional circumstances’ to be established, an Applicant must provide reasons for the whole of the period of delay in filing. In Stogiannidis the Full Bench stated:
‘[38] As we have mentioned, the assessment of whether exceptional circumstances exist requires a consideration of all the relevant circumstances. No one factor (such as the reason for the delay) need be found to be exceptional in order to enliven the discretion to extend time. This is so because even though no one factor may be exceptional, in combination with other factors the circumstances may be such as to be regarded as exceptional.
[39] So much is clear from the structure of s.366(2), each of the matters needs to be taken into account in assessing whether there are exceptional circumstances. The individual matters might not, viewed in isolation, be particularly significant, so it is necessary to consider the matters collectively and to ask whether collectively the matters disclose exceptional circumstances. The absence of any explanation for any part of the delay, will usually weigh against an applicant in such an assessment. Similarly a credible explanation for the entirety of the delay, will usually weigh in the applicant’s favour, though, as we mention later, it is a question of degree and insight. However the ultimate conclusion as to the existence of exceptional circumstances will turn on a consideration of all of the relevant matters and the assignment of appropriate weight to each.
[40] To the extent that the proposition at [29] of the Decision is to be understood as suggesting that an applicant seeking an extension of time ‘needs to provide a credible explanation for the entire period’, it is, with respect, erroneous. It is not a pre-condition to the grant of an extension of time that the applicant provide a credible explanation for the entire period of the delay. Indeed, depending on the circumstances, an extension of time may be granted where the application has not provided any explanation for any part of the delay.’
[36] The meaning of “exceptional circumstances” in section 366(1) was considered by a Full Bench of the then Fair Work Australia in Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd (Nulty) 6 as follows:
“[13] In summary, the expression “exceptional circumstances” has its ordinary meaning and requires consideration of all the circumstances. To be exceptional, circumstances must be out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon but need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare. Circumstances will not be exceptional if they are regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered. Exceptional circumstances can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional. It is not correct to construe “exceptional circumstances” as being only some unexpected occurrence, although frequently it will be. Nor is it correct to construe the plural “circumstances” as if it were only a singular occurrence, even though it can be a one off situation. The ordinary and natural meaning of “exceptional circumstances includes a combination of factors which, when viewed together, may reasonably be seen as producing a situation which is out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon.
[14]Mere ignorance of the statutory time limit in s.366(1)(a) is not an exceptional circumstance.”
[37] All of the relevant circumstances have been taken into account, for the period after the date of termination, until the lodgement of the Application with the Commission.
[38] The Applicant must provide a credible reason for the delay in filing the Application, in accordance with the approach in Stogiannidis. This reason is considered with the other matters in s.394(3). However the circumstances from the time of dismissal must also be considered and ultimately whether those circumstances are exceptional circumstances. 7
[39] In accordance with s.394(3) the Commission must be satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist, taking into account the following criteria:
s.394(3)(a) - the reason for the delay
[40] The Applicant submitted that the reason for the delay was his diminished ability to consider his options and avenues for recourse, and to file the application, due to his physical and mental health issues he was experiencing as set out. His doctor stated he had been prescribed endone and panadeine forte and he was to be non-weight bearing, and rest for 8 weeks. He had been required to attend medical appointments during the period after dismissal. The medication and situation affected his depression and insomnia. The Applicant agreed he had access to a computer during the period after the dismissal.
[41] The medical evidence and reasons for delay are not commensurate with physical and mental impairment of such a level (even when considered with the other matters regarding the impact of the dismissal which were causing him concern) to impede his capacity to file an Application. The reasons do not provide a credible explanation for the delay, or explain why on the twenty fifth day circumstances altered to allow for the filing of the Application. This weighs against the Applicant being granted a further period to accept the Application.
s.394(3)(b) - whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect
[42] It is not in dispute, that the Applicant first became aware of the dismissal during a face to face meeting on 29 July 2019. This consideration does not provide a basis for a further period being granted.
s.394(3)(c) - any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal
[43] The Applicant had his father as a support person present at the dismissal meeting and he made it known to the Respondent, during the meeting, that the dismissal was disputed. Both men were advised in the meeting, by the Respondent’s officer that an unfair dismissal Application could be lodged with the Fair Work Commission, if they felt the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable. The Applicant was also specifically advised of the 21 day time limit for lodging an unfair dismissal Application with the Commission, and that the Application could be lodged online. These matters were not challenged. The Applicant had a computer and information was not provided as to why the Applicant was able to file on the twenty fifth day. The lack of action taken by the Applicant to dispute the Application, weighs against him.
s.394(3)(d) - prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay)
[44] The length of the delay was four days. No significant prejudice was set out by the Respondent generally, or by virtue of the delay. The Respondent only referred to the impost of the necessity to respond to this jurisdictional objection. Whilst not determinative, the matter of absence of prejudice weighs, albeit slightly, in favour of the exercise of discretion to grant a further period to the Applicant.
s.394(3)(e) - the merits of the application
[45] In the matter of Kornicki v Telstra-Network Technology Group 8 the Commission considered the principles applicable to the exercise of the discretion, to extend time under (the then) s.170CE(8) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth). In that case the Commission said:
“If the application has no merit then it would not be unfair to refuse to extend the time period for lodgement. However we wish to emphasise that a consideration of the merits of the substantive application for relief in the context of an extension of time application does not require a detailed analysis of the substantive merits. It would be sufficient for the applicant to establish that the substantive application was not without merit.” 9
[46] The merits of the current substantive Application were unable to be assessed in detail, on the limited material provided. The dismissal as set out by the Respondent, related to serious misconduct by the Applicant, involving an alleged altercation, destruction of property and trespassing against a co-worker, in his property. However the Applicant stated the events occurred outside of work hours and not on the mine site.
[47] The Respondent alleged that the Applicant (outside of work hours), whilst intoxicated, confronted a co-worker, (his supervisor) at his residence at 1:00am, kicking his door down and physically confronting him. It was submitted that this caused significant disruption to the township area, waking neighbours and distressing other residents. Immediately following this incident (in the broad terms provided), the ‘infuriated’ supervisor went to the Applicant’s house where the further exchange occurred between the parties resulting in the injury to the Applicant and the damage to the supervisor’s car. These matters are only dealt with generally and the Applicant did not refute the allegations, but stated that his conduct was a ‘practical joke’ and that this type of behaviour was not uncommon in the workplace, or this work relationship. He maintained that the employer’s response to his conduct was disproportionate; stating that similar conduct from co-workers had not resulted in their dismissal. Based on the material filed by the parties it is clear there are factual disputes. I am not satisfied, on the limited material filed on the substantive matters that the Application is without merit, but also not satisfied that on the full hearing of the evidence that such may justify the dismissal. Given the need to specifically examine evidence on the merits of the matter, this matter has been considered as neutral, in considering the granting of a further period.
s.394(3)(f) - fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position
[48] It is not clear whether the assessment of this matter requires the consideration of other persons dismissed by the same employer or consideration of the other persons generally who have sought an extension of time on similar grounds. No specific material was provided on employees in a similar positon. However the Applicant argued he intended to bring evidence of comparative differentiation, in terms of the response of dismissal to his circumstances being different to the disciplinary response by the Employer to other employees in similar circumstances. The Respondent noted that the Applicant has previously received a first and final warning for a positive drug test. No weight can be attributed to the merits of this matter without evidence relevant to the merits proceedings. On the material provided, this criteria does not allow for a conclusion, and therefore has been considered neutral.
CONCLUSION
[49] The Applicant conceded that during the dismissal meeting of 29 July 2019 he and his support person were expressly made aware of the 21 day time limit for lodging an Application for unfair dismissal with the Commission. They were additionally informed that such an Application could be lodged online, and that the Commission’s helpline could assist the Applicant with any queries he may have had regarding the lodgement process. The Applicant also conceded, that whilst his depression was relied on as a factor for the delay, he had not advised the Respondent at any point during his employment that he was suffering depression, which was exacerbated during the post-dismissal period.
[50] In consideration of all these factors, and the overall circumstances, whilst the impact of the injury and the dismissal is recognised, in the terms set out by the Applicant I do not consider they satisfy the test of ‘exceptional circumstances’, to provide for the grant of an extension of time.
[51] Accordingly, pursuant to s.394(3) of the Act, the circumstances of the delay, were not circumstances considered to be “exceptional”. The discretion to extend the time limit is, therefore not exercised to grant a further period to accept the Application.
[52] The Application made pursuant to s.394 is, therefore dismissed.
[53] I Order accordingly.
COMMISSIONER
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
<PR714504>
1 [2013] FWC 1417 at [47] and [48].
2 [2012] FWA 3167 at [24].
3 [2013] FWC 3154 at [16].
4 [2018] FWCFB 901.
5 (2010) 197 IR 403.
6 [2011] FWAFB 975.
7 Periklis Stogiannidis v Victorian Frozen Foods Distributors Pty Ltd t/as Richmond Oysters [2018] FWCFB 901 at [22].
8 Print P3168, 22 July 1997 per Ross VP, Watson SDP and Gay C.
9 Garry Mellios v Qantas Airways Limited [2019] FWC 5029 at [48].
0
5
0